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Abstract	  
	  This	   study	   explores	   the	   dynamics	   and	   processes	   surrounding	   the	   formulation	   of	   the	  Egyptian	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class’	   socio-­‐political	   agency	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   context.	   In	   the	  context	  of	  Egypt’s	  two-­‐decade-­‐old	  neoliberal	  transformation,	  the	  state’s	  retreat	  from	  its	  traditional	  post-­‐1952	  role	  of	  providing	  trajectories	  for	  the	  reproduction	  of	  social	  status	  and	   distinction	   created	   new	   formative	   social	   processes	   of	   political	   agency	   for	   the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class.	  The	  de	  facto	  handover	  of	  such	  processes	  to	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  market	  since	  the	  early-­‐1990s	  has	  changed	  the	  modes	  of	  conditioning	  the	  relationship	   between	   the	   upper	  middle	   class	   and	   the	   Egyptian	   state.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	  social	   contract	   sustaining	   the	   upper	  middle	   class’	   traditional	   consent	   to	   the	   Egyptian	  state’s	  successive	  political	  orders	  suffered	  serious	  erosion.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  political	  discontent	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   upper	  middle	   class	   steadily	   grew	   beneath	   a	   thick	   layer	   of	  apathy	  towards	  farcical	  formal	  politics	  under	  Mubarak.	  In	  2011,	  the	  active	  participation	  of	   the	   upper	  middle	   class	   in	   the	   Egyptian	   revolution	   represented	   the	   debut	   onto	   the	  political	   stage	   of	   a	   social	   segment	   previously	   thought	   to	   be	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   crafting	  renewed	  legitimacy	  for	  authoritarian	  rule.	  	  	  The	  study	  uses	  gathered	  narratives	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  dynamics	   of	   the	   upper	  middle	   class’	   negotiation	   of	   status	   preservation	   and	   privilege	  reproduction	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  environment.	  By	  contextualising	  these	  narratives	  within	  structural	   transformations	   in	   the	   areas	   of	   education,	   employment	   and	   lifestyles,	   the	  study	   analyses	   the	   development	   of	   new	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   modes	   of	   socio-­‐political	  critique	  of	   the	   state	  based	  on	   the	   social	   experience.	  Furthermore,	   the	   study	  examines	  the	  effect	  of	  class-­‐typical	  encounters	  with	  the	  state	  in	  the	  social	  space	  as	  a	  medium	  for	  sharpening	   critical	   appraisals	   of	   the	   latter’s	   role,	   informed	   by	   a	   neoliberal	   ethos	  acquired	   during	   the	   various	   stages	   of	   the	   process	   of	   status	   reproduction.	   These	  discursive	   inferences	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   political	   composition	  accumulatively	   informed	   the	  development	  of	  an	  appetite	   for	  political	   change,	  and	  will	  arguably	  continue	  to	  shape	  the	  patterns	  of	  future	  politicisation	  of	  Egypt’s	  upper	  middle	  class.	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  4	  
Acknowledgements	  	  This	  thesis	  is	  the	  product	  of	  several	  years	  of	  passionate	  dedication,	  hard	  work,	  sacrifices	  and	   persistence.	   Its	   successful	   completion	   was	   called	   into	   question	   many	   times	   by	  difficult	   challenges	   to	  my	  morale	  and	  mental	   resilience.	  At	   times,	   even	  my	  health	  and	  physical	  well-­‐being	  were	   tested	   to	   new	  maximums	   I	   had	   never	   experienced	   before.	   I	  would	   have	   never	   been	   able	   to	   finish	   this	   research	   and	  my	   PhD	   degree	   without	   the	  generous	  support	  I	  received	  from	  my	  family	  and	  many	  colleagues	  and	  friends.	  They	  all	  share	  the	  credit,	  whereas	  any	  flaws	  in	  this	  thesis	  are	  solely	  my	  responsibility.	  	  	  In	  particular,	   I	  would	   like	   to	   thank	  my	  supervisor	  and	  academic	  mentor	  Prof.	  Charles	  Tripp	   of	   SOAS.	   Charles	   is	   indeed	   an	   authority	   in	   the	   field	   of	  Middle	   East	   Politics	   and	  Society.	  His	  deep	  understanding	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  region	  is	  matched	  by	  few	  on	  the	  contemporary	   academic	   circuit.	   I	   consider	   myself	   extremely	   lucky	   to	   have	   had	   the	  chance	  to	  work	  with	  him.	  Throughout	  the	  different	  phases	  of	  the	  research	  his	  guidance	  and	   encouragement	   were	   strong	   driving	   forces	   towards	   success.	   His	   patience,	  knowledge	  and	  engagement	  during	  our	  lengthy	  exchanges	  were	  essential	  to	  refining	  the	  ideas	   and	  developing	   the	   arguments	   of	   this	   thesis.	   I	  will	   always	   remember	   our	  many	  meetings	  in	  his	  office	  in	  London	  and	  the	  lengthy	  discussions	  over	  the	  phone	  when	  I	  was	  in	  Cairo	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  period	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  intellectually	  fulfilling	  parts	  of	  my	   doctoral	   study.	   Words	   cannot	   describe	   my	   gratitude	   to	   the	   steadfast	   and	  unwavering	  support	  he	  has	  given	  me	  throughout,	  even	  at	  times	  when	  this	  project	  was	  facing	  what	  seemed	  to	  be	  insurmountable	  complications.	  	  I	  am	  also	  indebted	  to	  Prof.	  Salwa	  Ismail	  of	  SOAS.	  Salwa's	  advice	  and	  insights	  during	  the	  initial	   phase	   of	   the	   study	   were	   illuminating	   in	   several	   areas	   which	   I	   had	   set	   out	   to	  research.	  Her	  scholarly	  works	  have	  had	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  shaping	  the	  structure	  and	  design	  of	  my	   research.	  Later	  on,	   in	   the	   spring	  of	  2011,	  we	  met	   several	   times	   in	  Cairo	  amidst	   a	   unique	   and	   unforgettable	   atmosphere	   of	   hope	   and	   aspiration	   following	   the	  downfall	   of	   Mubarak.	   Besides	   the	   coffees	   and	   discussions	   I	   enjoyed	   with	   her,	   my	  gratitude	   goes	   out	   to	   her	   for	   standing	   up	   for	   me	   considerably	   in	   the	   face	   of	   several	  administrative	   nuances	   created	   by	   the	   somewhat	   bumpy	   progression	   of	   my	   degree.	  From	   the	   SOAS	   family,	   Dr.	   Laleh	  Khalili's	   encouragement	   and	   belief	   at	   various	   stages	  were	  always	  uplifting,	  as	  were	  her	  substantive	  observations	  on	  my	  work.	  	  I	   am	   very	   grateful	   to	   both	  Dr.	   Jeroen	  Gunning	   of	  Durham	  University	   and	  Dr.	   Roberto	  Roccu	  of	  King's	  College	  London	  for	  the	  enjoyably	  vigorous	  and	  intense	  discussion	  that	  was	  my	  VIVA	  examination.	  Their	  thorough	  engagement	  with	  the	  thesis	  as	  well	  as	  their	  positive	   and	   reassuring	   approach	  during	   the	   three-­‐hour	   long	   examination,	   turned	  my	  initial	  nervousness	   into	  confidence	  and	  gave	  me	  a	  special	  opportunity	   to	  passionately	  present	   and	   discuss	   the	   fruits	   of	   six	   years	   of	   hard	   work.	   The	   corrections	   they	   have	  proposed	   to	   the	   text	   were	   all	   well	   placed	   to	   solidify	   the	   conceptual	   framework	   and	  express	   some	  parts	  of	   the	  argument	  more	  clearly,	   all	   to	   the	  welcome	  effect	  of	   further	  enhancing	  the	  academic	  quality	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  My	   doctoral	   study	  would	   not	   have	   been	   possible	  without	   the	   generous	   scholarship	   I	  have	  received	  from	  Egypt's	  Citadel	  Scholarship	  Foundation.	  I	  will	  always	  be	  proud	  to	  be	  an	  Ahmed	  Heikal	  Scholar,	  and	  to	  have	  been	  –along	  with	  my	  wife-­‐	  amongst	  the	  first	  group	  
	  	  5	  
of	   Egyptian	   post	   graduate	   and	   research	   students	   to	   be	   awarded	   this	   scholarship	   in	  2007.	   I	   am	   especially	   thankful	   to	   the	   foundation's	   dynamic	   manager,	   Yasmine	   El	  Dorghamy,	  for	  her	  help,	  support	  and	  understanding	  throughout	  my	  degree.	  	  I	  am	  deeply	  indebted	  to	  my	  mother	  institution,	  the	  Egyptian	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  for	  allowing	  me	  to	  take	  several	  years	  off	  my	  diplomatic	  career	  to	  continue	  my	  academic	  studies,	  both	  on	  the	  post-­‐graduate	  and	  research	  levels.	  During	  several	  critical	  phases	  of	  my	  doctoral	  study,	  I	  was	  blessed	  with	  the	  understanding	  and	  support	  of	  several	  senior	  colleagues	   who	   helped	   me	   negotiate	   the	   sometimes	   seemingly	   impossible	   burden	   of	  upholding	  my	  professional	  duties	  while	  writing	  a	  doctoral	  dissertation	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  In	   the	   fall	  of	  2010,	  and	  early	  2011,	   indeed	  one	  of	   the	  most	   challenging	  periods	  of	  my	  study,	   Ambassador	   Tarek	   El-­‐Kouni's	   support	   and	   understanding	   was	   indispensible.	  Towards	   the	   end	   of	   2013,	   during	   the	   very	   last	   stage	   of	   preparing	   the	   thesis	   for	  submission,	   the	   belief	   and	   encouragement	   of	   Ambassador	   Ashraf	   El-­‐Kholy	   was	  empowering	  and	  critical	   to	  my	  success.	  As	  for	  the	  help	  and	  support	  I	  have	  generously	  received	  from	  my	  dear	  friend	  and	  senior	  colleague	  at	  the	  Egyptian	  Embassy	  in	  London,	  Khaled	  Azmi,	  words	   fall	   short	   of	   describing	  my	   appreciation	   and	   gratitude.	   I	   am	   also	  thankful	  for	  support	  I	  have	  received	  from	  my	  dear	  friend	  and	  colleague	  Ahmed	  Fahmy.	  His	  substantive	  observations	  and	  moral	  encouragement	  have	  always	  given	  me	  renewed	  belief	  in	  the	  value	  of	  my	  work.	  	  This	  thesis	  draws	  on	  narratives	  of	  many	  Egyptian	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  men	  and	  women.	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  all	  those	  who	  allowed	  me	  into	  their	  homes,	  took	  the	  time	  to	  meet	  and	  talk	  to	  me	  about	  many	  aspects	  of	  their	   lives,	  shared	  their	  experiences,	  or	  passionately	  told	   of	   their	   struggles	   and	   aspirations.	   They	   did	   so	   in	   return	   for	   little	  more	   than	   the	  prospect	  of	  a	  generous	  contribution	  to	  satisfying	  my	  academic	  curiosity,	  and	  it	  is	  out	  of	  their	  narratives	  that	  this	  research	  derives	  any	  possible	  value.	  	  I	  am	  also	  grateful	  for	  the	  inspiration	  I	  derived	  from	  friends	  and	  comrades	  with	  whom	  I	  had	   the	   honour	   of	   marching	   during	   the	   25th	   of	   January	   revolution.	   No	   matter	   how	  disappointingly	  the	  complexities	  of	  politics	  played	  out	  afterwards,	  and	  no	  matter	  what	  historians	  will	  write,	   the	   streets	   of	   Cairo	  will	   always	   remember	  our	  daring	   spirit,	   the	  dream	  that	  we	  came	  very	  close	   to	   realize,	  and	   the	  blood	  some	  of	  us	  spilt	   for	   freedom	  and	  dignity	  for	  our	  people	  during	  these	  most	  glorious	  of	  days	  in	  2011.	  	  	  My	  utmost	  gratitude,	  however,	  is	  reserved	  for	  my	  dear	  family.	  I	  am	  endlessly	  thankful	  to	  my	   father,	  M.S.	   Shaalan,	  who	  was	  my	   first	   intellectual	  mentor	   and	   remains	   a	   guiding	  light	   of	   wisdom	   in	   my	   life.	   No	   written	   words	   would	   ever	   be	   able	   to	   describe	   my	  indebtedness	  to	  Safa’a,	  my	  mother,	  her	  amazing	  strength,	  her	  readiness	  to	  sacrifice	  for	  me	   and	   the	   flowing	   river	   of	   her	   infinitely	   giving	   love.	   For	  more	   than	   ten	   years	   now,	  between	  Cairo	  and	  London,	  my	  mother	  and	  father	  in	  law,	  Atef	  Nasr	  and	  Nahed	  El-­‐Tawila	  have	  never	  ceased	  to	  be	  a	  continuous	  source	  of	  warmth,	  love	  and	  support.	  	  Finally,	  this	  thesis	  and	  doctoral	  degree	  is	  dedicated	  to	  the	  three	  most	  special	  people	  in	  my	  life.	  Rania	  Atef,	  my	  beloved	  wife,	  is	  the	  inspiration	  that	  lights	  my	  ways.	  Finishing	  this	  degree	  would	   have	   been	   simply	   impossible	   if	   it	  was	   not	   for	   her	   belief	   in	  me,	   for	   her	  sacrifices	   and	   her	   never-­‐ending	   support	   through	   thick	   and	   thin.	   She	   has	   generously	  favored	  my	   intellectual	  ambitions	  over	  other,	   less	  cumbersome,	   routes	  we	  could	  have	  taken	   together.	   She	   is	   the	   love	  of	  my	   life,	   and	   I	   am	   indeed	  blessed	   to	  have	  her	   as	  my	  
	  	  6	  
partner.	  I	  also	  dedicate	  this	  work	  to	  Nazly	  and	  Ismail	  Shaalan,	  my	  two	  children	  and	  the	  very	   sunshine	   in	   my	   life.	   I	   pray	   that	   they	   will	   grow	   up	   to	   find	   an	   Egypt	   which	   my	  generation	  could	  unfortunately	  only	  ever	  dream	  of.	  	  
	  	  7	  
Table	  of	  Contents	  
	  
Abstract	  .............................................................................................................................................	  3	  
Acknowledgements	  .......................................................................................................................	  4	  
Table	  of	  Figures	  ............................................................................................................................	  10	  
Note	  on	  Transliteration	  .............................................................................................................	  11	  
Introduction	  ...................................................................................................................................	  12	  
1.	  Research	  ‘Problem’	  ..........................................................................................................................	  12	  
2.	  18	  Days	  in	  2011	  ................................................................................................................................	  19	  
3.	  Research	  Question	  and	  Main	  Argument	  ..........................................................................................	  21	  
4.	  Thesis	  Structure	  and	  Chapter	  Outline	  ..............................................................................................	  25	  
Chapter	  One:	  Conceptual	  Framework	  and	  Methodology	  ...............................................	  27	  
1.	  Introduction	  .....................................................................................................................................	  27	  
2.	  Class	  and	  The	  State	  ..........................................................................................................................	  29	  
2.1	  Class	  and	  Status:	  From	  Marx	  to	  Weber	  .....................................................................................	  29	  
2.2	  Bourdieu	  and	  Classes:	  The	  Multidimensional	  Social	  Field	  .........................................................	  38	  
2.3	  The	  State	  as	  a	  Concept:	  Marx,	  Weber	  and	  Beyond	  ...................................................................	  43	  
2.4	  Beyond	  Weber’s	  Conceptualisation	  of	  the	  State?	  .....................................................................	  49	  
3.	  The	  State,	  Classes	  and	  Neoliberal	  Politics	  in	  the	  Arab	  Context	  .......................................................	  54	  
3.1	  State	  and	  Class	  in	  the	  Arab	  World	  .............................................................................................	  54	  
3.2	  Neoliberalism	  and	  the	  Changing	  Foundations	  of	  Political	  Agency	  ............................................	  62	  
3.3	  The	  Centrality	  of	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  Status	  Reproduction	  ......................................................	  66	  
4.	  Methodological	  Approach	  and	  Fieldwork	  ........................................................................................	  71	  
4.1	  Reproducing	  Middle	  Class	  Status:	  Structure,	  Agency	  and	  Habitus	  ............................................	  71	  
4.2	  Fieldwork	  ...................................................................................................................................	  77	  
Chapter	  Two:	  In	  the	  Shadow	  of	  the	  State,	  Egypt’s	  Middle	  Class	  from	  Mohamed	  Ali	  
to	  Mubarak	  .....................................................................................................................................	  81	  
1.	  Introduction	  .....................................................................................................................................	  81	  
2.	  The	  Middle	  Class	  in	  Modern	  Egypt:	  	  Origins	  ....................................................................................	  82	  
2.1	  From	  Mohamed	  Ali	  to	  the	  Early	  Twentieth	  Century:	  The	  Formation	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  Middle	  
Class	  ................................................................................................................................................	  82	  
2.2	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Landownership	  and	  the	  Birth	  of	  Egypt’s	  Landed	  Bourgeoisie	  .........................	  88	  
2.3	  Egypt’s	  Belle	  Époque	  Middle	  Class:	  Land	  and	  Bureaucratic	  Dominance	  ...................................	  94	  
2.4	  The	  ‘New’	  Middle	  Class:	  The	  Rise	  of	  the	  Effendiyya	  ..................................................................	  98	  
3.	  Egypt’s	  ‘New	  Middle	  Class’	  in	  the	  Early	  Twentieth	  Century:	  Identity,	  Modernity	  and	  Political	  
Agency	  .................................................................................................................................................	  99	  
3.1	  Identity	  and	  Modernity	  ............................................................................................................	  100	  
3.2	  The	  Middle	  Class	  and	  Political	  Power	  Contestation	  Prior	  to	  1952	  ...........................................	  105	  
4.	  Social	  Change	  and	  Modernisation	  Under	  Nasser:	  The	  Rise	  of	  the	  Technocratic	  Middle	  Class	  ......	  107	  
4.1	  Land	  Redistribution	  and	  Social	  Change	  in	  the	  Countryside:	  Empowering	  the	  Rural	  Middle	  Class
	  .......................................................................................................................................................	  109	  
4.2	  The	  Nationalisations	  of	  1961:	  Rise	  of	  the	  Technocratic/Bureaucratic	  Middle	  Class	  ...............	  111	  
5.	  Disengagement:	  The	  Middle	  Class	  in	  the	  Sadat	  Years	  ...................................................................	  117	  
6.	  Egypt’s	  Middle	  Class	  Under	  Mubarak:	  Those	  Who	  Made	  It	  and	  Those	  Who	  Didn’t	  .....................	  123	  
6.1	  Survival:	  The	  Neoliberal	  Transformation	  Under	  Mubarak	  .......................................................	  123	  
6.2	  Middle	  Class	  Splits	  in	  the	  Neoliberal	  Context	  ..........................................................................	  128	  
	  	  8	  
6.3	  Political	  Calculations:	  Juggling	  Middle-­‐Class	  Segments	  ..........................................................	  131	  
7.	  Conclusion	  .....................................................................................................................................	  135	  
Chapter	  Three:	  Preparing	  for	  Distinction:	  Education	  and	  Social	  Status	  
Preservation	  in	  the	  Neoliberal	  Era	  .....................................................................................	  137	  
1.	  Introduction	  ...................................................................................................................................	  137	  
2.	  Rise	  and	  Fall:	  Public	  Education	  from	  Nasser	  to	  Mubarak	  ..............................................................	  141	  
3.	  The	  ‘Marketisation’	  of	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  Education	  ..................................................................	  151	  
3.1	  	  Marketing	  Distinction:	  ‘International’	  and	  ‘Semi-­‐International’	  Schools	  ...............................	  151	  
3.2	  Shopping	  for	  Education:	  School	  Fairs	  ......................................................................................	  157	  
4.	  The	  Case	  of	  Aliaa	  Abulnaga:	  Agency,	  Structure	  and	  Status	  Reproduction	  in	  the	  Neoliberal	  
Education	  Market	  ..............................................................................................................................	  161	  
4.1	  Producing	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  Status	  in	  Changing	  Times	  .......................................................	  162	  
4.2	  Passing	  the	  Torch:	  Schooling	  as	  an	  Essential	  Route	  to	  Status	  Re-­‐Production	  .........................	  166	  
4.3	  Window-­‐Shopping	  for	  Schools:	  Negotiating	  the	  Private-­‐School	  Market	  .................................	  168	  
5.	  Conclusion	  .....................................................................................................................................	  175	  
Chapter	  Four:	  The	  ‘Right’	  Job:	  Employment,	  Careers	  and	  the	  Preservation	  of	  Social	  
Status	  .............................................................................................................................................	  178	  
1.	  Introduction	  ...................................................................................................................................	  178	  
2.	  The	  Social	  Meaning	  of	  Employment	  ..............................................................................................	  181	  
2.1	  The	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  ‘Employment	  Domain’:	  ‘Clean’	  Jobs	  for	  ‘Clean’	  People	  ....................	  181	  
2.2	  From	  Bureaucrats	  to	  Private	  Sector	  Executives:	  The	  Changing	  Image	  of	  Employment	  ...........	  185	  
2.3	  Egypt’s	  Neoliberal	  Shift:	  The	  Birth	  of	  a	  New	  Breed	  of	  Employment	  ........................................	  190	  
3.	  Social	  Status	  Reproduction	  in	  the	  Neoliberal	  Employment	  Market	  ..............................................	  199	  
3.1	  Job	  Recruitment	  Mechanisms	  as	  De	  Facto	  Social	  Filters	  .........................................................	  199	  
3.2	  Securing	  Status	  Reproduction	  Through	  Career	  Advancement	  in	  a	  Transforming	  Banking	  Sector
	  .......................................................................................................................................................	  207	  
3.3	  The	  ‘Parallel	  Universe’:	  Extending	  the	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  Employment	  Domain	  Within	  the	  
State	  Bureaucracy	  .........................................................................................................................	  217	  
4.	  Conclusion	  .....................................................................................................................................	  221	  
Chapter	  Five:	  Living	  Your	  Class	  Identity:	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  Lifestyles	  in	  the	  
Neoliberal	  Era	  ............................................................................................................................	  225	  
1.	  Introduction	  ...................................................................................................................................	  225	  
2.	  Cairo:	  A	  Changing	  Habitat	  of	  the	  Upper	  Middle	  Class	  ...................................................................	  232	  
2.1	  The	  Extent	  of	  ‘Cairo’	  ................................................................................................................	  232	  
2.2	  Growing	  Frustration:	  A	  City	  out	  of	  Control	  ..............................................................................	  235	  
2.3	  Exodus:	  Immigration	  to	  the	  Gated	  Compounds	  .......................................................................	  243	  
3.	  Creating	  an	  Image	  of	  a	  New	  Cairo	  .................................................................................................	  245	  
3.1	  Desert	  Urban	  Expansion	  in	  Popular	  Culture	  ............................................................................	  245	  
3.2	  The	  Promised	  Land	  on	  Display	  .................................................................................................	  249	  
4.	  Handing	  Over	  to	  The	  Market:	  The	  State	  and	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  Housing	  in	  the	  Liberalisation	  Era
	  ...........................................................................................................................................................	  256	  
4.1	  Advent	  of	  the	  ‘New	  Towns’	  ......................................................................................................	  258	  
4.2	  Marketisation	  in	  Full	  Swing:	  Neoliberalising	  Urban	  Expansion	  ...............................................	  263	  
5.	  Commercialising	  Governance	  in	  Gated	  Compounds	  .....................................................................	  267	  
5.1	  Realities	  of	  the	  ‘Promised	  Land’	  ..............................................................................................	  268	  
5.2	  When	  Commercial	  Governance	  Fails	  .......................................................................................	  272	  
6.	  Conclusion	  .....................................................................................................................................	  276	  
Chapter	  Six:	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  Experiences	  of	  the	  State	  .........................................	  280	  
1.	  Introduction	  ...................................................................................................................................	  280	  
	  	  9	  
1.1	  The	  Social	  Experience	  of	  the	  State	  ...........................................................................................	  281	  
1.2	  The	  Image	  of	  the	  State	  and	  the	  Nature	  of	  Politics	  ...................................................................	  285	  
2.	  Experiencing	  the	  State:	  Neoliberal	  Criteria,	  Political	  Conclusions	  .................................................	  291	  
3.	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  Military	  Service:	  The	  Army	  as	  a	  Miniature	  of	  the	  State	  ................................	  298	  
3.1	  The	  Case	  of	  Tarek	  Hamdy:	  Military	  Service	  as	  a	  Socio-­‐Politically	  Defining	  Experience	  ...........	  302	  
3.1.1	  Social	  Differences	  in	  the	  Army:	  Confirming	  Social	  Distinction	  ..............................................	  303	  
3.1.2	  Petty	  Corruption:	  Clashing	  Values	  in	  the	  Barracks	  ...............................................................	  305	  
3.1.3	  Lessons	  from	  Military	  Service:	  Social	  Position	  and	  the	  Nature	  of	  the	  State	  .........................	  307	  
4.	  	  The	  Upper	  Middle	  Class	  and	  the	  ‘Law’	  .........................................................................................	  309	  
4.1	  ‘Good	  Citizens’:	  The	  Need	  for	  the	  ‘Law’	  ...................................................................................	  311	  
4.2	  Where	  Is	  the	  Law?	  The	  State’s	  Despotic	  Myth	  vs.	  Its	  Infrastructural	  Capacity	  ........................	  314	  
4.3	  The	  Case	  of	  Ahmed	  El	  Husseiny:	  Going	  to	  Court	  ......................................................................	  320	  
4.4	  Impossible	  Justice:	  Experiencing	  the	  Court	  ..............................................................................	  322	  
5.	  Working	  for	  the	  State:	  The	  State	  as	  a	  Producer	  of	  ‘Value’	  ............................................................	  327	  
6.	  Conclusion	  .....................................................................................................................................	  333	  
Conclusion	  and	  Findings	  .........................................................................................................	  336	  
1.	  Unexpected	  Upheaval	  ...................................................................................................................	  336	  
2.	  The	  New	  Dynamics	  Informing	  Political	  Agency	  .............................................................................	  340	  
2.1	  Concepts	  and	  Methodology	  .....................................................................................................	  340	  
2.2	  Reproducing,	  Preserving	  and	  Displaying	  Distinction	  ...............................................................	  341	  
2.2.1	  Education	  ..............................................................................................................................	  341	  
2.2.2	  Employment	  .........................................................................................................................	  342	  
2.2.3	  Lifestyles	  and	  the	  Display	  of	  Distinction	  ...............................................................................	  344	  
2.3	  The	  Upper	  Middle	  Class,	  the	  State	  and	  Future	  Politics	  ............................................................	  346	  
	  
Appendix	  One	  ....................................................................................................................................	  350	  
Appendix	  Two	  ....................................................................................................................................	  354	  
Bibliography	  .......................................................................................................................................	  362	  	  	   	  
	  	  10	  
	   Table	  of	  Figures	  	  
Figure	  1	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .159	  	  
Figure	  2	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .189	  
Figure	  3	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .195	  	  
Figure	  4	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .196	  
Figure	  5	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .251	  	  
Figure	  6	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .253	  	  
Figure	  7	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .264	  	  
Figure	  8.	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  .	  290	  
	  
	  
	  	   11	  
Note	  on	  Transliteration	  
	  Generally,	  Arabic	  transliteration	  throughout	  the	  thesis	  is	  based	  on	  a	  simple	  version	  of	  the	  International	  Journal	  of	  Middle	  East	  Studies’	  transliteration	  guide.	  However,	  exceptions	  have	  been	  made	  for	  the	  names	  of	  historical	  figures,	  and	  some	  well-­‐known	  locations.	  These	  have	  been	  provided	  according	  to	  widely	  accepted	  English	  spellings	  (e.g.	  Nasser	  instead	  of	  Nassir;	  or	  Maadi	  instead	  of	  Ma‘ady).	  In	  addition,	  Arabic	  names	  of	  interviewees	  and	  authors	  appear	  according	  to	  their	  own	  chosen	  English	  spellings,	  or	  as	  in	  their	  public	  profiles,	  respectively.
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Introduction	  
1.	  Research	  ‘Problem’	  At	   noon	   on	   25	   January	   2011,	   almost	   four	  months	   into	   the	   fourth	   year	   of	   this	  research,	  I	  sat	  at	  a	  desk	  in	  my	  flat	  in	  the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  district	  of	  Mohandessin	   in	  Cairo,	  reviewing	  materials	  I	  had	  gathered	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  for	  this	  study.	  As	  I	  went	  through	  interviews	  conducted	  with	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians,	  secondary	  literature	  and	  other	  types	  of	  evidence,	  it	  seemed	  to	  me	  that	  my	  research	  faced	  a	  conundrum.	  This	   was	   research	   exploring	   the	   dynamics	   and	   processes	   surrounding	   the	  formulation	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class’	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  context.	  The	  primary	  hypothesis	  that	  I	  had	  set	  out	  to	  test	  was:	  The	  state’s	  retreat	  from	  its	   traditional	   role	   as	   facilitator	   and	   guard	   of	   the	   reproduction	   of	   social	   status	   and	  distinction	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Egypt’s	   neoliberal	   transformation	   would	   create	   new	  formative	  social	  processes	  of	  political	  agency	  for	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class.	  The	  state-­‐engineered	  de	  facto	  handover	  of	  such	  processes	  to	  the	  neoliberal	  market	  since	  the	  early-­‐1990s	   had	   fundamentally	   changed	   the	   modes	   of	   conditioning	   the	   relationship	  between	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  and	  the	  Egyptian	  state.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  social	  contract	  sustaining	  the	  upper	  middle	  class’	  political	  consent	  to	  successive	  political	  orders	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  state	  had	  suffered	  serious	  erosion.	  This	  erosion	  would,	  in	  turn,	  open	  the	  door	  to	  different	  scenarios	  of	  potential	  political	  change.	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  question	  of	  possible	  political	  ramifications	  following	  the	  adoption	  of	  neoliberal	  reforms	  by	  crisis-­‐laden,	  post-­‐populist	  Arab	  states	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  novelty.	  Since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  a	  considerable	  body	  of	  scholarship	  has	  been	  produced	  about	  the	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subject.1	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  some	  advocates	  of	  the	  democratisation	  paradigm	  expected	  –perhaps	   too	   conclusively	   –	   the	   adoption	   of	   liberalisation	   policies	   to	   kick-­‐start	   a	  transformation	   to	   democratisation	   and	   the	   demise	   of	   inherently	   unsustainable	  authoritarianism	   in	   the	   Arab	  World.	  Much	   of	   this	   logic	   has	   been	   embedded	  within	   a	  wider	  view	  to	  a	  growing	  global	  democratisation	  prospect	  after	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  Soviet	   Union.	   For	   example,	   in	   his	   prediction	   of	   an	   upcoming	   ‘third	   wave’	   of	  democratisation,	   Samuel	   Huntington	   anticipated	   that	   the	   growing	   influence	   of	  international	  financial	  organisations	  in	  providing	  assistance	  to	  economically	  liberalising	  third-­‐world	   countries	   in	   the	   1990s	   would	   yield	   considerable	   leverage	   to	   encourage	  democratisation	  in	  various	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  Regarding	  the	  Arab	  world,	  Huntington’s	  optimism	  went	  so	  far	  that	  he	  proposed	  that,	  in	  such	  a	  context,	  ‘a	  new	  Jeffersonian-­‐style	  Nasser	   could	   spread	   a	   democratic	   version	   of	   Pan-­‐Arabism	   in	   the	   Middle	   East’.2	  	   In	  addition,	  he	  suggested	  that	  the	  American	  deployment	  of	  around	  half	  a	  million	  soldiers	  during	  the	  Gulf	  War	  in	  1990-­‐1991	  could,	  if	  sustained	  long	  enough,	  provide	  an	  external	  impetus	  for	  liberalisation	  –	  if	  not	  immediate	  democratisation	  –	  in	  the	  Gulf	  monarchies.3	  Other	  than	  Huntington’s	  optimism,	  much	  of	   the	  democratisation	   literature	  maintained	  that	   liberalisation	  policies	   and	   economic	   reform	   in	   the	  1990s	  would	   effectively	   set	   in	  motion	  a	  process	  of	  transformation	  in	  which	  emerging	  and	  empowered	  middle	  classes	  would	  act	  as	  catalysts	  for	  democratisation.4	  But	  apart	  from	  the	  proponents	  of	  the	  somewhat	  too-­‐generalist	  democratisation	  paradigm,	  another	  debate	  seemed	  to	  be	  approaching	  democratisation	  prospects	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As will be discussed in more detail in chapter one, academic and scholarly interest surrounding the adoption of 
liberalisation policies in Egypt can be traced back even earlier, to the initial inception of the infitah (open-door) 
policies under Sadat in the aftermath of the October 1973 war. 
2 Samuel P Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (1991): 17. 
3 Ibid., 15. 
4 Francesco Cavatorta, "The Convergence of Governance: Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World and 
Downgrading Democracy Elswhere?," Middle East Critique 19, no. 3 (2010): 218-19. 
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Arab	  World	  in	  more	  analytical	  depth,	  facilitated	  by	  lengthy	  scholarly	  engagement	  with	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  region’s	  socio-­‐political	  evolution.	  Much	  of	  this	  debate	  revolved	  around	   the	  notion	  of	   ‘Arab	   exceptionalism’.5	  This	   term	   refers	   to	   the	  broad	   suggestion	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  democratisation	  in	  the	  region	  could	  be	  attributed	  principally	  to	  inherent	  anti-­‐democratic	   features	  of	   its	  socio-­‐structural	   fabric.	  These	   included	  religion,	  culture,	  specific	   paths	   of	   socio-­‐historical	   evolution,	   and	   the	   many	   intractable	   conflicts	  facilitating	   militarisation	   and	   providing	   the	   normative	   foundations	   for	   solidifying	  authoritarianism	  by	  Arab	  states.6	  Writing	   in	   1994,	   Ghassan	   Salame	   recognised	   that,	   while	   the	   limits	   to	  experimentations	   with	   Western-­‐inspired	   democracy	   were	   increasingly	   apparent	   in	  newly	  democratising	  countries	  of	  the	  former	  Soviet	  bloc,	  ‘the	  Islamic	  region	  in	  general	  and	   the	   Arab	   world	   in	   particular	   has	   not,	   it	   seems,	   even	   had	   the	   opportunity	   to	  experience	   this	   process’.7	  Although,	   along	   with	   a	   number	   of	   seasoned	   Middle	   East	  scholars,	  Salame	  appeared	  to	  be	  critically	  appraising	  the	  notion	  of	  Arab	  ‘exceptionalism’	  (which	  was	   re-­‐emerging	   at	   the	  hands	  of	   ‘western	  proponents	  of	  universal	  democracy	  and	   established	   orientalists’8),	   Salame	   et.	   al9	  argued	   more	   broadly	   that,	   while	   at	   the	  time	   Arab	   states	  were	   opening	   the	   door	   for	   some	   forms	   of	   political	   participation,	   no	  ‘compelling	   unifying	   factors	   triggering	   a	   unilateral	   political	   evolution	   towards	  democracy’10	  were	  in	  sight.	  Posing	  serious	  questions	  regarding	  the	  real	  whereabouts	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 One of the main studies of the late 1980s into the democratic politics of developing countries explicitly 
excluded the consideration of most of the Middle East from its scope. It noted that ‘the Islamic countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa lack much previous democratic experience, and most appear to have little 
prospect of transition to even semi-democracy’.  See: Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, 
eds., Democracy in Developing Countries, Volume Two: Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1988), xix. 
6 Ghassan Salame, "Introduction: Where Are the Democrats?," in Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal 
of Politics in the Muslim World, ed. Ghassan Salame (London: I.B.Tauris, 2001), 2. 
7 Ibid., 1. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Ghassan Salame (ed.), Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World. 
10 Ghassan Salame, “Introduction: Where Are the Democrats?”, 2. 
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Arab	   polities	   in	   the	   evolutionary	   course	   that	   leads	   to	   the	   conscious	   adoption	   of	   the	  underpinning	   logic	   and	   spirit	   of	   representative	   democracy,	   John	   Waterbury,	   for	  example,	   argued	  outright	   that	   the	   claims	  of	   extraordinary	  Arab	   resistance	   to	   political	  liberalisation,	   respect	   for	  human	  rights,	   and	   formal	  democratic	  practices	  were	  by	  and	  large	  valid.11	  On	   a	   more	   optimistic	   side	   of	   the	   debate	   concerning	   the	   prospects	   of	  democratisation	  and	  political	   liberalisation	   in	   the	  Arab	  World,	  another	  set	  of	  analyses	  brought	  together	  in	  a	  research	  project	  led	  by	  Brynen,	  Korany	  and	  Noble12	  advanced	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  outlook	  for	  political	  liberalisation	  in	  Arab	  countries	  was	  not	  without	  hope.	  This	  study	  considered	  the	  adoption	  of	  economic	  liberalisation	  policies	  in	  various	  Arab	   countries	   to	  be	   a	   framework	  within	  which	   an	   eventual	   transition	   towards	  more	  representative	  and	  democratic	  forms	  of	  rule	  could	  take	  place	  over	  the	  following	  years.13	  In	   this	   context,	   a	   noticeable	   emphasis	   was	   placed	   on	   the	   role	   of	   liberalising	   and	  modernising	  Arab	  middle	   classes	  and	   intelligentsia	   in	   shaping	   the	  admittedly	  difficult	  transformation	  away	  from	  entrenched	  authoritarianism.	  Gabriel	  Ben-­‐Dor,	  for	  example,	  offered	   a	   typical	   articulation	   of	   this	   proposition	   by	   arguing	   that	   in	   the	   economic	  liberalisation	   and	   globalisation	   context,	   ‘the	   changing	   international	   environment	   and	  the	  disappearance	   of	   old	   ideological	   forces	   has	   created	   a	   positive	  momentum	   toward	  experiments	  with	  democracy	  in	  Arab	  countries’,	  and	  that	  while	  these	  transformational	  processes	  in	  the	  Arab	  World	  did	  not	  ‘necessarily	  satisfy	  all	  the	  criteria	  of	  the	  formalities	  of	  constitutional	  democracy,	  they	  [did]	  involve	  opening	  up	  the	  political	  system	  for	  freer	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 John Waterbury, "Democracy without Democrats?: The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle 
East," in Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, ed. Ghassan Salame 
(London: I.B.Tauris, 2001). 
12 See: Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble, eds. Political Liberalization & Democratization in the 
Arab World: Voume 1, Theoretical Perspectives (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995); Rex 
Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble, eds. Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World, 
Volume 2, Comparative Perspectives  (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). 
13 Brynen, Korany and Noble (eds.), Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 2, 
Comparative Perspectives, 4. 
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elections	  and	  greater	  participation	  and	  communications	  by	  more	  diverse	  political	  forces	  in	  society’.14	  	  	  	  Roughly	   two	   decades	   into	   the	   Arab	   experience	   with	   economic	   neoliberalism,	  however,	   another	   more	   critical	   stream	   advanced	   the	   argument	   that	   economic	  liberalisation	  in	  the	  Arab	  World	  was,	   in	  fact,	  having	  the	  opposite	  effect.	  This	  literature	  thus	   advocated	   a	   research	   agenda	   that	   would	   examine	   the	   causes	   of	   Arab	  authoritarianism’s	   persistence.	   Neoliberal	   policies	   benefiting	   new	   and	   widening	  segments	  of	  hopeful	  middle	   classes,	   it	  was	  argued,	  have	   facilitated	  an	  ever-­‐increasing	  degree	   of	   political	   repression.	  By	   intricately	  weaving	   the	  welfare	   aspirations	   of	   those	  segments	   with	   the	   interests	   of	   courted	   networks	   of	   crony	   capitalism,	   new	  constituencies	   supporting	   authoritarian	   regimes	   had	   been	   arguably	   created	   –	   hence	  upgrading	   and	   solidifying	   the	   authoritarian	   capacities	   of	   Arab	   regimes,	   rather	   than	  curbing	  them.15	  An	  earlier	  promise,	   that	  a	  growing	  and	  more	  emboldened	  civil	  society	  would	   force	   the	   Arab	   state	   to	   retreat	   from	   its	   despotism16	  in	   the	   neoliberal	   context,	  proved	  wishful	  thinking	  at	  best.	  Surely	  civil	  society,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  forms	  of	  opposition,	  had	   considerably	   evolved	   in	   the	   Arab	   World	   and	   in	   Egypt	   throughout	   the	   1990s,	  assuming	   a	   leading	   role	   in	   articulating	   dissent	   and	   resistance	   to	   entrenched	  authoritarian	  rule.	  However,	  there	  was	  little	  sign	  that	  civil	  society	  activists	  threatened	  the	   ever-­‐tighter	   grip	   of	   the	   state’s	   security	   apparatus	   on	   the	   political	   field.17	  Their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  Gabriel Ben-Dor, “Prospects of Democratization in the Arab World: Global Diffusion, Regional 
Demonstration and Domestic Imperatives” in Brynen, Korany and Noble, eds. Political Liberalization and 
Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 1, Theoretical Perspectives, 325-326. 
15 Most notably: Steven Heydemann, Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World (Saban Center for Middle 
East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 2007); Lisa Anderson, "Searching Where the Light Shines: Studying 
Democratization in the Middle East," Annual Review of Political Science 9 (2006). 
16 Laith Kubba, "The Awakening of Civil Society," Journal of Democracy 11, no. 3 (2000): 85. 
17 Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative 
Perspective," Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 143. 
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opposition	  remained	  limited	  to	  specific	  issues	  and	  narrow	  constituencies,	  hardly	  able	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  wider	  masses.18	  As	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  new	  millennium	  drew	  near,	  Arab	  autocracies	  indeed	  looked	  stronger	  than	  ever.	  In	  Syria,	  Bashar	  Al-­‐Assad	  appeared	  to	  be	  solidifying	  the	  authoritarian	   legacy	  he	  had	   inherited	   through	  a	  new	  social	   alliance	  with	   carefully	  selected	  crony	  capitalist	  elements	  within	  his	  direct	  kinship	  circle.19	  In	  Tunisia,	  Ben	  Ali’s	  police	  state	  seemed	  to	  be	  in	  effective	  control.	  In	  Egypt,	  the	  Arab	  World’s	  biggest	  country	  and	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  study,	  some	  wings	  of	  the	  ruling	  elite	  were	  enthusiastically	  planning	  presidential	  succession	  by	  the	  president’s	  son.	  With	  the	  armed	  Islamism	  of	  the	  1990s	  a	  distant	   memory,	   Gamal	   Mubarak’s	   rise	   was	   also	   well	   supported	   by	   a	   growingly	  powerful	  and	  aspiring	  business	  class,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  ever-­‐more-­‐vicious	  internal	  security	  apparatus.	   Not	   least	   significantly,	   it	   was	   silently	   (yet	   attentively)	   watched	   by	   the	  military. 20 	  What	   Gregory	   Gause	   retrospectively	   called	   the	   ‘myth’	   of	   Arab	  authoritarianism’s	  persistence	  was	  widely	  considered	  secure	  and	  stable.21	  Particularly	   in	   the	   Egyptian	   case,	   and	   beyond	   the	   regime’s	   crony	   capitalist	  arrangements	   and	   direct	   clientalistic	   networks,	   upper	   echelons	   of	   the	   middle	   class	  seemed	  the	  main	  broader	  social	  category	  benefiting	  from	  the	  neoliberal	  transformation.	  Above	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  strongly	  restricted	  and	  uninspiringly	  stagnant	  formal	  politics	  under	   Mubarak	   (especially	   in	   his	   last	   decade	   in	   power),	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	  appeared	   to	   represent	   one	   of	   the	   primary	   socio-­‐political	   constituencies	   supporting	   a	  renewed	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  ruling	  political	  arrangement.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Vickie Langohr, "Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics: Egypt and Liberalizing Arab Regimes," 
Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 182. 
19 Raymond Hinnebusch, "Syria: From ‘Authoritarian Upgrading’to Revolution?" International Affairs 88, no. 1 
(2012): 95. 
20 For a detailed account of the changing composition of the ruling alliance in the last decade of the Mubarak 
era, see Hazem Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to Revolt (London: Verso Books, 2012), 
208-16.  
21 F Gregory Gause III, "Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian 
Stability," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4 (2011). 
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Economically,	  the	  fortunes	  of	  Egypt’s	  upper	  middle	  class	  in	  the	  highly	  rewarding	  segments	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   economy	   and	   the	   emerging	   private	   sector	   indeed	   looked	  secure	  and	   thriving.	  Moreover,	   their	  privileged	  position	   in	   the	   labour	  market	  enabled	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  to	  continue	  enjoying	  access	  to	  other	  components	  of	  socio-­‐cultural	  capital	  needed	  for	  the	  constant	  upgrade	  of	  their	  capacity	  to	  reproduce	  privilege	  and	  distinction.	  However,	   in	   terms	   of	   politics,	   the	   evidence	   gathered	   during	   fieldwork	   for	   this	  study	  between	  the	  winter	  of	  2008	  and	  autumn	  of	  2010	  strongly	  suggested	  the	  need	  for	  a	   measured	   departure	   from	   the	   insistence	   on	   the	   validity	   of	   this	   myth	   of	   stable	  authoritarianism,	  and	  gave	  substantial	   reason	   to	  doubt	   the	  association	  of	   the	   thriving	  socio-­‐economic	  fortunes	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  with	  political	  consent.	  This	  evidence	  clearly	   indicated	   that	   the	   normative	   foundations	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   upper	  middle	   class’	  very	   understanding	   of	   politics,	   and	   –	   not	   least	   significantly	   –	   the	   internalised	   basic	  conceptions	   of	   its	   relationship	  with	   the	   state,	  were	   undergoing	   far-­‐reaching	   changes.	  The	  deliberate	   replacement	  of	   state-­‐sponsored	  or	   state-­‐provided	   social	   routes	   for	   the	  reproduction	   of	   status	   and	   distinction	   by	   free	   market	   trajectories	   had	   caused	   a	  profound	   change	   in	   the	   traditionally	   generic	   bond	   between	   the	   state	   and	   the	   upper	  middle	  class.	  The	  historic,	   integral	  and	  mutually	  constitutive	  relationship	  between	  the	  upper	   middle	   class	   and	   the	   Egyptian	   state	   had	   thus	   been	   subjected	   to	   a	   definitive	  change	  of	  mechanisms	  and	  dynamics.	   In	  the	  absence	  of	  meaningful	  political	  processes	  to	  mediate	  this	  historic	  disengagement	  under	  Mubarak,	  and	  with	  the	  regime’s	  stringent	  refusal	  to	  widen	  the	  base	  of	  political	  power	  beyond	  an	  ever-­‐shrinking	  elite	  circle,	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   political	   discontent	   brewed	   beneath	   a	   thick	   surface	   of	   apathy	   towards	  formal	  politics.	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Around	  noon	  on	  25	   January	  2011,	   the	  questions	  of	   if,	  how	  and	  when	   the	   long-­‐stalled	  political	   translation	  of	   this	  discontent	  would	  transpire	  were	  still	  wide	  open.	  At	  that	  point,	  they	  challenged	  a	  logical	  and,	  above	  all,	  well-­‐substantiated	  articulation	  of	  the	  valid	  findings	  of	  this	  research.	  Luckily,	  however,	  it	  turned	  out	  there	  was	  little	  need	  for	  anxiety.	   Egypt’s	   upper	  middle	   class	  was	   about	   to	  make	   an	   impressive	  debut	   onto	   the	  political	  stage.	  
2.	  18	  Days	  in	  2011	  On	  the	  afternoon	  of	  25	  January	  2011,	  I	  received	  a	  phone	  call	  from	  a	  friend	  who	  had	   joined	   one	   of	   the	   many	   demonstrations	   that	   had	   cropped	   up	   in	   various	   places	  around	  Cairo,	  attracting	  unprecedented	  numbers	  of	  ordinary	  people.	  ‘You	  have	  to	  come	  immediately	  and	  see	  this	  for	  yourself.	  This	  is	  unprecedented.	  These	  are	  people	  like	  us,	  not	  the	  usual	  activists’,	  his	  excited	  voice	  shouted.	   I	   joined	  him	  and	  another	   friend	  in	  a	  demonstration	   by	   the	   Nile	   Corniche	   in	  Dokki,	   not	   far	   from	  my	   flat.	   As	   the	   protesters	  marched	   to	  Tahrir	   square,	   crossing	  Cairo’s	   landmark	  6th	  of	  October	  Bridge,	   the	   size	  of	  the	  demonstration	   grew.	  The	   composition	  of	   the	  march	  had	  an	  unmistakably	  middle-­‐class	   character.	  Many	  bystanders	  who	  did	  not	  directly	   join	   cheered	   in	   support.	  There	  was	  no	  ambiguity	   in	  what	   the	  protests	  were	  demanding:	   ‘Down	  with	  Hosni	  Mubarak’,	  they	   shouted.	  When	   this	  march	  and	  several	  others	  managed	   to	   converge	   to	  Tahrir	   by	  sundown	   that	   evening,	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   the	   Mubarak	   regime	   was	   facing	   what	   could	  amount	  to	  an	  existential	  political	  crisis.	  	  By	   midnight,	   riot	   police	   had	   cleared	   the	   square,	   using	   teargas	   and	   birdshots.	  Many	  protesters	  had	  gone	  home	  already;	  hence,	  it	  was	  relatively	  easy	  to	  disperse	  those	  who	  had	  decided	  to	  camp	  there.	  26	  and	  27	  January	  were	  marked	  by	  skirmishes	  between	  the	  police	  and	  pro-­‐democracy	  activists,	  mostly	  in	  downtown	  Cairo.	  A	  call	  for	  a	  ‘Friday	  of	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Rage’	  on	  28	  January	  was	  made	  online,	  and	  the	  mobilisation	  on	  social	  media	  outlets	  was	  unprecedented.	  On	  its	  part,	  the	  regime	  was	  also	  preparing	  for	  a	  major	  confrontation.	  On	  the	   morning	   of	   the	   28th,	   the	   government	   shut	   down	   all	   mobile	   and	   data	  communications,	  practically	  restoring	  Egypt	  to	  the	  pre-­‐information	  age.	  Having	  decided	  to	   join	   the	   protests	   that	   were	   planned	   to	   begin	   at	   the	  Mustafa	   Mahmud	   mosque	   in	  
Mohandessin,	  I	  met	  there	  with	  several	  friends	  in	  time	  for	  the	  Friday	  prayers.	  The	  scene	  on	   site	   was	   a	   snapshot	   of	   a	   representative	   gathering	   of	   Cairo’s	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  community.	  There	  were	  hundreds	  of	  activists,	  actors	  and	  public	  figures.	  But	  most	  of	  the	  crowd	  was	  composed	  of	  ordinary	  men	  and	  women,	  AUC22	  and	  foreign	  school	  graduates,	  and	  Gezira	  and	  Shooting	  Club	  members.23	  A	   little	   while	   later,	   once	   the	   Imam	   in	   the	   mosque	   finished	   the	   prayers,	   loud	  chants	  declared	   that	   ‘al-­‐sha‘b	  yurid	  iskat	  al-­‐nizam’	   (‘The	  people	  demand	  the	   fall	  of	   the	  regime’).	   As	   the	   core	   protest	   started	   to	   move	   towards	   Tahrir	   Square,	   one	   could	   see	  thousands	   of	   people	   coming	   from	   side	   streets	   in	   the	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   quarters	   of	  
Mohandessin	   and	   Dokki	   to	   join	   the	   march.	   By	   the	   time	   it	   had	   reached	   the	   Nile	   and	  protesters	  wanted	  to	  cross	  Al-­‐Gala’	  bridge	  in	  Dokki,	  many	  tens	  of	  thousands	  had	  joined.	  Clashes	  with	   the	  Central	  Security	  Forces	  (CSF)	  began	  and	   intensified	  as	   time	  went	  by,	  and	  the	  protesters’	  determination	  to	  reach	  Tahrir	  square	  grew	  into	  adamant	  insistence	  not	  to	  give	  in	  to	  the	  state’s	  use	  of	  force.	  We	   now	   know	   that	   a	   similar	   scene	   was	   unfolding	   elsewhere	   in	   Cairo.	   Huge	  demonstrations	  began	  in	  the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  quarters	  of	  Nasr	  City,	  Heliopolis,	  Maadi	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 American University in Cairo 
23 The ‘Gezira Sporting Club’ in Zamalek and the ‘Egyptian Shooting Club’ in Dokki are two of the most 
important institutions within the social environment of Egypt’s upper middle class. Their private and gated 
facilities for sports and socialisation are notoriously distinctive spaces in which traditionally upper-middle-class 
identity and prestige are produced and practiced, and social networks forged and expanded. Their membership is 
an important social marker for thousands of upper-middle-class families in today’s Egypt. Other similar ‘clubs’ 
exist in other upper-middle-class quarters of Cairo and Alexandria.    
	  21	  
and	  Zamalek.	   Of	   course,	   they	  were	   not	   alone:	  Many	   popular	   quarters	   also	   rose	   up	   to	  revolt	  that	  day.	  By	  the	  early	  evening,	  as	  the	  police	  struggled	  to	  handle	  the	  situation	  both	  in	  Cairo	  and	  other	  revolting	  cities,	  the	  army	  was	  deployed	  onto	  the	  streets	  to	  maintain	  order.	  Around	  seven	  o’clock,	  my	  friends	  and	  I	  were	  still	  aimlessly	  roaming	  the	  streets	  around	  the	  Zamalek	  area,	  trying	  to	  find	  a	  way	  to	  cross	  the	  river	  towards	  Tahrir,	  as	  the	  police	  were	  violently	  forcing	  protesters	  back	  from	  the	  bridges	  connecting	  the	  two	  banks	  of	   the	   Nile.	   I	   saw	   an	   affluent	   young	  woman	   running	   towards	   us,	   shouting	  with	  what	  appeared	   to	   be	   nervous	   excitement:	   ‘The	   army	   is	   coming	   down,	   a	   curfew	   has	   been	  declared.’	   After	   a	   brief	   assessment	   of	   the	   situation	   by	   several	   people	   who	   gathered	  around	   the	  young	   lady,	   the	  majority	  of	  my	   small	   group	  decided	   it	  was	   time	   to	   return	  home.	  ‘If	  the	  army	  is	  coming	  down,	  then	  our	  job	  here	  is	  done,’	  someone	  said.	  Indeed,	  as	  the	  dust	  settled	  from	  the	  momentous	  events	  of	  that	  day,	  Egypt	  was	  bracing	  itself	  for	  a	  historical	  turning	  point	  in	  its	  socio-­‐political	  evolution.	  A	  series	  of	  developments	  took	  its	  course,	  and	  two	  weeks	  later	  Hosni	  Mubarak	  stepped	  down	  from	  the	  presidency.	  
3.	  Research	  Question	  and	  Main	  Argument	  	  The	   previous	   personal	   account	   is	   far	   from	   –	   and,	   indeed,	   hardly	   intended	   to	  provide	   –	   a	   comprehensive	   picture	   of	   the	   2011	   revolt.	   Undoubtedly,	   such	   an	  undertaking	  would	  require	  a	  separate	  study	  that	  would	  most	  certainly	  have	  to	  examine	  the	   complexity	  of	   the	  multi-­‐layered	  events	  occurring	   in	  various	  parts	  of	  Egypt	  during	  this	  upheaval.	   Indeed,	   the	  multitude	  of	  political	  players	  and	  forces	   involved,	   the	  many	  socio-­‐historical	  trails	  that	  came	  to	  intersect	  during	  these	  days,	  and	  the	  very	  intensity	  of	  this	  uprising	  as	  a	  collective	  human	  experience,	  are	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  one	  single	  study.	  The	   above	   account	   is	   rather	   meant	   to	   present	   a	   brief	   recollection	   of	   observations	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relevant	   to	   the	   study	   at	   hand,	   and	   to	   provide	   a	   framework	   for	   the	   articulation	   of	   the	  research	  question	  and	  main	  argument	  of	  this	  study.	  The	   uprising	   of	   2011	   was	   in	   large	   part	   fuelled	   by	   the	   wide	   participation	   and	  persistence	   of	   upper	   echelons	   of	   the	   Egyptian	  middle	   class.	  While	   a	   small	   number	   of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   actors	   and	   activists	   had	   participated	   in	   limited-­‐scale	   opposition	  protests	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  activism	  over	  the	  previous	  few	  years,	  the	  mass	  participation	  of	   ordinary	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   in	   the	   2011	   revolt	   was	   novel	   and	  unprecedented.	  	  In	  comparison,	  over	  previous	  years	  the	  regime	  had	  kept	  the	  relatively	  weak	  workers’	  movement	  and	  its	  protests	  effectively	  under	  control	  with	  little	  trouble.	  Lower	  echelons	  of	  the	  middle	  class,	  and	  the	  marginalised	  urban	  poor,	  showed	  little	  sign	  of	  challenging	  their	  ever-­‐deteriorating	  positions	  within	  the	  neoliberal	  economy.	  Rather,	  it	  was	  the	  direct,	  swift,	  and	  forceful	  action	  of	  those	  previously	  assumed	  to	  have	  been	  co-­‐opted	   into	  political	   apathy	   that	  dealt	   the	   fatal	   blow	   to	  Mubarak	   in	  February	  2011.	  Of	  course,	   the	   Egyptian	   upper	   middle	   class	   could	   not	   have	   brought	   down	   the	   political	  order	  all	  by	  itself;	  this	  outcome	  only	  materialised	  when	  other	  wide	  segments	  of	  society	  joined	   the	   revolt,	   leaving	   the	   core	   state	   institution	   (the	   military)	   little	   choice	   but	   to	  acquiesce	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  president.	  But	  no	  matter	  how	  unexpected	  an	  occurring,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  widely	  and	  actively	  participated	  in	  the	  2011	  revolt	  should	  not	  be	  belittled;	  rather,	  it	  should	  be	  fully	  recognised.	  	  Therefore,	   the	   question	   representing	   the	   main	   framework	   of	   analysis	   in	   the	  following	   chapters,	   is:	   Why	   did	   the	   Egyptian	   upper	   middle	   class	   build	   a	   growing	  reservoir	  of	  political	  discontent	  over	  the	  years	  of	  neoliberal	  transformation,	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  became	  sufficient	   to	  drive	   the	  class	   to	   revolt	  against	  a	   regime	  advancing	  a	   socio-­‐economic	  agenda	  of	  which	  it	  was	  supposedly	  one	  of	  the	  prime	  beneficiaries?	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This	   study	   aims	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   general	   comprehension	   of	   the	   underlying	  causes	  and	  factors	  of	  the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  political	  discontent	  that	  created	  the	  socio-­‐political	  conditions	  for	  this	  class’	  seemingly	  unexpected	  mass	  participation	  in	  the	  2011	  revolt.	  Since	  most	  of	   the	  underlying	  research	   for	   this	   thesis	  was	  conducted	  before	  the	  2011	  uprising,24	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  thesis	  neither	  provides	  a	  historic	  account,	  nor	   is	   it	   intended	  as	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  overt,	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  political	   action	   in	   the	   revolutionary	   context	   of	   these	   remarkable	   events	   in	   Egypt’s	  political	  history.	  Rather,	   the	   thesis	   intends	   to	  provide	  a	   framework	   for	  understanding	  the	   effect	   of	   the	   changing	   dynamics	   shaping	   the	   normative	   foundations	   of	   the	   upper	  middle	   class’	  understanding	  of	  politics	  and	   transforming	   the	   internalised	  class-­‐typical	  conceptions	  of	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  state	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  context.	  Developing	  such	  a	   framework	   is	   not	   only	   useful	   for	  making	   sense	   of	   the	   en	  masse	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  participation	  in	  the	  2011	  uprising,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  but	  also,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  useful	  for	  sharpening	  our	  grasp	  of	  the	  lines	  along	  which	  the	  future	  politicisation	  of	  this	  emerging	  constituency	  of	  post-­‐Mubarak	  Egyptian	  politics	  will	  be	  formed.	  The	  main	  argument	  that	  this	  study	  will	  advance	  is	  therefore	  multi-­‐fold:	  1. The	  impressive	  and	  decisive	  debut	  of	   the	  upper	  middle	  class	  as	  a	  political	   constituency	   needs	   to	   be	   contextualised	   within	   the	   complex	   and	  protracted	  historical	  evolution	  of	  its	  constitution	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  Egyptian	  state.	  On	  the	   face	   of	   it,	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   revolted	   against	   the	   Mubarak	   regime.	  However,	   this	   should	   not	   cloud	   our	   reading	   of	   this	   explosion	   of	   political	  discontent	   as	   in	   fact	   caused	   by	   a	   long-­‐standing	   disenchantment	  with	   the	   very	  reconfiguration	   of	   the	   state’s	   social	   role	   since	   the	   inception	   of	   liberalisation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Remarkably, all the interviewees for this study – with one exception – took part in the demonstrations of 
January and February 2011 and supported the uprising.  
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infitah	  policies	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s.	  By	  administering	  the	  neoliberal	  shift	  since	  the	  1990s,	  Mubarak	  had	  merely	  intensified	  the	  orientations	  that	  his	  predecessor	  laid	  out.	  Mubarak	  thus	  steered	  the	  state	  to	  an	  irreversible	  default	  on	  its	  basic	  social	  contract	  with	  the	  upper	  middle	  class.	  2. The	  consistent	  retreat	  of	  the	  state	  from	  its	  role	  as	  an	  arena	  for	  the	  attainment,	  preservation	  and	  reproduction	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  distinction	  and	  status	   had	   gradually	   eroded	   the	   implicit	   socio-­‐political	   arrangement	   by	  which	  the	   upper	  middle	   class	  was	   traditionally	   conceived	   of	   as	   the	   immediate	   social	  base	  of	  successive	  political	  orders.	  3. In	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  the	  state	  has	  deliberately	  handed	  over	  its	  formative	  role	  in	  processes	  contributing	  to	  shaping	  the	  normative	  foundations	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  to	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  free	  market.	  Upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptian	  generations	  from	  the	  1990s	  onwards	  have	  found	  themselves	  negotiating	  trajectories	  for	  the	  preservation,	  reproduction	  and	  display	  of	  social	  class	  status	  with	  market	  forces,	  rather	  than	  with	  the	  state.	  The	  intertwinement	  of	  this	  change	  and	  the	  growing	  reconfiguration	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  social	  identity	  along	  more	  globalised	  conceptions	  of	  modernity	  and	  entitled	  citizenship	   has	   profoundly	   contributed	   to	   the	   accumulation	   of	   political	  discontent.	  4. Finally,	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  normative	  foundations	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	   class’	   socio-­‐political	   agency	   primarily	   as	   a	   result	   of	   social	   processes	  engulfed	   in	   the	  workings	  of	   the	  neoliberal	  market	  has	  produced	  new	  modes	  of	  socio-­‐political	   critique,	   through	   which	   the	   Egyptian	   state	   and	   the	   prevailing	  political	   arrangement	   have	   been	   cumulatively	   appraised	   by	   the	   upper	   middle	  class.	  At	   first,	   these	  processes	  were	  thought	  to	   inform	  the	  formulation	  of	  social	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identity	  by	  an	  inherently	  politically	  apathetic	  ethos	  that	  characterises	  neoliberal	  rationale	   itself.	   However,	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   experiences	   and	   encounters	  with	  the	  state	  have,	  in	  fact,	  been	  a	  defining	  input	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  political	  attitudes	  and	   agency.	   Notably,	   they	   provide	   continued	   and	   diverse	   contexts	   for	   the	  application	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   ethos	   for	   purposes	   of	   socio-­‐political	   critique	   and	  formulating	  lines	  and	  patterns	  of	  politicisation.	  
4.	  Thesis	  Structure	  and	  Chapter	  Outline	  Organisationally,	   this	   dissertation	   is	   divided	   into	   an	   introduction,	   six	   chapters,	  and	  a	  conclusion.	  Chapter	   one	  will	   tackle	   the	   theoretical	   and	  methodological	   frameworks	   of	   the	  study.	  It	  will	  present	  the	  substantiated	  conceptual	  preferences	  on	  which	  the	  use	  of	  this	  study’s	   main	   concepts	   is	   based.	   The	   chapter	   will	   also	   shed	   light	   on	   some	   of	   the	  important	   aspects	   pertaining	   to	   the	   required	   sensitivity,	   analytical	   utility	   and	  limitations	   of	   these	   concepts	   in	   the	   specific	   contexts	   of	   the	  Middle	  East	   and	  Egyptian	  politics.	   Finally,	   the	   chapter	   will	   emphasise	   the	   importance	   of	   combining	   structural	  factors	  and	  agency	  as	  a	  balanced	  methodological	  approach	  to	  the	  qualitative	  analysis	  of	  processes	  formulating	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  and	  its	  normative	  foundations.	  Chapter	   two	   is	   a	  historical	   review	  of	   some	  defining	   aspects	   in	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   Egyptian	   state	   and	   the	   middle	   class.	   The	   mutually	   constitutive	   and	  formative	   evolution	   of	   the	   state	   and	   the	   middle	   class	   will	   be	   traced	   from	   the	   early	  nineteenth	  century.	  This	  chapter	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  traditional	  intertwinement	  between	  the	   evolution	   of	   the	   modern	   state	   in	   Egypt	   and	   successive	   cycles	   of	   middle-­‐class	  formation,	   implicitly	   conditioning	   the	   socio-­‐political	   agency	  of	   the	  middle	   class	  as	   the	  social	  backbone	  of	  the	  state.	  The	  chapter	  will	  conclude	  by	  demonstrating	  the	  change	  in	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this	  dynamic	  as	  Egypt	  has	  gone	   through	   the	  neoliberal	   transformation	  since	   the	  early	  1990s.	  Chapters	  three	  through	  five	  will	  tackle	  different	  grounds	  of	  social	  distinction	  for	  today’s	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class.	  Education	  and	  employment,	  discussed	  in	  chapters	  three	  and	  four	  respectively,	  are	  essential	  social	   fields	   in	  which	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  negotiates	   the	   preservation	   and	   reproduction	   of	   its	   social	   status.	   Lifestyle	   elements	  reflecting	  specific	  socio-­‐cultural	  conceptions	  of	  modernity	  and	  distinction	  will	   then	  be	  discussed	   in	  chapter	   five.	  Together,	   the	  three	  chapters	  will	  demonstrate	  the	  retreat	  of	  the	  state’s	   role	   in	   these	  vital	   social	   fields,	   in	   favour	  of	  neoliberal	  market	  mechanisms.	  Using	   in-­‐depth	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   narratives,	   the	   chapters	   will	   emphasise	   the	  formative	  effect	  entailed	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  status	  preservation	  and	  reproduction	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  context.	  In	  chapter	  six,	  the	  main	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  ‘social	  experience	  of	   the	   state’.	   The	   chapter	   will	   demonstrate	   how	   the	   multitude	   of	   experiences	   and	  encounters	  with	  various	  manifestations	  of	   the	  state	   in	   the	  social	   field	  are	  an	  essential	  factor	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  state’s	  image	  in	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  worldviews.	  During	  these	   encounters,	   the	   state	   as	   an	   institutional	   arrangement	   is	   appraised	   according	   to	  notions	   and	   criteria	   of	   effectiveness,	   rationality	   and	   efficiency,	   broadly	   conceived	   as	  part	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  rationale	  engulfing	  processes	  of	  status	  reproduction.	  In	  this	  sense,	  encounters	  with	  the	  state	  act	  as	  important	  formative	  experiences	  for	  political	  agency,	  as	  they	   invoke	   different	   modes	   of	   critique	   of	   the	   state’s	   performance	   and	   the	   utility	   of	  politics	  in	  general.	  The	  thesis	  will	  end	  with	  a	  conclusion	  in	  which	  the	  main	  findings	  of	  the	  individual	  chapters	  will	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  research	  question	  and	  main	  argument.	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Chapter	  One:	  Conceptual	  Framework	  and	  Methodology	  
1.	  Introduction	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  outline	  the	  theoretical	  and	  conceptual	  frameworks	  of	  the	  study.	  Much	  of	   the	   discussion	   in	   the	   chapters	   ahead	  will	   repeatedly	   reference	   concepts	   that	  are	   traditionally	   the	  subject	  of	  rigorous	  debate,	   to	  say	   the	   least,	   in	   the	  social	  sciences.	  Therefore,	   it	   is	   only	   proper	   that	   the	   study	   proceed	   with	   a	   clear	   and	   well-­‐defined	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  main	  concepts	  in	  play.	  	  As	   the	   introduction	   to	   this	   research	  emphasised,	   this	   is	   a	   study	  of	   the	  political	  agency	   of	   Egypt’s	   upper	   middle	   class,	   the	   processes	   surrounding	   its	   struggle	   for	  preserving	  and	  reproducing	  distinction,	  and	  its	  formative	  relationship	  with	  the	  state	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  context.	  To	  understand	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  class-­‐based	  development	  of	  modes	  and	  foundations	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  in	  today’s	  Egypt,	  it	  is	   necessary	   to	   formulate	   an	   adequate	   conception	   of	   how	   class	   should	   generally	   be	  conceptualised.	  The	  position	  of	   the	  contemporary	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class	  within	  the	  wider	  ensemble	  of	  social	  groupings	  in	  Egyptian	  society,	  which	  arguably	  informs	  its	  socio-­‐political	  agency,	  can	  only	  be	  comprehended	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  conceptualisation	  of	  class	  that	  is	  simultaneously	  complex	  and	  flexible.	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   in	   comparison	   with	   advanced	   industrial	   societies,	   the	  underdeveloped	   capitalist	   economic	   relations	   in	   Egypt	   suggest	   the	   need	   for	   an	  appreciation	  of	  a	  multitude	  of	  subjective	  factors	  that	  account	  for	  the	  emergence	  both	  of	  a	  class-­‐common	  worldview	  and	  of	  an	  objectively	  defined	  position	  within	  the	  prevailing	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system	  of	  economic	  relations.	  The	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class	  is	  a	  fragment	  of	  a	  wider	  Egyptian	  middle	  class.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  shares	  many	  defining	  characteristics	  that	  render	  it	  analytically	  valuable	  to	  view	  its	  historical	  evolution	  as	  a	  social	  grouping	  within	  that	  of	  the	   broader	   middle	   class.	   However,	   the	   realities	   of	   today’s	   complex	   and	   intersecting	  lines	   of	   socio-­‐cultural	   composition	   of	   Egyptian	   society	   require	   the	   analysis	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   socio-­‐political	   agency	   to	  be	  based	  on	  a	  model	  of	   social	   stratification	   that	  combines	   an	   appreciation	   of	   objective,	   subjective	   and	   context-­‐specific	   forms	   of	   class	  identity.	  Similarly,	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   complex,	   formative	   and	   mutually	   constitutive	  relationship	   between	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   and	   the	   state	   in	   Egypt	   requires	   a	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state	  that	  bridges	  the	  often	  artificially	  maintained	  dichotomy	  of	  state	  and	  society.	  Once	  again,	   the	  historical	  evolution	  of	   the	  Arab	  state	   in	  general	  and	  the	   Egyptian	   state	   in	   particular	   is	   different	   than	   those	   of	   advanced	   capitalist	   settings	  (whether	   in	   Europe	   or	   North	   America).	   Therefore,	   the	   state’s	   legitimacy	   as	   a	  conglomeration	   of	   institutional	   power	   arrangements,	   and	   its	   perceived	   role	   as	   social	  actor	  by	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  (and	  other	  classes	  for	  that	  matter)	  in	  Egypt	  can	  only	  be	  grasped	   if	   examined	   through	   conceptualisations	   of	   the	   state	   that	   emphasise	   the	  dialectical	  and	  mutually	  constitutive	  nature	  of	  its	  presence	  and	  role	  in	  society.	  This	  chapter	  aims	  to	  indicate	  a	  theoretical	  bias	  towards	  a	  certain	  understanding	  of	   this	   study’s	  main	   concepts.	   Such	   a	   theoretical	   bias	   is	   intended	   to	   be	   not	   only	  well	  based	  in	  the	  merit	  of	  the	  chosen	  conceptualisations,	  but	  also	  aware	  of	  other	  elements	  in	  the	   general	   debate	   surrounding	   them.	   Based	   on	   a	   critical	   appreciation	   of	   the	   main	  relevant	  theoretical	   trends	   in	  Western	  scholarship,	   the	  chapter	  will	  point	  out	  how	  the	  concepts	  at	  play	  need	  to	  be	  understood	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  particularities	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of	   the	   Egyptian	   context.	   As	   shall	   later	   be	   evident,	   these	   theoretical	   preferences	   will	  considerably	  impact	  both	  the	  subject	  and	  methodology	  of	  the	  research.	  
2.	  Class	  and	  The	  State	  
2.1	  Class	  and	  Status:	  From	  Marx	  to	  Weber	  	  For	   more	   than	   a	   century,	   class	   analysis	   as	   a	   conceptual	   framework	   for	  understanding	   social	   and	   political	   developments	   has	   played	   a	   considerable	   role	   in	  shaping	   the	   intellectual	   debate	   in	   both	  Marxist	   and	   non-­‐Marxist	   scholarly	   traditions.	  However,	   it	   is	   fair	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   concept	   is	   no	   longer	   the	   powerful	   and	   popular	  analytical	   tool	   that	   it	  once	  was.	   In	   the	  context	  of	  a	  study	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  middle	  class,	  one	  might	  ask	  to	  what	  extent	  –	  if	  any	  –	  the	  concept	  is	  still	  capable	  of	  explaining	  socio-­‐political	   realities.	   In	   the	   introduction	   to	   a	   recent	   study	   that	   delves	   into	   the	   current	  status	  of	  class	  analysis	  in	  social	  sciences,	  Dworkin	  maintains	  that	  the	  pronouncements	  of	   ‘the	  death	  of	   class’	   are	  exaggerated.	  However,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	  he	  admits	   that	   the	  concept’s	   ‘status	  within	   history	   and	   sociology	   –	   as	   well	   as	   anthropology,	   philosophy,	  cultural	  studies,	  and	  political	  science	  –	  is	  greatly	  diminished’.1	  As	  far	  as	  this	  study	  is	  concerned,	  class	  is	  and	  will	  always	  remain	  relevant,	  albeit	  inasmuch	   as	   our	   understanding	   and	   conceptualisation	   of	   class	   and	   its	   modes	   of	  operation	   as	   a	   social	   player	   is	   constantly	   adapting	   to	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   ever-­‐growing	   complexity	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   relations	   in	   today’s	   interconnected	  world.	   Not	  less	  significantly,	  as	  an	  explanatory	  tool,	  the	  concept	  must	  also	  be	  sensitive	  to	  specifics	  of	  different	  historical	  and	  local	  contexts	  of	  the	  cases	  being	  studied.	  No	  matter	  how	  out	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Dennis L Dworkin, Class Struggles (London: Pearson Longman, 2007), 2. 
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of	   fashion	   it	   has	   become,	   ‘class	   always	   matters’,	   as	   Michael	   Mann	   stresses,	   ‘and	   its	  recent	  neglect	  by	  social	  scientists	  is	  simply	  indefensible’.2	  	  The	  debates	  around	  class	  could	  roughly	  be	  described	  as	  falling	  onto	  a	  spectrum	  in	  which	  appreciation	  of	  the	  analytical	  utility	  of	  the	  concept	  varies,	  from	  accusations	  of	  futility	   to	   the	   strong	   belief	   in	   its	   capacity	   to	   explain	   the	   historical	   developments	   of	  different	   societies.	  At	   the	   appreciative	   end	  of	   the	   spectrum,	   the	  most	   straightforward	  articulation	  of	  the	  Marxist	  proposition	  on	  the	  composition	  of	  society	  can	  be	  found	  in	  The	  
Communist	  Manifesto,	   which	   states:	   ‘The	   history	   of	   all	   hitherto	   existing	   society	   is	   the	  history	  of	  class	  struggles.’3	  	  According	  to	  Marx	  and	  Engels,	  history	  has	  been	  shaped	  by	  the	   continuous	   struggles	   between	   existing	   classes	   in	   their	   various	   historical	   forms.	  These	   struggles	   are	   bound	   to	   end	   in	  what	   they	   call	   a	   ‘revolutionary	   reconstitution	   of	  society	  at	  large,	  or	  the	  common	  ruin	  of	  the	  contending	  classes’.4	  The	  capitalist	  society	  is	  characterised	   by	   a	   clear	   antagonism	   between	   two	   main	   classes	   (bourgeoisie	   and	  proletariat),	  dictated	  by	  inherently	  conflicting	  positions	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  production	  relations.	   This	   classification	   of	   social	   forces	   is	   part	   of	   a	   more	   comprehensive	  understanding	   of	   the	   movement	   of	   history	   by	   Marx	   –	   which,	   although	   detailed	   and	  elaborated	  upon	  in	  later	  works,	  found	  its	  classic	  expression	  in	  the	  Preface	  to	  A	  Critique	  
of	   Political	   Economy.	   In	   Marx’s	   own	   words,	   what	   later	   became	   known	   as	   historical	  materialism	  is	  best	  described	  by	  the	  following	  passage:	  	  In	  the	  social	  production	  of	  their	   life,	  men	  enter	   into	  definite	  relations	  that	  are	  indispensable	   and	   independent	   of	   their	   will,	   relations	   of	   production	   which	  correspond	   to	   a	   definite	   stage	   of	   development	   of	   their	   material	   productive	  forces.	  The	  sum	  total	  of	  these	  relations	  of	  production	  constitutes	  the	  economic	  structure	   of	   society,	   the	   real	   foundation,	   on	   which	   rises	   a	   legal	   and	   political	  superstructure	  and	  to	  which	  correspond	  definite	  forms	  of	  social	  consciousness.	  The	   mode	   of	   production	   of	   material	   life	   conditions	   the	   social,	   political	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Michael Mann, Power in the 21st Century: Conversations with John Hall (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 
111.  
3 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto, a Modern Edition (London, New York: Verso 
Books, 1998), 34. 
4 Ibid., 35. 
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intellectual	   life	   process	   in	   general.	   It	   is	   not	   the	   consciousness	   of	   men	   that	  determines	  their	  being,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  their	  social	  being	  that	  determines	  their	  consciousness.5	  	  	  	   Evidently,	  a	  strict	  economic	  determinism	  underlies	  Marx’s	  classification	  of	  social	  forces	   in	   the	   capitalist	   society.	   ‘Classes’	   as	   social	   actors	   are	   formed	   as	   a	   result	   of	  ownership	  relations	  to	  the	  means	  of	  material	  production.	  In	  the	  bourgeoisie-­‐dominated	  capitalist	  society,	  this	  mode	  of	  production	  is	  exploitative	  by	  nature.	  The	  capitalist	  mode	  of	   production	   and	   the	   resulting	   relations	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   means	   of	   production	   are	  responsible	   not	   only	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   classes,	   but	   also,	   most	   importantly,	   for	  shaping	  a	  collective	  class	  consciousness,	  which	  constitutes	  the	  foundation	  for	  their	  socio-­‐political	   agency.	   An	   objectively	   existing	   class	   in	   itself	   therefore	   only	   becomes	   a	   socio-­‐political	  player	  that	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  advance	  certain	  interests,	  or	  become	  a	  class	  for	  
itself,	   if	   its	   objective	   position	   within	   the	   relations	   of	   production	   is	   coupled	   with	   a	  consciousness	  of	  this	  position	  and	  its	  ensuing	  relations	  to	  other	  classes.6	  	  The	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  economic	  relations	   in	  determining	  social	  structure	  has	  been	   the	   subject	   of	  much	  of	   the	   criticism	  of	  Marxist	   theory.	  Marx	   is	   criticised	   for	  reducing	   social	   developments	   and	   consequences	   to	   functions	   of	   economic	   relations,	  while	   ignoring	  other	   significant	   factors	   that	   shape	   the	  nature	  of	   social	   actors	   and	   the	  dynamics	  of	  their	  action.	  Maintaining	  a	  basic	  belief	  in	  the	  soundness	  of	  Marx’s	  economic	  determinism,	  leading	  Marxist	  theorists	  have	  made	  significant	  contributions	  that	  aimed	  to	  refine	  Marx’s	  basic	  propositions	  on	  this	  particular	  point,	  as	  well	  as	  others.	  Nicos	   Poulantzas,	   for	   example,	   attempts	   to	   remedy	   Marx’s	   overemphasis	   on	  economic	   relations	   through	   the	  depiction	  of	   classes	  as	   social	   agents	  defined	   solely	  by	  their	   position	   in	   the	  mode	   of	   production.	  He	   advocates	  what	   could	   be	   described	   as	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Karl Marx, A Critique of Political Economy [1859], in David McLellan, Karl Marx, Selected Writings, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 425. 
6 Dworkin, Class Struggles, 29.  
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structural	  determinism	  approach,	   in	  which	  a	  social	  class	   ‘is	  defined	  by	   its	  place	   in	   the	  ensemble	   of	   social	   practices,	   i.e.	   by	   its	   place	   in	   the	   ensemble	   of	   the	   division	   of	   labor	  which	  includes	  political	  and	  ideological	  relations.’7	  Poulantzas’	  work	  is	  quite	  significant	  as	  it	  represents	  a	  Marxist	  attempt	  to	  appreciate	  the	  diversity	  of	  determinants	  for	  social	  action,	   which	   Marx	   is	   often	   accused	   of	   having	   reduced	   to	   ‘the	   economic’	   alone.	  Poulantzas	   therefore	   proposes	   defining	   social	   classes	   according	   to	   their	   place	   in	  economic	  and	  other	  social	  structures.8	  However,	  while	  identifying	  political	  aspects	  and	  state-­‐produced	   ideology	   as	   important	   factors	   in	   shaping	   class	   identity,	   he	   remains	  principally	   loyal	   to	   the	   Marxist	   tradition	   in	   acknowledging	   that	   these	   structures	   in	  themselves	  are	  offshoots	  of	  the	  prevailing	  economic	  power	  relations.	  Poulantzas	  ought	  thus	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  attempting	  to	  extend	  the	  coverage	  of	  Marxist	  logic,	  rather	  than	  revisiting	  its	  foundations.	  For	  example,	  by	  way	  of	  this	  important	  addition	  to	  the	  concept	  of	   ‘class’,	   Poulantzas	   notably	   accounts	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   other	   classes,	   such	   as	   the	  petty	   bourgeoisie,	  whose	   relations	   to	   the	   forces	   of	   production	  may	  not	   be	   as	   sharply	  defined	  as	  the	  two	  principal	  classes,	  but	  who	  nonetheless	  constitute	  classes	  with	  clear	  social	  preferences.9	  	  Erik	   Olin	  Wright	   regards	   Poulantzas’	   urge	   for	   accommodating	   class	   categories	  that	   the	  classic	  Marxist	  concept	  of	  class	   fails	   to	  encompass	  as	  somewhat	  unnecessary.	  The	   former	   acknowledges	   that	   some	   classes	   may	   indeed	   occupy	   objectively	  contradicting	   locations	   within	   class	   relations.	   And	   ‘[r]ather	   than	   eradicating	   these	  contradictions	   by	   artificially	   classifying	   every	   position	   within	   the	   social	   division	   of	  labor,	   unambiguously	   into	   one	   class	   or	   another’,	   he	   argues,	   ‘contradictory	   locations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Nicos Poulantzas, "On Social Classes," in Classes, Power and Conflict: Classical and Contemporary Debates, 
ed. Anthony Giddens and David Held (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982), 101. 
8 Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: NLB and Sheed and Ward, 1973), 62-68. 
9 Poulantzas, "On Social Classes," 107-08. 
	  33	  
need	   to	   be	   studied	   in	   their	   own	   right.’ 10 	  He	   identifies	   three	   main	   clusters	   of	  contradicting	   positions	   within	   the	   social	   division	   of	   labour:	   namely,	   managers	   and	  supervisors;	   certain	   categories	   of	   semi-­‐autonomous	   employees;	   and	   small	   employers.	  Wright	  calls	  for	  the	  need	  to	  examine	  the	  dynamics	  of	  class	  relations	  through	  which	  such	  contradicting	  class	  categories	  emerged	  in	  advanced	  capitalist	  societies.11	  In	  the	  case	  of	  some	  of	   these	  categories	  of	  employees,	   this	  could	  be	  a	  means	  to	  ultimately	  determine	  their	   divergence	   from	   what	   he	   calls	   ‘the	   classic	   image	   of	   the	   fully	   proletarianized	  worker’.12	  	  There	  are,	  of	  course,	   countless	  contributions	   to	   the	  conceptual	  effort	  aiming	   to	  refine	   the	   basics	   of	   Marx’s	   social	   analysis	   by	   various	   Marxist	   theorists,	   and	   there	   is	  naturally	  hardly	  room	  to	  list	  all	  of	  them	  here.	  The	  important	  point,	  however,	  is	  that	  neo-­‐Marxist	   class	   analysis	   has	   made	   a	   considerable	   effort	   to	   broaden	   the	   scope	   of	   its	  conceptualisation	  in	  order	  to	  encompass	  the	  complexity	  of	  modern	  capitalist	  relations.	  This	   is	   particularly	   true	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   intermediate	   class	   categories	  within	  the	  social	  structure.	  However,	  these	  analyses	  have	  worked	  to	  expand	  the	  limits	  of	   Marxist	   conceptualisation	   without	   surrendering	   its	   basic	   economic	   deterministic	  holdings.	   This	   is	   quite	   important	   in	   addressing	   the	   suitable	   conceptual	   framework	  within	   which	   to	   analyse	   the	   socio-­‐political	   agency	   of	   middle	   classes	   in	   general.	  Nevertheless,	   it	   is	  not	  enough,	  especially	  when	  the	  analysis	  at	  hand	   is	  concerned	  with	  the	   origins	   and	   causes	   of	   socio-­‐political	   behaviour	   in	   societies	   in	   which	   capitalist	  relations	   have	   historically	   developed	   along	   lines	   not	   easily	   comparable	   to	   those	   in	  Western	  industrial	  societies.	  While	  this	  should	  be	  no	  invitation	  to	  ignore	  the	  premises	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11 Ibid., 113. 
12 Ibid., 128. 
	  34	  
of	  Marxist	  analysis	  altogether,	  additional	  grounds	  for	  understanding	  and	  contextualising	  both	   the	   emergence	   and	   agency	   of	   social	   classes	   and	   fragments	   therein	   must	   be	  considered.	  As	   a	   further	   step	   in	   this	   direction,	   it	   would	   be	   appropriate	   to	   shed	   light	   on	  another	   major	   theoretical	   tradition	   in	   Western	   sociology	   that	   offers	   widely-­‐acknowledged	   alternative	   frameworks	   to	   the	   Marxist	   conceptualisation	   of	   class:	  namely,	  what	   can	  be	  broadly	   referred	   to	  as	   the	  Weberian	   school.	   In	   the	   section	   titled	  ‘Class,	   Status	  Groups	  and	  Parties’	   in	  his	  major	  work	  Economy	  and	  Society,	  Max	  Weber	  identifies	  these	  three	  forms	  of	  social	  groupings	  as	   ‘phenomena	  within	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  within	  a	  community’.13	  Concerning	  classes	  in	  particular,	  he	  explains	  that:	  We	   may	   speak	   of	   a	   “class”	   when	   (1)	   a	   number	   people	   have	   in	   common	   a	  specific	  causal	  component	  of	  their	  life	  chances,	  insofar	  as	  (2)	  this	  component	  is	  represented	  exclusively	  by	  economic	   interests	   in	   the	  possession	  of	  goods	  and	  opportunities	   for	   income,	   and	   (3)	   is	   represented	   under	   the	   conditions	   of	   the	  commodity	  of	  labor	  markets.	  This	  is	  class	  situation.14	  	  For	  Weber,	   classes	   are	   social	   categories	   that	   are	   primarily	   defined	   by	   certain	  relationships	   to	   prevailing	   market	   relations.	   This	   is	   essentially	   reflected	   in	   their	  patterns	  of	  ownership,	  access	   to,	  and	  consumption	  of	  goods	  and	  assets	   in	   the	  market.	  ‘Class	  situation	  is,	  in	  this	  sense,	  ultimately	  market	  situation’15,	  he	  points	  out.	  Contrary	  to	  the	   Marxist	   presumption,	   Weber	   questions	   whether	   a	   certain	   class	   situation	   would	  result	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  cohesive	  class	  awareness	  and	  hence	  class	  interest.	  Individuals	  in	   the	   same	   class	   situation	   may	   define	   their	   interests	   differently	   and,	   perhaps	   more	  importantly,	  may	   choose	  different	  ways	  of	   pursuing	   these	   interests	   politically.	  Weber	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thus	  concludes	  that	  ‘[t]he	  emergence	  of	  an	  association	  or	  even	  mere	  social	  action	  from	  a	  common	  class	  situation	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  universal	  phenomenon.’16	  Importantly,	  Weber	  does	  not	  entirely	  dismiss	  the	  Marxist	  notion	  of	  class	  identity	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  socio-­‐political	  agency.	  He	  acknowledges	  that	  individuals	  in	  the	   same	   class	   situation	  may	   be	   inclined	   to	   react	   in	   similar	   fashions	   to	   certain	   social	  situations,17	  or	  even	  to	  ‘react	  in	  mass	  numbers	  to	  such	  tangible	  situations	  as	  economic	  ones’.18	  However,	  Weber	  believes	  that	  this	  is	  an	  insufficient	  basis	  for	  considering	  classes	  in	   their	  entirety	  as	  primary	  units	  of	   social	   analysis,	   since	   the	  material	  basis	  on	  which	  class	  is	  defined	  could	  hardly	  account	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  unified	  social	  consciousness	  or	  an	  inevitable	  collective	  identity	  shared	  by	  members	  of	  the	  same	  class.	  The	  existence	  of	  a	  class	  in	  itself	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  this	  social	  grouping	  will	  act	  as	  a	  class	  for	  itself.	  Instead,	  Weber	   proposes	   a	  more	   limited	   and	   clearly	   definable	   unit	   of	   analysis.	  	  He	   advocates	   the	   consideration	   of	   status	   groups	   as	   the	   starting	   point	   for	  meaningful	  social	   stratification	   and	   analysis.	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   purely	   economically	   determined	  
class	  situation,	  he	  explains,	  a	  status	  situation	  encompasses	   ‘every	  typical	  component	  of	  the	  life	  of	  men	  that	  is	  determined	  by	  a	  specific,	  positive	  or	  negative,	  social	  estimation	  of	  
honor’.19	  Honour	  in	  this	  regard	  ought	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  set	  of	  sometimes	  sharply	  and	  sometimes	   implicitly	   defined	   values,	   norms,	   moral	   understandings	   and	   lifestyle	  elements	   shared	   by	   those	   who	   belong	   to	   a	   status	   group.	   These	   include,	   but	   are	   not	  limited	   to,	   shared	   economic	   conditions,	   such	   as	   the	   possession	   of	   property	   or	   other	  assets.	  It	  is	  individuals’	  wilful	  and	  conscious	  adherence	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  elements	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that	   creates	  an	   identifiable	   status	  group,	  which	   could	  qualify	  as	  a	  meaningful	  unit	   for	  socio-­‐political	  analysis.20	  According	  to	  Weber,	  classes	  may	  exist	  and	  form	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  their	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   prevailing	   economic	   structure,	   but	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   accounting	   for	  trajectories	   of	   socio-­‐political	   agency,	   one	   needs	   to	   look	   deeper	   into	   more	   sharply	  defined	   subcategories	   within	   classes.	   Wright,	   therefore,	   explains	   Weber’s	   distinction	  between	  class,	  status	  group	  and	  party	  as	  comprising	  three	  stages	  in	  the	  development	  of	  identifiable	  social	  actors,	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  collective	  socio-­‐political	  action.	   In	  this	  sense,	   Weber’s	   emphasis	   on	   status	   groups,	   rather	   than	   classes,	   as	   more	   measurable	  social	   categories	   should	   be	   understood	   to	   mean	   that	   ‘members	   of	   a	   class	   become	   a	  status	   group	   when	   they	   become	   conscious	   of	   sharing	   a	   common	   identity,	   and	   they	  become	   a	   party	   when	   they	   organize	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   that	   identity.’21	  In	   general,	   the	  propositions	  of	  the	  Weberian	  school	  arguably	  entail	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  appreciation	  of	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  awareness	  and	  patterns	  of	  agency	  of	  different	  groupings	  that	  may	  exist	   within	   broader	   defined	   social	   classes.	   These	   different	   groupings	   enjoy	   similar	  relations	   to	   the	  wider	   economic	   structure,	   yet	   each	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   develop	   their	  patterns	  of	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  differently.	  Once	  again,	  this	  realisation	  is	  particularly	  useful	   when	   the	   analysis	   focuses,	   as	   it	   does	   in	   this	   study,	   on	   societies	   with	   more	  traditionally	  delineated	  class	  structures.	  	  On	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  of	  appreciation	  of	  the	  conceptual	  value	  of	  class	  analysis,	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  criticisms.	  One	  typical	  account	  is	  presented	  by	  Barry	  Hindess,	  who	  articulates	  in	  great	  detail	  the	  arguments	  against	  class	  as	  a	  meaningful	  social	  actor	  and	  its	  use	  in	  political	  analysis,	  whether	  in	  the	  Marxist	  or	  the	  Weberian	  sense.	  Hindess	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid., 932-33. 
21 Erik Olin Wright, "The Shadow of Exploitation in Weber's Class Analysis," American Sociological Review 
67, no. 6 (2002): 835.  
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dismisses	  the	  idea	  of	  classes	  as	  collective	  actors	  with	  unified	  collective	  interests.	  While	  he	   admits	   that,	   in	   the	   socio-­‐political	   sphere,	   there	   are	   indeed	   actors	   other	   than	  individuals,	  he	  insists	  that	  classes	  are	  not	  among	  them.	  He	  explains	  that	  ‘the	  analysis	  of	  politics	  in	  terms	  of	  struggle	  between	  classes	  must	  be	  regarded	  as	  highly	  problematic.’22	  According	   to	   Hindess,	   classes	   cannot	   be	   identified	   as	   social	   actors	   due	   to	   the	   lack	   of	  clearly	   defined	  mechanisms	   for	   their	   presumed	   collective	   social	   action.	   ‘An	   actor’,	   he	  writes,	   ‘is	   something	   that	   formulates	   decisions	   and	   acts	   on	   some	   of	   them.’23	  In	   this	  sense,	   collectivities	   such	   as	   ‘societies’	   or	   ‘classes’	   cannot	   be	   considered	   social	   actors	  (unlike	   units	   such	   as	   state	   agencies,	   political	   parties	   and	   trade	   unions,	   which	   have	  identifiable	   processes	   of	   decision-­‐making	   and	   collective	   action).	   Hindess	   also	   rejects	  both	   the	   attribution	   of	   certain	   unified	   or	   collective	   interests	   to	   classes,	   and	   the	  assumption	   that	   such	   interests	   could	   be	   a	   basis	   for	   collective	   social	   action.	   In	   this	  regard,	   he	   seriously	   questions	   the	   underlying	   notion	   of	   class	   interest,	   namely	   in	   its	  definition	   as	   the	   objectively	   accumulated	   interest	   of	   individuals	   who	   are	   said	   to	  constitute	  a	  certain	  class.24	  ‘The	  claim	  that	  class	  as	  a	  social	  force	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  representation	  of	  class	  interests	  must	  therefore	  collapse’,	  he	  concludes.25	  Although	   Hindess’	   rejection	   of	   class	   as	   a	   useful	   framework	   of	   socio-­‐political	  analysis	   sheds	   light	   on	   legitimate	  weaknesses	   in	   traditional	   class	   analysis,	   he	   fails	   to	  introduce	   a	   plausible	   alternative.	   His	   aforementioned	   preference	   for	   units	   and	  groupings	  that	  have	  more	  clearly	  identifiable	  processes	  of	  collective	  action	  ignores	  the	  fact	   that	   these	   so-­‐called	   ‘units’	   neither	   emerge	   nor	   take	   political	   action	   in	   a	   social	  vacuum.	   The	   processes	   that	   give	   birth	   to	   various	   forms	   of	   politically	   motivated	  associations	   must	   carry	   traces	   of	   class	   interest	   in	   one	   form	   or	   another.	   The	   very	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Barry Hindess, Politics and Class Analysis (Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 7. 
23 Ibid., 110. 
24 Ibid., 115. 
25 Ibid., 113. 
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existence	   of	   such	   associations	   is	   evidence	   of	   the	   realisation	   by	   individuals	   in	   similar	  positions	  within	   the	  social	   structure	  of	  possible	  common	   interests	  among	   them.	  More	  importantly,	   these	   associations	   are	   a	   reflection	   of	   individuals’	   desire	   to	   advance	   such	  interests	   through	   organised	   social	   action.	   In	   other	   words,	   these	   forms	   of	   association	  may	  take	  on	  a	  life	  of	  their	  own	  if	  the	  practicalities	  and	  the	  dynamics	  of	  decision-­‐making	  are	   considered,	   but	   the	   social	   development	   that	   underlies	   their	   establishment	   in	   the	  first	   place	   indicates	   their	   representation	   of	   a	   wider	   form	   of	   collective	   identity	   or	  interest.	   These	   arguably	   arise	   from	   a	   social	   situation	   shared	   by	   a	   collectivity	   of	  individuals	  –	  i.e.,	  a	  class	  situation.	  Moreover,	  such	  criticisms	  of	  class	  hardly	  account	  for	  societies	   in	  which	   the	   political	   space	   for	   the	   expression	   of	   class-­‐based	   socio-­‐political	  agency	  is	  closed	  off	  or	  highly	  restricted	  by	  the	  authoritarian	  nature	  of	  the	  state	  or	  ruling	  regimes	  –	  such	  as,	  of	  course,	   in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Our	  study	  of	  socio-­‐political	  players	  in	  such	  contexts	  is	  therefore	  better	  served	  through	  a	  more	  complex	  understanding	  of	  class	  both	  as	  a	  socio-­‐political	  force	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  workings	  as	  the	  reservoir	  for	  various	  players	  on	  the	  political	  stage	  in	  a	  given	  context.	  
2.2	  Bourdieu	  and	  Classes:	  The	  Multidimensional	  Social	  Field	  The	  work	  of	  Pierre	  Bourdieu	  is	  particularly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  inherent	  complexity	  of	   the	  social	   sphere	  and	   therefore	  deserves	  special	  attention.	  For	  Bourdieu,	   the	  social	  field26	  is	  essentially	  defined	  as	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the ‘social field’ is part of his wider use of ‘fields’ as a theoretical framework 
for understanding the complex features of the overall structure of society. In this sense, ‘fields’ should be 
understood to ‘denote arenas of production, circulation, and appropriation of goods, services, knowledge, or 
status, and the competitive positions held by actors in their struggle to accumulate and monopolize these 
different kinds of capital’ (David Swartz, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (Chicago, 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 117).‘Fields’ may also be conceived of as structured spaces, the 
features of which are recognizable through, and indeed determined according to, the distributions of specific 
types of capital or combinations of capital. Appreciating the structural properties of fields and their effects on 
social actors (including the ensuing imposition of specific struggles on actors within these fields) is essential to 
understanding social reality as a space characterised and shaped by power struggles, where agents use their 
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multi-­‐dimensional	   space	   of	   positions	   such	   that	   every	   actual	   position	   can	   be	  defined	   in	   terms	  of	   a	  multi-­‐dimensional	   system	  of	   co-­‐ordinates	  whose	  values	  correspond	   to	   the	  values	  of	   the	  different	  pertinent	  variables.	  Thus	  agents	  are	  distributed	  within	  it,	  in	  the	  first	  dimension,	  according	  to	  the	  overall	  volume	  of	  the	   capital	   they	   possess,	   and	   in	   the	   second	   dimension,	   according	   to	   the	  composition	  of	  their	  capital.27	  	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  capital	  is	  understood	  as	  the	  possession	  of	  a	  combination	  of	  sources	  of	  material,	  as	  well	  as	  intangible	  power,	  which	  individuals	  use	  in	  ‘order	  to	  maintain	  and	  enhance	  their	  positions	  in	  the	  social	  order’.28	  Types	  of	  capital	  include	  economic	  capital	  (such	   as	   wealth,	   money	   and	   property),	   cultural	   capital	   (cultural	   goods	   and	   services	  including	   educational	   credentials),	   social	   capital	   (acquaintances,	   kinships,	   and	  networks),	   as	   well	   as	   symbolic	   capital	   (legitimation,	   prestige,	   reputation,	   etc).29	  The	  mechanisms	  of	  accumulating	  these	  types	  of	  capital,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  interplay	  between	  them,	  and	  their	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  relative	  position	  of	  individuals	  and	  groups	  in	  the	  multidimensional	  social	   field	  (and	   its	  sub-­‐fields),	   is	  a	  central	   theme	  that	  runs	   through	  much	   of	   Bourdieu’s	   sociology.	   Bourdieu	   maintains	   that	   Marxist	   social	   theory	  inadequately	  reduces	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  social	  world	  solely	  to	  the	  characteristics	  of	   the	   prevailing	   economic	   structure.	   As	   pointed	   out	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	  Marxist	  social	   theory	   thus	   explains	   individual	   and	   collective	   agency	   almost	   exclusively	  according	   to	   the	   possession	   of	   economic	   capital	   and	   agents’	   position	   within	   the	  relations	  of	  economic	  production.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Bourdieu,	  while	  not	  ignoring	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
capital portfolios (including economic, cultural, symbolic, etc.) to negotiate their relative positions across 
various fields within the social world. Most interesting from a conceptual point of view is the extent to which 
the concept of ‘fields’ reflects what Swartz refers to as the ‘metatheoretical dimension’ in Bourdieu’s thought: 
In other words, its flexibility vis-à-vis positivism and the often artificial, self-inflicted boundaries of social 
analysis it tends to produce. Bourdieu’s depiction of social reality through the demarcation of the analytical 
constructs of ‘fields’ moves social analysis towards a greater appreciation of the complex relations that create 
and shape the empirically recognizable categories, and which condition the underlying dynamics of power 
amongst them. Such an approach is invaluable to the study at hand, as will be explained further towards the end 
of this section, and as will indeed be evident in the following chapters. It is a particularly useful framework for 
analysing the Egyptian and Arab socio-political contexts, given the blurry boundaries that still persist in those 
contexts amongst social actors and categories (such as classes, class fractions, institutions, etc.) 
For a thorough introduction to Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of ‘fields’, see: Swartz, Culture and Power: The 
Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, 117-142.     
27 Pierre Bourdieu, "The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups," Theory and Society 14, no. 6 (1985): 724. 
28 Swartz, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, 73. 
29 Ibid., 74. 
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importance	  of	  economic	  capital	  (especially	  its	  role	  in	  facilitating	  access	  to	  other	  types	  of	  capital)30,	   counters	   that	   it	   ‘is	   in	   fact	   impossible	   to	   account	   for	   the	   structure	   and	  functioning	  of	  the	  social	  world	  unless	  one	  reintroduces	  capital	   in	  all	   its	   forms	  and	  not	  solely	   in	   the	   one	   form	   recognised	   by	   economic	   theory’.31	  In	   order	   to	   identify	   the	  patterns,	  and	  indeed	  the	  rationale,	  of	  agents’	  movement	  in	  the	  multidimensional	  social	  sphere,	   the	   composition	  of	   their	   ‘capital	  portfolios’	  must	  be	   considered.	   In	   this	   sense,	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  acquisition	  and	  retention	  of	  various	  types	  of	  capital,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  dynamics	  of	  their	  conversion	  into	  one	  another,	  are	  all	  essential	  factors	  in	  understanding	  the	  dispositions	  of	  individuals	  and	  groups	  in	  the	  social	  field.	  	  Bourdieu’s	  Distinction:	  a	  Social	  Critique	  of	  the	  Judgment	  of	  Taste	   ,32	  for	  example,	  is	   a	   thorough,	   empirical	   study	   of	   how	   the	   production	   and	   consumption	   of	   culture	   in	  society	   play	   a	   decisive	   role	   in	   determining	   the	   lines	   of	   distinction	   between	   different	  classes	  and	  subclasses	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  cultural	  capital.	  The	  latter	  is	  acquired	  in	  early	  life	  stages	  through	  the	  systematic	  internalisation	  of	  codes	  of	  conduct,	  lifestyles,	  values	  and	  similar	  factors,	  which	  are	  constantly	  enforced	  by	  practice	  as	  indicators	  of	  a	  certain	  class	  belonging.	   At	   a	   later	   stage,	   cultural	   capital	   is	   objectified	   in	   the	   form	   of	   cultural	  consumption,	   as	   is	   reflected	   in	   preferred	   cultural	   goods	   and	   services	   such	   as	   books,	  works	   of	   art,	   music,	   and	   the	   like.	   And	   finally,	   it	   is	   institutionalised	   through	   the	  acquisition	   of	   educational	   credentials,	   primarily	   facilitated	   by	   the	   procession	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 In fact, Bourdieu also clearly recognises that in a primordial sense, all other forms of capital (cultural, 
symbolic and social) could strictly be reduced to economic capital. However, he parts paths with Marxism in his 
insistence that once other forms of capital are acquired (even if this acquisition can be traced back to economic 
capital), they become analytically valuable to understanding their effect on agents’ movement in the social field 
in their own right.  
31 Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," in Cultural Theory: An Anthology, ed. Imre Szeman and Timothy 
Kaposy (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 81., 
32 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1984). 
	  41	  
structurally	   accumulated	   cultural	   capital	   rather	   than	   as	   the	   sole	   result	   of	   the	   natural	  progression	  of	  individuals,	  or	  their	  personal	  achievement	  and	  talents.33	  Along	   the	   same	   dialectics,	   understanding	   the	   processes	   by	   which	   social	   and	  symbolic	   capitals	   are	   acquired,	   accumulated	   and	   preserved	   within	   their	   respective	  social	   fields	   in	   a	   given	   context	   is	   indispensible	   to	   our	   comprehension	   of	   the	   relative	  positions	   of	   individuals	   and	   groups	   across	   the	   overall	   social	   structure.	   Social	   and	  symbolic	   capitals	   are	   best	   described	   as	   ‘the	   aggregate	   of	   the	   actual	   or	   potential	  resources	   which	   are	   linked	   to	   possession	   of	   a	   durable	   network	   of	   more	   or	   less	  institutionalized	  relationships	  of	  mutual	  acquaintance	  and	  recognition’.34	  Of	  course,	  the	  respective	  volumes	  of	  capital	   (in	  all	   its	   forms)	  within	  these	  networks	  have	  a	  mutually	  defining	  relationship	  to	   the	  volume	  of	  capital	  possessed	  by	  each	  agent	   individually.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	   size	   of	   an	   agent’s	   network	   and	   the	   ability	   to	  mobilise	   (positively	   or	  negatively)	  the	  capitals	  possessed	  by	  others	  in	  this	  network	  reflect	  on	  the	  agent’s	  own	  volume	  of	  capital	  and	  hence	  his	  ability	  to	  negotiate	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  social	  field.	  In	  general,	  the	  four	  types	  of	  capital,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  dynamics	  surrounding	  their	  conversion	  from	   one	   type	   to	   the	   other	   (including	   the	   active	   role	   of	   agents	   in	   this	   process	   of	  conversion),	   play	   an	   integral	   and	   mutually	   supportive	   role	   in	   facilitating	   agents’	  continuous	   effort	   to	   enhance	   and	   reproduce	   their	   relative	   positions	   in	   the	  multidimensional	   social	   field.	   ‘The	   convertibility	   of	   the	   different	   types	   of	   capital’,	  Bourdieu	  explains,	   ‘is	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  strategies	  aimed	  at	  ensuring	  the	  reproduction	  of	  capital	  (and	  the	  position	  occupied	  in	  the	  social	  space)’.35	  	  By	  introducing	  what	  may	  be	  called	  ‘positional	  determinism’	  –	  that	  is,	  position	  in	  the	   social	   space	   determined	   by	   the	   composition	   of	   capital	   –	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Swartz, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, 75-8. 
34 Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," 86.  
35 Ibid., 89. 
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formation	  and	  agency	  of	   social	   classes,	  Bourdieu’s	   ideas	  gain	  profound	   importance	  as	  they	   succeed	   in	   expanding	   the	   relevance	   of	   class	   analysis	   to	   societies	   not	   necessarily	  affected	   by	   the	   same	   socio-­‐historic	   development	   of	   capitalist	   economic	   relations	   as	  those	   in	   advanced	   industrial	   contexts.	   Such	   an	   approach	   is	   also	   very	   effective	   in	  accounting	  for	  intermediary	  class	  categories	  and	  sub-­‐class	  fragments	  without	  having	  to	  draw	  what	  must	  inevitably	  be	  theoretically	  constructed	  lines	  of	  demarcation	  within	  an	  artificially	  imagined	  class	  structure.	  As	  Bourdieu	  explains:	  On	   the	   basis	   of	   knowledge	   of	   the	   space	   of	   positions,	   one	   can	   separate	   out	  
classes,	   in	  the	  logical	  sense	  of	  the	  word,	  i.e.,	  sets	  of	  agents	  who	  occupy	  similar	  positions	  and	  who,	  being	  placed	  in	  similar	  conditions	  and	  subjected	  to	  similar	  conditionings,	   have	   every	   likelihood	   of	   having	   similar	   dispositions	   and	  interests	   and	   therefore	   of	   producing	   similar	   practices	   and	   adopting	   similar	  stances.36	  	  	  Logically,	  it	  follows	  that	  the	  preservation	  and	  reproduction	  of	  social	  class	  status	  in	  a	  given	  social	  context	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  constant	  movement	  by	  agents	  within	  the	  social	   field	   and	   the	   negotiation	   of	   its	   coordinates	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   maintaining	   and	  developing	  the	  types	  and	  levels	  of	  various	  components	  of	  capital	  they	  possess.	  An	   important	   qualification,	   to	   which	   Bourdieu	   himself	   draws	   attention	   in	  relation	   to	   his	   above	   conceptualisation	   of	   class,	  must	   be	  mentioned,	   as	   it	   serves	   as	   a	  reminder	   of	   the	   limitations	   not	   only	   of	   the	   concept	   itself,	   but	   also	   arguably	   of	   social	  analysis	  in	  general.	  Bourdieu	  explains	  that	  class	  in	  the	  above	  sense,	  as	  plausible	  a	  social	  category	  as	   it	  may	  seem,	   is	  still	  an	  academic	  construct,	  a	  class	  on	  paper,	  which	  has	   its	  limitations.	  This	  class	  on	  paper,	  he	  elaborates,	  has	  the	  theoretical	  existence	  that	  is	  that	  of	  theories:	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  the	  product	  of	  an	  explanatory	  classification	  […],	  it	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  explain	  and	  predict	  the	   practices	   and	   properties	   of	   the	   things	   classified	   –	   including	   their	   group	  forming	  practices.	  It	  is	  not	  really	  a	  class,	  an	  actual	  class,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  group,	  a	   group	   mobilized	   for	   struggle;	   at	   most,	   it	   might	   be	   called	   a	   probable	   class,	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  is	  a	  set	  of	  agents	  that	  will	  present	  fewer	  hindrances	  to	  efforts	  at	  mobilization	  than	  any	  other	  set	  of	  agents.37	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Bourdieu, "The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups," 725.  
37 Ibid. 
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The	  explanatory	  claims	  of	   theoretical	  class	  analysis	  should	   thus	  not	  prevent	  us	  from	   acknowledging	   the	   probability	   –	   no	  matter	   how	   low	   –	   that,	   in	   any	   given	   social	  context,	  real	  outcomes	  could	  produce	  political	  actions	  that	  emerge	  along	  different	  lines	  than	   the	   ones	   theory	   may	   initially	   have	   foreseen.	   Individuals	   occupying	   similar	  positions	   in	   the	  social	   space,	  and	   thus	  more	   likely	   to	  be	  considered	  a	  class,	   could	  and	  sometimes	  do	  engage	  in	  alliances	  which	  make	  little	  sense	  if	  measured	  according	  to	  their	  theoretically	  assumed	  class	  identities.	  As	  Bourdieu	  reminds	  us:	  	  [W]hile	   the	  probability	   of	   assembling	   a	   set	   of	   agents,	   really	   or	  nominally	   […]	  rises	  when	  they	  are	  closer	  in	  social	  space	  and	  belong	  to	  a	  more	  restricted	  and	  therefore	   more	   homogenous	   constructed	   class,	   alliances	   between	   those	   who	  are	  closest	   is	  never	  necessary,	   […]	  and	  alliance	  between	   those	  most	  distant	   is	  never	  impossible.38	  	  	  	   It	   is	  within	  Bourdieu’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  class,	  aware	  of	  both	   its	  explanatory	  powers	   to	   political	   action	   based	   on	   social	   identity	   and	   its	   self-­‐imposed	   analytical	  limitations,	  that	  this	  study	  intends	  to	  examine	  the	  mechanisms	  and	  dynamics	  that	  shape	  the	  political	   agency	  of	   the	  upper	  middle	   class	   in	  Egypt.	   Such	  a	   conceptual	   framework	  emphasises	  the	  significance	  of	  class	  identity	  as	  a	  function	  of	  proximate	  positions	  in	  the	  social	   space,	   while	   simultaneously	   accommodating	   the	   complexity	   of	   social	   reality,	  which	  no	  single	  conceptual	   framework	  can	  claim	   to	  capture	   fully	  and	  explain	  without	  qualification.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	  socio-­‐political	  setting	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  in	   general	   and	   of	   Egypt	   in	   particular,	   the	   complexity	   of	   factors	   contributing	   to	   the	  political	  agency	  of	  social	  groups	  is	  fairly	  well	  served	  by	  such	  an	  approach.	  	  
2.3	  The	  State	  as	  a	  Concept:	  Marx,	  Weber	  and	  Beyond	  This	  section	  will	  turn	  to	  the	  second	  major	  concept	  involved	  in	  this	  study:	  namely,	  the	   state.	   As	   the	   introduction	   previously	   pointed	   out,	   understanding	   the	   normative	  foundations	  of	  the	  political	  agency	  of	  Egypt’s	  upper	  middle	  class	  is	  in	  large	  part	  a	  matter	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid., 726.  
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of	  developing	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  complex	  interplay	  between	  this	  class	  and	  the	  state.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  democratic	  politics,	  the	  state’s	  perceived	  despotic	  prerogatives	  of	  power	  and	  authority,	   its	   material	   manifestations	   in	   the	   everyday	   life	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  individuals,	   and	   these	   individuals’	   shared	   class	   experiences	   of	   the	   state	   all	   play	   a	  profound	  role	   in	  aggregating	  critical	  appraisals	  of	   the	  prevailing	  political	  order,	  hence	  informing	  political	  agency.	  The	  state	  as	  a	  concept	  is	  difficult	  to	  grasp	  and	  poses	  many	  ‘thorny	  problems	  for	  any	   researcher	   studying	   comparative	   politics’.39	  Just	   as	  with	   class,	   various	   theoretical	  traditions	   tend	   toward	   different	   understandings	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   state.	   The	  definition	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  envisaging	  of	  its	  limits	  and	  boundaries	  within	  the	  social	  field	  (if	  any	  such	  limits	  can	  be	  argued	  to	  exist	  at	  all)	  bear	  significant	  consequences	  for	  how	   we	   comprehend	   its	   interplay	   with	   the	   social	   agency	   of	   specific	   classes	   and	   the	  resulting	  political	  outcomes.	  Again,	  this	  is	  especially	  true	  in	  societies	  in	  which	  the	  state	  has	   arguably	   been	   a	   colonial	   import	   rather	   than	   a	   form	   of	   rule	   resulting	   from	   an	  extended	  and	  accumulative	  social	  evolution.	  The	  following	  section	  will	  elaborate	  further	  upon	  this	  point,	  discussing	  concepts	  of	  class	  and	  state	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Egyptian	  contexts.	  	   Although	  arguably	  an	  ambiguously	  defined	  concept	  in	  traditional	  Marxist	  theory,	  the	  Marxist	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state	  could	  well	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  continuation	  of	   the	   economic	   determinism	   underpinning	   the	   Marxist	   understanding	   of	   social	  dynamics	   in	   general.	   Marx’s	   approach	   to	   the	   state	   developed	   over	   the	   course	   of	   his	  works,	   from	  a	  consideration	  of	   it	  as	  a	  mere	   ‘committee	  for	  managing	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  whole	   bourgeoisie’	   in	   the	   Communist	   Manifesto,	   to	   a	   depiction	   of	   it	   in	   Capital	   as	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Joel S. Migdal, "Researching the State," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, eds. 
Mark Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 162. 
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superstructure,	  a	  social	  arrangement,	  the	  shape	  of	  which	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  economic	  basis	  of	   society	   in	  order	   to	  optimise	  conditions	   for	   capitalist	  accumulation.	  Post-­‐Marx	  Marxist	   theory	   has	   a	   lot	   to	   offer	   on	   the	   issue	   as,	   yet	   again,	   it	   involves	   interesting	  attempts	  to	  refine	  classical	  Marxist	  conceptualisations	  of	  the	  state,	  especially	  in	  the	  area	  of	   state-­‐class	   relations.	   Poulantzas,	   for	   example,	   holds	   that	   state	   power	   can	   only	   be	  considered	  in	  relation	  to	  ‘social	  classes	  which	  hold	  power’.40	  The	  examination	  of	  social	  institutions	   such	   as	   the	   state	   must	   therefore	   take	   into	   account	   that	   ‘the	   relative	  autonomy	  of	  the	  various	  institutions	  (power	  centers)	  in	  relation	  to	  social	  classes	  is	  not	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   they	  possess	  power	  of	  their	  own	   distinct	   from	  class	  power,	  but	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  structures.’41	  In	  this	  sense,	  various	  social	  institutions,	  and	  especially	  the	  state,	  are	  not	  sources	  of	  power,	  but	  rather	  arenas	  that	  reflect	  power	  relations	  created	  by	  the	  class	  structure.42	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  Antonio	  Gramsci’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	   hegemony	   of	   the	   prevailing	   social	   class	   –	   the	   bourgeoisie	   –	   deserves	   special	  attention.	   In	  contrast	   to	  previous	  ruling	  classes,	  who	  were	   ‘essentially	  conservative	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  did	  not	  tend	  to	  construct	  an	  organic	  passage	  from	  other	  classes	  into	  their	   own,	   i.e.	   to	   enlarge	   their	   class	   sphere	   ‘technically’	   and	   ‘ideologically’,’ 43 	  the	  bourgeoisie	   is	  a	  class	  which	  uses	   the	  state	  as	  a	   tool	   to	   impose	   its	   ideology	  on	  society.	  Hence,	  Gramsci	  conceives	  of	  the	  state	  as	  ‘the	  entire	  complex	  of	  practical	  and	  theoretical	  activities	  with	  which	  the	  ruling	  class	  not	  only	  justifies	  and	  maintains	  its	  dominance,	  but	  manages	  to	  win	  the	  active	  consent	  of	  those	  over	  whom	  it	  rules’.44	  Far	  beyond	  simplistic	  coercion,	   Gramsci’s	   conception	   of	   hegemony	   is	   a	   form	   of	   domination	   in	   which	   social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, 115. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart 1971), 260. 
44 Ibid., 244. 
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spaces	  and	  frameworks	  are	  used	  as	  arenas	  for	  establishing	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  ruling	  class	  by	  lifting	  it	  to	  the	  status	  of	  socially	  accepted	  common	  sense.	  The	  diffusion	  of	  this	  common	   sense	   generates	   the	   voluntary	   consent	   of	   other	   social	   forces	   to	   prevailing	  power	  relations.	  The	  general	  notion	  of	  the	  state,	  in	  Gramsci’s	  words,	  includes	  elements	  which	  need	  to	  be	  referred	  back	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  civil	  society	  (in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  might	  say	  that	  State	  =	  political	  society	  +	  civil	  society,	  in	  other	  words	  hegemony	  protected	  by	  the	  armour	  of	  coercion).45	  	  Gramsci’s	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   tool	   for	   spreading	   a	   certain	  understanding	  of	  order	  and	  common	  sense	  by	  dominant	  social	  classes	  is	  very	  useful	  in	  looking	   at	   the	  Egyptian	   state’s	   changing	   relationship	  with	   the	  middle	   class	   in	   general	  and	   the	  upper	  middle	   class	   in	  particular.	  The	  social	   experience	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  era,	  as	  will	  be	  argued	  throughout	  this	  study,	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  fundamentally	  challenged	  a	  previously	  established	  preconception	  of	  the	  state,	   its	  boundaries,	  its	  role	  in	  society	  and	  hence	  the	  political	  dominance	  of	  its	  ruling	  elites.	  Any	  serious	  attempt	  to	  apply	  conceptualisations	  of	  the	  state	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Egyptian	  contexts	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  socio-­‐political	  analysis	  will	  find	  it	  imperative	  to	  incorporate	  at	   least	  some	  elements	  of	  Gramsci’s	  notion	  of	  hegemony	   into	  its	  comprehension	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  political	  change	  and	  the	  role	  of	  social	  classes	  therein.	  	  	  	  	   Outside	  Marxist	  circuits,	  however,	  Max	  Weber’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state	  is	  by	  far	  the	  most	  influential	  in	  modern	  political	  science	  scholarship.	  In	  Politik	  als	  Beruf46	  (Politics	   as	   a	   Vocation),	   Weber	   defines	   the	   state	   as	   ‘a	   human	   community	   that	  (successfully)	  claims	  the	  monopoly	  of	  the	  legitimate	  use	  of	  physical	  force	  within	  a	  given	  territory’.47	  Weber	  sees	  the	  modern	  state	  as	  an	  actor	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  his	  other	  works,	  Weber’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state	  is	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  investigation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid., 263. 
46 Originally a speech given at Munich University in 1918 and then published in Munich a year later. 
47 Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. 
Wright Mills (London: Routledge, 1991), 78.  
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into	  the	  different	  forms	  of	  political	  authority	  in	  society,	  from	  the	  traditional	  patrimonial,	  to	  the	  charismatic,	  to	  the	  most	  rational	  form	  of	  all	  –	  namely,	  the	  bureaucratic	  state.48	  Weber’s	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   state	   emphasises	   the	   importance	   of	  understanding	  it	  functionally:	  as	  an	  organised,	  rational	  and	  efficient	  tool	  of	  domination.	  He	   is	   uninterested	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   reflection	   of	   a	   certain	   social	  composition,	  for	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  political	  sphere,	   ‘the	  particular	  content	  of	  social	  action,	   beyond	   the	   forcible	   domination	   of	   territory	   and	   inhabitants’,	   he	   writes,	   ‘is	  conceptually	   irrelevant.’49 	  It	   is	   in	   this	   spirit	   that	   one	   should	   understand	   Weber’s	  fascination	   with	   ‘bureaucracy’	   as	   the	   most	   efficient	   and	   technically	   superior	  institutional	  form	  of	  carrying	  out	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  state.	  Bureaucracy,	  we	  are	  told,	  is	   the	   means	   of	   transforming	   social	   action	   into	   rationally	   organized	   action.	  Therefore	   as	   an	   instrument	   of	   rationally	   organizing	   authority	   relations,	  bureaucracy	   was	   and	   is	   a	   power	   instrument	   of	   the	   first	   order	   for	   one	   who	  controls	  the	  bureaucratic	  apparatus.50	  	  	  Max	   Weber’s	   definition	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   tool	   of	   domination,	   and	   of	   the	  bureaucracy	  as	  the	  state’s	  apparatus	  for	  translating	  authority	  into	  action,	  is	  a	  significant	  articulation	   of	   his	   belief	   in	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	   ‘political’.	   Such	   a	   belief	   is	   quite	  consequential	  for	  socio-­‐political	  analysis.	  It	   lays	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  theoretical	   tradition	   that	   clearly	   contrasts	   with	   the	   Marxist	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	  state	  as	  an	  institutional	  arrangement	  reflecting	  prevailing	  economic	  relations	  of	  power.	  As	  Nash	  notes,	  ‘Weber’s	  work	  stands	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  tradition	  of	  thought	  which	  is	  explicitly	  anti-­‐Marxist	  on	  just	  this	  issue	  of	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  state’.51	  For	  many	  years	  after	  Weber’s	  work,	  however,	  his	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state	  had	  to	  make	  way	  for	  other	  concepts	  developed	  in	  socio-­‐political	  analysis	  that	  essentially	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 2. 
49 Ibid., 902. 
50 Ibid., 987.  
51  Kate Nash, Contemporary Political Sociology: Globalization, Politics and Power (London: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2000), 10. 
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attempted	   to	   capture	   the	   essence	   of	   authority	   and	   political	   rule,	   such	   as	   those	   of	   the	  ‘political	   system’,	   ‘interest	   groups’	   and	   ‘elite	   theory’.	   Such	   concepts	   were	   thought	   to	  offer	  better	  explanations	  of	  political	  actions	  of	  power	  centres	  in	  society.	  According	  to	  J.	  P.	  Nettl,	   this	   is	  mainly	  due	  to	   the	   ‘shift	   in	   the	  center	  of	  gravity	  of	  social	  science	   to	   the	  United	   States’	   since	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1930s. 52 	  Timothy	   Mitchell	   agrees	   with	   this	  explanation.	   In	   his	   review	   of	   why	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   state	   was	   abandoned,	   he	   also	  explains	  that,	  following	  the	  logic	  that	  gave	  birth	  to	  other	  conceptual	  frameworks	  (such	  as	  ‘pluralist’,	  ‘elite’,	  or	  ‘political	  systems’	  theories),	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  state	  was	  found	  to	  be	  weak,	  in	  that	  it	  was	  too	  elusive	  to	  account	  for	  political	  actors	  who	  stand	  in	  the	  grey	  area	   between	   what	   is	   ‘state’	   and	   what	   is	   ‘society’	   (such	   as	   political	   parties,	   interest	  groups	  and	  the	  like).53	  	  The	  value	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  conceptual	  variable	  in	  socio-­‐political	  analysis	  made	  a	  remarkable	   comeback	   in	   the	   1980s.	   Notably,	   the	   call	   to	   bring	   the	   state	   back	   in	  was	  clearly	  based	  on	  a	  Weberian	  understanding	  of	  the	  state.	  To	  that	  end,	  Theda	  Skocpol,	  for	  example,	  suggests	  that	  there	   is	  a	  need	  to	  go	  beyond	  pluralist	  approaches,	   towards	  the	  reinstitution	  of	  the	  state	  in	  its	  own	  right	  as	  a	  variable	  in	  political	  analysis.	  She	  argues	  for	  the	  need	  to	  see	  the	  state	  ‘as	  much	  more	  than	  a	  mere	  arena	  in	  which	  social	  groups	  make	  demands	   and	   engage	   in	   political	   struggles	   or	   compromises’.54	  Skocpol	   calls	   for	   a	   new	  research	   agenda	   based	   on	   a	   two-­‐pronged	   understanding	   of	   the	   state	   both	   as	  ‘organizations	   through	   which	   official	   collectivities	   may	   pursue	   distinctive	   goals’,	   but	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 J. P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," World Politics 20, no. 4 (1968): 561. Inerestingly, Nettl 
attributes this conceptual evolution in American Political Science primarily to the relative ‘stateless’ nature of 
the United States as a society.  
53 Timothy Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics," The American 
Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (1991): 78-79. In trying to make the case for what she calls a ‘paradigmatic 
shift’ to establish renewed interest in the state as a concept, Theda Skocpol also mentions this development in 
the history of the discipline. See: Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current 
Research," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 185), 4.  
54 Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," 8. 
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equally	   as	   ‘configurations	   of	   organization	   and	   action	   that	   influence	   the	  meanings	   and	  methods	  of	  politics	  for	  all	  groups	  and	  classes	  in	  society’.55	  
2.4	  Beyond	  Weber’s	  Conceptualisation	  of	  the	  State?	  	   The	   shift	   back	   to	   using	   the	   state	   in	   socio-­‐political	   analysis,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	  Weberian	   understanding	   of	   the	   concept,	   rests	   on	   a	   core	   premise:	   namely,	   that	   of	   the	  relative	  autonomy	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  actor	  to	  be	  accounted	  for	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  Without	  going	  too	  far	  into	  a	  critique	  of	  this	  paradigm,	  an	  important	  shortcoming	  thereof	  needs	  to	   be	   highlighted	   here.	   By	   adopting	   Weber’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   state	   without	  qualification,	  the	  subject	  of	  inquiry	  of	  any	  socio-­‐political	  analysis	  is	  inevitably	  bound	  to	  be	  confined	  to	  investigating	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  state’s	  structure,	  policies	  and	  actions	  affect	   different	   social	   categories	   and	   fields.	   Both	   state	   and	   society	   in	   this	   case	   are	  treated	   as	   two	   separate	   units	   of	   analysis.	   No	   particular	   value	   is	   attributed	   to	   the	  dialectics	  of	   the	  complex	  relationship	  between	  state	  and	  society,	   the	  role	  of	  society	   in	  shaping	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   state	   itself,	   the	   bearing	   of	  members	   of	   the	   state	   apparatus’	  social	   identity,	   or	   the	   bearings	   of	   the	   processes	   whereby	   the	   state	   engages	   with	   its	  social	  surrounding.	  This	   is	  a	  primary	  product	  of	   the	  assumed	  autonomous	  personality	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  actor	  in	  the	  socio-­‐political	  context	  analysed.	  	  	  	  	   The	  work	  of	  Joel	  Migdal	  is	  significant	  and	  provides	  a	  remedy	  that	  addresses	  this	  shortcoming	  and	  will	   therefore	  represent	  a	  conceptual	   framework	  that	   this	  study	  will	  henceforth	   draw	   upon.	   Migdal’s	   work	   represents	   an	   attempt	   to	   overcome	   these	  analytical	  limitations	  by	  a	  scholar	  who	  initially	  followed	  an	  approach	  based	  on	  a	  classic	  Weberian	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state	  before	  developing	  a	  new	  paradigm	  that	  called	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Ibid., 28. 
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for	  the	  qualification	  of	  Weber’s	  holdings.	  In	  one	  of	  his	  earlier	  works,56	  Migdal	  bases	  his	  analysis	   of	   Third	  World	   states’	   failure	   to	   carry	   out	   their	   declared	   intentions	   of	   social	  transformation	  on	  a	  strict	  adherence	  to	  Weber’s	  definition	  of	  the	  state.57	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	   state	   is	   clearly	   depicted	   as	   an	   autonomous	   actor	   in	   the	   social	   context.	  Difficulties	  arising	   from	  such	  analytical	  deployment	  of	   the	  concept	  are	  more	  or	   less	  attributed	   to	  the	   ‘ideal	   type’-­‐nature	  of	   the	  Weberian	  definition	  of	   the	  state,	   and	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  analysis	   of	   practical	   cases	   of	   state-­‐society	   relations	   naturally	   implies	   minor	  qualifications	  for	  some	  components	  of	  the	  Weberian	  model	  (without	  compromising	  its	  overall	  validity).	  Migdal	  regards	   the	  state	  as	  an	  autonomous	  actor	   that	  exists	  within	  a	  mélange	  of	  conflicting	  social	  actors.58	  When	  confronted	  by	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  Weberian	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state	  appears	  to	  be	  unable	  to	  explain	  socio-­‐political	  outcomes,	  we	   are	   advised	   that,	   instead	   of	   thinking	   of	   this	   conceptualisation	   as	   problematic,	   we	  should	   rather	   seek	  explanations	  of	   the	  dynamics	  of	   state-­‐society	   relations	   through	  an	  analytical	  model	   that	  duly	  accounts	   for	  what	  Migdal	  calls	   ‘sources	  of	  resistance	   to	   the	  state’s	  efforts	  at	  achieving	  predominance’	  in	  society.59	  	   Almost	  a	  decade	  and	  a	  half	  later,	  we	  find	  that	  Migdal	  has	  come	  to	  advocate	  a	  new	  working	  definition	  of	  the	  state	  to	  replace	  Weber’s,	  on	  which	  his	  earlier	  work	  primarily	  relied.60	  In	  Migdal’s	   explanation	  of	   his	   own	   scholarly	   development,	   he	  points	   out	   that	  the	   study	   of	   state-­‐society	   relations	   was	   to	   that	   point	   dominated	   by	   a	   paradigm	   that	  considered	   the	   state	   to	   be	   the	   core	   of	   social	   activity,	   with	   the	   rest	   of	   society	   on	   the	  receiving	  end	  of	  this	  relation.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  state	  acts	  and	  society	  reacts.	  It	  follows	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third 
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that	  the	  subject	  field	  of	  state-­‐society	  relations	  was	  mainly	  occupied	  by	  the	  investigation	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  this	  interaction	  between	  the	  state	  as	  a	  primary	  actor	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  society,	  with	  a	  clear	  emphasis	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  former,	  as	  it	  was	  assumed	  that	  the	  city	  or	  center	  or	  core	  or	  state	  or	  dominant	  social	  class-­‐some	  integral	  locus	  of	   authority-­‐	   held	   superior	   resources	   and	   ideas	   that	   it	   could	   use	   in	   order	   to	  extend	   its	  will	   throughout	   an	  entire	   society.	  Those	  acted	  upon,	   the	  objects	  of	  control,	  played	  little	  role	  in	  the	  theories.61	  	  Migdal	   therefore	  proposes	  a	  new	  definition	  of	   the	  state,	  primarily	  as	  a	  complex	  social	  field.	  Our	  understanding	  of	  the	  state	  would	  be	  better	  served	  by	  coinsidering	  the	  latter	  as	  	  a	  field	  of	  power	  marked	  by	  the	  use	  and	  threat	  of	  violence	  and	  shaped	  by	  (1)	  the	  
image	   of	   a	   coherent,	   controlling	   organization	   in	   a	   territory,	   which	   is	   a	  
representation	   of	   the	   people	   bounded	   by	   that	   territory,	   and	   (2)	   the	   actual	  
practices	  of	  its	  multiple	  parts.62	  	  	   This	  dual	  understanding	  of	  the	  state	  has	  two	  important	  effects	  pertaining	  to	  both	  the	  scope	  of	  political	  research	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  research	  is	  conducted.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Migdal’s	  definition	  can	  be	  argued	  to	  extend	  practically	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  subject	  field	  of	  state-­‐society	  relations'	  research	  by	  ridding	  the	  state	  of	  its	  unqualified	  depiction	  as	  an	  autonomous	  actor,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  preserving	  the	  image	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  institutional	   arrangement.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   state	   exists	   as	   both	   a	   structure	   and	   a	  social	  construction	  that	  is	  shaped,	  produced	  and	  reproduced	  by	  its	  social	  environment.	  It	  is	  part	  –	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  product	  –	  of	  its	  society.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  such	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  state	  is	  no	  less	  important	  in	  its	  methodological	  consequences.	  This	  is	   reflected	   in	  Migdal’s	   call	   for	   a	   new	  approach,	  which	  he	   terms	   ‘state	   in	   society’	   and	  which	   points	   researchers	   to	   the	   process	   of	   interaction	   of	   groupings	   with	   one	  another.[…]	  Like	  any	  other	  group	  or	  organization,	  the	  state	  is	  constructed	  and	  reconstructed,	  invented	  and	  reinvented,	  through	  its	  interaction	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  of	  its	  parts	  with	  others.63	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   A	  decade	  earlier,	  Timothy	  Mitchell	  made	  another	  important	  call	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  so-­‐called	  statist	  approaches	  to	  socio-­‐political	  analysis.	  Drawing	  on	  Foucault’s	  notion	  of	  discourse,	  Mitchell	  makes	  the	  case	  for	  going	  beyond	  the	  unrealistic	  dichotomy	  of	  state	  vs.	   society.	  He	  stresses	   the	  need	   for	  understanding	   the	  state	   through	   the	  effects	  of	   its	  structures,	  on	  both	  material	  and	  other	   levels:	   i.e.,	   ‘the	  powerful,	  metaphysical	  effect	  of	  practices	  that	  make	  such	  structures	  appear	  to	  exist’.	  64	  In	  this	  sense,	  Mitchell	  concludes	  that	  the	  state	  is	  and	  should	  thus	  be	  addressed	  as	  a	  social	  construction	  resulting	  from	  the	  detailed	   processes	   of	   spatial	   organization,	   temporal	   arrangement,	   functional	  specification,	  and	  supervision	  and	  surveillance,	  which	  create	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  world	   fundamentally	  divided	   into	  state	  and	  society.	  The	  essence	  of	  modern	  politics	   is	   not	   policies	   formed	   on	   one	   side	   of	   this	   division	   being	   applied	   or	  shaped	   by	   the	   other,	   but	   the	   producing	   and	   reproducing	   of	   this	   line	   of	  difference.65	  	  	  	  	   One	   cannot	   deny	   that	   there	   is	   some	   benefit	   in	   considering	   the	   state	   an	  autonomous	   variable	   in	   political	   analysis,	   especially	   the	   analysis	   of	   state-­‐society	  relations.	  For	  example,	  it	  makes	  the	  analysis	  clearer	  and	  easier	  to	  conduct,	  as	  analytical	  variables	  are	  clearly	  defined	  in	  contrast	  to	  one	  another.	  A	  sharply	  defined	  dichotomy	  of	  ‘state’	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  ‘society’,	  however,	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  several	  important	  complexities	  of	  social	  reality.	  First	  of	  all,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  independent	  state	  identity,	  i.e.	  one	  that	  is	  shared	  by	  its	  agents	  and	  has	  them	  act	  in	  an	  orchestrated	  manner	  in	   pursuit	   of	   an	   assumed	   ‘state	   interest’.	   Second,	   it	   fails	   to	   capture	   the	   constructed	  nature	  of	   the	  state’s	   image	   in	   individual	  and	  collective	  class	  perceptions	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  specific	  patterns	  of	   their	   interactions	  with	   ‘the	  state’	  on	  an	  everyday	  basis.	   In	  real	  life,	  as	  Mitchell	  has	  accurately	  observed,	   the	  state	  exists	   ‘simultaneously	  as	  a	  material	  force	   and	   as	   ideological	   construct’.66 	  He	   therefore	   maintains	   that	   the	   network	   of	  institutional	  arrangements	  and	  political	  practices	  that	  form	  what	  he	  calls	   ‘the	  material	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics," 94. 
65 Ibid., 95. 
66 Timothy Mitchell, "Society, Economy and the State Effect," in The Anthropology of the State: A Reader, ed. 
Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 169. 
	  53	  
substance	   of	   the	   state’,	   is	   diffuse	   and	   ambiguously	   defined	   at	   its	   edges,	   whereas	   the	  public	   image	   of	   the	   state	   as	   an	   ideological	   construction	   is	   more	   coherent.67	  Thus,	  arguably,	  the	  image	  of	  the	  state	  is	  in	  a	  constant	  mode	  of	  production	  and	  reproduction	  as	  a	  result	  of	  everyday	  encounters	  with	  the	  state.	  	  	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  presence	  of	  ‘the	  state’	  is	  admittedly	  evident	  in	  the	  social	  context	  and	  effective	  at	  shaping	  the	  socio-­‐political	  setting	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  would	  make	  it	  impossible	  to	  overlook	  or	  render	  it	  insignificant	  as	  an	  actor,	  especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  (as	  the	  following	  section	  will	  discuss).	  This	  study	  will	  thus	  follow	  an	  approach	  based	  on	  Migdal’s	  qualified	  Weberian	  ‘state	  in	  society’	  paradigm,	  focusing	  on	  the	  social	  experience	  of	  the	  state.	  This	  much-­‐needed	  flexibility,	  capturing	  the	  nature	  of	  the	   state	   as	   a	   structure	   –	   albeit	   one	   that	   is	   by	   nature	   constantly	   produced	   and	   re-­‐produced	   through	  social	  experience	  and	  action	  –	   is	  well	   served	  by	   this	  model.	  Within	  this	  conceptual	   framework,	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  state	  can	  prove	  useful	  without	  carrying	  the	  risks	  and	  weaknesses	  attached	  to	  deploying	  it	  based	  on	  definitions	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  artificially	   constructed,	   autonomous	   actor.	  Moreover,	   the	   preservation	   of	   a	   degree	   of	  appreciation	  for	  the	  state	  as	  an	  institutional	  arrangement	  of	  power	  further	  opens	  up	  the	  analytical	   scope	   of	   any	   research	   into	   state-­‐society	   relations.	   Among	   many	   other	  benefits,	   especially	   as	   far	   the	   subject	   of	   this	   study	   is	   concerned,	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   this	  model	  permits	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  social	  effect	  of	  structural	  changes	  induced	  by	  the	  state,	   while	   duly	   acknowledging	   the	   role	   played	   by	   formations	   of	   power	   within,	   or	  indeed	   in	   control	   of,	   the	   state’s	   institutional	   apparatus	   (such	   as	   political	   regimes	   or	  ruling	  elites).	  	  	  Migdal’s	   emphasis	   on	   the	   dialectical	   relationship	   that	   characterises	   the	   state’s	  role	   in	   society	   is	   also	   a	   useful	   conceptual	   framework	   for	   understanding	   the	   link	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between	   social	   processes	   and	   the	   formulation	   of	   normative	   foundations	   of	   political	  agency,	   as	   will	   be	   evident	   throughout	   the	   chapters	   to	   follow.	   Classes	   and	   class	   sub-­‐categories,	   in	   the	   sense	   outlined	   earlier,	  meet	   and	   engage	  with	   ‘the	   state’	   in	   different	  social	  spaces	  and	  contexts.	  The	  experience	  of	  ‘meeting	  the	  state’	  entails	  not	  only	  coming	  into	   contact	   with	   the	   various	   branches	   of	   the	   state	   and	   being	   exposed	   to	   its	   various	  capacities,	  but	  also	  engaging	  in	  various	  forms	  of	  power	  relations	  and	  exchanges	  within	  the	  context	  of	  these	  everyday	  encounters.	  ‘What	  aspect’	  and	  ‘how	  much’	  of	  the	  state	  an	  individual	   encounters	   on	   an	   everyday	   basis	   is	   bound	   to	   be	   determined	   by	   this	  individual’s	   position	   and	  movement	   in	   the	   social	   space,	   as	  well	   as	   by	   the	   degree	   and	  form	   of	   state	   presence	   therein.	   It	   follows	   that	   a	   group	   of	   similarly	   positioned	   agents	  within	  the	  social	  space	  are	  more	   likely	  not	  only	   to	  develop	  a	  sense	  of	  collective	  social	  identity,	  as	  Bourdieu	  maintains,	  but	  also	  to	  experience	  the	  state	  in	  more	  or	  less	  similar	  ways.	  The	  proximity	  of	  these	  agents	  in	  the	  social	  space	  and	  their	  patterns	  of	  movement	  within	  the	  clearly	  demarcated	  boundaries	  therein	  therefore	  serve	  as	  the	  perfect	  media	  for	   the	   emergence	   of	   class-­‐typical,	   commonly	   accepted	   and	   characteristic	   discourses	  about	  the	  state	  and	  politics	  in	  general.	  
3.	  The	  State,	  Classes	  and	  Neoliberal	  Politics	  in	  the	  Arab	  Context	  
3.1	  State	  and	  Class	  in	  the	  Arab	  World	  This	   study	  will	   demonstrate	  how	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	   are	   engaged	   in	  on-­‐going	   and	   protracted	   quests	   for	   the	   reproduction	   of	   social	   status	   through	   various	  practices	  in	  the	  social	  field.	  Such	  an	  experience	  is	  defined	  by	  proximate	  positions	  in	  the	  class	   structure	   and	   thus	   includes	  many	   shared	   and	   internalized	   elements.	   One	   could	  thus	  argue	  that	  the	  experience	  produces	  class-­‐typical	  normative	  foundations	  of	  political	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agency,	   while	   also	   taking	   place	   within	   dialectic	   frameworks	   that	   engulf	   the	   various	  manifestations	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  social	  space.	  The	  following	  chapters’	  analysis	  will	  thus	  be	   concerned	   with	   the	   examination	   of	   the	   two	   elements	   that	   arguably	   produce	   the	  normative	  foundation	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  class’	  political	  agency	  in	  Egypt:	  namely,	  the	  class	  aspect,	  and	  the	  social	  experience	  of	  the	  state.	  As	  highlighted	  earlier,	  concepts	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter	  should	   therefore	   be	   approached	   and	   applied	  with	   a	   degree	   of	   sensitivity,	   in	   order	   to	  avert	  the	  risk	  of	  theoretical	  abstraction	  in	  studying	  socio-­‐political	  developments	  in	  the	  particular	  context	  of	  the	  Arab	  World.	  This	  should	  be	  fairly	  understandable	  in	  light	  of	  the	  nature	   of	   political	   science	   –	   or	   at	   least	   its	   theoretical	   foundations	   –	   as	   a	   discipline	  primarily	   informed	   by	   the	  Western	   historical	   experience.	   The	   investigation	   of	   socio-­‐political	  developments	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  especially	  when	  focused	  on	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  state	  and	  various	  social	  forces,	  must,	  in	  one	  form	  or	  another,	  take	   the	   specific	   historical	   context	   in	   which	   both	   classes	   and	   states	   emerged	   and	  interact	  in	  the	  region	  into	  account.	  	  In	  laying	  out	  the	  analytical	  framework	  of	  his	  landmark	  study	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Arab	  state,	  Nazih	  Ayubi	  highlights	  the	  challenges	  posed	  by	  this	  region-­‐specific	  historical	  context	  to	  any	  research	  into	  state-­‐society	  relations	  in	  the	  Arab	  World	  in	  particular	  and	  postcolonial	   societies	   in	  general.	  The	  state	   in	  ex-­‐colonial	   societies,	  he	  writes,	   ‘was	  not	  created	  by	  a	  national	  bourgeoisie	  but	  by	  a	  foreign	  colonial	  one	  which	  over	  inflated	  the	  size	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  machine,	  especially	  its	  military	  wing,	  to	  serve	  its	  own	  main	  bulk	  of	   national	   interests.’	   As	   a	   result,	   ‘this	   state	   has	   developed	   a	   considerable	   amount	   of	  ‘relative	   autonomy’	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  native	   economic	   and	   social	   forces.	   […]	   Inevitably	   this	  gave	  the	  state	  significant	  power	  in	  the	  economic	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  political	  affairs	  of	  the	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society.’68	  Strongly	  influenced	  by	  Gramsci’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  hegemony,	  Ayubi	  is	  very	  conscious	  of	  the	  state’s	  strong	  presence	  in	  the	  social	  sphere,	  especially	  its	  role	  not	  only	  as	  a	  mediator	  or	  former	  of	  alliances	  with	  certain	  social	  forces,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  creator	  of	  its	  own	  class,	  which	  accordingly	  plays	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  social	  structure	  at	  certain	  historical	  stages.	  Furthermore,	   Ayubi	   draws	   attention	   to	   the	   absence	   of	   social,	   economic	   and	  historical	  contexts	  in	  the	  Arab	  World	  mirroring	  those	  that	  produced	  the	  state	  and	  class-­‐structured	  societies	  in	  Europe.	  Combined	  with	  the	  imposition	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  form	  of	  rule	   and	   authority	   by	   colonialism,	   the	   lack	   of	   these	   characteristics	   leaves	   us	   with	   a	  ‘dispersed,	   fluid	   class	  map	  with	   classes	  excessively	  dependent	  on	   the	   state	   (or	  on	   the	  outside	  world)	   and	  with	  many	   intermediate	   strata,	   couches	  moyennes,	   in	   existence’.69	  Thus,	  the	  study	  of	  state,	  society,	  and	  politics	  in	  the	  Arab	  World	  must	  not	  solely	  concern	  itself	  with	   the	   state	   as	   an	   institutional	   structure.	  Rather,	   the	   inquiry	   should	  primarily	  focus	  on	  the	  classes	  and	  groups	  state	  actions	  tend	  to	  favour	  or	  disfavour.	  Looking	  at	  the	  essence	  of	  Arab	  politics,	  we	  thus	  seem	  to	  be	  	  	  	  having	  groups	   (some	  of	   them	  more	   ‘primordially’	   solidaristic	   and	   some	  more	  socio-­‐economic	   in	   nature),	   and	   we	   have	   the	   state.	   Then	   we	   have	   a	   whole	  variety	  of	  'arrangements'	  (some	  more	  abrupt	  and	  cruel	  than	  others)	  for	  sorting	  out	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  groups	  and	  the	  state.70	  	  In	  general,	  Ayubi’s	  work	  can	  be	  considered	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  attempts	  to	   refine	   theoretical	   frameworks	  of	   socio-­‐political	   analysis,	  with	   the	  aim	  of	   advancing	  the	  cause	  of	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  Arab	  society	  and	  politics.	  However,	  the	  growing	  complexity	  and	  fragmentation	  of	  today’s	  social	  composition	  in	  Arab	  societies	  generally	  and	   in	   Egypt	   specifically	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   prompting	   a	   framework	   with	   arguably	   less	  emphasis	   on	   the	   autonomy	   of	   state	   and	   social	   classes	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   each	   other,	   as	   argued	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Nazih Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 
12. 
69 Ibid., 31. 
70 Ibid., 33. 
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earlier.	  While	   this	   should	  be	  no	   invitation	   to	  discard	   the	  mutual	  effects	  of	  a	  state	   and	  classes,	  we	  need	  to	  dig	  deeper	  into	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  them	  in	  the	  social	  field.	  As	  the	  following	  chapters	  will	  demonstrate,	  today’s	  Egyptian	  context	  exemplifies	  the	   dialectic	   and	   mutually	   constitutive	   state-­‐society	   relationship.	   In	   Egypt,	   both	   the	  state	  and	   society	  are	   constantly	   forming	  each	  other.	  The	  analysis	  of	  politics	   in	   such	  a	  context	   must	   thus	   look	   into	   the	   dynamics	   and	   results	   of	   this	   process.	   The	   political	  agency	   of	   a	   certain	   class	   or	   social	   group	   is	   therefore	   a	   function	   of	   state-­‐society	  interaction,	   both	   defined	   within	   the	   previously	   outlined	   conceptual	   framework.	   This	  framework	   has	   not	   traditionally	   been	   dominant	   in	   studies	   of	   Egyptian	   politics	   and	  society.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  more	  classic	  tradition	  exists	  in	  which	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  a	  clear	  dichotomy	  between	  the	  state	  and	  certain	  social	  forces;	  more	  specifically,	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  former	  on	  the	  latter.	  In	  this	  tradition,	  the	  state,	  or	  a	  specific	  regime	  of	  political	  rule	  equated	  with	   the	  state,	   is	  accounted	   for	  as	  an	   independent	  actor	  with	  clear	  effects	  on	  the	  social	  structure.	  Hence,	   the	  main	  subject	  of	   inquiry	  has	  been	  social,	  economic	  and	  political	   transformations	   viewed	   mainly	   as	   a	   function	   of	   state	   measures,	   actions,	  policies	  and	  even	  ideologies.71	  Examples	   of	   works	   falling	   within	   this	   broad	   category	   include	   Egypt:	   Military	  
Society, 72 	  in	   which	   Anouar	   Abdel-­‐Malek	   meticulously	   traces	   the	   process	   of	   social	  engineering	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Nasserist	  state	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1960s,	  following	  a	  period	   of	   relative	   accommodation	   of	   the	   old	   elites	   after	   the	   1952	   change	   of	   regimes.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 There is certainly an important amount of literature that specifically focuses on the Arab and Egyptian state 
itself as the main subject of inquiry. Such studies consciously confine themselves to the investigation of the 
nature, historical evolution and composition of the state, indulging into the dynamics of state-society interaction 
only insofar as these can explain the nature or the evolution of the state. See for example: Nazih Ayubi, 
Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary Egypt (London: Ithaca Press, 1980); Giacomo Luciani, ed. The Arab 
State (London: Routledge, 1990), 24-45.   
72 Anouar Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society. The Army, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1968).  
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Other	  pivotal	  studies	  of	  the	  political	  economies	  of	  the	  Nasser	  and	  Sadat	  regimes,	  such	  as	  Waterbury’s	  The	  Egypt	  of	  Nasser	  and	  Sadat:	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Two	  Regimes,73	  also	  fall	   into	   this	   category,	   in	   that	   they	   investigate	   the	   socio-­‐political	   effects	   of	   the	   state’s	  manipulation	  and	  intervention	  in	  the	  economy	  while	  more	  or	  less	  treating	  the	  state	  as	  an	  independent	  player	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  Similarly,	  more	  recent	  studies	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  authoritarian	  rule	  under	  Mubarak	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  state	  as	  an	  authoritarian	  political	  actor	  and	  various	  elements	  of	  society	  as	  reactors	  to,	  or	  receivers	  of,	  such	  authoritarian	  action.74	  While	   relying	   on	   some	   of	   this	   literature	   provides	   a	   source	   of	   invaluable	  research	  to	  demonstrate	  specific	  points	  or	  to	  present	  evidence	  regarding	  certain	  facts,	  this	  study	  will	  do	  so	  with	  a	  view	  to	  preserving	  an	  overall	  adherence	  to	  the	  previously	  discussed	  conceptualisations	  of	  state	  and	  class.	  Another	   approach,	   which	   has	   arguably	   produced	   a	   rather	   thinner	   body	   of	  literature	  on	  politics	  and	  society	  in	  the	  Arab	  World	  in	  general	  and	  Egypt	  in	  particular,	  is	  one	  that	  finds	  elite	  theory	  to	  be	  a	  suitable	  framework	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  socio-­‐political	  settings	   in	   this	   region.	   A	  model	   of	   a	   ruling	   few	   against	   a	   ruled	  majority	   is	   used	   as	   a	  departure	  point	   for	  developing	   an	  understanding	  of	   the	  overall	   socio-­‐political	   picture	  and	  the	  dynamics	  of	  political	  domination	  and	  change	  in	  Arab	  societies	  and	  in	  Egypt.75	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  more	  recent	  scholarly	  stream	  has	  advanced	  an	   increasing	  sense	   of	   separation	   from	   such	   traditional	   depictions	   of	   state	   and	   society	   as	   two	  contrasting	  entities	  to	  be	  investigated	  separately	  from,	  or	  in	  contrast	  to	  each	  other.	  The	  somewhat	  artificial	  contrast	  between	  what	  is	  ‘state’	  and	  what	  is	  ‘society’	  has	  made	  way	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1983). 
74 See for example: Maye Kassem, Egyptian Politics, the Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2004); Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delusion : Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2000). 
75 See for example: Volker Perthes, "Politics and Elite Change in the Arab World " in Arab Elites: Negotiating 
the Politics of Change, ed. Volker Perthes (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004); and Gamal Abdelnasser, 
"Egypt: Sucssesion Politics," in Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change, ed. Volker Perthes (London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).  
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for	  a	  more	  integrative	  approach,	  which	  examines	  socio-­‐political	  settings	  with	  a	  view	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  what	  may	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  the	   ‘social	  effect	  of	   the	  state’.	  The	  main	  focus	  here	  shifts	  towards	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  process	  of	  interaction	  between	  actors	  in	  a	  ‘social	   space’.	   In	   such	   a	   space,	   images	   of	   state,	   class	   and	   society,	   and	   in	   turn	   political	  convictions,	   are	   the	   constructed	   product	   of	   people’s	   everyday	   experiences,	   both	  individually	  and	  collectively,	  with	  different	  forms	  of	  authority	  and	  power.	  This	  growing	  academic	   stream	   is	  primarily	   concerned	  with	   the	   interplay	  between	  various	  actors	   in	  the	   social	   field	  and	  how	   they	  shape	  each	  other	   through	  a	  dialectic	  and	  constantly	  on-­‐going	  relationship.	  As	  Diane	  Singerman	  puts	   it,	   it	  holds	   that	   in	  order	   ‘[t]o	  understand	  the	   dynamics	   of	   political	   change,	   we	   must	   widen	   our	   investigation	   of	   the	   locus	   of	  politics	   and	   revise	   our	   stereotypes	   about	   its	   institutional	   shape’.76	  Similarly,	   Timothy	  Mitchell	   stresses	   the	   significance	   of	   understanding	   Egyptian	   politics	   within	   the	  frameworks	  of	  power	  discourses.	  Indeed,	  much	  of	  his	  work	  on	  Egypt	  is	  an	  extension	  of	  his	  call	  for	  conceptualising	  the	  state	  in	  terms	  surpassing	  the	  traditional	  emphasis	  on	  its	  autonomy	  as	  a	  socio-­‐political	  actor	  (as	  mentioned	  earlier).77	  More	   recently,	   Salwa	   Ismail78	  placed	   considerable	   emphasis	   on	   the	   need	   to	  understand	  the	  state	  in	  Egypt	  as	  a	  constructed	  product	  in	  the	  collective	  consciousness	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Diane Singerman, Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 4. 
77 Timothy Mitchell, "The Ear of Authority," Middle East Report, no. 147 (1987); "The Invention and 
Reinvention of the Egyptian Peasant," International Journal of Middle East Studies 22, no. 2 (1990); 
"Dreamland: The Neoliberalism of Your Desires," Middle East Report, no. 210 (1999).  
78  Salwa Ismail and Timothy Mitchell’s work primarily employs a Foucauldian conceptual framework, 
especially with regards to their analysis of discourses underpinning the prevalence and reproduction of power 
structures. Their work is amongst the most influential of recent scholarly attempts to explain the social 
processes surrounding the reproduction of authoritarianism in Egypt from below. In particular, Salwa Ismail’s 
scholarship has been valuable to the study at hand, especially as concerns her research design in examining 
political discourses and subjectivities emerging from everyday practices, and forms of state presence in 
marginalised and poor communities in the recent Egyptian neoliberal context. However, this thesis remains 
committed to a conceptual framework informed primarily by Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of class and 
modes of movement in the social field by agents in possession of similar compositions of different types of 
capital, and hence occupying proximate positions in the social field. The Foucauldian approach is suitable for 
explaining the emergence of subjectivities as a result of everyday practices that take place within specific 
material compositions and orderings of material space and time – which themselves are the reflection and 
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of	  social	  forces.79	  The	  image	  of	  the	  state	  and,	   in	  turn,	  political	  attitudes,	  arise	  from	  the	  day-­‐to	   day	   process	   of	   negotiating	   the	   state	   in	   the	   form	   of	   living	   conditions,	   power	  relations	  and	  authority	  dynamics	  attributed	  to	  the	  works	  of	  the	  state	  by	  the	  community.	  Asef	   Bayat	   takes	   this	   mode	   of	   analysis	   to	   yet	   another	   level	   as	   he	   argues	   that	   socio-­‐political	  change	  may	  very	  well	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  patterns,	  displays	  and	  dynamics	  of	  the	  everyday	   movement	   of	   non-­‐collective	   actors	   in	   the	   public	   space,	   especially	   in	   the	  neoliberal	   Middle	   Eastern	   city.	   Consequently,	   the	   everyday	   movement	   of	   millions	   of	  people	   in	   dense	   urban	   conglomerates	   across	   the	   Middle	   East	   is	   creating	   what	   Bayat	  calls	  the	  Political	  Street.	  The	  term	  is	  meant	  to	  capture	  the	  political	  effect	  of	  	  collective	   sentiments,	   shared	   feelings,	   and	  public	  opinions	  of	  ordinary	  people	  in	   their	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   utterances	   and	   practices	   that	   are	   expressed	   broadly	   in	  public	  spaces-­‐in	  taxis,	  buses,	  and	  shops,	  on	  street	  sidewalks,	  or	  in	  mass	  street	  demonstrations.80	  	  The	  politics	  of	  change	  in	  the	  modern	  Middle	  East	  are	  increasingly	  the	  workings	  of	   what	   Bayat	   calls	   nonmovements.	   These	   are	   primarily	   constituted	   of	   ‘the	   collective	  actions	   of	   noncollective	   actors’. 81 	  These	   nonmovements,	   conditioned	   by	   a	   set	   of	  characteristics	   distinguishing	   them	   from	   more	   conventional	   forms	   of	   socio-­‐political	  action,	  are	  most	  remarkably	  ‘made	  up	  of	  practices	  that	  are	  merged	  into,	  indeed	  are	  part	  and	  parcel	  of,	  the	  ordinary	  practices	  of	  everyday	  life’.82	  Traditional	   literature’s	   focus	   on	   elite	   or	   high	   politics	   and	   formal	   political	  processes	   is	   bound	   to	   exclude	   the	   alternative	   strategies	   of	   effective	   participation,	  resistance	  and	  engagement	  developed	  by	   social	   formations	  and	  classes	  which	  are	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
product of certain distributions of power. The study of class-common dispositions and inclinations towards 
politics (in this case, those of the Egyptian upper middle class), however, is better served by Bourdieu’s 
emphasis on frameworks for understanding the dynamics used by agents to translate their subjectivities into 
social action (individual and eventually collective) and the features of the social order that emerges as a result.            
79 Salwa Ismail, Political Life in Cairo's New Quarters: Encountering the Everyday State (London: University 
of Minnesota Press 2006). 
80 Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2010), 13. 
81 Ibid., 19. 
82 Ibid., 20. 
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part	  of	  these	  processes.	  It	  therefore	  loses	  sight	  of	  the	  dynamics	  through	  which	  the	  very	  politicisation	  of	   these	  groups	   takes	  place.	   If	   the	  essence	  –	  and,	   indeed,	   the	  origin	  –	  of	  political	   outcomes	   is	   to	   be	   grasped,	   especially	   in	   countries	  where	   societies	   negotiate	  their	   welfare	   against	   authoritarian	   states,	   it	   is	   imperative	   to	   extend	  what	   Singerman	  calls	   ‘our	   self-­‐conscious	   construction	   of	   disciplinary	   boundaries’ 83 	  in	   order	   to	  accommodate	  alternative	  forms	  of	  political	  participation	  and	  actions	  of	  different	  social	  groups.	  Our	  understanding	  of	  how	  state	  and	  society	  constitute	  and	  shape	  one	  another	  is	  thus	  never	   complete	  unless	   the	   subject	   of	   our	   investigation	  becomes	   the	  dynamics	  of	  the	   processes	   of	   interaction	   between	   them.	   The	   objective	   is	   not	   to	   understand	   these	  dynamics	   in	  themselves	  as	  much	  as	   it	   is	   to	  develop	  a	  sense	  of	  how	  they	  influence	  and	  shape	   the	   political	   agency	   of	   social	   groupings.	   ‘An	   integrative	   notion	   of	   the	   political	  process’,	  as	  Singerman	  asserts,	  ‘captures	  the	  participation	  of	  less	  visible	  members	  of	  the	  community	  and	  refutes,	  or	  at	  least	  modifies,	  claims	  that	  they	  are	  apathetic,	  alienated	  or	  repressed’.84	  Particularly	   in	   today’s	  Arab	   and	  Egyptian	   contexts,	   this	   seems	   to	   be	   both	  wise	  and	  useful,	  as	  wide	  constituencies	  have,	  in	  their	  own	  unique	  ways,	  made	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  decisive	  move	  from	  the	  political	  peripheries	  of	  the	  past	  decades	  into	  the	  arena	  of	  political	  contestation.	  This	  study	  contends	  that	  the	  everyday	  and	  social	  experiences	  of	  ordinary	   people	   are	   a	   rich	   source	   of	   material	   to	   aid	   our	   inquiry	   of	   the	   normative	  foundations	   of	   political	   agency.	   Furthermore,	   it	   maintains	   that	   studying	   these	  experiences	   could	   be	   a	   suitable	   entry	   point	   for	   the	   examination	   of	   class-­‐specific	  attitudes	   towards	   politics,	   a	   point	   that	   will	   be	   substantiated	   in	   more	   detail	   in	   the	  chapters	  to	  follow.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Singerman, Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo, 5. 
84 Ibid., 4. 
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The	  study	  will	  therefore	  proceed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  broader	  understanding	  of	  the	  notion	  of	   'politics'	   that	  deliberately	   surpasses	   the	   traditional	   focus	  on	   formal	  political	  dynamics	   and	   the	   actions	   of	   players	   that	   could	   collectively	   be	   said	   to	   constitute	   the	  polity	   or	   the	   body	   politique.	   Much	   of	   our	   success	   in	   making	   sense	   of	   future	   political	  patterns,	  changes	  and	  outcomes	  in	  post-­‐2011	  Egypt	  arguably	  depends	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  appreciate	   the	   significance	   of	  more	   informal	   and	  mostly	   overlooked	   aspects	   of	   social	  and	   class-­‐typical	   negotiations	   of	   prevailing	   power	   structures	   embedded	   within	  everyday	  social	  struggles.	  ‘Politics’	  in	  this	  broader	  sense	  originates	  in	  the	  subjectivities	  bred,	   sharpened,	   and	   intensified	   as	  part	   of	   the	  on-­‐going	   struggles	   of	   ordinary	  people.	  Once	  again,	  as	  chapter	  six	  will	  demonstrate	  in	  detail,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  emphasise	  this	  study’s	  underlying	  proposition	   that	   internalised	  class-­‐specific	  experiences	  of	   the	  state	  in	   this	   context	   bear	   a	   profound	   impact	   on	   the	   development	   of	   normative	   convictions	  about	   the	   nature	   and	   utility	   of	   politics,	   and	   thus	   on	   the	   development	   of	   normative	  foundations	  of	  political	  agency.	  	  	  	  	  	  
3.2	  Neoliberalism	  and	  the	  Changing	  Foundations	  of	  Political	  Agency	  The	   introduction	   argued	   that	   Egypt’s	   upper	   middle	   class	   is	   formulating	   the	  patterns	  of	  its	  future	  political	  agency	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  fundamental	  departure	  from	  its	  traditional	   relationship	   with	   the	   state	   in	   the	   social	   field.	   Since	   the	   early	   1990s,	   this	  relationship	  (which	  has	  shaped	  the	  role	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  as	  the	  social	  bulwark	  of	   the	   state	   over	   previous	   decades)	   has	   irreversibly	   been	   replaced	   with	   a	   more	  politically	   constitutive	   and	   defining	   process	   of	   negotiating	   neoliberal	   market	  mechanisms.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   introduction	   pointed	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   questions	  surrounding	  the	  potential	  political	  consequences	  of	  liberalisation	  in	  the	  Arab	  World	  are,	  admittedly,	   not	   all	   that	   new.	   Since	   the	   inception	   of	   limited	   forms	   of	   liberalisation	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policies	  in	  several	  North	  African	  Arab	  countries	  during	  the	  1970s,85	  a	  considerable	  body	  of	   literature	  has	  concerned	   itself	  with	   the	  patterns	  and	  destination	  of	  political	  change	  that,	  it	  was	  assumed,	  would	  follow	  such	  a	  transformation.	  This	  study	  will	   repeatedly	  argue	   that	   in	  order	   to	  understand	  the	  socio-­‐political	  settings	  leading	  to	  the	  unexpected	  political	  outcomes	  of	  early	  2011	  (particularly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class),	  we	  need	  to	  look	  back	  on	  the	  social	  processes	  by	  which	   the	   political	   agency	   of	   that	   class	   had	   been	   shaped	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   setting.	  This	   prompts	   a	   conceptual	   observation	   necessary	   for	   proceeding	   with	   the	   following	  chapters’	  analysis:	  namely,	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘neoliberalism’.	  The	  technical	  meaning	   usually	   refers	   to	   a	   bundle	   of	   structural	   adjustment,	   financial	   stability	   and	  privatisation	  policies	  adopted	  in	  Britain	  and	  the	  US	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s	  in	  response	   to	   a	   growing	   financial	   crisis	   of	   the	   post-­‐WWII	  welfare	   state.	   In	   the	   last	   two	  decades,	  these	  policies	  have	  arguably	  been	  upheld	  as	  a	  universally	  applicable	  ‘manual’	  for	  economic	  reform,	  advocated	  by	  international	  financial	  organisations,	  and	  especially	  put	   forth	   to	   third	   world	   countries	   suffering	   the	   typical	   failures	   of	   post-­‐colonial	  economic	  development	  models.86	  However,	  as	  far	  as	  this	  study	  is	  concerned,	  neoliberalism	  in	  the	  Arab	  World	  and	  particularly	  in	  Egypt	  needs	  to	  be	  appreciated	  beyond	  its	  technical	  terms.	  In	  Egypt,	  the	  shift	  towards	  neoliberalism	  was	  an	  ambitious	  attempt	  to	  secure	  the	  political	  survival	  of	  an	   aging	   and	   financially	   burdened	   authoritarian	   state.	   At	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   1980s,	  this	   important	   political	   dimension	   of	   the	   institution	   of	   the	   first	  wave	   of	   liberalisation	  policies	   in	   various	   post-­‐populist	   Arab	   states	   has	   been	   accurately	   acknowledged	   by	  Moore	  as	  primarily	  ‘a	  political	  tactic	  for	  sustaining	  authoritarian	  regimes	  rather	  than	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Roger  Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 3rd ed. (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 115-16. 
86 Alfred Zack-Williams, Ed Brown, and Giles Mohan, Structural Adjustment: Theory, Practice and Impacts 
(London, New York: Routledge, 2000), 14-20. 
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a	   set	   of	   reforms	   for	   stimulating	   free	   enterprise	   or	   market’. 87 	  Arab	   autocracies	  reluctantly	  resorted	   to	  what	  Springborg	  calls	   the	  new	   ‘development	  orthodoxy’	  of	   the	  mid	  1970s	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  administer	  the	  growing	  financial	  crisis	  of	  the	  state	  with	  as	  few	  political	  concessions	  as	  possible.88	  In	  this	  regard,	  some	  conceptual	  parallels	  could	  perhaps	  be	  drawn	  from	  attempts	  at	  appreciating	  neoliberalism	  as	  a	  class	  project.	  For	  example,	  David	  Harvey	  has	  argued	  that	  neoliberalism	  is	  essentially	  a	  concerted	  effort	  motivated	  by	  capitalist	  class	  interests	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  lifting	  regulatory	  and	  political	  constraints	  that	  may	  have	  been	  imposed	  in	   earlier	   historical	   contexts	   around	   the	   accumulation	   of	   capitalist	   profits.	   In	   some	  cases,	  most	   notably	   1970s	   Argentina	   and	   Chile,	   the	   accomplishment	   of	   this	   goal	  was	  ‘swift,	  brutal,	  and	  sure’,	  carried	  out	  via	  classic	  military	  coups	  backed	  by	  capitalist	  upper	  classes.	  In	  the	  US,	  Britain	  and	  other	  Western	  democracies,	  the	  same	  objectives	  had	  to	  be	  achieved,	   albeit	   by	   embedding	   them	   within	   a	   discourse	   of	   ‘freedom’,	   which	   would	  eventually	  penetrate	  society	  and	  become	  hegemonic	  common	  sense.89	  In	   Egypt’s	   case,	   Raymond	   Hinnebusch	   accurately	   detected	   the	   post-­‐Nasserist	  crisis	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   state.	  When	   Nasser	   died	   in	   1970,	   he	   left	   Egypt	   crippled	   by	   its	  unsustainable	   populist	   promises	   and	   a	   financially	   costly	   social	   pact	   with	   the	   middle	  class.	  The	  Egyptian	  state	  was	  in	  crisis.	  The	  shift	  to	  liberalisation	  policies	  was	  therefore	  inevitable	  as	  a	  crisis	  relief	  measure	  to	  save	  the	  authoritarian	  nature	  of	  the	  state,	  by	  way	  of	   reconfiguring	   its	  main	   social	   alliance	   and	   incorporating	   new	   segments	   of	   both	   the	  state	   and	   private	   bourgeoisie.90	  As	   Veltmeyer	   later	   pointed	   out	   in	   the	   1990s,	   by	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adopting	   neoliberal	   policies,	   Mubarak	   (and	   indeed	   the	   Egyptian	   state	   as	   a	   whole)	  represented	   ‘an	   entire	   capitalist	   class’.91	  For	   the	   past	   two	  decades,	   neoliberalism	   as	   a	  political	  survival	  strategy	  appeared	  to	  be	  paying	  off	  in	  Egypt	  as	  well	  as	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  Arab	  World.	  As	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  introduction,	  by	  early	  2011	  there	  was	  little	  indication	  that	  neo-­‐liberalising	  Arab	  states	   in	  general,	  or	  Egypt	   in	  particular,	  were	  facing	  serious	  challenges	  to	  authoritarian	  rules.	  However,	  the	  wave	  of	  sweeping	  political	  discontents	  came	  swiftly,	  forcefully	  and	  fatally.	   Much,	   it	   turns	   out,	   had	   been	   brewing	   beneath	   the	   surface.	   Neoliberalism	   had	  gradually	   been	   inflicting	   fundamental	   changes	   to	   the	  mechanisms	   through	  which	   the	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  of	  wide	  segments	  of	  society	  were	  formed,	  to	  a	  degree	  unforeseen	  by	  those	  who	  had	  hoped	  it	  would	  perpetuate	  their	  rule.	  Such	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  deep	  changes	   in	   the	   social	   fabric	   inflicted	   by	   neoliberalism	   and	   the	   growing	   hegemony	   of	  market	   mechanisms	   in	   general92;	   hence,	   the	   need	   for	   looking	   beyond	   the	   technical	  structural	   change	   it	   brings	   to	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   the	   state.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	  substantial	   departure	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   economic	   model	   from	   state-­‐led	   and	   classic	  development	   approaches,	   this	   model	   also	   has	   an	   intricate	   social	   effect	   on	   the	   self-­‐constitution	  of	  citizens	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  their	  states.	  The	  discourses	  about	  citizenship,	  state	  and	  authority	   produced	   in	   the	   course	   of	   rearranging	   socio-­‐economic	   relations	   through	  neoliberal	  structural	  changes,	  and	  the	  persistent	  diffusion	  of	  new	  social	  orthodoxies	  in	  society,	  are	  bound	  to	  change	  the	  foundations	  of	  political	  agency.	  For	  example,	  as	  Henry	  Giroux	  has	  noted,	  the	  prevalence	  of	  corporate	  culture	  in	  neoliberal	  societies	  practically	  turns	  citizenship	  into	  an	  ‘utterly	  privatized	  affair	  whose	  aim	  is	  to	  produce	  competitive	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self-­‐interested	   individuals	   vying	   for	   their	   own	  material	   and	   ideological	   gain’.93	  Such	   a	  change	   in	   the	   conventional	   patterns	   of	   formation	   of	   political	   agency	   has	   been	   taking	  place	   slowly,	   accumulatively	   and	   gradually	   in	   Egypt	   over	   the	   past	   two	   decades.	  Most	  ironically,	   it	   has	   been	   happening	   in	   social	   areas	   and	   spaces	   casually	   ignored	   by	   the	  watchful	   eyes	   of	   state	   security	   agents	   and	   internal	   spying	   bodies	   charged	   with	  controlling	  access	  to	  and	  movement	  within	  the	  formal	  political	  field.	  	  Neoliberalism	  in	  Egypt	  as	  an	  authoritarian	  endeavour	  has	  ignored	  the	  agency	  of	  intermediate	  social	  segments	  that	  are	  directly	  affected	  by	  the	  accompanying	  economic	  transformations,	  especially	  in	  the	  middle	  class.	  However,	  the	  support	  of	  these	  segments	  proved	  fundamental	  for	  the	  sustainability	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  political	  order.	  Eventually,	  for	  the	   traditional	   middle	   class	   backbone	   of	   the	   post-­‐July	   1952	   Egyptian	   state,	   the	  neoliberal	  experience	  has	  provided	  a	  socio-­‐economic	  context	  for	  a	  fundamental	  change	  in	   the	   conditions	   shaping	   its	   political	   agency.	   To	   sharpen	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	  mechanisms	  and	  dynamics	   involved	   in	   this	  process	   in	   the	  neoliberal	  era,	  especially	   in	  areas	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   considers	   vital	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   social	   status	  reproduction,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  develop	  viable	  paradigms	  through	  which	  the	  road	  leading	  to	   the	   upheaval	   of	   January	   2011	   can	   be	   understood.	   The	   multi-­‐layered	   nature	   of	  neoliberalism	  as	  both	  an	  economic	  model	  and	  a	  political	  project	  need	  to	  underpin	  our	  appreciation	   of	   the	   changing	   structural	   dynamics	   informing	   the	   political	   agency	   of	  Egypt’s	  upper	  middle	  class	  since	  the	  early	  1990s.	  
3.3	  The	  Centrality	  of	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  Status	  Reproduction	  Much	  of	  the	  analyses	  in	  the	  following	  chapters	  of	  this	  study	  will	  be	  essentially	  an	  attempt	   to	  extract	  political	  meaning	   from	  the	  processes	   that	   form	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	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middle	  class’	  effort	   to	  preserve	  and	  reproduce	  status	  and	  distinction	   in	   the	  neoliberal	  context,	   as	   pointed	   out	   repeatedly	   before.	   This	   warrants	   a	   last	   set	   of	   conceptual	  observations,	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  process	  and	  its	  centrality	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  socio-­‐political	  agency.	  Although	  such	  centrality	  may	  initially	  seem	  self-­‐evident,	  Paul	  Kaufman	  reminds	  us	   that	   in	  much	   of	   the	   literature	   on	  middle	   class	   social	   agency,	   ‘[m]iddle-­‐class	   social	  reproduction	   is	   not	   always	   recognized	   as	   an	   active	   process	   of	   negotiation	   and	  construction	   -­‐	  much	   less	   contestation’.94	  The	   depiction	   of	   the	   process	   of	   reproducing	  middle-­‐class	  status	  as	  structurally	  determined,	  with	  little	  need	  for	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  human	  agency,	  he	  claims,	  has	  almost	  grown	  into	  a	  restraining	  myth	  for	  researchers:	  Because	   middle-­‐class	   social	   reproduction	   is	   “known”	   to	   be	   structurally	  determined,	  no	  attempt	  is	  made	  to	  study	  the	  active	  and	  constructed	  nature	  of	  it,	  which	  confirms	  and	  reinforces	  its	  supposedly	  inert	  nature.95	  	  	  Furthermore,	   Kaufman	   asserts	   that	   the	   typical	  middle-­‐class	   struggle	   for	   social	  re-­‐production	   is	   taken	   for	   granted	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   very	   rationale	   behind	   the	  process,	   or	   ‘such	   matters	   as	   the	   meaning	   of	   going	   to	   college,	   the	   meaning	   of	   a	  professional	   job,	   or	   the	  meaning	   of	   living	   in	   a	  nice,	  middle-­‐class	  neighbourhood’,96	  do	  not	  appear	  problematic	  and	  have	  traditionally	  warranted	  little	  analytical	  attention.	  The	   narratives	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   acquired	   during	   this	   research	  clearly	   indicate	   otherwise.	   The	   very	   rationales	   developed	   throughout	   the	   process	   of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status	  reproduction	  represent	  essential	  inputs	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  normative	   foundations	   of	   political	   convictions	   and	   actions.	   The	   processes	   underlying	  these	  struggles	  have	  become	  an	  everyday	  social	  space	  in	  which	  a	  wider	  array	  of	   ideas	  about	  those	  individuals’	  relations	  to	  society,	  power,	  authority	  and	  the	  state	  are	  created	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and	   tested,	  not	   to	  mention	   shared	  and	   spread.	  The	   social	   experiences	   involved	   in	   the	  process	   of	   status	   reproduction	   trigger	   a	   more	   articulate	   expression,	   as	   well	   as	   a	  constant	  refinement,	  of	  social	  aspirations.	  One	   of	   the	   rather	   broad	   conclusions	   of	   this	   research	   pertaining	   to	   the	   simple	  question	  of	  what	   it	   entails	   to	  be	  upper	  middle	  class	   in	   today’s	  Egypt	   is	   that	   this	   status	  primarily	  includes	  a	  working	  involvement	  in	  a	  daily	  process	  of	  activating	  various	  types	  of	   resources	   to	   negotiate	   the	   surrounding	   social	   environment	   and	   its	   structures	   in	  pursuit	   of	   class	   status	   preservation	   and	   re-­‐production.	   It	   is	   out	   of	   this	   continuous,	  everyday	   negotiation	   of	   those	   structures	   and	   their	   practical	   manifestations	   by	  individuals	  that	  experiences	  and	  judgements	  are	  accumulated	  and	  shared.	  And	  it	  is	  also	  in	   this	   context	   that	   judgements,	   convictions	   and	   attitudes	   are	   created	   and	   refined	  regarding,	   among	   other	   things,	   politics.	   There	   is	   indeed	   a	   mutually	   deterministic	  relationship	  between	  structure	  and	  agency,	  compelling	  the	  attribution	  of	  importance	  to	  both	   in	   following	   chapters.	   For,	   in	   the	   end,	   as	   Kaufman	   concludes,	   ‘middle-­‐class	  reproduction,	   like	   all	   social	   processes	   arises	   out	   of	   the	   interplay	   between	   social	  structure	  and	  human	  agency.’97	  	  It	  is	  the	  micro-­‐processes	  surrounding	  the	  central	  struggle	  of	  status	  preservation	  and	  reproduction	  that	  draw	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  interplay	  between	  structural	  factors	  and	  human	  agency.	  In	  the	  social	  space,	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  take	  specific	  and	  clearly	   defined	   actions,	   widely	   understood	   as	   class-­‐common	   or	   characteristic.	   These	  actions	   aim	   to	   preserve	   and	   reproduce	   their	   social	   status	   within	   a	   wider	   and	   often	  changing	  environment	  of	  structural	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  relations.	  It	  is	  within	  this	  process	  of	  negotiating	  structural	  factors	  to	  achieve	  individual	  objectives	  that	  class-­‐typical	   foundations	   for	   political	   convictions	   are	   generated,	   political	   subjectivities	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elaborated,	   and	   eventually	   articulated	   and	   expressed	   in	   various	   forms.	   Today,	   a	  generation	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptian	   men	   and	   women	   are	   faced	   with	   the	  challenge	   of	   being	   forcefully	   drawn	   into	   the	   political	   arena	   in	   post-­‐Mubarak	   Egypt.	  Social	   interactions	   in	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   homes,	   workplaces,	   cafes,	   clubs	   and	   typical	  middle-­‐class	   holiday	   destinations	   on	   the	   Egyptian	   North	   Coast;	   conversations	   among	  family	   members,	   colleagues	   and	   friends	   in	   various	   formal	   and	   informal	   settings;	   the	  prevalent	  subjects	  of	  discussions	  and	  discourses	  in	  such	  gatherings	  all	  stand	  witness	  to	  a	  wave	  of	  interest	  in	  ‘politics’	  by	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  that	  is	  unprecedented	  in	  recent	  Egyptian	  history.	  The	  upper	  middle	  class’	  preferences,	  biases	  and,	  last	  but	  not	  least,	  inclination	  to	  act	  in	  particular	  political	  ways	  during	  this	  transformation	  from	  the	  politically	  stagnant	  Mubarak	  era	  to	  the	  fluid	  post-­‐revolt	  political	  environment,	  has	  primarily	  been	  informed	  by	   social	   experience.	   Most	   of	   this	   social	   experience	   has	   taken	   and	   continues	   to	   take	  place	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   fundamental	   change	   in	   the	   structural	   environment	   within	  which	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   negotiates	   the	   re-­‐production	   of	   its	   social	   status.	   The	  narratives	   contained	   in	   interviews	   conducted	   as	   part	   of	   this	   study	   unmistakably	  demonstrate	  the	  centrality	  of	  preserving	  and	  reproducing	  subjects’	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status	  to	  both	  their	  social	  aspirations	  and	  actions.	  Ayman	  Hani,	  a	  35-­‐year-­‐old	  manager	  at	  a	  multinational	  consumer	  goods	  company	  operating	  in	  Egypt,	  perfectly	  articulated	  this	  rationale.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  interview,	  he	  had	  recently	  completed	  instalment	  payments	  of	  his	  three-­‐bedroom	  apartment	  in	  hay	  al-­‐
ashgar	   (neighbourhood	   of	   the	   trees),	   a	   residential	   gated	   compound	   in	   the	   Sixth	   of	  
October	   City,	   one	   of	   Cairo’s	   westward	   urban	   extensions.	   Ayman	   was	   already	   looking	  ahead	   to	   challenges	   awaiting	   him	   on	   his	   journey	   to	   ensure	   the	   re-­‐production	   of	   his	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small	  family’s	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status.	  In	  his	  own	  words,	  the	  goal	  he	  strives	  for	  above	  all	  else	  in	  his	  life	  is	  	  to	  guarantee	  my	  family	  a	  decent	  life.	  Socially	  speaking	  this	  means	  raising	  them	  similar	   to	  how	   I	  was	   raised,	  having	  been	  educated	   in	   the	  best	  of	   schools	   and	  universities,	   eating	   the	  best	   food	  and	  wearing	   the	  best	   clothes.	   […]	  One	   finds	  that	   Life	   is	   a	   set	   of	   sequences	   and	   challenges	   […]	   from	   acquiring	   a	   home;	   to	  educate	  (your	  children);	  to	  upgrading	  your	  lifestyle,	  such	  as	  upgrading	  your	  car	  or	   upgrading	   where	   you	   take	   your	   summer	   vacation;	   to	   securing	   your	  children’s	   future	   needs,	   such	   as	   facilitating	   their	  marriage	   or	   getting	   them	   a	  home	   […]	   put	   together,	   this	  will	   take	  most	   of	   your	   adult	   life	   for	   the	   next	   25	  years.98	  	  	  	  The	  centrality	  of	   the	  social	   strife	   for	  status	  reproduction	   to	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  was	  not	  only	  strikingly	  evident	  in	  all	  of	  the	  interviews	  on	  which	  this	  study	  is	  based,	   but	   also	   corresponds	   to	   a	   characteristic	   believed	   to	   be	   universal	   to	   middle	  classes	   in	   general.	   ‘The	   bourgeois	   family’,	   as	   Frank	   Parkin	   points	   out,	   ‘cannot	   rest	  comfortably	   on	   the	   assumption	   of	   automatic	   class	   succession;	   it	   must	   make	   definite	  social	  exertions	  of	  its	  own	  or	  face	  the	  very	  real	  prospect	  of	  generational	  decline.’99	  	  There	   is	   a	   lot	   to	   be	   learnt	   from	   such	   centrepieces	   of	   social	   awareness	   and	  identity	  of	  a	  given	  social	  class.	  Diane	  Singerman	  took	  a	  similar	  approach	  in	  her	  study	  of	  the	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  of	  residents	  of	  sha‘by	   (popular)	  communities	   in	  Cairo,	  when	  she	   devoted	   a	   considerable	   part	   of	   that	   study	   to	   discussing	   the	   reproduction	   of	   ‘the	  family’,	  a	  process	  she	  chose	  to	  label	  as	  the	  ‘familial	  ethos’.	  The	  centrality	  of	  reproducing	  ‘the	   family’	   in	   the	   lives	   of	   individuals	   in	   these	   communities,	   argues	   Singerman,	  facilitates	   the	   comprehension	   of	   the	   rationale	   behind	   social	   action.	   The	   struggles	  revolving	  around	  the	  final	  goal	  of	  reproducing	  ‘the	  family’,	  she	  stresses,	  are	  invaluable	  to	  understanding	  the	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  of	  residents	  in	  Cairo’s	  popular	  communities.	  This	  very	  process	  of	  reproducing	  a	  certain	  social	  institution,	  or	  the	  ‘familial	  ethos’,	  is	  a	  fertile	  ground	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  wider	  process	  of	  negotiating	  the	  surrounding	  social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Ayman Hani in discussion with the author, in the Sixth of October City, Cairo, 10 February 2008. 
99 Frank Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 62-63.  
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environment.	  ‘Because	  the	  family	  is	  still	  very	  meaningful	  to	  the	  community,	  and	  because	  it	   organizes	   economic	   and	   political	   relationships	   in	   the	   community,’	   she	   argues,	   ‘the	  familial	   ethos	   influences	   individuals	   and	   groups	   when	   they	   deal	   with	   a	   broader	  spectrum	  of	  issues	  and	  problems.’100	  Similarly,	   the	   ethos	   of	   reproducing	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   status	   will	   occupy	   a	  considerable	   part	   of	   this	   study.	   Through	   an	   examination	   of	   the	   processes	   whereby	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   credentials	   are	   acquired,	   secured	   and	   displayed,	   many	   points	   of	  intersection	   with	   the	   dynamics	   forming	   the	   normative	   foundations	   of	   political	  perceptions	  can	  be	  identified.	  Throughout	  the	  study,	  these	  processes	  will	  be	  constantly	  contextualised	  within	  the	  wider	  evolution	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  relations	   in	  Egypt	  over	  the	  past	  decades.	  Today,	  Egypt’s	  neoliberal	  middle	  class	  is	  stepping	  into	  the	  post-­‐Mubarak	   political	   arena	   as	   a	   forceful	   constituency.	   The	   appreciation	   of	   the	   interplay	  between	  structural	  factors	  and	  human	  agency	  in	  negotiating	  the	  reproduction	  of	  social	  class	   status	   is	   indispensable	   if	   future	   patterns	   of	   political	   actions	   and	   issues	   that	  stimulate	  various	  forms	  of	  political	  engagement	  for	  this	  class	  are	  to	  be	  understood.	  
4.	  Methodological	  Approach	  and	  Fieldwork	  
4.1	  Reproducing	  Middle	  Class	  Status:	  Structure,	  Agency	  and	  Habitus	  	  As	  previously	  discussed	   in	  detail,	   researching	  a	  class	  or	  a	  class	  segment	   in	  any	  given	  socio-­‐political	  context	   is	  conceptually	  challenging.	  Naturally,	   this	   is	  no	   less	  so	   in	  terms	   of	   choosing	   the	   research	  methodology	   and	   approach.	   The	  main	   questions	   that	  have	  guided	  the	  practical	  conduct	  of	  this	  research	  are:	  how	  is	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  shaped	  within	  the	  prevailing	  set	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  conditions	  in	  today’s	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Egypt?	   How	   can	   gathered	   self-­‐representations	   and	   narratives	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  individuals	  be	  aggregated	  to	   induce	  conclusions	  regarding	  class-­‐common	  agency?	  And	  no	  less	  importantly,	  how	  can	  the	  dialectical	  relationship	  between	  structural	  conditions	  and	  human	  agency	  be	  properly	  appreciated?	  A	  guiding	  principle	  for	  this	  study	  has	  been	  the	  conviction	  that	  both	  structure	  and	  human	  agency	  matter	  equally.	  An	  almost-­‐exclusive	  focus	  on	  the	  structural	  causes	  of	  social	  agency	  was	  a	  distinct	  feature	  of	  analytical	  models	  used	  by	  class	  theorists,	  especially	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  Although	   many	   such	   writers	   acknowledged	   that	   culture	   and	   politics	   played	   an	  important	   role	   in	  mediating	   class-­‐consciousness,	   they	  were	   adamant	   that	   agency	  was	  ultimately	  determined	  by	   the	  prevailing	   structure.101	  Nevertheless,	   Ira	  Katznelson	  has	  made	  an	  important	  attempt	  from	  inside	  the	  structuralist	  school	  to	  remedy	  the	  inherent	  abstraction	   of	   this	   basic	   model.	   To	   avert	   the	   risk	   of	   using	   ‘experience	   distant’	  conceptualisations	   of	   class	   in	   structural	   analyses,	   he	   advocated	   a	   multi-­‐layered	  approach	   to	   the	   conception	   of	   how	   structural	   and	   other	   cognitive	   factors	   combine	   to	  form	  class	  awareness	  and	   forms	  of	  agency.	  His	  aim	   is	   to	  appreciate	  both	   the	  common	  patterns	   in	  all	  capitalist	  developments,	  as	  well	  as	   the	   fact	   that	  such	  developments	  are	  affected	  by	  other	  context-­‐specific	  factors	  (such	  as	  family	  patterns,	  demography,	  cultural	  traditions,	   inherited	  practices,	   state	   policies	   and	   geopolitics).	   These	   and	  other	   factors	  are	   pivotal	   in	   determining	   what	   he	   terms	   the	   ‘empirical	   contours	   of	   macroscopic	  development’	  of	  class.102	  	  Still,	  this	  attempt	  has	  not	  been	  enough	  for	  critics	  of	  structural	  determinism,	   in	   part	   because	   in	   Katznelson’s	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   structure-­‐determined	   classification	   of	   social	   classes,	   human	   agency	   and	   collective	   action	   are	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viewed	  merely	  as	  ‘responses	  to	  material	  social	  conditions,	  thus	  ignoring	  their	  potential	  role	  in	  shaping	  those	  very	  conditions’.103	  	  The	  failure	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  dialectical	  and	  mutually	  constitutive	  relationship	  between	   structural	   factors	   and	   human	   agency	   in	   socio-­‐political	   analysis	   of	   class-­‐common	  agency	  could	  lead	  to	  falling	  into	  the	  trap	  of	  researching	  what	  Bourdieu	  refers	  to	  as	  a	   ‘class	  on	  paper’,	   as	  pointed	  out	  earlier	   in	   this	   chapter.	   In	   this	   case,	   class	  could	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  mere	  academic	  construct,	  ignorant	  of	  both	  the	  complexity	  and	  subjectivity	  of	   social	   reality.	   It	   follows	   that,	   unless	   the	   self-­‐perceptions	   and	   self-­‐representation	   of	  the	   agents	   under	   consideration	   in	   their	   own	   social	  world	   are	   taken	   into	   account,	   the	  picture	  is	  bound	  to	  remain	  incomplete.	  Bourdieu	  is	  very	  conscious	  of	  this	  predicament	  when	   he	   explains	   that	   social	   science	   ‘oscillates	   between	   two	   seemingly	   incompatible	  points	   of	   view,	   two	   apparently	   irreconcilable	   perspectives:	   objectivism	   and	  subjectivism’.104	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  social	  facts	  could	  be	  treated	  as	  ‘objects’,	  ignoring	  that	  they	  are	  subjects	  of	  knowledge	  and	  perceptions	  constructed	  within	  the	  social	  realm.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   the	  social	  world	  could	  not	  possibly	  be	  reduced	   to	   the	  representations	  agents	  have	  of	   it.	   In	  this	  case,	  the	  role	  of	  social	  science	  would	  practically	  descend	  into	  the	   provision	   of	   what	   Bourdieu	   calls	   an	   ‘account	   of	   accounts’.105	  Therefore,	   if	   the	  complexity	  of	  social	  reality	  is	  to	  be	  captured	  and	  reflected	  in	  social	  research,	  these	  two	  approaches	   must	   be	   reconciled.	   Structural	   analysis	   and	   agents’	   subjective	  representations	   of	   their	   social	   world	   must	   not	   be	   treated	   as	   mutually	   exclusive,	   but	  rather	  as	  equally	  valuable	  inputs	  in	  the	  attempt	  to	  draw	  an	  accurate	  picture	  of	  the	  social	  world	  and	  to	  comprehend	  political	  outcomes.	  As	  Bourdieu	  explains:	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  objective	  structures	  that	  the	  sociologist	  constructs,	  in	  the	  objectivist	   moment,	   by	   setting	   aside	   the	   subjective	   representations	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Dworkin, Class Struggles, 4. 
104 Pierre Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power," Sociological Theory 7, no. 1 (1989): 14. 
105 Ibid., 15. 
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agents,	   form	   the	  basis	   for	   these	   representations	  and	  constitute	   the	   structural	  constraints	   that	   bear	   upon	   interactions;	   but	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   these	  representations	  must	  also	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  particularly	  if	  one	  wants	  to	   account	   for	   the	  daily	   struggles,	   individual	   and	   collective,	  which	  purport	   to	  transform	  or	   to	  preserve	   these	   structures.	  This	  means	   the	   two	  moments,	   the	  objectivist	  and	  the	  subjectivist,	  stand	  in	  a	  dialectical	  relationship:	  […]	  points	  of	  view	   are	   grasped	   as	   such	   and	   related	   to	   the	   positions	   they	   occupy	   in	   the	  structure	  of	  agents	  under	  consideration.106	  	  If	   this	   appreciation	   of	   the	   objective	   and	   the	   subjective107	  is	   to	   connect	   with	  Bourdieu’s	   definition	   of	   the	   social	   space	   as	   a	   multidimensional	   structure,	   which	   this	  chapter	  has	  already	  discussed,	  important	  questions	  must	  be	  asked.	  Just	  how	  much	  of	  a	  role	   does	   human	   agency	   play,	   exactly,	   as	   opposed	   to	   structures,	   and	   what	   is	   the	  appropriate	  weight	   to	   be	   given	   to	   either	   in	   analysing	   the	   formation	   of	   socio-­‐political	  agency	  within	   specific	   contexts?	   These	   questions	   are	   significant	  when	   discussing	   the	  reproduction	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status,	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  that	  they	  are	  essential	  in	  the	   context	   of	   discussing	   the	   process	   of	   middle	   class	   formation	   itself.	   The	   difficult	  analytical	  task	  in	  this	  regard,	  as	  Swartz	  articulates	  it,	  is	  how	  one	  can	  take	   into	   account	   both	   the	   observed	   regularities	   of	   social	   action,	  which	  most	  frequently	  are	  visible	  only	  to	  the	  social	  scientist	  who	  takes	  the	  time	  and	  effort	  to	   calculate	   them,	   and	   the	   experiential	   reality	   of	   free,	   purposeful,	   reasoning	  human	   actors	   who	   carry	   out	   their	   everyday	   actions	   practically,	   without	   full	  awareness	  of	  or	  conscious	  reflection	  on	  structures?	  108	  	   Building	   further	   on	   Bourdieu’s	   earlier	   conceptualisation,	   the	   latter’s	   notion	   of	  
habitus	  provides	  a	  particularly	  useful	  framework	  for	  appreciating	  this	  complexity	  of	  the	  natural	   interplay	   between	   agency	   and	   structure.	   Centrally	   placed	   in	   Bourdieu’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Ibid. 
107 There are several critical reactions to Bourdieu’s conceptual attempt to conceptualise social action or practice 
as a function of both the subjective (or agency) and objective (structure) combined, especially through his 
notion of habitus. While it is acknowledged that Bourdieu’s contributions in this regard are indeed amongst the 
most influential in sociology, critics draw attention to his admission that the operation of habitus can be 
disrupted in certain instances. In addition, he is criticized for failing to provide a convincing explanatory link 
between disposition and practices. Such critiques are aimed mainly at pointing to an inherent, yet somewhat 
intentionally concealed, structuralism in Bourdieu’s argument. For more insight, see: Dave Elder-Vass, 
"Reconciling Archer and Bourdieu in an Emergentist Theory of Action," Sociological Theory 25, no. 4 (2007): 
325-46.  
108 Swartz, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, 95. 
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preoccupation	   with	   rationales	   underlying	   social	   ‘practice’109 ,	   the	   concept	   aims	   to	  address	   the	   dilemma	   of	   understanding	   patterns	   of	   behaviour	   and	   action	   among	  proximately	  positioned	  actors	   in	   the	   social	   field	  as	  naturally	   influenced	  by	  structures,	  yet	  without	  attributing	  them	  to	  individuals'	  conscious	  contributions	  to	  the	  reproduction	  of	  some	  abstract	  external	  structure.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Bourdieu	  defines	  habitus	  as	  a	  system	  of	   durable,	  transposable	  dispositions,[…],	  that	  can	  be	  objectively	  adapted	  to	  their	  outcomes	   without	   presupposing	   a	   conscious	   aiming	   at	   ends	   or	   an	   express	  mastery	   of	   the	   operations	   necessary	   in	   order	   to	   attain	   them.	   Objectivity	  ‘regulated’	  and	  ‘regular’	  without	  being	  in	  any	  way	  the	  product	  of	  obedience	  to	  rules,	   they	   can	   be	   collectively	   orchestrated	   without	   being	   the	   product	   of	  organizing	  action	  of	  a	  conductor.110	  	  	  	  	  There	  is	  thus	  a	  potentially	  mutually-­‐constitutive	  dynamic	  between	  structure	  and	  human	  agency	  in	  shaping	  the	  social	  process	  of	  status	  reproduction,	  which	  is	  in	  turn	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  normative	  foundations	  of	  political	  agency.	  On	  the	  one	   hand,	   the	   process	   of	   reproducing	   social	   class	   positions	   and	   social	   status	   is	  composed	  primarily	  of	  social	  actions	  carried	  out	  by	  individuals	  in	  the	  social	  field.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  equally	  significantly,	  these	  actions	  take	  place	  within	  the	  given	  context	  of	   a	   prevailing	   structure	   of	   social,	   economic	   and	   cultural	   relations.	   As	   pointed	   out	  earlier,	  an	  important	  thread	  in	  this	  study	  is	  explaining	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  social	  processes	  surrounding	   status	   reproduction	   on	   shaping	   the	   normative	   foundations	   of	   political	  agency	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  in	  today’s	  Egypt.	  In	  practice,	  as	  the	  following	  section	  will	   further	   detail,	   this	   meant	   focusing	   on	   typical	   and	   class–common	   social	   actions,	  dispositions	  and	  subjectivities	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  neoliberal	   transformations	   in	  the	  social	   fields	  most	  relevant	  to	  shaping	  the	  traditional	  relationship	  between	  this	  class	  and	  the	  Egyptian	  state.	  Bourdieu’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 See in this regard: Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977); and Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Oxford: Polity Press, 1990). 
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everyday	  struggles	  in	  the	  social	  field	  and	  their	  mutually	  constitutive	  relationship	  to	  the	  prevailing	   structural	   factors	   through	  habitus	   indeed	  provides	  a	  useful	   conceptual	   tool	  for	  understanding	  the	  workings	  of	  this	  process.	  The	  concept	  is	  designed	  to	  account	  for	  the	   regularity,	   coherence	   and	   order	   of	   human	   action	   ‘without	   ignoring	   its	   negotiated	  and	   strategic	   nature’.111	  Above	   all,	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   study,	   it	   facilitates	   the	  incorporation	   of	   attitudes,	   social	   actions	   and	   subjectivities	   by	   actors	   occupying	  proximate	   positions	  within	   the	   social	   field	   into	   a	  wider	   analysis	   of	   the	   emergence	   of	  class-­‐typical	  conceptions	  of	  politics	  within	  a	  specific	  structural	  context.	  A	   closely	   related	   conceptual	   observation	   becomes	   significant	   at	   this	   point,	  namely	   regarding	   agents’	   degrees	   of	   awareness	   or	   intention	   underlying	   their	  contribution	  to	  the	  composition	  or	  reproduction	  of	  a	  set	  of	  prevailing	  structures.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class,	  this	  thesis	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  a	  set	  of	  socio-­‐political	  conceptions	  shaping	  this	  class’	  relationship	  with	  the	  state	  has	  been	  profoundly	  altered	   by	   the	   structural	   shift	   towards	   neoliberal	   economics.	   Therefore,	   naturally,	  interviews	   conducted	   with	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   for	   this	   research	   often	  revealed	  a	  sense	  of	  victimisation	  by	  and	  discontent	  with	  the	  socio-­‐political	  ramifications	  of	   those	   structural	   transformations	  .112	  Equally,	   however,	   these	   interviews	   reflected	   a	  noticeable	   obscurity	   by	   those	   interviewed	   towards	   their	   own	   role,	   and	   that	   of	   their	  class,	   in	   the	  production	  and	  reproduction	  of	   the	  prevailing	   structures	   that	  were	  often	  the	  subject	  of	  their	  discontent.	  Once	  again,	  Bourdieu	  offers	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  understand	  these	  seemingly	  contradicting	  tendencies:	  namely,	  that	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  symbolic	  power	  and	  symbolic	  violence.	  The	  former	  is	  understood	  as	  the	  capacity	   of	   structures	   to	   generate	   and	   internalise	   a	   comprehension,	   acceptance	   and	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adaptation	   to	   the	   social	   world	   by	   representing	   economic	   and	   political	   relations	   in	  disguised	   and	   taken-­‐for-­‐granted	   forms.113	  Symbolic	   power	   is	   exercised	   ‘only	   through	  the	  complicity	  of	  those	  who	  do	  not	  want	  to	  know	  that	  they	  are	  subject	  to	  it	  or	  even	  that	  they	  themselves	  exercise	  it’.114	  Symbolic	  violence	  is	  the	  practical,	  everyday	  exercise	  and	  generation	  of	   symbolic	   power.	  The	  overlooked	   contribution	   to	   and	   complacence	  with	  the	  reproduction	  of	  certain	  power	  structures	  in	  the	  social	  field	  is	  an	  important	  critical	  angle	  through	  which	  the	  self-­‐representation	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptian	  narratives	  featured	  through	  this	  study	  ought	  to	  be	  weighed.	  This	  does	  not	  in	  any	  considerable	  way	  question	   the	   validity	   of	   this	   study’s	   conclusion	   regarding	   the	   political	   effects	   of	   the	  perceived	   grievances	   of	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   neoliberal	  structural	   transformation,	   especially	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   state.	   It	   is,	   however,	   a	   significant	  critical	   conceptual	   filter	   to	  bear	   in	  mind	  when	  considering	   the	   self-­‐representations	  of	  agents’	  worldviews	   in	   the	   context	   of	   qualitative	   research	   in	   general,	   and	   the	   study	   at	  hand	  in	  particular.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4.2	  Fieldwork	  	  The	   need	   to	   combine	   analysis	   of	   structural	   factors	   and	   subjective	  representations	   will	   be	   a	   guiding	   methodological	   framework	   throughout	   this	   study.	  During	  the	  period	  of	  evidence	  collection	  in	  which	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  research	  are	  based,	  this	  proved	  analytically	  rewarding.	  It	  was	  only	  by	  delving	  into	  the	  detailed	  narratives	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   struggles	   for	   social	   status	   reproduction	   and	   distinction	   that	   an	  enhanced	   understanding	   of	   the	   effect	   of	   neoliberal	   market	   mechanisms	   on	   creating	  critical	  discourses	  of	  the	  state	  could	  be	  achieved.	  Moreover,	  the	  detailed	  (and	  at	  times	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114 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, 
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intense	  and	  emotional)	  narrative	  reproduction	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  experiences	  of	  the	  state	   provided	   a	   suitable	   framework	   for	   understanding	   the	   contexts	   through	   which	  neoliberal	   logics	   are	   informing	   new	   modes	   of	   socio-­‐political	   critique.	   The	   subjective	  representations	  of	  upper-­‐middle	  class-­‐Egyptians	   interviewed	   for	   this	  study	  have	  been	  invaluable	   in	   establishing	   a	   link	   between	   macrostructures	   within	   which	   Egyptian	  politics	   have	   traditionally	   been	   framed	   and	   analysed,	   and	   the	   constantly	   manifested	  effect	  of	  structural	  changes	  on	  the	  lives	  of	  real	  people.115	  While	  the	  contextualisation	  of	  individual	   narratives	   within	   wider	   structural	   frameworks	   is	   invaluable	   for	  understanding	   the	   future	  of	  middle	   class	  politics	   in	  Egypt,	   it	  must	  never	  be	   forgotten	  that	   politics	   is	   mostly	   determined	   by	   the	   collective	   action	   of	   ordinary	   people.	   The	  negotiation	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  market	  for	  the	  acquisition,	  preservation	  and	  reproduction	  of	  distinction	  is	  a	  process	  full	  of	  detailed	  social	  experiences	  in	  which	  both	  self-­‐perceived	  class	   identities	   and	   constructed	   images	   of	   the	   state	   are	   informing	   the	   formation	   of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  political	  agency	  in	  Egypt.	  	  A	   qualitative	   research	   technique	  was	   therefore	   used	   throughout	   the	   fieldwork	  period,	  which	  extended	  from	  the	  autumn	  of	  2008	  to	   late	  2010.	   In	  the	  first	  part	  of	   this	  period,	   a	   round	   of	   34	   formal,	   semi-­‐structured	   and	   open-­‐ended	   interviews	   was	  conducted	  with	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptian	  men	  and	  women.	  These	  interviews	  tackled	  broadly	   demarcated	   areas	   of	   social	   reproduction,	   the	   credentials	   of	   distinction	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 In the few years following the fieldwork and evidence-gathering phase of this study, there was a visible surge 
in the Egyptian upper middle class’ exposure to and usage of Internet-based social media websites and other 
online forums (such as blogs, chat rooms, and discussion boards of mainstream media websites). The ‘Internet’ 
has steadily grown as a rich source for the proliferation and intensification of political trends, perceptions and 
attitudes. Naturally, this trend increased dramatically after the 2011 upheaval. At the time this research was 
conducted, this trend was in its very early stages, and those Internet-based fora were not relied on as sources of 
evidence, in favour of focusing on in-depth narratives obtained from upper-middle-class Egyptians through 
interviews. Had this research begun at a later stage, it would have certainly stood to benefit from numerous 
forms of expression of political subjectivities and attitudes continuously ventured by upper-middle-class 
Egyptians on social media. For a further discussion of the personalisation of politics through social media and 
online, see: W. Lance Bennett, "The Personalization of Politics: Political Identity, Social Media, and Changing 
Patterns of Participation," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 644, no. 1 
(2012): 20-39.  
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upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  identity,	  political	  perceptions,	  and	  the	  array	  of	  different	  experiences	  of	  the	  state.	  The	  author’s	  background,	  social	  network	  and	  personal	  acquaintances	  in	  the	  ranks	   of	   Cairo’s	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   society	   facilitated	   initial	   access	   to	   suitable	  candidates	  for	  interviews.	  After	  the	  first	  few	  interviews	  were	  conducted,	  referrals	  from	  interviewees	  to	  others	  willing	  to	  be	  interviewed	  proved	  a	  rich	  source	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  narratives	  that	  were	  most	  relevant	  to	  the	  areas	  covered	  by	  this	  study.	  	  Throughout	  the	   interview	   selection	   process,	   however,	   candidates	   were	   subjected	   to	   an	   objective	  appraisal	  of	  their	  ‘upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  credentials’.116	  In	  other	  words,	  interviewees	  were	  carefully	  chosen	  according	  to	  elements	  of	  their	  social	  and	  professional	  profiles	  (family	  history,	   schools	   and	   universities	   attended,	   places	   of	   residence,	   careers,	   etc.)	   that	  reflected	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   economic,	   cultural	   and	   material	   markers.	   The	   latter	  markers	   will	   be	   subject	   to	   a	   more	   thorough	   discussion	   at	   the	   end	   of	   chapter	   two.	  Interviewees’	  explicit	  consent	  to	  using	  the	  interviews,	  including	  the	  publication	  of	  direct	  quotes,	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	   academic	   thesis	  was	  obtained	   in	  almost	   all	   cases.117	  In	  some	   cases,	   interviewees	   intervened	  during	   the	   interview	   to	   request	   the	   exclusion	  of	  specific	   parts	   of	   their	   testimonies	   from	   this	   consent,	   requests	   which	   were	   duly	  respected	  at	  the	  time	  of	  this	  text’s	  preparation.	  In	  addition	  to	  countless	  informal	  exchanges	  and	  observations	  during	  the	  period	  of	   fieldwork,	   interviews	   conducted	   were	   central	   to	   the	   development	   of	   this	   study’s	  argument,	   as	  well	   as	   to	   the	  determination	  of	   further	   lines	  of	   inquiry,	   along	  which	   the	  research	   proceeded	   on	   a	   more	   targeted	   basis.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   second	   stage	   of	   the	  research	   was	   mainly	   composed	   of	   in-­‐depth	   interviews	   with	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 This included initial screening in the form of telephone conversations used to obtain details about their 
profiles.  
117 Direct quotes from the singular case in which such consent was not explicitly obtained are used on one 
occasion in chapter five, where it is duly noted and the name of the interviewee concealed. In another case, 
quoted in chapter six, the author voluntarily chose to conceal the identity of the interviewee (although the latter 
gave his consent), in light of potential legal liability on the part of the interviewee.  
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Egyptians	  on	  specific	  aspects	  of	  their	  social	  experiences	  pertaining	  to	  both	  social	  status	  reproduction	   and	   encounters	   of	   the	   state.	   At	   the	   final	   stage	   of	   the	   preparation	   for	  writing,	  some	  of	  these	  interviewees,	  especially	  those	  whose	  narratives	  have	  been	  cited	  as	   evidence	   in	   the	   substantive	   chapters,	  were	   contacted	   in	   search	   of	   clarifications	   or	  additional	  elaboration	  on	  parts	  of	  their	  testimonies.	  Simultaneously,	   primary	   and	   secondary	   data	   pertaining	   to	   the	   structural	  development	  of	  the	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  Egyptian	  social,	  economic	  and	  political	  evolution	  were	  also	  gathered	   from	  various	   related	   sources,	   as	   shall	   be	  duly	   evident	   throughout	  the	  following	  chapters.	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Chapter	  Two:	  In	  the	  Shadow	  of	  the	  State,	  	  Egypt’s	  Middle	  Class	  from	  Mohamed	  Ali	  to	  Mubarak	  	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  This	   chapter	  will	   draw	  a	  brief	   historical	   portrait	   of	   the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class.	   Consequently,	   this	   portrait	  will	   include	   a	   review	   of	   the	   process	   of	  middle	   class	  formation	  as	  a	  result	  of	  major	  structural	  changes	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  political	  and	  economic	  orders	  over	  the	  last	  two	  centuries.	  Such	  a	  review	  not	  only	  allows	  us	  to	  develop	  a	  sense	  of	   the	   historically	   intertwined	   relationship	   between	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   and	   the	  state	   in	   modern	   Egypt,	   but	   also	   to	   understand	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   neoliberal	  transformation	   has	   been	   changing	   the	   foundations	   and	   dynamics	   of	   this	   relationship	  since	  the	  early	  1970s.	  	  From	  Mohamed	  Ali	  to	  Mubarak,	  the	  middle	  class	  has	  tended	  to	  be	  deeply	  affected	  by	  structural	  changes	  induced	  by	  the	  state	  at	  different	  stages	  of	   its	  evolution.	   In	  some	  instances,	   such	   as	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Mohamed	   Ali’s	   state	   building	   project	   as	   well	   as	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  his	  successors,	  these	  changes	  directly	  prompted	  the	  very	  formation	  of	  the	  middle	  class.	  At	  other	  times,	  workings	  of	  the	  state	  either	  changed	  or	  expanded	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  middle	  class.	  However,	  one	  common	  trait	  has	  characterised	  most	  of	  the	  past	  two	  centuries:	  an	  entwined	  and	  organic	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  middle	  class.	  Though	  this	  relationship	  has	  taken	  different	  forms	  at	  different	  times,	  the	  boundaries	  between	  state	  and	  middle	  class	  have	  been	  hard	  to	  define	  in	  all	  stages	  since	  Mohamed	   Ali’s	   rule,	   as	   both	   entities	   were	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   each	   other’s	   social	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composition.	  Notably,	   as	   the	   backbone	   of	   the	   state,	   the	  middle	   class	   acted	   as	   a	   social	  base	  for	  various	  forms	  of	  political	  domination	  by	  ruling	  regimes.	  	  With	  the	  advent	  of	  Egypt’s	  shift	  towards	  liberal	  economic	  policies	  under	  Sadat	  in	  the	  mid	  1970s,	  however,	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  middle	  class	  and	  the	  state	  witnessed	  the	  beginning	  of	  fundamental	  changes	  with	  far-­‐reaching	  social	  –	  and	   eventually	   political	   –	   consequences.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state	   as	   the	  default	   arena	   for	   middle	   class	   social	   mobility	   and	   consolidation	   of	   social	   status	   has	  faded	  considerably,	  giving	  way	  to	  market	  mechanisms.	  	  The	   aim	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   present	   an	   account	   of	   the	   effect	   of	   structural	  changes	   on	   the	   composition	   and	   character	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   middle	   class	   at	   various	  historical	   stages,	   from	  Mohamed	  Ali	   to	  Hosni	  Mubarak.	  To	  appreciate	   the	   importance	  and	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   changing	   dynamics	   of	   upper	   middle	   class	   socio-­‐political	  agency	   formulation	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   context	   in	   the	   following	   chapters,	   developing	   a	  sense	  of	  the	  historically	  interwoven	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  middle	  class	  is	  essential.	  
2.	  The	  Middle	  Class	  in	  Modern	  Egypt:	  	  Origins	  
2.1	  From	  Mohamed	  Ali	  to	  the	  Early	  Twentieth	  Century:	  The	  Formation	  of	  the	  
Egyptian	  Middle	  Class	  	  Most	  historical	  accounts	  of	  a	  modern	  state	   in	  Egypt	  date	   the	   foundation	  of	   this	  state	  to	  the	  reign	  of	  Mohamed	  Ali	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.1	  The	  latter	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 There is, however, a varying degree of consensus as to whether Mohamed Ali represented a fundamental 
turning point regarding the nature of rule in Egypt (he is often referred to as the ‘founder of modern Egypt’), or 
if his rule was merely an institutional evolution of the same political, economic and strategic dynamics by which 
Egypt had been ruled under the Mamelukes. The latter opinion is particularly adopted by Marsot in: Afaf Lutfi 
al-Sayyid- Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
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rose	  to	  power	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  socio-­‐political	  turmoil	  that	  marked	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  French	  expedition	  to	  Egypt	  (1798-­‐1801),	  with	  the	  main	  goals	  of	  winning	  Ottoman	  recognition	   of	   his	   independent	   control	   of	   Egypt	   and	   securing	   his	   family’s	   hereditary	  right	  to	  rule	  the	  country.	  A	  principle	  requirement	  for	  the	  attainment	  of	  these	  goals	  was	  the	   formation	   of	   a	   European	   modelled	   modern	   army.	   In	   1820,	   Mohammed	   Ali	   thus	  formed	   a	   new,	   standing	   armed	   force	   under	   the	   title	   nizam	   jadid	   (New	   Order).2	  Top	  commands	   in	   the	   newly	   established	   military	   were	   reserved	   for	   European	   trained	  Turkish	   and	   Circassian	   officers,	   while	   young	   graduates	   of	   former	   Mamluk	   training	  schools	   became	   commissioned	   and	   non-­‐commissioned	   officers.	   Soldiers	   were	   mainly	  recruited	  through	  the	   ‘press-­‐gang	  conscription	  of	   fallahin	   (peasants)	   in	  Upper	  Egypt’.3	  By	  1923	   the	  new	   force	  grew	   into	  an	  army	  of	  24,000	  officers	  and	  men,	   comprising	  six	  well-­‐trained	   infantry	   regiments	  equipped	  with	  French	  weaponry,	  which	  Mohamed	  Ali	  later	   relied	   on	   in	   his	  military	   endeavours	   in	   the	  Arab	  Peninsula,	   Sudan	   and	   Southern	  Greece.4	  Building	   a	  modern	   army	   that	   could	   support	   the	   Pasha’s	   ambitions	   ‘created	   a	  need	   both	   for	   more	   revenues	   and	   institutions’.5	  Therefore,	   such	   strategic	   orientation	  drove	   Mohamed	   Ali	   to	   initiate	   a	   fundamental	   modernisation	   project,	   mindful	   of	  constructing	   a	   solid	   power	   base	   to	   support	   his	   militarisation.	   This	   foundation	   of	   his	  power	  included	  a	  reorganisation	  of	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  pooling	  and	  increasing	   state	   revenues.	   The	   agricultural	   sector	   reforms	   primarily	   entailed	   the	  introduction	   of	   widespread	   cultivation	   of	   export-­‐oriented	   long-­‐fibre	   cotton	   and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1984). Also, Khaled Fahmy has examined the establishment of a standing army under Mohamed Ali using a 
critical view of the traditional depiction of the Pasha as an enlightened reformer in: Khaled Fahmy, All the 
Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997).  
2  F. Robert Hunter, Egypt under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern 
Bureaucracy (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1999), 15. 
3 J. C. Hurewitz, "The Beginnings of Military Modernization in the Middle East: A Comparative Analysis," 
Middle East Journal 22, no. 2 (1968): 145.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Hunter, Egypt under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy, 15. 
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placement	   of	   all	   cultivated	   lands	   under	   direct	   state	   control.	   Furthermore,	   new	   deep-­‐water	   canals	  and	  a	  Nile	  barrage	  north	  of	  Cairo	  were	  constructed	   to	   facilitate	   summer	  cultivation.	  Other	  public	  works,	  eventually	   leading	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  perennial	  irrigation	  system,	  were	  also	  launched.6	  Ultimately,	  the	  investment	  in	  infrastructure	  and	  the	   cultivation	   of	   export	   crops	  was	  worthwhile:	   Cotton,	   for	   example,	   provided	   about	  one-­‐fifth	  to	  one-­‐quarter	  of	  state	  revenues	  in	  times	  of	  good	  harvests	  and	  high	  prices,	  and	  one-­‐tenth	  at	  other	  times.7	  Mohamed	  Ali’s	  vision	  for	  Egypt	  also	  included	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  industrial	  and	  infrastructural	  base	  to	  cater	  to	  his	  growing	  military	  needs,	  as	  he	  worked	  tirelessly	  to	   impose	   his	   undisputed	   control	   over	   Egypt	   against	   the	   remaining	   Mamelukes,	  establish	  his	  independent	  power	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  and	  build	  his	  capacity	  to	  deter	  foreign	  invasions	  (such	  as	  the	  British	  attack	  of	  1807).8	  A	  new	  marine	  arsenal	  was	  constructed	   in	   Alexandria	   and	   another	   existing	   arsenal	   in	   Bulaq,	   near	   Cairo,	   was	  considerably	  upgraded.	  Beginning	  in	  1810,	  a	  gunpowder	  and	  arms	  production	  facility,	  as	  well	   as	   a	   set	   of	   other	  military	   industrial	   projects,	  were	   built	   –	   sometimes	   even	   in	  defiance	  of	  Ottoman	  will	  and	  objections	  –	  to	  cater	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  army’s	  wars	  in	  the	  Arabian	  peninsula	  and	  the	  Sudan.9	  	  	  Naturally,	   the	   reorganisation	   of	   the	   agricultural	   sector	   and	   creation	   of	   the	  military-­‐oriented	   industrial	   infrastructure	   inevitably	   required	   considerable	  bureaucratic	  expansion.	  Thus,	  during	  this	  time,	  Egypt	  witnessed	  the	  establishment	  of	  its	  first	  modern	  bureaucratic	  apparatus.	  The	  expansion	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  structure,	  while	  kept	   highly	   centralised	   under	   the	   Pasha’s	   strict	   personal	   authority,	   required	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid., 17. 
7 Roger Owen, Cotton and the Egyptian Economy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 40. 
8 Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali, 162-195.  
9 Ibid. 
	  85	  
recruitment	   of	   a	   considerable	   number	   of	   administrators,	   technicians	   and	   experts,	  whose	  mission	  was	  to	  ensure	  the	  effective	  implementation	  of	  his	  strategic	  objectives.	  Although	  Mohamed	  Ali	  owed	  his	  1805	  rise	  to	  power	  to	  the	  support	  he	  received	  from	   representatives	   of	   the	   popular	   uprising	   against	   the	  Ottoman	   governor10	  (mainly	  notables	  and	  Al	  Azhar	  Sheikhs),	  he	  restricted	  his	  appointments	  to	   leading	  positions	   in	  the	   young	   bureaucratic	   apparatus	   to	   cadres	   of	   non-­‐Egyptian	   descent.	   Even	  when	   the	  size	   of	   the	   army	   inflated	   to	   around	   376,000	   soldiers	   in	   1839,	   its	   high	   command	  remained	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  Turkish	  and	  Circassian	  elements.	  Similarly,	  most	  members	  of	  educational	  missions	   to	  Europe,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  heads	  of	   the	  new	  administrative	  units,	  were	  chosen	  from	  non-­‐native	  minorities.	  The	  development	  of	  the	  industrial	  sector	  was	  mainly	   overseen	   and	   supervised	   by	   European	   experts,	   especially	   in	   the	   military	  industries.	   The	   expansion	   in	  widely	   growing	   export-­‐oriented	   cotton	   attracted	   foreign	  traders	  who	  settled	  in	  Cairo	  and	  Alexandria.	  In	  Alexandria	  alone,	  the	  number	  of	  trading	  companies	   owned	   by	   foreigners	   —	   mostly	   Greeks,	   British,	   French,	   Austrians	   and	  Italians—	  reached	  70	  at	  one	  point.11	  	  Due	  to	  such	  undertakings,	  Mohamed	  Ali’s	  efforts	  to	  establish	   the	   foundations	  of	  a	  modern	  state,	   guided	  by	  his	  ambition	   to	  break	  away	  eventually	  from	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  led	  to	  a	  gradual	  shift	  away	  from	  his	  alliance	  with	  the	  traditional	   local	  bourgeoisie	  who	  had	  originally	  brought	  him	  to	  power.	  Instead,	  he	  clearly	   favoured	   an	   alliance	   with	   a	   non-­‐Egyptian,	   mostly	   European	   and	   Turkish,	  bourgeoisie	  class.12	  In	  this	  regard,	  Nazih	  Ayubi	  points	  out	  that	  Mohamed	  Ali’s	  monopoly	  on	   all	   trade	   sectors	   and	   his	   preference	   for	   trading	   with	   English	   and	   European	  commercial	   agents	   strongly	   contributed	   to	   the	   disempowerment	   of	   the	   traditional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Luwis Awad, Tarikh Al-Fikr Al-Misry Al-Hadith [History of Modern Egyptian Thought] (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, 
1969), 75. 
11 Nazih Ayubi, Al-Dawla Al-Markaziyya Fi Misr [the Centralized State Tradition in Egypt] (Beirut: Center for 
Arab Unity Stuides (CAUS), 1989), 80-81. 
12 Ibid., 82. 
	  86	  
bourgeoisie	  by	  overtaking	  the	  main	  sphere	  of	  its	  economic	  activity.13	  This	  orientation	  is	  sometimes	  explained	  by	  Mohamed	  Ali’s	  desire	   to	  avoid	   the	  emergence	  of	  an	  Egyptian	  elite,	  which	  could	  potentially	  shake	  his	  solid	  grip	  on	  power,	  especially	  in	  the	  army.	  But	  though	  this	  may	  have	  been	  the	  main	  rationale	  behind	  Mohamed	  Ali’s	  approach,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  take	   into	  account	  that	  the	  Pasha’s	  drive	  to	  modernise	  the	  Egyptian	  army	  and	  to	  mobilise	   the	  necessary	  resources	   for	  building	  the	   foundations	  of	  a	  strong	  state	  
did	  require	  expertise	  and	  experiences	  that	  Egypt	  lacked	  at	  the	  time.	  Employing	  qualified	  foreign	  experts	  and	  encouraging	  them	  to	  settle	  in	  Egypt	  was	  essential	  to	  the	  design	  and	  implementation	   of	   major	   industrial	   and	   irrigation	   projects,	   as	   well	   as	   for	   the	  organisation,	  structuration	  and	  training	  of	  the	  army.	  Gradually,	  however,	  Mohamed	  Ali’s	  dependence	  on	  non-­‐Egyptian	  elements	  had	  to	   be	   reinforced	  by	   several	   other	   layers	   of	   bureaucrats,	  who	  would	   consist	  mainly	   of	  Egyptian	  natives.	  To	  produce	  trained	  cadres	  in	  various	  technical	  specialisations	  for	  the	  army,	   a	   new	  non-­‐religious	   education	   system,	  which	   included	   preparatory	   and	   special	  schools	  in	  Cairo,	  was	  introduced.14	  Administratively,	  the	  country	  was	  divided	  into	  different	  levels	  of	  municipal	  units,	  which	   were	   headed	   by	   appointed	   officials.15	  An	   army	   of	   supporting	   staff,	   such	   as	  accountants,	  clerks,	   tellers,	  guards,	  and	  so	   forth,	  aided	   the	   latter.16	  The	  newly	   forming	  administrative	   bourgeoisie	   emerged	   as	   the	   backbone	   of	   Mohamed	   Ali’s	   attempt	   to	  establish	  an	  administrative	  structure	  for	  controlling	  and	  directing	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  strong	   state	   and	   an	   Egypt	   relatively	   independent	   from	   Ottoman	   control.	   Socially	  speaking,	   this	  bureaucratic	  bourgeois	  category	  was	  certainly	  subservient	   to	   the	  ruling	  elite	   of	  Mohamed	   Ali’s	   entourage,	   or	   al-­‐ma‘iyya	  al-­‐saniyya,	  which	   remained	   primarily	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid. 
14 Hunter, Egypt under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy, 17. 
15 Ibid., 18-22. 
16 Ayubi, Al-Dawla Al-Markaziyya Fi Misr [the Centralized State Tradition in Egypt], 49. 
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non-­‐Egyptian.	  However,	  without	  this	  category	  of	  workers	  Egypt’s	  capacity	  to	  implement	  the	  vision	  of	  its	  new	  ruler	  was	  almost	  inconceivable.	  Thus,	  the	  modern	  Egyptian	  middle	  class	  was	  born.	  From	  its	  conception,	  Egypt’s	  middle	  class	  was	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	  notion	  of	   modernisation,	   with	   a	   clear	   moral	   sense	   of	   responsibility	   for	   the	   advancement	   of	  building	  a	  modern	  and	   independent	   state.	  Arguably,	   this	  was	   the	  very	  raison	  d’être	  of	  Egypt’s	  middle	  class.	  As	  Hunter	  notes:	  During	   the	   reign	   of	   Muhammad	   Ali,	   a	   cadre	   of	   “new	   men”-­‐physicians,	   engineers,	  geographers,	  metallurgists,	  printers-­‐	  began	  to	  emerge.	  Employed	  by	  Muhammad	  Ali	  in	  various	  jobs,	  from	  translating	  French	  law	  to	  managing	  medical	  dispensaries	  in	  the	  countryside,	   these	   young	   men	   worked	   their	   way	   through	   the	   ranks	   of	   the	  bureaucracy	   until	   by	   the	   1860’s	   many	   had	   become	   part	   of	   Egypt’s	   administrative	  elite.	  Although	  they	  appear	  in	  our	  tables	  and	  elsewhere	  as	  “technicians”,	  they	  became	  the	  cutting	  edge	  of	  a	  new	  society.17	  	  	  	  Whereas	   the	   leading	   positions	   in	   Mohamed	   Ali’s	   bureaucracy	   remained	  exclusively	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  non-­‐Egyptians,	  Egyptians	  filled	  the	  medium	  and	  lower	  levels	  of	  the	  state	  structure,	  including	  the	  army.	  Ayubi	  points	  out	  that	  the	  state-­‐monopolistic	  approach	   of	   Mohamed	   Ali	   formed	   a	   class	   of	   executive	   administrators	   with	   ‘definite	  bureaucratic	  interests’,18	  which	  arguably	  continues	  to	  exist	  in	  Egypt	  to	  the	  present	  day.	  	  The	   process	   of	   formation	   and	   expansion	   of	   this	   new	   bureaucratic	   bourgeoisie	  continued	   over	   the	   decades	   following	   Mohamed	   Ali’s	   death.	   Unlike	   much	   of	   the	  industrial	   base	   established	   during	   his	   rule,	   the	   centralised	   bureaucracy	  Mohamed	  Ali	  created	   outlived	   its	   founder.	   In	   subsequent	   years	   it	   even	   grew	   to	   the	   extent	   that	  ‘bureaucracy’	  became	  almost	  synonymous	  with	  the	  modern	  Egyptian	  state.19	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Hunter, Egypt under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy, 113-
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2.2	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Landownership	  and	  the	  Birth	  of	  Egypt’s	  Landed	  
Bourgeoisie	  Mohamed	   Ali’s	   strict	   state-­‐monopolistic	   modernisation	   approach	   was	  characterised	   by	   strong,	   if	   not	   near-­‐total,	   state	   control	   of	   economic	   activity.	   As	  highlighted	  above,	  this	  approach	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  new	  bureaucratic	  class,	  which	  controlled	   most	   of	   the	   means	   of	   production,	   finance	   and	   distribution,	   and	   which	  supervised	  the	  process	  of	  mobilisation	  of	  resources	  to	  implement	  Mohamed	  Ali’s	  vision.	  However,	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  modern	  Egyptian	  class	  structure,	  and	  particularly	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  middle	  and	  upper	  middle	  classes,	  would	  not	  be	  complete	  without	  considering	  the	  emergence	  of	  another,	  equally	  important	  wing	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  bourgeoisie	   as	   a	   result	   of	   land	   allocation	   policies	   which	   began	   under	   Mohamed	   Ali.	  Agricultural	   land,	  we	  must	  not	   forget,	  was	  Egypt’s	  most	   important	  economic	  resource	  and	  base	  of	  wealth	  at	  the	  time.	  The	  history	  of	  individual	  landownership	  in	  modern	  Egypt20	  can	  be	  said	  to	  begin	  with	   Mohamed	   Ali.	   A	   few	   years	   into	   his	   reign,	   Mohamed	   Ali	   abolished	   the	   iltizam	  (commitment)	   system	   that	   had	   dominated	   Egypt’s	   agricultural	   regime	   for	   centuries	  under	  the	  Mamelukes,	  and	  could	  arguably	  have	  accumulatively	  formed	  a	  class	  of	  land-­‐controlling	  rural	  notables.21	  Between	  1813	  and	  1818,	  land	  distribution	  policies	  aimed	  at	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For a comprehensive study of the evolution of Landownership in Egypt from Mohamed Ali to the mid-20th 
century, see: Gabriel Baer, A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt, 1800-1950 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1962). 
21 The iltizam system stipulated that lands remain owned by the central authority in Cairo. The land was divided 
to constituencies controlled by officially appointed tax collectors –the multazimun. As Anouar Abdel-Malek 
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creating	  networks	  of	  patronage	  and	   loyalty	  across	  the	  country	   led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  several	  categories	  of	  landowners	  as	  follows:22	  Category	   of	   Land	  Ownership	   Description	   and	  Total	   Lands	   Allocated	   in	  
Faddans23	  
Ab‘adiyyat	  	   Tax	   exempt	   lands	  bestowed	   on	   members	   of	  Mohamed	   Ali’s	   Family,	   his	  court,	   military	   chiefs,	   and	  high	  officials-­‐200,000	  
Awsya	  	   Lands	   given	   to	  former	  multazimun	   by	   way	  of	  compensation	  -­‐100,000	  
Masmuh	   al-­‐
Mashayikh/Masmuh	  al-­‐Mastaba	  
Lands	   given	   to	  village	   notables	   and	  sheikhs-­‐154,000	  
Al-­‐Rizka	   Tax-­‐exempt	   land	  turned	   over	   to	   foreign	  functionaries-­‐6,000	  
Al-­‐	  Kharajiyya	   Land	   given	   in	   life	  tenancy	   to	   the	   peasants,	   in	  parcels	   of	   three	   to	   five	  feddans	  due	  to	  the	  payment	  of	  appropriated	  taxes.	  	  Although	  not	  granting	  direct	  ownership	  rights	  to	  cultivated	  lands,	  Mohamed	  Ali’s	  distribution	   of	   land	   titles	   as	   shown	   above	   was	   the	   first	   step	   in	   establishing	   private	  property	  in	  agricultural	  land	  in	  modern	  Egypt.	  However,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  a	  few	  decades	  later	  that	  private	  ownership	  of	  agricultural	  land	  was	  fully	  established.	  The	  abolition	  of	  monopolies,	  imposed	  on	  Mohamed	  Ali	  by	  European	  powers	  at	  the	  Settlement	  of	  1841,24	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  promulgation	  of	  the	  law	  of	  1846,	  which	  recognised	  a	  limited	  form	  of	  landownership	  and	  allowed	  for	  mortgages	  and	  conveyance	  to	  a	  third	  party.	  In	  1858,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid., 55. 
23 A faddan is equal to approximately four thousand square meters of land. 
24 The settlement of 1841 is widely regarded as signaling the decay of Mohamed Ali’s rule and representing the 
effective end to his modernisation project and expansionist ambitions. Signed after the Egyptian army’s defeat 
in the Levant, the settlement mandated the decrease of the army’s size and the abolition of monopolies, and 
opened the country widely to foreign intervention. In return, Mohamed Ali and his descendants were granted 
hereditary rule over Egypt as part of the Ottoman Empire. See: Hurewitz, "The Beginnings of Military 
Modernization in the Middle East: A Comparative Analysis," 147.  
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the	   Khedive,	  Mohamed	   Said	   Pasha,25	  went	   a	   step	   further	   in	   the	   institution	   of	   private	  land	  ownership	  by	  introducing	  a	  regulation	  allowing	  individuals	  the	  right	  to	  lease	  lands	  for	   three	  years,	   to	  mortgage	   it,	   to	  sell	   the	  rights	  of	  use	   to	   third	  parties,	  and	   to	   inherit	  land	  titles.26	  	  The	   financial	   crisis,	  which	   characterised	  much	  of	  Khedive	   Ismail	   Pasha’s27	  rule	  (1863-­‐1879),	  and	  which	  (among	  other	  things)	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  sale	  of	  Egypt’s	  share	  in	   the	   Suez	   Canal	   Company	   to	   Britain,	   was	   the	   main	   driving	   force	   behind	   the	  promulgation	  of	  a	  series	  of	  laws	  and	  regulations	  aiming	  to	  increase	  the	  state’s	  revenues	  and	  keep	  its	  fiscal	  solvency.	  This	  ultimately	  led	  to	  the	  final	  establishment	  of	  private	  land	  ownership.	   In	   1871,	   a	   law	   was	   issued	   that	   allowed	   holders	   of	   usage	   rights	   to	  agricultural	   lands	   to	   acquire	   final	   ownership	   of	   these	   lands	   if	   they	   paid	   a	   total	   lump	  sum,	  equal	   to	  six	   times	  the	  yearly	  appropriated	  tax	  on	  their	   lands.	  This	  condition	  was	  abolished	  in	  1891,	  only	  to	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  private	  ownership	  of	  agricultural	  lands	  to	  be	  incorporated	   into	   civil	   law,	   according	   to	   an	   amendment	   of	   article	   six	   thereof	   in	   1896	  that	   acknowledged	   the	   right	   to	   ownership	   of	   real	   estate,	   including	   al-­‐Kharajiyya	  agricultural	   lands.28	  A	   class	   structure	   revolving	   around	   the	   ownership	   of	   agricultural	  lands	  was	  issued	  its	  final	  birth	  certificate.29	  	  Anouar	  Abdel-­‐Malek	  gives	  a	  detailed	  description	  of	  the	  class	  structure	  of	  Egypt’s	  landowners	   from	   1894	   to	   1952	   based	   on	   the	   size	   of	   ownership.30	  At	   the	   top	   of	   this	  landownership-­‐based	   structure	   was	   the	   group	   of	   large	   proprietors	   with	   holdings	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Mohamed Ali’s son and third to rule after his death.  
26 Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society. The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser, 56. 
27 Mohamed Ali’s grandson and fourth to rule after his death. 
28 Assem El-Dessouki, Kibar Mullak Al-Arady Al-Ziraʻiyya Wa Dawruhum Fi Al-Mujtamaʻ Al-Misry 1914-
1952 [Big Agricultural Landowners and Their Role in Egyptian Society 1914-1952] (Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouk, 
2007), 19-20. 
29 For a thorough breakdown of the different categories of landowners in 19th century Egypt, including members 
of the Mohamed Ali family, state officials, Copts, ‘Ulama (religious scholars), village notables, A‘rab  (Beduin 
notables), foreigners and ordinary fallahin (peasants), see: Baer, A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt, 
1800-1950, 13-70.  
30 Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society. The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser, 55-57.  
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more	   than	   fifty	   faddans.	   The	  biggest	   landowners,	   comprised	  of	   the	   royal	   family	  and	  a	  handful	   of	   other	   magnet	   families,	   depended	   mainly	   on	   the	   proceeds	   of	   leasing	   their	  lands.	  The	  lower	  stratum	  in	  this	  category	  was	  comprised	  mainly	  of	  rich	  proprietors	  who	  resided	  in	  the	  countryside	  to	  supervise	  the	  farming	  of	  their	  lands.	  	  At	   the	  heart	  of	   the	   landownership	  structure,	  however,	  was	   the	  class	  of	  middle-­‐size	  landowners.	  	  In	  1894,	  for	  example,	  15.4%	  of	  all	  landowners	  fell	  into	  the	  category	  of	  middle-­‐size	  ownership	  (five	  to	  fifty	  faddans).	  These	  middle-­‐size	  landowners	  controlled	  around	  34.3%	  of	   agricultural	   lands.	  Although	  over	   the	   following	  decades,	  middle-­‐size	  owners	  decreased	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	   the	   total	  number	  of	   landowners	   (from	  15.4%	   in	  1894	  to	  5.2%	  in	  1952),	  their	  actual	  share	  of	  land	  remained	  steady.	  In	  1914,	  for	  example,	  this	   share	  was	   recorded	  at	  30.4%	  of	  Egypt’s	   cultivated	  area,	  which	   is	   the	  same	   figure	  recorded	   in	   1952,	   when	   the	   July	   23	   change	   of	   regimes	   took	   place.31	  El-­‐Dessouki	   has	  argued	   that,	   despite	   some	   flaws	   as	   a	   method	   of	   categorisation,	   defining	   landowning	  class	  factions	  based	  on	  the	  size	  of	  their	  land	  ownership	  was	  essential	  to	  understanding	  their	   political	   role	   from	   1914	   to	   1952.32	  In	   this	   sense,	   Abdel-­‐Malek	   distinguishes	  between	  two	  groups	  within	  the	  landed	  middle	  class	  in	  this	  historical	  period.	  The	  upper	  strata	  of	  the	  landholding	  middle	  class	  (twenty	  to	  fifty	  faddans)	  was	  traditionally	  guided	  by	  an	  ambition	   to	   lift	   itself	  up	   to	   the	  status	  of	   ‘big’	   landownership	  and	  thus	  remained	  socio-­‐politically	  conservative.33	  	  	  Perhaps	  the	  only	  incident	  in	  which	  this	  social	  category	  was	  involved	  in	  a	  form	  of	  revolt	  against	  the	  central	  authority	   in	  Cairo	  was	  the	   ‘Orabi’	  revolt,	  which	  they	  initially	  supported	  and	  which	  ended	  in	  a	  tragic	  defeat	  of	  Ahmed	  Orabi’s	  rebellion	  and	  the	  British	  occupation	  of	  Egypt	  in	  1882.	  The	  Orabi	  movement,	  which	  later	  developed	  into	  an	  armed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid., 57. 
32 El-Dessouki, Kibar Mullak Al-Arady Al-Ziraʻiyya Wa Dawruhum Fi Al-Mujtamaʻ Al-Misry 1914-1952 [Big 
Agricultural Landowners and Their Role in Egyptian Society 1914-1952], 27-33. 
33 Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society. The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser, 60. 
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rebellion	   prompting	   British	   intervention,	   is	   an	   important	   and	   telling	   moment	   in	   the	  history	   of	   Egypt’s	  middle	   class,	   and	   arguably	   one	   from	  which	   some	   parallels	   to	   later	  stages	   can	   be	   drawn.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Orabi	   revolt,	   the	   upper-­‐middle	   landed	  bourgeoisie	   formed	  part	  of	   a	   temporary	  alliance	  with	  other	  discontented	  segments	  of	  the	   bureaucratic	   and	   urban	  middle	   class,	   most	   notably	   in	   the	   army.	   Native	   Egyptian	  middle-­‐ranked	  officers	  leading	  the	  movement	  were	  primarily	  driven	  by	  their	  discontent	  with	   the	   lack	  of	   upward	  mobility	   into	   the	   leading	  posts	  within	   the	   army,	  which	  were	  reserved	   for	   elite	   officers	   of	   Turkish	   origins.	   The	   middle	   class	   alliance	   of	   Egyptian	  middle-­‐ranked	   army	   officers	   and	   the	   notable	   rural	   figures	   leading	   the	   Orabi	   revolt	  pursued	   disparate	   interests	   and	   was	   thus	   relatively	   easily	   breakable.	   Nevertheless,	  remarkably,	  the	  discontent	  of	  both	  wings	  of	  the	  movement	  (and	  hence	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  political	   change	   agenda	   calling	   for	   constitutional	   representation)	   can	  be	   traced	   to	   a	  disturbance	  in	  the	  structural	  relationship	  with	  the	  state.	  Demands	  to	  put	  limitations	  on	  the	  absolute	  power	  of	   the	  Khedive	  only	  emerged	  when	   the	  state	  was	  about	   to	   revoke	  valuable	   land	  titles	  and	  when	   it	   insisted	  on	  blocking	  the	  advancement	  of	  bureaucratic	  careers	   for	   the	  middle-­‐ranked	  officers34.	   The	   two	  wings	  of	   the	  middle	   class,	   the	   rural	  and	  bureaucratic,	  were	  only	  motivated	  to	  act	  politically	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  growing	  sense	  of	  being	  abandoned	  or	  excluded	  from	  the	  social	  base	  of	  the	  state.	  	  Another	  lower	  segment	  of	  the	  landholding	  bourgeoisie	  (five	  to	  twenty	  faddans	  of	  landownership),	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   was	   experiencing	   a	   constantly	   deteriorating	  economic	   position	   and	   was	   thus	   largely	   unable	   to	   develop	   political	   mechanisms	   of	  significant	   leverage	   in	   the	  years	  between	  1870	  and	  1952.	  The	  size	  of	   their	  ownership	  was	   barely	   enough	   to	  make	   the	   production	   of	   crops	   on	   an	   economically	   viable	   scale	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, "The Transformation of the Egyptian Élite: Prelude to the Urabi Revolt," Middle East 
Journal 21, no. 3 (1967): 326. 
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possible.	  Most	  of	  them	  were	  therefore	  bound	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  one-­‐crop	  economy	  that	  had	   prevailed	   in	   Egypt	   since	   Ismail	   Pasha’s	   rule,	   to	   cater	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   British	  cotton	   mills	   in	   Manchester.	   Even	   when	   there	   was	   a	   later	   attempt	   by	   the	   Wafd	  government	  in	  1930	  to	  create	  the	  Banque	  du	  Credit	  Agricole	  d’Egypte	  to	  help	  small	  and	  medium	   landholders	   face	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   Great	   Depression,	   the	   pressure	   of	  large	   landowning	   families	   succeeded	   in	   forcing	   the	   government	   to	   step	   down.	   Ismail	  Sidqi,	  who	  succeeded	  the	  Wafd	  in	  power	  as	  Prime	  Minister,	  passed	  a	  law	  in	  1931	  that	  listed	  a	  minimum	  ownership	  of	  200	  faddans	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  prospective	  borrowers,	  thus	  allowing	  only	  large	  proprietors	  of	  agricultural	  lands	  to	  get	  financial	  support	  from	  this	  bank.35	  The	  socio-­‐political	  ramifications	  of	  this	  relatively	  vulnerable	  position	  within	  the	  landowning	   middle	   class,	   however,	   became	   increasingly	   significant,	   as	   many	  landowners	  belonging	  to	  this	  group	  were	  keen	  to	  provide	  the	  younger	  generation	  with	  other	   venues	   of	   social	   mobility.	   Along	   with	   access	   to	   traditional	   religious	   education	  leading	   to	   Al	   Azhar,	   this	   generation	   benefited	   strongly	   from	   Lord	   Cromer’s	   pre-­‐WWI	  policy	  of	  educating	  the	  fallahin	  (peasants)	  as	  a	  way	  of	  creating	  cadres	  capable	  of	  taking	  up	   low	  and	  medium	  ranked	  bureaucratic	  positions	  under	  British	  control,	  especially	   in	  the	   countryside.36	  A	   new	   generation	   of	   rural	   middle-­‐class	   youth	   was	   preparing	   to	  become	  indigenous	  to	  the	  expanding	  bureaucratic	  apparatus	  and	  thereby	  make	  a	  debut	  onto	  the	  public	  and	  political	  scene	  in	  the	  following	  decades.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society. The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser, 61-62. 
36 Shortly after the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, and upon the recommendations of a report submitted by 
Lord Dufferin –the British ambassador to Constantinople at the time, Lord Cromer followed a policy of 
bureaucratic expansion that included embedding colonial officials in influential parts of the bureaucracy to 
stabilise British presence in Egypt. For more details on the Dufferin report and Cromer’s approach to tightening 
British control over the bureaucratic structure in the first years of the occupation, see: Talaat Ramadan, Al-Idara 
Al-Misriyya Fi Fatrat Al-Saytara Al-Britaniyya [Egyptian Administration under British Contro] (Cairo: Dar Al-
Maʻarif, 1983).  
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2.3	  Egypt’s	  Belle	  Époque	  Middle	  Class:	  Land	  and	  Bureaucratic	  Dominance	  Throughout	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   the	   two	   main37	  wings	   of	  Egypt’s	  evolving	  middle	  class	  continued	  to	  play	  an	  important	  –	  if	  not,	  indeed,	  the	  leading	  –	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  cultural	  and	  political	  identity	  of	  Egyptian	  society.	  Before	  shedding	  light	  on	  some	  dynamics	  of	  this	  role,	  however,	  two	  important	  aspects	  must	  be	  noted	  in	  order	  to	  give	  a	  more	  realistic	  picture	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  what	  can	  be	  described	  as	  the	  belle	  
époque	  Egyptian	  middle	  class	  of	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  social	  formation	  and	  its	  functions	  as	  a	  political	  actor.	  	  The	   separately	   demonstrated	   emergence	   of	   the	   bureaucratic	   and	   landholding	  wings	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   middle	   class	   from	   Mohamed	   Ali’s	   reign	   onwards	   should	   not	  suggest	  that	  both	  processes	  of	  social	  formation	  took	  place	  in	  isolation	  from	  one	  another:	  quite	   the	   contrary.	   The	   bureaucratic	   class	   that	   emerged	   and	   expanded	   under	   the	   Ali	  dynasty	   gradually	   became	   enmeshed	   with	   the	   landholding	   class,	   in	   that	   it	   benefited	  greatly	  from	  the	  previously	  described	  land	  allocation	  policies.	  Land	  titles	  were	  used	  as	  an	  important	  tool	  for	  building	  patronage	  networks	  across	  different	  part	  of	  the	  country	  and	   creating	   power	   centres	   in	   various	   provinces	   that	   were	   loyal	   to	   the	   Khedival	  authority	   in	  Cairo.	  Moreover,	   land	  allocations	  were	  one	  of	   the	  most	   common	  political	  rewards	  bestowed	  by	  the	  ruling	  dynasty	  on	  their	  entourage	  or	  on	  powerful	  families	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Depending on the angle and focus of the analysis, other middle-class categories and demarcations could be 
argued to have existed and to have played an important role in shaping the socio-political evolution of the 
country throughout the 19th century and well into the first quarter of the 20th century. The influential ‘Ulama 
(Muslim religious scholars) and urban-based Tujjar (merchants) are two noticeable examples. Of course, these 
middle-class demarcations and those employed in this chapter’s analysis (bureaucratic middle class and landed 
bourgeoisie) are not necessarily mutually exclusive; there are indeed many overlapping aspects between them, 
such as notable religious scholars traditionally holding sizable land ownerships or urban-based merchants 
having strong familial connections to the countryside and having cultivated ties to the state bureaucracy. For 
analysis on different aspects of these categories’ role in the socio-historical development of Egyptian society 
from the 19th century onwards, see: Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid- Marsot, "The Role of the Ulama in Egypt During the 
Early Nineteenth Century," in Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt:Historical Studies from the 
Ottoman Conquest to the United Arab Republic, ed. P.M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press,1968); 
Marsot, "The Ulama of Cairo in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: 
Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 1500, ed. Nikki Keddi (Berkeley, London: University of 
California Press, 1972); and Amira El-Azhary Sonbol, The New Mamluks: Egyptian Society and Modern 
Feudalism (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000). 
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different	  parts	  of	  the	  country.	  Lands	  were	  also	  given	  as	  rewards	  for	  services	  rendered	  by	  individuals	  of	  different	  ranks	  in	  various	  branches	  of	  the	  bureaucracy,	   including	  the	  army.	   This	   trend	   reached	   its	   height	   during	   the	   reign	   of	   Ismail	   Pasha,	   Mohamed	   Ali’s	  grandson.	  Once	  the	  Khedive	  had	  decided	  to	  give	  an	  estate	  to	  someone,	  Hunter	  writes,	  he	  would	   send	   an	   order	   to	   a	   provincial	   governor	   or	   to	   his	   inspector	   general,	  who	  was	  requested	  to	  locate	  and	  delimit	  a	  specific	  amount	  of	  land	  and	  to	  send	  a	  statement	   to	   the	   Department	   of	   Finance,	   which	   would	   issue	   the	   title	   deed	  (taqsit)	  to	  the	  new	  owner.38	  	  Between	  January	  1863	  and	  December	  1865,	  official	  records	  indicate	  that	  a	  total	  of	  77,620	  faddans	  were	  granted	  to	  government	  officials	  and	  army	  officers;	  by	  the	  end	  of	  Khedive	   Ismail’s	  reign,	  a	   total	  of	  876,863	   faddans	  of	  all	   types	  of	  cultivated	   lands	  were	  granted	  following	  the	  aforementioned	  procedure.39	  	  Leading	   a	   bureaucratic	   career	   and	   acquiring	   agricultural	   land	   wealth	   became	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin:	  influence	  and	  social	  status.	  This	  was	  especially	  true	  for	  the	  struggling,	  lower	  echelons	  of	  the	  middle-­‐size	  landholding	  class.	  Middle-­‐class	  families	  in	  the	  countryside	  typically	  wished	  to	  provide	  either	  a	  traditional	  Azharian-­‐	  or	  Western-­‐type	  education	  to	  their	  children,	  with	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  securing	  a	  prestige-­‐generating	  career	   within	   either	   the	   religious	   establishment	   or	   the	   state	   bureaucracy.	   By	   the	  beginning	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   rural	   middle	   class	   families	   increasingly	   came	   to	  favour	   non-­‐religious	   education	   in	   the	   government’s	   secondary	   schools	   and	   higher	  institutes.	   By	   facilitating	   access	   to	   influential	   careers	   in	   the	   state	   bureaucracy,	   such	  education	  became	   the	  basis	   for	  a	  valuable	   trajectory	   towards	   the	  acquisition	  of	   social	  power	  and	  prestige.40	  Education	  was	   thus	  an	  essential	  preparatory	  step	   for	   the	   future	  responsibility	  of	  preserving,	  and	  ideally	  increasing,	  the	  family’s	  land	  wealth.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Hunter, Egypt under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy, 106. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Lucie Ryzova, "Egyptianizing Modernity through the 'New Effendyia', Social and Cultural Constructions of 
the Middle Class in Egypt under the Monarchy," in Re-Envisioning Egypt 1919-1952, ed. Arthur Goldschmidt, 
Amy J. Johnson, and Barak A. Salmoni (Cairo, New York: American University in Cairo Press, 2005), 129. 
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The	   relationship	   between	   the	   pursuit	   of	   a	   bureaucratic	   career	   and	   the	  acquisition	  of	  land	  wealth	  was	  characteristically	  interdependent	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  the	  acquisition	  and	  preservation	  of	  social	  status.	  Often	  enough,	  bureaucratic	  office	  holders	  would	  use	  their	  powers	  to	  acquire	  more	  lands;	  however,	  the	  opposite	  is	  also	  true.	  The	  possession	  of	   land	  wealth	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  social	  prominence	  and	  thus	  enhanced	  the	   possibility	   of	   the	   landowner	   being	   considered	   for	   high-­‐ranking	   public	   office.	   In	  short,	   land	   wealth	   and	   holding	   influential	   positions	   in	   the	   bureaucratic	   apparatus	  became	   two	  mutually	   supportive	   credentials	   for	   the	   obtainment	   and	  maintenance	   of	  social	  and	  political	  status.	  The	  evolution	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  apparatus	  and	  agricultural	  landownership	  under	  Mohamed	  Ali	  and	  his	  successors	  can	  thus	  be	  considered	  the	  two	  main	   historical,	   structural	   frameworks	   within	   which	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   modern	  Egyptian	  middle	  class	  took	  place.	  Indeed,	   Egyptian	   politics	   in	   the	   period	   between	   1919	   and	   1952	  was	   primarily	  shaped	  by	   a	   generation	   of	   new	  middle-­‐class	   politicians	  who	   emerged	   from	   structural	  changes	   induced	   by	   the	   state	   in	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century.41	  The	   two	  major	   political	   parties	   (the	   Wafd	   and	   the	   Constitutional	   Liberals)	   were	   essentially	  institutional	   representations	   of	   the	   prevailing	   class	   structure	   in	   the	   countryside.	   The	  Wafd	   clearly	   represented	   most	   segments	   of	   the	   rural	   middle	   class	   and	   its	   urban	  extensions.	  The	  Constitutional	  Liberals,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  embodied	  the	  interests	  of	  big	  landowning	   families,	   higher	   echelons	   of	   the	   rural	   middle	   class,	   and	   the	   thin	   crust	   of	  urban	  elites.	  All	   the	  aforementioned	   categories	   saw	   the	   state	   as	   a	  means	  of	   enforcing	  their	  ideological	  perceptions	  and	  advancing	  fairly	  well	  defined	  class	  interests.	  Capturing	  and	   steering	   the	   state	   in	   conformity	   with	   class-­‐motivated	   perceptions	   of	   ‘the	   best	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41James Whidden, "The Generation of 1919," in Re-Envisioning Egypt 1919-1952, ed. Arthur Goldschmidt, 
Amy J. Johnson, and Barak A. Salmoni (Cairo, New York: The American University in Cairo Press), 29-30. 
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interest	   of	   the	   nation’,	  was	   therefore	   the	   core	   dynamic	   of	   the	   political	   process	   in	   the	  pre-­‐1952	  period.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  Egyptian	  state	  was	  regarded	  as	  a	  field	  of	  gravity	  and	  power,	   attracting	   various	   political	   representatives	   of	   social	   classes.	   Similar	   to	   the	  dynamics	   which	   have	   engulfed	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   state	   in	   post-­‐Ottoman	   Iraq,42	  Egyptian	  politics	  in	  the	  constitutional	  period	  (1923-­‐1952)	  eventually	  became	  shaped	  by	  attempts	  to	  capture	  and	  direct	  the	  state	  in	  conformity	  with	  nationalistic	  articulations	  of	  fundamentally	   class-­‐shaped	   interests.	   In	   short,	   the	   middle	   and	   upper	   middle	   classes	  were	   aware	   of	   the	   significance	   of	   maintaining	   their	   structural	   relationship	   with	   the	  state	  and	  using	  it	  to	  secure	  their	  interests.	  	  One	   of	   the	   most	   representative	   examples	   of	   these	   intertwined	   structural	  characteristics	  of	  the	  early	  twentieth-­‐century	  Egyptian	  middle	  class	  is	  Saad	  Zaghlul,	  the	  Wafd’s	  historical	  leader	  and	  the	  most	  prominent	  figure	  of	  the	  national	  movement	  from	  1919	  to	  1924.	  Zaghlul	  was	  the	  son	  of	  a	  village	  chief	  in	  the	  governorate	  of	  Gharbiyya,	  in	  the	  Nile	  delta,	  and	  came	   from	  a	  middle-­‐size	   landowning	   family.	  After	  his	  education	   in	  Al-­‐Azhar,	   he	   led	   a	   professional	   and	   politically	   active	   career,	   in	  which	   he	   held	   several	  positions	   in	   the	   government	   bureaucracy.	   A	   nationalist	   liberal,	   he	   was	   an	   engaged	  advocate	   of	   independence	   from	   Britain	   and	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   representative	  constitutional	  system	  of	  rule.	  During	  Zaghlu’s	  political	  career,	  he	  assumed	  cabinet	  posts,	  first	  that	  of	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  and	  later	  that	  of	  Minister	  of	  Education.	  His	  activism	  and	  role	   in	   leading	   the	   delegation	   that	  met	  with	   the	   British	   High	   Commissioner	   Reginald	  Wingate	  to	  demand	  that	  Egypt’s	  case	  of	  independence	  be	  brought	  before	  the	  1918	  Paris	  peace	  conference	  lifted	  him	  to	  an	  undisputed	  position	  of	  leadership	  within	  the	  national	  movement.	  After	  the	  promulgation	  of	  the	  1923	  constitution,	  Zaghlul	  was	  elected	  prime	  minister,	  as	  the	  Wafd	  easily	  won	  a	  landslide	  electoral	  victory.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1. 
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2.4	  The	  ‘New’	  Middle	  Class:	  The	  Rise	  of	  the	  Effendiyya	  The	  political	   ascendance	  of	   Saad	  Zaghlul	   is	  but	  one	  example	  of	  how	  social	   and	  structural	  changes	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  resulted	  in	  influences	  affecting	  the	  composition	  of	  Egypt’s	  body	  politic	  in	  the	  early	  decades	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  Egyptian	  political	  society	  had	  more	  or	   less	   been	   exclusive	   to	   first-­‐	   and	   second-­‐generation	   families	   surrounding	   the	  Mohamed	  Ali	  dynasty	  rulers	  and	  their	  allies	  in	  the	  landed	  upper	  class,	  roughly	  until	  the	  British	  occupation	  of	  Egypt	   in	  1882.43	  By	  the	  early	  decades	  of	   the	  twentieth	  century	  a	  third	  generation	  began	  to	  infiltrate	  the	  political	  scene.	  This	  generation	  reflected	  changes	  in	   the	   social	   structure	   that	   had	   been	   accumulating	   in	   the	   previous	   decades	   and	  were	  inevitably	   bound	   to	   produce	   political	   ramifications.	   Middle-­‐class	   families	   who	   had	  benefited	   from	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   bureaucracy	   and	   the	   education	   system	   began	   to	  enter	  into	  political	  society.	  As	  Whidden	  explains:	  Egypt’s	   third	   political	   generation	   included	   men	   born	   in	   the	   1860’s,	   such	   as	   Saad	  Zaghloul,	  ‘Adli	  Yakan,	  Husayn	  Rushdi,	  and	  Mohamed	  Said,	  who	  attended	  western	  type	  schools	  and	  took	  positions	  within	  the	  bureaucracy	  or	  professions.44	  	  	  But	  the	  ‘new’	  middle	  class	  was	  not	  only	  rising	  in	  politics.	  Such	  effective	  presence	  on	   the	   political	   scene	   was	   but	   a	   mere	   reflection	   of	   a	   wider	   social	   presence.	   The	  formation	  of	  Egypt’s	  new	  middle	  class	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  structural	  changes	  throughout	  the	   nineteenth	   and	   early-­‐twentieth	   centuries	   redefined	   the	   features	   of	   the	   Egyptian	  class	   structure	   –	   and,	   arguably,	   Egyptian	   society	   in	   general	   –	   until	   another	   wave	   of	  structural	   changes	   were	   induced	   post-­‐1952.	   Gershoni	   and	   Jankowski	   draw	   an	  outstandingly	  accurate	  map	  of	  various	  social	  groups,	  the	  sum	  of	  which	  could	  be	  roughly	  considered	   the	   core	   of	   this	   new	   emerging	  middle	   class,	   often	   generically	   labelled	   the	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effendiyya	   class,	   in	   reference	   to	   the	   middle-­‐class	   Ottoman	   rank	   of	   effendi.	   The	   term	  collectively	  refers	  to	  a	  melange	  of	  rising	  middle-­‐class	  groups:	  	  [S]tudents	  in	  the	  Western-­‐style	  secondary	  schools,	  higher	  institutes	  and	  the	  Egyptian	  University,	   who	   were	   in	   the	   process	   of	   becoming	   effendis;	   perhaps	  most	   typically,	  civil	   servants	   in	   the	   bureaucracy	   and	   teachers	   in	   the	   modern	   educational	   system;	  clerks	   in	   the	   expanding	   commercial	   economy;	   depending	   on	   their	   dress	   and	  education,	   some	  of	   the	  merchants	  and	  employees	  of	   the	  more	   traditional	   sectors	  of	  the	  economy;	  and	  even	  a	  segment	  of	  the	  industrial	  workforce	  such	  as	  technical	  school	  graduates	   who	   perceived	   their	   education	   as	   distinguishing	   them	   from	   other	  workers.45	  	  Lines	  of	  demarcation	  for	  social	  groupings	  who	  could	  be	  categorised	  as	  effendiyya	  are	  almost	  impossible	  to	  draw.	  However,	  there	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  the	  social	  formations	  produced	  by	  the	  deep-­‐reaching,	  structural	  changes	  of	  the	  recent	  past,	  as	  Gershoni	  and	  Jankowski	  have	  accurately	  asserted,	  came	  to	  embody	  ‘modern	  Egypt’.	  Indeed,	  just	  as	  the	  new	  middle	  class	  was	  the	  product	  of	  past	  changes,	  so	  too	  was	  it	  representative	  of	  what	  the	  nation	  was	  ‘in	  the	  process	  of	  becoming’.46	  	  
	  
3.	  Egypt’s	  ‘New	  Middle	  Class’	  in	  the	  Early	  Twentieth	  Century:	  
Identity,	  Modernity	  and	  Political	  Agency	  
	  After	  studying	  the	  development	  of	   the	  middle	  class	   in	  the	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  centuries,	   it	   is	  worthwhile	  to	  take	  a	  closer	   look	  at	  the	  kind	  of	  socio-­‐political	  transformation	  that	  resulted	  from	  the	  rise	  of	  Egypt's	  modern	  middle	  class	  to	  a	  central	  place	   in	   Egyptian	   society.	   The	   rise	   of	   this	   new	   middle	   class	   in	   the	   early	   twentieth	  century	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  facilitating	  the	  transition	  of	  both	  state	  and	  society	  to	  what	  would	   later	   become	   a	   sense	   of	   a	   distinct	   national	   identity,	   or	   ‘Egyptianness’.	  This	   section	   aims	   to	   point	   out	   some	   important	   aspects	   of	   the	   cultural	   and	   political	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Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995), 11. 
46 Ibid. 
	  100	  
frameworks	  in	  which	  this	  transition	  took	  place.	  Understanding	  the	  role	  of	  Egypt’s	  early	  twentieth-­‐century	   middle	   and	   upper	   middle	   classes	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   national	  identity	  and	  shaping	  of	  the	  socio-­‐political	  scene	  generally,	  presents	  significant	  parallels	  to	  the	  self-­‐perception	  of	  subsequent	  generations	  of	  the	  middle	  class.	  These	  generations	  include	   today’s	  neoliberal	  middle	  class	   in	  Egypt,	  and	   its	  self-­‐perception	  as	   the	   leading	  soul	  of	  society’s	  aspiration	  for	  modernity	  and	  progress.	  	  
3.1	  Identity	  and	  Modernity	  The	   mid-­‐nineteenth	   century	   saw	   the	   gradual	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	  Egyptians	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  Turks	  and	  those	  of	  other	  non-­‐Egyptian	  descent	  –	  who	  were	  assigned	  leading	  positions	  in	  the	  state	  bureaucracy,	  a	  trend	  that	  continued,	  with	  varied	  degrees	  of	  stability,	  from	  then	  on.	  As	  Hunter	  points	  out,	  Mohamed	  Ali’s	  high	  officials	  had	  for	  the	  most	  part	  been	  Turks,	  but	  by	  mid-­‐century	  changes	   in	  recruitment	  had	   led	   to	   the	   appearance,	   at	   the	   upper	   level	   of	   administration,	   of	   distinct	  groups	  of	  al-­‐dhawat,	  new	  types	  of	  men.	  The	  high	  office	  holders	  of	  mid-­‐century,	  then,	  reflected	  a	  basic	  realignment	  of	  social	  forces	  taking	  place	  throughout	  the	  state.47	   	  Amongst	  those	  rising	  social	  forces	  were	  western-­‐educated	  Egyptian	  technocrats	  and	  provincial	  notables.48	  Their	  infiltration	  of	  the	  middle,	  and	  gradually	  the	  high,	  ranks	  of	  the	  bureaucracy	  made	  the	  Egyptian	  state,	  in	  a	  sense,	  more	  Egyptian.	  The	  new	  middle	  class	  assumed	  a	  defining	  role	  in	  giving	  birth	  to	  a	  solid	  sense	  of	  Egyptian	  nationalism.	  Its	  growing	   social	   presence	  was	   reflected	   in	   a	   persistent	   imposition	   of	  what	   Gasper	   has	  termed	  proto-­‐bourgeois	  political,	   intellectual,	   artistic,	   social	   and	  moral	   conceptions	  of	  Egyptian	  identity.49	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A	  decade	  or	  so	  into	  British	  occupation,	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  Egyptian	  politicians	  and	   activists	   belonging	   to	   the	   new	   middle	   class	   emerged.	   They	   were	   inclined	   to	  formulate	   their	  political	  agendas	  along	  more	  Egyptian	  nationalistic	   identity	   lines.	  This	  significant	   transformation	   became	   clear	   when	   expressed	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   1919	  national	  movement,	  which	  listed	  independence	  and	  constitutionalism	  as	  top	  priorities.	  Both	   the	  movement’s	  discourse	  and	  political	   agenda	  reflected	  a	   clear	   shift	   in	   the	   self-­‐perceived	  national	  identity	  of	  widening	  segments	  of	  Egyptian	  society.	  This	  was	  true	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  Lord	  Allenby,	  the	  British	  High	  commissioner	  in	  Egypt	  who	  replaced	  Reginald	   Wingate	   after	   the	   massive	   demonstrations	   of	   1919,	   reported	   back	   to	   the	  Foreign	   Office	   in	   London	   that	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   Wafd,	   Saad	   Zaghlul,	   ‘represented	   a	  transformation	   from	   Ottoman	   and	   Islamic	   to	   liberal	   and	   nationalist	   political	  identities’.50	  With	  no	  little	  symbolic	  significance,	  Zaghlul’s	  residence	  in	  Cairo,	  which	  was	  the	  place	  of	  landmark	  meetings	  of	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  national	  movement,	  became	  known	  as	  bayt	  al-­‐umma:	  house	  of	  the	  nation.	  If	  by	   the	  early	   twentieth	   century	  a	  national	   identity	  was	   in	  part	   shaped	  by	   the	  rise	  of	  the	  1919	  Wafdist	  movement	  representing	  (and	  naturally	  led	  by)	  the	  new	  middle	  class,	   it	  must	  also	  be	  observed	  that	  this	  identity	  was	  equally	  formed	  by	  another	  socio-­‐demographic	  and	  cultural	  development.	  The	  ethno-­‐cultural	  composition	  of	  Egypt’s	  elite	  had	  also	  changed.	  The	  Turkish	  minority,	  which	  had	  been	  favoured	  in	  terms	  of	  running	  the	   bureaucracy	   and	   in	   land	   allocation	   policies	   since	   Mohamed	   Ali’s	   rule,	   eventually	  melted	  into	  the	  newly	  developing	  social	  fabric,	  shaped	  by	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	   institution	   of	   landownership.	   Marriage,	   for	   example,	   was	   one	   of	   the	   main	   forms	  through	   which	   such	   socio-­‐cultural	   integration	   took	   place.	   Marrying	   into	   Turco-­‐Circassian	   aristocratic	   families	   (including	   marrying	   freed	   female	   slaves	   of	   those	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families)	  was	  broadly	  regarded	  by	  young	  Egyptian	  professionals	  and	  army	  officers	  from	  provincial	   middle-­‐landowning	   families	   as	   an	   important	   step	   up	   the	   social	   ladder.51	  Marriage	  was	  an	  effective	  way	  to	  establish	   loyalty	  and	  patronage	  networks	  within	  the	  bureaucracy	  with	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  securing	  position,	  status	  and	  personal	  wealth.52	  Again,	  Saad	  Zaghlul’s	  personal	  history	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  typical	  example	  of	  this	  socio-­‐cultural	   development,	   which	   quite	   significantly	   shaped	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   new	  middle-­‐class-­‐dominated	   body	   politic	   at	   this	   time.	   Zaghlul’s	   wife,	   Saffiyya,	   was	   the	  daughter	  of	  Mustafa	  Fahmy	  Pasha,	  a	  prominent	  politician	  who	  held	  several	  ministerial	  positions	  between	  1879	  and	  1891,	   including	   those	  of	  Minister	  of	   the	   Interior,	  Foreign	  Affairs,	   Defence,	   Justice	   and	   Finance.	   From	   1891	   to	   1893	   and	   from	   1895-­‐1908,	   he	  served	   as	   Prime	  Minister	   and	  was	  widely	   regarded	   as	   Britain’s	   strong	  man	   in	   Egypt.	  However,	   in	   this	   context,	  Mustafa	  Fahmy	  Pasha’s	  Turkish	  origins	  are	  most	   important.	  His	  father	  was	  a	  Turkish	  officer	  killed	  during	  the	  Crimean	  War,	  at	  which	  point	  Mustafa	  Fahmy	  moved	   to	  Egypt	   to	   live	  under	   the	   custodianship	  of	   his	  uncle,	   Zaki	   Fahmy.	  The	  marriage	   of	   Saad	   Zaghlul	   and	   Saffiyya	   Fahmy,	   who	  was	   later	   titled	   umm	  al-­‐misriyyin	  (Mother	  of	  the	  Egyptians),	  was	  but	  one	  example	  of	  a	  gradual	  merger	  between	  most	  of	  the	  Turkish	  minority	  elite	  and	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  the	  emerging	  middle	  class,	  and,	  of	  course,	   vice-­‐versa.	   Inter-­‐ethnic	  marriage	  was	   of	   course	   not	   the	   only	  means	   by	  which	  such	   integration	   took	   place.	   Another	   characteristic	   of	   that	   evolution	  was	   the	   gradual	  replacement	  of	  Turkish	  by	  Arabic	  as	  the	  main	  spoken	  language	  in	  the	  social	  quarters	  of	  the	   elite	   and	   the	   bureaucratic/landholding	   upper	   class	   in	   the	   decades	   following	   the	  reign	   of	   Mohamed	   Ali.	   The	   slowly	   consolidating	   upper-­‐middle	   class	   faction,	   now	  linguistically	   and	   culturally	   unified	   and	   in	   line	  with	   the	  wider	  middle	   class,	  was	   thus	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able	  to	  accumulate	  enough	  social	  leverage	  to	  direct	  the	  country’s	  economic	  and	  political	  life.53	  	   These	   social-­‐level	   structural	   changes	   were	   also	   reflected	   on	   the	   cultural	  production	  scene.	  Cultural	  and	  media	  production	  also	  asserted	  a	  new	  national	  identity.	  Walter	  Armbrust	  argues	  that	  a	  boom	  in	  the	  production	  of	  audio-­‐visual	  media	  ‘decisively	  reshaped	   political	   and	   religious	   expression’	   in	   the	   early	   decades	   of	   the	   twentieth	  century	   in	   Egypt.	   According	   to	   Armbrust,	   the	   interaction	   of	   various	   factors,	   such	   as	  social	   change	  and	   the	  evolution	  of	  new	   forms	  of	  media	  production,	  produced	  a	   social	  environment	  susceptible	   to	   the	  construction	  of	  a	  national	   identity.54	  The	  main	  driving	  force	  behind	   this	  process	  was	   the	  new	  middle	   class.	  The	   independence	  agenda	  of	   the	  national	   movement,	   reaching	   its	   peak	   in	   1919,	   provided	   the	   suitable	   political	  framework	  within	  which	   the	   emphasis	   on	   an	   ‘Egyptian’	   identity	  was	   essential	   to	   the	  mobilisation	  of	  widespread	  political	  support	  among	  wider	  social	  audiences.55	  	  	  	  Conventional	  media	  productions,	  the	  printed	  press,	  and	  more	  popular	  forms	  of	  expression	  echoed	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  clearly	  forming	  national	  identity	  at	  this	  historical	  stage.56	  Arguably	  to	  a	  great	  extent,	  this	  was	  a	  reflection	  of	  discursive	  constructions	  generated	  by	  the	   intellectual	  movement,	   in	  which	   the	  most	  prominent	   figures	  belonged	   to	   the	  new	  middle	  class.	  A	  vibrant	   intellectual	  movement	  coincided	  with	   the	  political	  struggle	   for	  independence	   and	   constitutional	   representative	   rule	   with	   a	   nationalist	   sentiment,	  characterising	  the	  self-­‐projected	  identity	  of	  the	  new	  middle	  class.	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It	   thus	   comes	   as	   no	   surprise	   that,	   during	   this	   period,	  most	   of	   the	   icons	   of	   the	  Egyptian	   intellectual	   movement	   had	   similar	   social	   backgrounds	   to	   those	   of	   their	  political	   representatives.	   They	   came	   from	   middle-­‐size	   landholding	   or	   urban-­‐based	  middle-­‐class	   families,	   who	   facilitated	   their	   new	   generations’	   obtainment	   of	   western-­‐type	   education	   and	   professional	   careers.	   Abdel-­‐Malek	   observes	   that	   this	   later	   social	  group	   ‘was	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   the	   national,	   liberal	   and	   democratic	  middle	   class	   that	  found	  its	  expression	  in	  the	  Wafd’.	  He	  continues	  to	  explain	  that	  [i]t	  was	  within	  this	  subgroup	  that	  the	  intellectuals	  of	  independent	  Egypt	  were	  born-­‐Taha	   Hussein,	   Abbas	   el-­‐Akkad,	   Ahmed	   Amin,	   Ibrahim	   Abdel	   Kader	   el-­‐Mazni,	  Dr.	  Mohamed	  Hussein	  Heykal,	  Salama	  Moussa,	  Ahmed	  Hassan	  el	  Zayat,	  Ali	  Mustafa	  Musharrafa,	  Hussein	  Fawzi,	  Tewfik	  el-­‐Hakim,	  and	  so	  many	  others-­‐as	  well	  as	  the	  political	  leaders	  of	  the	  Wafdist	  movement.57	  	  In	   this	   regard,	  we	   should	   note	   that	  many	   of	   the	   aforementioned	  names	   (along	  with	   others)	   were	   simultaneously	   part	   of	   both	   the	   body	   politic	   and	   the	   intellectual	  movement,	  forming	  the	  early	  core	  of	  Egypt’s	  future	  intelligentsia.	  	  The	   assertion	   of	   national	   identity	   and	   the	   leading	   role	   of	   the	   Egyptian	  middle	  class	  therein	  was	  also	  closely	  tied	  to	  a	  perceived	  advancement	  towards	  ‘modernity’.	  The	  social	   transformation	   that	   took	   place	   as	   a	   by-­‐product	   of	   bureaucratic	   expansion	   and	  land	  allocation	  policies	  under	  Mohamed	  Ali	  and	  his	  successors	  closely	  correlated	  with	  a	  modernisation	  project	  of	  both	  state	  and	  society	  in	  Egypt.	  By	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  the	  newly	  emerging	  middle	  class	  had	  become	  both	  an	  agent	  and	  product	  of	  modernity.	  The	   assumption	   of	   such	   status	   by	   the	   new	   middle	   class	   was	   mainly	   due	   to	   modern	  secular	   education,	   state	  or	  professional	   employment,	   and	  hence	  a	  material	   and	  moral	  structural	   bond	   to	   the	   state’s	   modernising	   project.	   The	   distinguished	   status	   derived	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from	   these	  social	   assets	  placed	   the	   rising	  middle	   class	   ‘above	   the	   rest	  of	   society’.58	  As	  Ryzova	   once	   again	   argues,	   the	   new	   effendiya,	   predominantly	   drawn	   from	   provincial	  notability	  to	  serve	  in	  the	  various	  parts	  of	  the	  bureaucracy	  under	  the	  higher	  ranks	  of	  bey	  and	  pasha	  since	  roughly	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century,	  were	  distinguished	  not	  only	  by	   their	   jobs,	  but	  also,	  by	   their	  specific	   “culture”:	   their	  western	  manners,	  signified	  by	  their	   ‘European	  dress’	   in	  the	  first	   instance,	  and	  their	  distinct	  perspective	  on	  the	  society	  in	  which	  they	  lived.59	  	  The	  effendiyya	  came	  to	  represent	  a	  new	  urban	  society,	  new	  social	  codes,	  and	  new	  lifestyles.60	  In	   short,	   by	   the	  1930s	   and	  1940s,	   in	  Egypt,	  middle-­‐class	   status	   and	   social	  function	  had	  developed	  into	  being	  a	  cultural	  and	  practical	  expression	  of	  ‘the	  modern’,	  or	  in	  the	  very	  least	  an	  aspiration	  thereof.	  
3.2	  The	  Middle	  Class	  and	  Political	  Power	  Contestation	  Prior	  to	  1952	  The	   social	   transformations	   since	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	  which	   had	   caused	   the	   rise	   of	   a	   new	   middle	   class,	   were	   closely	   correlated	   with	   the	  assertion	   of	   a	   national	   identity	   and	   modernity.	   Eventually,	   they	   also	   resulted	   into	  attempts	  to	  contest	  political	  power.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  middle	  class	  was	  a	  homogenous	  political	  player.	  James	  Whidden	  clearly	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  1919	  middle-­‐class	  generation	  of	  political	  actors	  was	  relatively	  divided	  along	  ideological	  and	  cultural	  lines.61	  Nevertheless,	  the	  main	  point	  is	  that	  even	  if	  this	  may	  have	  been	  the	  case,	  it	   should	   not	   blind	   us	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  middle	   class	   political	   representatives	   played	   a	  decisive	  role	  in	  contesting	  political	  power,	  however	  different	  the	  ideological	  incentives	  that	   launched	   such	   contestation	  may	  have	  been.	  The	  middle	   class	  was	  also	   the	   target	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audience	  of	  most	  attempts	  at	  political	  mobilisation	  in	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	   After	   all,	   as	   Ryzova	   reminds	   us,	   ‘[a]	   state	   building	   project	   based	   on	   liberal	  ideology	  and	  institutions	  needs	  a	  middle	  class.’	  Clearly,	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  case,	  ‘the	  effendi	  became	  the	  ideal	  citizen	  of	  the	  state	  who	  also	  fulfilled	  the	  role	  of	  a	  modern	  public.’62	  	  	  Thus,	  the	  middle	  class	  emerged	  as	  the	  main	  force	  behind	  what	  historians	  often	  refer	   to	   as	   Egypt’s	   ‘liberal	   experiment’	   (1919-­‐1952).	   The	   political	   field,	   comprised	   of	  politicians	  and	  political	  subjects	  alike,	  had	  an	  overwhelmingly	  middle-­‐class	  character	  –	  and	  this	  was	  not	  only	  the	  case	  for	  mainstream	  parties	  such	  as	  the	  Wafd.	  When,	  for	  many	  reasons,	  the	  Wafd	  was	  demoted	  to	  the	  party	  that	  had	  made	  what	  Nazih	  Ayubi	  calls	  the	  single	  most	  obvious	  broken	  promise	  of	  modern	  Egyptian	  political	  history	  in	  the	  1930s	  and	   1940s,	   the	   middle	   class	   became	   the	   main	   target	   constituency	   of	   other	   political	  players	  with	  more	  radical	  socio-­‐political	  platforms,	  such	  as	  the	  ultra-­‐nationalist	  Misr	  al-­‐
Fatah,	  different	  communist	  factions,	  and	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood.63	  In	   the	   context	   of	   examining	   the	   ‘middle-­‐class’	   character	   of	   Egyptian	   politics	   in	  those	   decades	   of	   the	   late-­‐nineteenth	   and	   early-­‐twentieth	   centuries,	   the	   key	   aspect	   to	  grasp	  is	  the	  responsiveness	  of	   the	   ‘political’	   to	  transformations	   in	  the	  social	  structure.	  To	   illustrate	   this	   point	   more	   clearly,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   remember	   that	   the	   three	   most	  significant	  challenges	  to	  the	  political	  order	  in	  Egypt	  from	  the	  1870s	  to	  the	  1950s	  were	  political	  manifestations	  of	   a	   changing	   social	   structure,	   in	  which	   the	  middle	   categories	  were	   on	   the	   rise	   in	   one	   form	   or	   another.	   Whether	   it	   was	   the	   alliance	   of	   the	   landed	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   al-­‐a‘yan	   (countryside	   notables)	   with	   the	   middle-­‐ranked	   army	  officers	   and	   the	   constitutionalists	   in	   the	   Orabi	   Revolt	   against	   the	   absolutism	   of	   the	  Khedive;	   the	   predominantly	   bourgeois	   alliance	   of	   the	   Wafd	   in	   1919;	   or	   the	   middle-­‐	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ranked	   army	   officers	   who	   toppled	   King	   Farouk	   in	   1952,	   in	   all	   three	   instances,	   the	  middle	  segments	  of	  the	  social	  structure	  eventually	  attempted	  to	  contest	  political	  power,	  as	  a	  political	  expression	  of	  social	  transformations	  that	  had	  reached	  a	  state	  of	  what	  could	  be	  described	  as	  historical	  maturity.	  Admittedly,	   it	   could	  be	  analytically	  hazardous	   to	  assume	   that	   the	  Orabi	  Revolt,	  the	  1919	   revolution,	   and	   the	  1952	  army-­‐led	   change	  of	   regimes	  were	   all	   the	  works	  of	  one	   unchanged	   social	   or	   political	   force.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   an	   appreciation	   of	   the	  particularities	  of	  each	  of	  these	  historical	  situations	  should	  not	  drive	  us	  to	  disregard	  the	  similarities	  between	   them.	  From	  a	  structural	  point	  of	  view,	   in	  each	  of	   these	  historical	  junctions,	  changes	  in	  the	  social	  structure	  (induced	  in	  great	  part	  by	  the	  state	  and	  mostly	  resulting	   in	   the	   emergence	   or	   the	   further	   evolution	   of	   the	   middle	   class)	   produced	  significant,	   though	  not	  always	  successful,	   challenges	   to	   the	  established	  political	  order.	  This	   is	   quite	   significant	   to	   keep	   in	  mind	   as	   a	   clear	   parallel	   to	   the	   situation	   in	   today’s	  Egypt,	   in	   which	   the	   downfall	   of	   Mubarak	   stands	   witness	   to	   a	   political	   outcome	  prompted,	  among	  other	  factors	  of	  course,	  by	  the	  changing	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  middle	  classes.	  
4.	  Social	  Change	  and	  Modernisation	  Under	  Nasser:	  The	  Rise	  of	  the	  
Technocratic	  Middle	  Class	  One	  of	  the	  most	  visible	  consequences	  of	  the	  1952	  change	  of	  regimes	  in	  Egypt	  is	  arguably	  a	  reshuffling	  of	  power	  relations	  within	  the	  Egyptian	  class	  structure.	  The	  first	  three	  years	  of	  the	  Free	  Officer’s	  rule	  was	  marked	  by	  power	  consolidation	  manoeuvres,	  both	  amongst	   the	  new	  ruling	  group	  of	  officers	   themselves64	  or	  between	   them	  and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Nadia Ramsis Farah, Egypt's Political Economy: Power Relations in Development (Cairo, New York: 
American University in Cairo Press, 2009), 72. 
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wider	   circle	   of	   older	   political	   forces.65	  From	   1952	   to	   1954,	   the	   political	   field	   went	  through	  a	  phase	  of	  adjustment	  and	  rearrangement	  of	  positions,	  directly	   influenced	  by	  the	   political	   newcomers	   from	   the	   army.	   Beyond	   these	   direct	   political	   consequences,	  changes	   in	   the	  wider	  social	   structure	  occurred	  more	  slowly,	  but	  definitely	  profoundly	  enough	  to	  have	  redrawn	  the	  social	  map	  of	  Egypt	  over	  the	  following	  decades.	  The	  change	  in	  the	  social	  structure	  once	  again	  came	  about	  as	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  new	  regime’s	  self-­‐construction	   as	   an	   agent	   of	   modernisation	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   progress.	   As	   will	   be	  demonstrated	  shortly,	   structural	   change	   initiated	  an	   important	   social	  outcome:	  a	  new	  middle	  class	  formation	  cycle.	  The	   new	   regime’s	   rather	   broadly	   defined	   goal	   of	   restoring	   Egyptian	   national	  power,	  as	  Waterbury	  points	  out,	  required	   a	   diversified	   economy,	   no	   longer	   shackled	   to	   agricultural	  performance,	  an	  economy	  whose	  center	  of	  gravity	  would	  be	  a	  heavy	  industrial	  sector	   that	  would	  simultaneously	  act	  as	  a	   catalyst	   to	   further	   industrialization	  and	  agricultural	  modernization	  and	  protect	  Egypt	   against	   the	  dependency	  on	  the	  manufactures	  of	  advanced	  economies.	  Nasser	  et	  al.	  sought	  to	  take	  up	  where	  Mohamed	  ’Ali	  had	  been	  obliged	  to	  leave	  off.	  66	  	  The	  quest	   for	  modernisation	  and	  the	  need	  to	  establish	  a	  social	  base	  of	  political	  support	  prompted	  a	  series	  of	  measures	  aimed	  at	  dismantling	  the	  power	  of	  the	  old	  elites	  and	  their	  allies	  and	  expanding	  the	  state’s	  role	  as	  the	  implementer	  of	  economic	  plans	  and	  objectives.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  new	  rulers	  of	  Egypt	  immediately	  turned	  their	  attention	  to	  the	   two	  most	   important	  bases	  of	  power	  of	   the	  old	   ruling	  bourgeois	   class:	   agricultural	  land	   wealth	   and	   control	   of	   the	   bureaucracy.	   Similar	   to	   Mohamed	   Ali’s	   rule,	   Nasser’s	  regime	  found	  that	  in	  order	  to	  effectively	  achieve	  modernisation	  and	  development	  goals,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Memoirs of the Free Officers, although naturally biased from the points of view of their respective authors, 
represent an important assembly of accounts of these internal struggles among the Free Officers in that period. 
In this regard see in particular: Khaled Mohyeldin, Al-an Atakallam [Now I Speak] (Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre 
For Translation and Publishing, 1992). For a more objective and thorough analysis of internal conflicts within 
the new regime between 1952 and 1954, see: Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to Revolt, 15-
42. 
66 Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, 53. 
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it	   needed	   to	   follow	   a	   two-­‐fold	   strategy	   of	   tightly	   controlling	   the	   state	   apparatus	   and	  mobilising	   resources	   from	   agriculture	   to	   invest	   in	   building	   a	   heavy	   industrial	   sector.	  	  For	   that,	   it	   needed	   to	   reconfigure	   the	   middle	   class	   and	   inject	   it	   with	   segments	   that	  would	  be	  invested	  in	  the	  success	  of	  the	  new	  regime.	  
4.1	  Land	  Redistribution	  and	  Social	  Change	  in	  the	  Countryside:	  Empowering	  
the	  Rural	  Middle	  Class	  	  There	  is	  much	  to	  be	  said	  about	  the	  complicated	  dynamics	  with	  which	  the	  Nasser	  regime	   tackled	   the	   issue	   of	   redistributing	   landownership.	   However,	   in	   this	   section,	  numbers	  indicative	  of	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  process	  suffice	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  scope	  of	  social	   change	   that	  must	  have	  accompanied	   it.	  Much	  has	  been	  written	  about	   the	  social	  consequences	   of	   al-­‐islah	   al-­‐zira‘y	   (agricultural	   reform)	   in	   Egypt.	   Hamied	   Ansari,	   for	  example,	  examines	  some	  of	  the	  typical	  dynamics	  of	  social	  conflict	  that	  accompanied	  the	  process	  of	  land	  reform	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  case	  of	  Kamshish.	  This	  Nile	  Delta	   village	   saw	  one	  of	   the	  most	   violent	  displays	   of	   social	   friction	  over	   land	   re-­‐distribution.	  The	  conflict	  between	  the	  old	  landowning	  class	  and	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  post-­‐1952	  land	  reforms	  played	  out	  repeatedly	  in	  most	  parts	  of	  the	  countryside,	  even	  if	  not	  as	  violently	  as	  in	  Kamshish.67	  	  	  A	  series	  of	  land	  reform	  laws	  during	  the	  period	  from	  1952	  to	  1969	  redistributed	  almost	   755,000	   faddans	   of	   agricultural	   land	   to	   318,000	   families.	   By	   1969,	   the	   land	  reform	  laws	  had	   lowered	  the	  ceiling	   for	   land	  ownership	  to	  50	   faddans	   for	   individuals,	  while	   the	   maximum	   ownership	   per	   family	   was	   kept	   at	   100	   faddans.68	  Instead	   of	  redistributing	   the	   land	   to	   non-­‐landowning	   peasants,	   the	   government	   allowed	   large	  landowners	  to	  sell	  the	  surplus	  on	  the	  open	  market,	  thereby	  essentially	  empowering	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See: Hamied Ansari, Egypt, the Stalled Society (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986). 
68 Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, 266. 
	  110	  
expanding	  the	  rural	  middle	  class.	  The	   latter	  category	  benefited	  from	  lower-­‐than-­‐usual	  land	  prices	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  increase	  in	  supply,	  following	  the	  imposition	  of	  these	  caps.	  The	  main	  intention	  of	  the	  government’s	  actions	  was	  to	  destroy	  the	  resource	  base	  of	  the	  upper	   landed	   bourgeoisie	   and	   elite	   (who	   dominated	   Egyptian	   politics	   from	   1919	   to	  1952),	  to	  redistribute	  agricultural	  wealth	  to	  the	  regime’s	  new	  social	  base	  of	  small	  and	  medium	  landowners,	  and	  –	  most	  importantly	  –	  to	  push	  rural	  capitalists	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  newly-­‐emerging	   heavy	   industrial	   sector.69	  	   As	   Kandil	   notes,	   although	   the	   new	   regime	  presented	  a	  token	  amount	  of	  divested	  land	  to	  small	  peasants	  to	  win	  their	  sympathy,	  it	  preferred	  to	  create	  a	  power	  base	   in	  the	  rural	  middle	  class.	  By	  putting	  this	  class	  at	  the	  apex	  of	  already	  existing	  patronage	  networks	  in	  the	  countryside,	  the	  regime	  chose	  to	  tap	  into	  existing	  power	  structures	  and	  change	  their	  social	  composition,	  rather	  than	  abolish	  them	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  more	  emancipating	  redistribution	  of	  agricultural	  lands.70	  	  Redistribution	  through	  the	  land	  reform	  laws	  was	  accompanied	  by	  the	  expansion	  of	   the	   state	   apparatus	   in	   the	   countryside,	   creating	   various	   mechanisms	   (such	   as	  agricultural	   co-­‐ops)	   through	   which	   new	   medium-­‐sized	   landowners	   could	   obtain	   the	  financial	   and	   technical	   support	   they	   needed	   from	   the	   state.	   Either	   by	   directly	  controlling	  these	  extended	  branches	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  apparatus	  or	  (at	  the	  very	  least)	  by	  manipulating	  them,	  the	  middle-­‐size	  landowning	  class	  not	  only	  increased	  in	  size	  after	  1952,	   but	   it	   also	   rose	   to	   a	   position	   of	   unprecedented	   dominance	   in	   the	   Egyptian	  countryside.	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70 Hazem Kandil, "Why Did the Egyptian Middle Class March to Tahrir Square?" Mediterranean Politics 17, 
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4.2	  The	  Nationalisations	  of	  1961:	  Rise	  of	  the	  Technocratic/Bureaucratic	  
Middle	  Class	  On	  another	  front,	  a	  brief,	  uneasy	  standoff	  between	  the	  new	  regime	  and	  the	  urban	  industrial	  private	  sector,	  which	  lasted	  until	  1958,	  ended	  with	  a	  series	  of	  nationalisation	  actions	  culminating	  in	  the	  promulgation	  of	  the	  ‘Socialist	  Laws	  of	  July’	  in	  1961.	  The	  July	  1961	   laws	  put	  most	  non-­‐agricultural	   economic	  activity	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   the	   state,	   thus	  giving	  birth	  to	  the	  public	  sector.	  This	  orientation	  was	  in	  line	  with	  an	  ambitious	  five-­‐year	  economic	  plan	  drawn	  up	   in	  1959	   to	  cover	   the	  years	   from	  1960	   to	  1965,	   in	  which	   the	  state-­‐owned	   public	   sector	  was	   to	   be	   the	  main	   locomotive	   of	  much-­‐desired	   industrial	  development.71	  	  The	  effects	  of	   these	  measures	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  within	  society	  were	  profound.	   The	   leading	   role	   of	   the	   public	   sector	   in	   implementing	   the	   first	   and	   second	  five-­‐year	  economic	  plans,	  which	  essentially	  became	  the	  core	  component	  of	  the	  Nasserist	  promise	  of	  economic	  progress,72	  provided	  the	  context	  for	  the	  unprecedented	  expansion	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  and	  urban	  middle	  class.	  This	  new	  segment	  was	  primarily	  composed	  of	   technocrats,	   experts	   and	   bureaucrats	   charged	   with	   steering	   the	   vastly	   expanding	  state	  apparatus,	  which	  was	  in	  almost	  full	  control	  of	  economic	  activity	  after	  the	  July	  1961	  laws.	   As	   Egypt	   moved	   into	   a	   state	   capitalist	   mode	   of	   production,	   this	   class	   was	   to	  provide	   the	  main	   fuel	   for	   the	   intended	  modernisation	   process	   in	   terms	   of	   expertise,	  manpower,	  and	  managerial	  and	  planning	  skills	   to	  serve	   the	  expanding	  bureaucracy	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state-­‐owned	  economic	  entities.	  Moreover,	  it	  was	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  political	   mobilisation	   of	   various	   other	   classes	   and	   the	   dissemination	   of	   a	   new	  ideological	  cocktail	  of	  pan-­‐Arabism	  and	  populist	  socialism.	  This	  class	  therefore	  played	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, 72-76. 
72 The second plan’s declared goal was to double real GNP and per capita income within 10 years. See: ibid., 
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leading	  role	  in	  the	  different	  forms	  of	  political	  associations	  that	  Egypt	  saw	  under	  Nasser,	  especially	   the	   Arab	   Socialist	   Union,	   from	   1962	   onward.	   At	   the	   core	   of	   the	   emerging	  bureaucratic	   middle	   class	   were	   ‘tens	   of	   thousands	   of	   high-­‐level	   managers	   and	  administrators	  occupying	  institutionally	  defined	  positions	  that	  control	  the	  major	  means	  of	   finance,	   production	   and	   consumption’. 73 	  By	   one	   account,	   public	   employment	  increased	   by	   almost	   43%	   between	   1962	   and	   1967,	   swelling	   from	   770,000	   to	   1.1	  million.74	  Anouar	   Abdel-­‐Malek	   provides	   what	   he	   calls	   an	   ‘anatomy’	   of	   the	   new	  administrative	   and	  managerial	   class	   by	   examining	   the	   direct	   effects	   of	   the	   July	   1961	  nationalisation	  laws	  on	  Egypt’s	  economic	  structure.	  The	  July	  1961	  laws,	  as	  he	  points	  out	  gave	   pre-­‐eminence	   to	   the	   public	   sector,	   which	   now	   owned	   banks,	   insurance	  companies,	  heavy	  and	  basic	  industries,	  transportation	  and	  foreign	  trade	  in	  fee	  simple;	   it	   participated	   to	   the	   extent	   of	   50	  %	   in	   the	   ownership	   of	   the	   greater	  number	  of	  light	  industries	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  corporations,	  and	  owned	  variable	  shares	  of	  what	  was	  left.75	  	  A	   total	   of	   367	  nationalised	   economic	   entities	  were	   re-­‐organised	   into	  38	  public	  agencies	  under	  a	  ‘High	  Council	  for	  Public	  Agencies’	  headed	  by	  the	  president.76	  First	  and	  second	  line	  bureaucratic	  and	  administrative	  positions	  within	  these	  new	  entities	  were	  all	  appointed	   by	   presidential	   and	   prime-­‐ministerial	   decrees.	   A	   new	   administrative	   and	  bureaucratic	  upper	  middle	  class	  was	  formed	  when	  preference	  was	  given	  to	  technicians,	  engineers,	  and	  economists	  with	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  training	  and	  education,	  as	  the	  state	  turned	  its	   back	   on	   the	   old	   tradition	   of	   ministers	   and	   directors	   with	   legal	   backgrounds	   who	  were	  ‘deeply	  impregnated	  with	  French	  influences’.77	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Proper	   conditions	   for	   introducing	   such	   a	   change	   in	   the	   type	  of	   cadres	   running	  the	  country	  through	  the	  bureaucracy	  had	  been	  evolving	  gradually	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time,	  until	   it	  was	   structurally	   consolidated	   through	   the	   1961	  nationalisation	   laws.	  Up	   until	  then,	   these	   professionals	   –	   primarily	   decedents	   of	   the	   urban	   and	   rural	   lower	  middle	  classes	   for	   whom	   higher	   education	   had	   provided	   the	   chance	   to	   assume	   professional	  occupations	   in	   the	   bureaucracy	   –	   had,	   in	   previous	   years,	   mostly	   occupied	   middle-­‐management	   and	   administrative	   positions	  within	   private	   sector	   economic	   entities,	   in	  which	  the	  top	  levels	  of	  management	  were	  still	  reserved	  for	  large	  stockholders	  or	  their	  favourites.	  When	  nationalisation	  took	  place	  in	  1961	  and	  most	  of	  the	  country’s	  economy	  started	  to	  run	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  newly	  established	  38	  public	  agencies,	  hundreds	  of	  	   state	   functionaries,	   energetic	   and	   long	   highly	   envious	   of	   the	   privileges	   and	  possibilities	  of	  advancement	  enjoyed	  by	   their	   colleagues	   in	   the	  private	  sector,	  were	  shifted	  into	  the	  economic	  agencies,	  to	  which	  they	  contributed	  both	  their	  tradition	  of	  bureaucracy	  and	  their	  desire	  to	  make	  a	  showing.78	  	  It	   is,	   of	   course,	  difficult	   to	  draw	  artificial	   and	   theoretical	  boundaries	  as	   to	  who	  was	   included	   in	   the	   new	   social	   category	   and	   to	   what	   extent	   they	   were	   socially	  distinctive	  from	  the	  old	  bourgeoisie.	  However,	  a	  quick	  look	  at	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  top	  management	  of	  the	  public	  agencies	  could	  perhaps	  provide	  an	  acceptable	  approximation	  of	  both	  the	  size	  and	  social	  profile	  of	  the	  new	  bureaucratic	  middle	  class	  of	  the	  1960s.	  For	  example,	   in	   1962,	   the	   distribution	   of	   top	  managerial	   positions	   in	   37	   of	   the	   38	   public	  economic	  agencies	  was	  as	  follows:	  Out	  of	  301	  board	  members,	  there	  were	  57	  engineers	  and	  scientists,	  57	  holders	  of	  doctoral	  degrees,	  and	  187	  high	  state	  officials	  such	  as	  army	  officers	  and	  the	  like.79	  These	  were	  board	  members	  of	  the	  public	  agencies,	  which	  in	  turn	  each	  controlled	  a	  large	  number	  of	  companies.	  Each	  company	  also	  had	  board	  members,	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managers	   and	   leading	   professionals	   of	   similar	   backgrounds.	   At	   the	   level	   of	   middle	  management,	   mobility	   was	   even	   more	   obvious	   –	   even	   in	   the	   army	   itself,	   where	   the	  uniform	  was	  no	  longer	  enough	  to	  attain	  a	  position	  of	  influential	  bureaucratic	  function.	  In	  addition	   to	   increasing	  graduates	  of	  business	  administration,	   engineering	  and	  other	  technical	  specialisations,	  from	  1961	  onwards,	  large	  numbers	  of	  officers	  and	  cadets	  were	  admitted	  to	  the	  newly	  established	   ‘Military	  Technical	  Faculty’,	  which	  was	   ‘designed	  to	  train	  managerial	  staffs	  both	  of	  career	  officers	  and	  of	  civilian	  engineers’.80	  	  The	   expansion	  of	   the	   state	   apparatus	   and	   its	   employment	   as	   a	   tool	   for	   central	  planning	  and	  implementation	  of	  development	  plans	  provided	  the	  context	  for	  the	  rise	  of	  the	   technocratic	   urban	   middle	   class	   to	   a	   position	   of	   social,	   as	   well	   as	   economic,	  prominence	   during	   the	   Nasser	   era.	   Out	   of	   the	   many	   ‘scattered	   and	   inadequately	   co-­‐ordinated	   components	   that	   were	   available’,	   concludes	   Abde-­‐Malek,	   ‘the	   purpose	   was	  indeed	   to	   create	   a	   new	   social	   category,	   tabakat	   al-­‐mudirin	   (the	   managerial	   class)’,81	  which	   was	   to	   dominate	   Egyptian	   public	   life	   for	   the	   following	   decade.	   Moreover,	   this	  class	  would	   represent	   one	  of	   the	   significant	   social	   origins	  of	   today’s	  neoliberal	   upper	  middle	  class.	  The	   new	   urban	   middle	   class	   was	   not	   restricted	   to	   state	   employees	   and	  bureaucrats.	  It	  also	  included	  other	  groups,	  which	  orbited	  in	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same	  social	  sphere.	  Despite	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  branch	  of	  the	  Nasserist	  middle	  class,	  a	  demarcation	  thereof	  must	  equally	  recognize	  other	  strata	  which,	  	  though	  not	  formally	  employed	  by	  the	  state,	  cannot	  be	  located	  within	  the	  social	  structure	  without	  taking	  their	  ties	   with	   the	   state	   bourgeoisie,	   and	   indeed	   the	   state	   itself,	   into	   consideration.	   In	   his	  description	  of	   the	  various	  strata	  of	   the	  state	  bourgeoisie	  at	   that	  historical	  stage	   in	  the	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Middle	   East,	   Waterbury	   draws	   attention	   to	   what	   Richard	   Sklar	   described	   as	   ‘the	  coexistence	  of	   a	  newly	  developing	   and	  private	   enterprise	   sector	  with	   a	  preponderant	  yet	   protective	   public	   sector’.82	  Together,	   the	   different	   segments	   of	   the	   statist	   middle	  class	   developed	   a	   self-­‐produced	   image	   as	   the	   heart	   and	   soul	   of	   the	   state-­‐led	  modernisation	  project.	  This	  occurred	   to	  such	  an	  extent	   that	   in	  1963	  Manfred	  Halpern	  even	  predicted	  that	  this	  new	  formation	  might	  very	  well	  become	  a	  dominant	  class:83	  Given	  the	  predominant	  role	  of	  the	  new	  middle	  class	   in	  the	  government,	  and	  hence	  in	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  development	  of	   the	  country,	   the	  modern	  upper	  middle	  class	   is	  very	  likely	  to	  develop	  to	  a	  considerable	  extent	  from	  the	  former.	  Even	  members	  of	  the	  modern	  professions,	  almost	  exclusively	  sons	  of	  landlords	  and	  the	  traditional	  bourgeoisie	  earlier	  in	  this	  century,	  are	   increasingly	  drawn	  from	  the	  same	  broader	  ranks	  as	  the	  salaried	  middle	  class.	   If	   such	   social	   and	   economic	   development	   grows	   apace,	   the	  modern	   upper	  middle	  class	   of	   politicians,	   professional	   men,	   and	   administrators	   may	   well	   come	   to	   dominate	  society	  […]	  This	  upper	  middle	  class	  which	  starts,	  as	  it	  were,	  from	  scratch,	  may	  be	  joined	  by	  private	   entrepreneurs	   taking	   advantage	   of	   the	   new	   political	   stability	   and	   the	   economic	  foundations	  built	  by	  the	  government.84	  	  	  Along	  with	   the	   newly	   empowered,	   landed	  middle	   class	   in	   the	   countryside,	   the	  new	  bureaucratic	  middle	  class	  (with	  other	  urban	  strata	  orbiting	   it),	  became	  the	  social	  backbone	   of	   the	   state	   under	   Nasser.	   These	   were	   the	   cadres	   that	   manned	   the	   state’s	  political	   apparatus,	   the	   rural	   notables	  who	  delivered	   the	   necessary	   votes	   in	   elections	  and	   popular	   referendums,	   and	   those	   who	   could	   be	   readily	   mobilised	   in	   pro-­‐Nasser	  demonstrations.85	  Although	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  speak	  of	   the	  empowered	  middle	  class	  as	  a	  ‘ruling	   class’	   in	   the	   full	   sense	   of	   the	   term,	   its	   role	   as	   a	   social	   reservoir	   for	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authoritarianism	   and	   regime	   stability	   under	   Nasser	  was	   pivotal.	   As	   Binder	   argues,	   it	  acted	  as	  a	   ‘second	  stratum	  of	  the	  ruling	  class’,	  mediating	  the	  regime's	  dominance	  over	  the	   state	   and	   society,	   albeit	   without	   serious	   aspirations	   of	   controlling	   the	   political	  order.86	  This	  inclusive	  definition	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  middle	  class	  that	  emerged	  under	  Nasser	  is	  quite	  significant	  in	  understanding	  the	  evolution	  of	  this	  class	  as	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  state-­‐led	   development	   and	   modernisation	   model	   became	   clear	   by	   the	   mid-­‐sixties.	   By	   this	  point,	   the	   underlying	   assumptions	   of	   the	   five-­‐year	   economic	   plan	   of	   1960-­‐1965	   had	  proved	  far	  too	  optimistic.	  National	  savings	  were	  not	  accumulating	  at	  high	  enough	  rates,	  nor	   was	   public-­‐sector-­‐generated	   capital	   (which	   was	   essential	   for	   re-­‐investment	   in	  further	   industrial	   development).	   Public	   sector	   performance	  was	   crippled	   by	   both	   red	  tape	  and	  the	  disadvantages	  of	  guaranteed	  employment	  state	  policies,	  codified	  by	  law	  in	  1964.87	  The	  1967	  military	  defeat	  against	  Israel	  and	  the	  redirection	  of	  vast	  resources	  to	  rebuilding	   the	   army	   further	   deepened	   the	   crisis.	   But	   in	   spite	   of	   both	   these	   growing	  problems	   and	   Nasser’s	   broken	   image	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   June	   1967	   defeat,	   the	  regime’s	  base	  remained	  unshaken,	  as	  it	  continued	  to	  uphold	  the	  state’s	  commitment	  to	  the	   middle	   classes.	   However,	   when	   Nasser	   died	   in	   1970,	   several	   of	   the	   inherent	  paradoxes	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  between	  the	  Egyptian	  state	  and	  its	  middle-­‐class	  social	  base	  became	  more	  difficult	  to	  conceal.	  With	  Nasser’s	  charisma	  gone,	  a	  long,	  bumpy	  and	  complex	  historical	  process	  of	  gradual	  default	  by	  the	  state	  was	  about	  to	  commence.	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5.	  Disengagement:	  The	  Middle	  Class	  in	  the	  Sadat	  Years	  The	  years	  following	  the	  military	  defeat	  against	  Israel	  in	  the	  six-­‐day	  war	  of	  June	  1967	  presented	  an	  even	  more	  challenging	  interruption	  to	  1960s	  development	  plans.	  By	  the	   time	  Egypt	  managed	   to	   restore	   some	  of	   its	  national	  pride	   through	  military	  action	  against	   Israel	   in	   1973,	   Anwar	   Al-­‐Sadat	   had	   risen	   to	   power	   after	   Nasser’s	   death	   in	  September	   of	   1970.	   Nasser’s	   successor	   was	   indeed	   one	   of	   the	   rather	   controversial	  figures	   of	   the	   Free	   Officers.	   He	  was	   appointed	   vice	   president	   shortly	   before	   Nasser’s	  death,	  a	   choice	  widely	  considered	  by	  potential	   contenders	   to	   the	  country’s	   leadership	  both	  temporary	  and	  politically	  risk-­‐free.	  In	  a	  major	  political	  showdown	  in	  May	  of	  1971,	  later	   labelled	   thawrat	  al-­‐tashih	   (the	   corrective	   revolution),	  with	   the	   strongmen	  of	   the	  Nasser	  regime,	  Sadat	  managed	  to	  consolidate	  his	  grip	  on	  power	  and	  remove	  his	  rivals	  mainly	  by	  winning	  the	  support	  of	  the	  army.	  By	  launching	  military	  action	  against	  Israel	  in	  October	  1973,	  he	  also	  succeeded	  in	  gaining	  wide	  popular	  approval	  and	  establishing	  legitimacy	  for	  his	  rule	  beyond	  that	  of	  his	  predecessor.	  As	  attention	  once	  again	  turned	  to	  the	  domestic	  under	  Sadat	  following	  the	  1973	  war,	   the	   lessons	   learned	   from	   the	   Nasserist	   experience	   proved	   most	   influential	   in	  prompting	   a	   gradual	   relaxation	   of	   the	   state’s	   monopoly	   on	   economic	   activity,	   an	  orientation	  which	  became	  known	  as	  infitah,	  or	  ‘open	  door	  policy’.	  In	  a	  move	  to	  remedy	  the	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   five-­‐year	   economic	   plans	   of	   1960-­‐65	   and	   1966-­‐1971,	   Sadat	  administered	   a	   U-­‐turn	   on	   economic	   policies	   that	   placed	   the	   public	   sector	   and	   state-­‐owned	   economic	   enterprises	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   economy.	   Law	   43	   passed	   in	   1974	  reduced	   taxes	   and	   import	   tariffs	   for	   foreign	   investors	   and	   exempted	   them	   from	   the	  provisions	   of	   strict	   labour	   laws.	   The	   law	   initiated	   what	   El-­‐Naggar	   describes	   as	   a	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‘landmark	  shift	   in	  Egyptian	  economic	  policy’.88	  A	  gradual	  empowerment	  of	   the	  private	  sector,	   it	  was	   argued,	  was	  pivotal	   to	  Egypt’s	   goal	   of	   tempting	   the	   flow	  of	   foreign	   and	  Arab	  investments	  into	  its	  capital-­‐hungry	  economy.89	  But	  the	  motivation	  behind	  Sadat’s	  inception	  of	  economic	  liberalisation	  under	  infitah	  was	  not	  exclusively	  economic.	  In	  fact,	  it	   was	   primarily	   political,	   part	   of	   his	   strategic	   realignment	   with	   the	   US	   –	   and,	   more	  importantly,	  emblematic	  of	  his	  desire	  to	  establish	  a	  new	  social	  base	  to	  support	  his	  new	  West-­‐friendly	  orientations.	  Sadat	  needed	  to	  secure	  the	  support	  of	  a	  powerful	  business	  class	   with	   strong	   American	   connections	   and	   a	   real	   stake	   in	   the	   continuation	   of	  authoritarian	  rule.	   ‘There	  was	  a	  slight	  problem,	  however’,	  Kandil	   reminds	  us.	   ‘[T]here	  was	   no	   such	   business	   elite.	   Once	   again	   the	   political	   leadership	  was	   forced	   to	   tailor	   a	  middle	  class	  fragment	  to	  fit	  its	  needs.’90	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  independent	   bourgeoisie,	   Sadat	  was	   keen	   to	   tailor	   this	   class	   in	   close	   intertwinement	  with	  the	  state.	  As	   Sadat	   opened	   the	   country	   for	   business	   with	   the	   US	   and	   Europe,	   a	   new	  capitalist	  bourgeoisie	  emerged	  as	  the	  leading	  faction	  in	  a	  newly	  configured	  ruling	  social	  alliance.	   The	   new	   bourgeoisie	   was	   composed	   mainly	   of	   several	   groups.	   There	   were	  rehabilitated	  old	  landowning	  families	  whose	  confiscated	  lands	  were	  returned	  by	  court	  orders	  under	  Sadat.	  It	  also	  included	  middle-­‐class	  professionals	  and	  other	  migrants	  who	  had	  made	  huge	  petro-­‐dollar	  fortunes	  in	  the	  Gulf	  countries.	  In	  the	  period	  between	  1970	  and	   1980,	   their	   number	   increased	   from	   approximately	   58,000	   to	   a	   startling	   five	  million.91	  Another	  quite	  visible	  component	  of	  the	  new	  middle	  class	  composition	  under	  Sadat	   was	   the	   rising	   nouveau	   riche	   merchants	   and	   businessmen	   who	   made	   their	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fortunes	   from	   land	   speculations	   facilitated	  by	   the	   state	   and	  as	   commission	  agents	   for	  foreign	  companies.	  Heikal	   records	   that	  during	   the	  1970s,	  53.5%	  of	   state-­‐owned	   lands	  on	  the	  Egyptian	  North	  Coast	  passed	  into	  private	  hands	  for	  free,	  and	  were	  then	  resold	  in	  the	   private	   market	   for	   LE	   4	   billion,	   virtually	   creating	   a	   new	   speculative	   capitalist	  bourgeoisie	   in	   a	   very	   short	   period	   of	   time.	   Cairo	   became	   a	   city	   of	   middlemen	   and	  commission	  agents	  for	  European	  and	  American	  companies	  ‘wheeling	  and	  dealing’	  on	  an	  increasing	  scale.	  Their	  numbers	  jumped	  from	  a	  few	  dozen	  in	  1974	  to	  almost	  16,000	  in	  1981.92	  	  Not	   unremarkably,	   the	   new	   configuration	   of	   the	   middle	   class	   included	   state	  bureaucrats,	   who	   benefited	   from	   their	   positions	   in	   the	   state	   apparatus	   to	   prosper	  beyond	   their	   government	   incomes	   within	   the	   new	   economic	   environment.	   In	   a	   way,	  their	   role	   as	   a	   catalyst	   for	   the	   facilitation	  of	   the	   emergence	  of	   a	   new	   state-­‐sponsored	  capitalist	  bourgeoisie	  was	   indispensable.	  According	  to	  Waterbury,	  some	  34,000	  public	  sector	   managers	   and	   around	   11,000	   senior	   administrators	   were	   allowed	   to	   forge	  shadowy	  alliances	  with	  foreign	  and	  local	  businessmen.	  In	  these	  arrangements,	  investors	  received	   state-­‐owned	   land	   allocations,	   building	   licenses,	   trade	   permits,	   tax	   breaks,	  discounted	   loans	   from	  public	  banks,	  and	   inside	   information	  on	  upcoming	  policies	  and	  decisions,	  all	  in	  return	  for	  lucrative	  commissions	  or	  other	  favours.93	  By	   the	  end	  of	   the	  1970s,	   the	  middle	   class	  had	  evolved	   into	   a	  diverse	  milieu	  of	  bureaucrats,	   technocrats,	  descendants	  of	  capitalist	   families	  of	   the	  pre-­‐1952	  era,	   lower	  strata	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  with	  higher	  education	  and	  state	  careers,	  and	  descendants	  of	  working	  families	  and	  small	   landowners	  who	  had	  achieved	  considerable	  upward	  social	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mobility	   as	   a	   result	   of	   free	   education	   and	   the	   state’s	   employment	   guarantee	   under	  Nasser.94	  The	  incipient	  stages	  of	  liberalisation,	  or	  infitah,	  under	  Sadat	  can	  arguably	  be	  seen	  to	  have	  caused	  a	  change	  in	  the	  once-­‐solid	  belief	  in	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  the	  Nasserist	  middle	   class	   that	   the	   state	   was	   a	   tool	   of	   modernisation	   and	   change,	   and	   –	   not	  unimportantly	  –	  a	  social	  venue	  for	  the	  acquisition	  and	  preservation	  of	  social	  status	  and	  prestige.	   This	   new	   logic	   was	   most	   clearly	   reflected	   amongst	   upper	   echelons	   of	   state	  bureaucrats.	  Once	  the	  bulwark	  of	  the	  regime,	  they	  started	  to	  act	  in	  anticipation	  of	  what	  they	   sensed	   would	   be	   far-­‐reaching	   socio-­‐economic	   changes	   in	   the	   post-­‐Nasser	   era.	  Adjusting	   to	   perceived	   future	   trends,	   many	   bureaucrats	   turned	   their	   attention	   to	  opportunities	   of	   enrichment	   and	   prosperity	   outside	   the	   state	   by	   nourishing	   ties	  with	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  foreign	  capital,	  thereby	  joining	  the	  newly	  forming	  social	  alliance	  of	  state-­‐sponsored	  capitalists	  and	  other	  benefactor	  middle-­‐class	  segments.	  Under	  Sadat,	  the	   state’s	   previously	   pivotal	   role	   in	   the	   fields	   most	   associated	   with	   class	   status	  reproduction	  and	  preservation	  by	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  started	  gradually	  fading	  away,	  widening	  the	  cracks	  in	  the	  ailing	  social	  contract.	  The	  result	  of	  the	  proliferation	  of	  easy	  wealth	  among	  various	  segments	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  was	  a	  gradual	  encroachment	  of	  an	  ‘enrichment’	  culture	  on	  the	  previously	  self-­‐regarded	  champions	  of	  statist	  approaches	  to	  socio-­‐economic	  progress.	  Residences	  with	  gardens	  and	  swimming	  pools,	   elegant	   cars;	  high	   incomes,	   foreign	   educations,	   and	   structural	   ties	   with	   the	   West;	   all	   were	  components	   of	   a	   social	   lifestyle	   and	   consumption	   pattern	   typical	   of	   this	   emerging	  ‘hybrid’	   upper	   middle	   class.95	  As	   Abdelmoety	   argues,	   by	   the	   late	   1970s,	   the	   upper	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segments	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  managed	  to	  re-­‐position	  themselves	  on	  the	  Egyptian	  socio-­‐political	  scene,	  implicitly	  supporting	  the	  retreat	  from	  the	  state-­‐controlled	  economy	  and	  effectively	  facilitating	  the	  reinstitution	  of	  market	  mechanisms	  in	  many	  socio-­‐economic	  spheres.96	  	  Since	   the	   mid-­‐1970s,	   the	   twilight	   of	   the	   state-­‐led	   development	   era	   and	   the	  continuously	  shrinking	  role	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  state	  in	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  sphere	  had	  had	  a	   defining	   effect	   on	   the	  way	   the	   Egyptian	  middle	   class	   constructed	   its	   socio-­‐political	  agency	  in	  the	  following	  decades.	  This	  effect	  has	  arguably	  continued	  into	  the	  present	  day.	  An	  unwritten	  pact	  of	  social	  alliance	  between	  the	  middle	  class	  and	  the	  state	  was	  on	  its	  way	   out.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   upper	   echelons	   of	   the	   state	   bourgeoisie	   gradually	  abandoned	  their	  character	  as	  champions	  of	  state-­‐led	  development	  and	  modernisation,	  and	  increasingly	  closed	  ranks	  with	  the	  liberalisation-­‐hungry	  private	  sector	  bourgeoisie,	  long	  undermined	  under	  Nasser.	  In	  Malak	  Zaalouk’s	   exploration	  of	   the	   social	   origins	  of	   the	   ‘new	  bourgeoisie’	   in	  the	  years	   following	  Sadat’s	   introduction	  of	   the	   infitah	  policy,	  we	  are	  presented	  with	  a	  clear	   view	   of	   the	   mechanism	   through	   which	   the	   Nasserist	   state’s	   technocratic	  bourgeoisie	   practically	   defected	   from	   its	   statist	   role	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   socio-­‐economic	  alliance	   with	   rising	   private	   sector	   capitalist	   interests.	   Examining	   a	   sample	   of	  ‘commercial	   agents’,	   a	   popular	   form	   of	   entrepreneurship	   which	   characterised	   the	  
infitah	   period,	   Zaalouk	   found	   that	   50%	   of	   the	   studied	   group	   belonged	   to	   traditional	  trading	  and	  industrial	  families	  who	  had	  survived	  the	  continued	  blows	  of	  nationalisation	  during	   the	   Nasser	   years.	   The	   second	   largest	   subgroup,	   representing	   30%	   of	   the	  commercial	   agents,	   was	   comprised	   of	   state	   sector	   technocrats,	   managers	   and	   senior	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civil	  servants.	  Liberal	  professionals,	  such	  as	  accountants,	  lawyers,	  doctors,	  teachers	  and	  engineers,	   amounted	   to	   10%	   of	   those	   benefiting	   from	   the	   spread	   of	   commercial	  agencies	   (primarily	   of	   foreign	   companies).	   Zaalouk’s	   conclusions	   need	   little	   further	  explanation	  as	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  re-­‐positioning	  that	  was	  taking	  place	  within	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class.	  Writing	  in	  1989,	  she	  points	  out:	  The	  high	  percentage	  of	  both	  the	  traditional	  bourgeoisie	  and	  the	  state	  technocrats	  in	  the	   listing	   of	   social	   background	   is	   also	   indicative	   of	   the	   anatomy	   of	   the	   new	   ruling	  class.	   The	   new	   ruling	   class	   of	   today	   is	   a	   merger	   between	   fractions	   of	   the	   old	  bourgeoisie,	  who	  were	  restricted	  under	  Nasser	  and	  once	  again	  revived	  with	  the	  ‘open	  door’	  economic	  policy,	   fractions	  of	   the	  bureaucratic	  bourgeoisie	  born	  with	   the	  state	  sector	  under	  Nasser	  and	  finally	  businessmen	  performing	  new	  activities	  and	  stepping	  into	  areas	  of	   investment	  with	   the	   least	   risk	  and	  highest	  profits,	  namely	  commercial	  agents.97	  	  	  Naturally,	   these	   social	   changes	   bore	   political	   consequences.	   ‘Political	   power	  relations’,	  as	  Farah	  argues,	   ‘had	  to	  be	  changed	   in	  order	  to	  build	  a	  new	  alliance	  among	  top	  members	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  elite	  favouring	  a	  liberal	  and	  market-­‐oriented	  economic	  system,	  the	  traditional	  wing	  of	  the	  old	  elite,	  and	  private	  sector	  magnets’.98	  In	   1978,	   this	   new	   social	   alliance	   found	   its	   political	   expression	   in	   Sadat’s	  reinvention	  of	   the	  dominant	  ruling	  party	  under	  a	  new	  name:	   the	  National	  Democratic	  Party.	   And	  with	   the	   adoption	   of	   even	  more	   aggressively	   neoliberal	   policies	   from	   the	  1990s	   onward,	   the	   reconfiguration	   of	   the	   middle	   class,	   including	   a	   growing	   divide	  between	  upper	  and	  lower	  segments	  therein,	  has	  intensified	  even	  further.	  Under	  Sadat,	  this	  reconfiguration	  was	  administered	  with	  a	  view	  to	  creating	  a	  loyal	  capitalist	  middle	  class	  to	  renew	  the	  social	  base	  of	  the	  state.	  However,	  as	  Kandil	  remarks,	  little	  did	  Sadat	  realise	   that	   he	   had	   planted	   ‘the	   germ	  whose	   covetousness	  would	   eventually	   pull	   the	  roof	  down	  in	  January	  2011’.99	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6.	  Egypt’s	  Middle	  Class	  Under	  Mubarak:	  Those	  Who	  Made	  It	  and	  
Those	  Who	  Didn’t	  
6.1	  Survival:	  The	  Neoliberal	  Transformation	  Under	  Mubarak	  In	  October	  1981,	  Hosni	  Mubarak	  ascended	  to	  power	  following	  the	  assassination	  of	  Sadat	  by	  a	  group	  of	  army	  officers	  belonging	  to	  the	  armed	  Islamist	  group	  al-­‐Jama‘a	  al-­‐
Islamiyya.	   Economically,	   Mubarak’s	   first	   decade	   in	   power	   was	   difficult.	   Egypt’s	   rent-­‐dependent	  economy	  suffered	  from	  the	  steep	  decline	  in	  oil	  prices	  in	  the	  mid	  1980s.	  This	  decline	   not	   only	   affected	   direct	   oil	   revenues,	   but	   also	   indirectly	   affected	   important	  sources	  of	   foreign	  currency,	  such	  as	  the	  remittances	  of	  Egyptians	  working	  in	  the	  Arab	  Gulf	   countries	   and	   revenues	   from	   the	   Suez	   Canal.	   Egypt’s	   external	   debt	   rose	   from	  around	  $21	  billion	   in	  1980	   to	  $41	  billion	   in	  1991.100	  With	  an	  economy	  plagued	  by	  an	  ever-­‐struggling	  balance	  of	  payment	  deficit	  and	  high	  inflation	  rates,	  Egypt	  concluded	  an	  agreement	   in	   1987	   with	   the	   IMF	   on	   a	   Stand-­‐By	   Arrangement	   (SBA)	   of	   250	   million	  SDR.101	  The	   amount,	   equal	   to	   USD	   $400.2	   million	   (May	   2011	   exchange	   rates),102	  was	  meant	   to	   ‘resolve	   the	   problem	   of	   external	   payments	   arrears	   and	   address	   structural	  weaknesses	  that	  manifested	  themselves	  in	  growing	  domestic	  inflation’.103	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	   agreement,	   the	  Paris	  Club	   countries	   agreed	   to	   reschedule	  debt	   service	  payments,	  which	   were	   squeezing	   the	   Egyptian	   treasury	   to	   the	   point	   of	   near-­‐default.	   Breathing	  space	  was	  provided	   to	   the	  Mubarak	   regime.	  However,	   instead	  of	  pressing	  ahead	  with	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the	   politically	   risky	   but	   urgently	   required	   economic	   reforms,	   the	   regime	   chose	   to	  manoeuvre.	  	  	  	  	  With	   the	  wide	  spread	  social	  unrest	  of	   January	  1977	  still	   fresh	   in	   the	  country’s	  political	  memory,	   the	  regime	  was	  wary	  of	   the	  socio-­‐political	  costs	  associated	  with	   full	  implementation	  of	   the	   structural	   adjustments	   and	   fiscal	   policy	   changes	  prescribed	  by	  the	   IMF.	   In	   spite	  of	  what	   the	  agreement	  with	   the	   IMF	  had	  stipulated,	  public	   spending	  increased	  from	  54%	  of	  GDP	  in	  1986-­‐87	  to	  57.2%	  in	  1987-­‐88,	  thus	  increasing	  the	  budget	  deficit	   from	  5.3%	   to	  8.6%	   respectively.104	  As	   a	   result,	   the	   IMF	  dispensed	  only	   around	  half	  of	  the	  funds	  of	  the	  agreement.	  Inevitably,	  the	  economy’s	  sufferings	  continued,	  and	  the	  fact	  remained	  that	  the	  state’s	  deep	  fiscal	  problems	  posed	  a	  serious	  challenge	  to	  the	  regime’s	   stability.	   Facing	   the	   prospect	   of	   defaulting	   on	   its	   foreign	   debts,	   Egypt	  eventually	  came	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  declaring	  bankruptcy	  once	  again	  in	  1989.105	  There	  was	  no	  more	  room	  for	  manoeuvres	  with	  the	  IMF.	  Robert	  Springborg,	  a	  long-­‐time	  student	  of	  Egypt’s	   political	   system,	   predicted	   that	   in	   the	   face	   of	   such	   a	   structural	   crisis,	   three	  possible	  scenarios	  could	  occur.	  Two	  of	  those	  scenarios	  would	  entail	  a	  fortification	  of	  the	  ruling	  alliance	   led	  by	  the	  military,	  either	  through	  concluding	  a	  pact	  with	  the	  capitalist	  class	  to	  implement	  ultraliberal	  policies	  using	  an	  iron	  fist	  (a	  Latin	  American	  scenario),	  or	  with	  the	  Islamists	   in	  search	  of	  renewed	  ideological	  cover	  and	  populist	   legitimacy.	  The	  third	  scenario	  would	  be	  simply	  to	  entrench	  and	  ‘hope	  that	  the	  political	  system	  does	  not	  collapse	   before	   rental	   receipts	   miraculously	   increase’106.	   Characteristically,	   Mubarak	  chose	   the	   third	   option.	   Unrelated	   to	   either	   his	   own	   work	   or	   that	   of	   his	   regime,	  circumstances	  rewarded	  him	  rather	  generously.	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The	  Gulf	  crisis	  of	  1990-­‐1991	  was	  a	  lifeline	  to	  the	  Mubarak	  regime.	  Initially,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  invasion	  of	  Kuwait,	  the	  Egyptian	  economic	  crisis	  had	  been	  aggravated.	  Vast	   numbers	   of	   Egyptian	   workers	   in	   the	   Gulf,	   whose	   remittances	   traditionally	  comprise	   one	   of	   the	   main	   sources	   of	   foreign	   currency	   for	   the	   economy,	   returned	   to	  Egypt.	  Tourism,	  another	  important	  source	  of	  foreign	  currency,	  was	  severely	  affected	  by	  the	  regional	  unrest.	  However,	  Mubarak’s	  careful	  positioning	  of	  Egypt	  as	  part	  of	  the	  US-­‐led	  alliance	  against	  Saddam	  Hussein	  provided	  a	  suitable	  context	  for	  the	  obtainment	  of	  a	  much-­‐needed	   economic	   pain	   relief	   package.	   A	   rare	   window	   of	   opportunity	   for	   an	  economic	  shift	  towards	  the	  adoption	  of	  more	  openly	  liberal	  policies	  with	  a	  reduced	  risk	  of	  social	  unrest	  and	  political	  instability	  had	  opened.	  Mubarak’s	  decision	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  American-­‐led	  military	  coalition	  against	  Iraq	  was	  rewarded	  by	  the	  forgiveness	  of	  $7	  billion	   in	   military	   debt	   to	   the	   United	   States.	   Furthermore,	   the	   Paris	   Club	   countries	  promised	   to	   cancel	   half	   of	   Egypt’s	   external	   debts	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	  implementation	   of	   an	   economic	   reform	   program	   through	   a	   new	   agreement	   with	   the	  IMF.	   Egypt	   was	   being	   gradually	   ushered	   into	   a	   new	   stage	   in	   its	   economic	   –	   and,	  eventually,	  social	  –	  evolution.	  	  Egypt	   concluded	   the	  new	  agreement	  with	   the	   IMF	   in	  1991.	  Accordingly,	  major	  structural	  adjustment	  and	  financial	  control	  measures	  were	  to	  be	  implemented.	  Another	  SBR	   for	   the	   amount	   of	   SDR	  234.4	  million107	  was	  made	   available	   for	   Egypt	   to	   address	  rising	   inflation	   and	   current	   account	   deficits,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   decrease	   of	   net	   capital	  inflows.	  The	  policy	  changes	  demanded	  of	  Egypt	  included	  a	  commitment	  to	  reducing	  the	  chronic	  budget	  deficit	  by	  cutting	  subsidies	  and	  public	  spending,	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  new	  sales	  tax	  to	  help	  increase	  state	  revenues.	  Fundamental	  changes	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	   country’s	   economy	  were	   to	   take	   effect	   through	   the	   privatisation	   of	   public	   sector	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companies,	  as	  well	  as	  measures	  to	  liberalise	  foreign	  trade.108	  For	  example,	  in	  June	  1991,	  Law	  203/1991	  was	  passed,	  creating	  a	  new	  structure	  for	  the	  public	  sector	  by	  removing	  control	   over	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises	   from	   the	   respective	   sectorial	   ministries	   and	  placing	  them	  under	  the	  control	  of	  holding	  companies.	   In	  1992,	  a	   list	  of	  94	  companies,	  candidates	  for	  privatisation	  within	  the	  following	  two	  years,	  was	  made	  public.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  June	  2002,	  the	  government	  had	  completed	  132	  major	  and	  57	  partial	  privatisations	  of	  some	   314	   companies	   scheduled	   for	   sale,	   generating	   revenues	   of	   around	   L.E14.4	  billion.109	  The	   years	   following	   the	   agreement	   with	   the	   IMF	   saw	   a	   continuous	   strategic	  commitment	  by	  the	  Mubarak	  regime	  to	  liberalisation.	  Despite	  the	  regime’s	  continuous	  manoeuvres	  to	  avoid	  socio-­‐politically	  costly	  measures,	  an	  additional	  SBA	  was	  arranged	  with	  the	  IMF	  between	  1993-­‐1996	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  SDR	  400	  million,	  under	  the	  so-­‐called	  Extended	  Fund	  Facility	   (EFF).	   Then,	   finally,	   from	  1996	   to	  1998,	   the	   two	   sides	   agreed	  upon	  an	  SBA	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  SDR	  634.4	  million.	  Although	  Egypt	  did	  not	  actually	  draw	  on	   any	   of	   the	   funds	   made	   available	   to	   it	   by	   this	   last	   SBA,	   it	   did	   provide	   a	   much-­‐welcomed	  certificate	  of	  confidence	   in	  Egypt’s	  commitment	   to	  reforms	   in	   international	  economic	  circuits.	  By	  the	  IMF’s	  own	  testimony,	  ‘this	  program	  and	  its	  predecessor—the	  EFF—provided	   a	   framework	   for	   obtaining	   the	   cancellation	   of	   50%	   of	   Egypt's	   official	  debt	   from	   countries	   that	   are	   members	   of	   the	   Paris	   Club.’110	  In	   2004,	   a	   complete	  overhaul	   of	   the	   country’s	   banking	   sector	  was	   launched	   in	   close	   consultation	  with	   the	  World	  Bank.111	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Egypt’s	  adoption	  of	  IMF-­‐	  and	  World-­‐Bank-­‐advised	  structural	  adjustment	  policies	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  reflected	  a	  deeply	  reaching	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  economic	  policy,	  which	  would	  usher	  the	  country	  into	  a	  new	  era	  in	  its	  economic,	  social	  and	  eventually	  political	  evolution	   over	   the	   following	   years.	   This	   was	   arguably	   the	   third	   such	   paradigm	   shift	  since	  1952.112	  As	  a	  framework	  for	  the	  analysis	  in	  the	  following	  chapters,	  it	  is	  important	  to	   emphasise	   the	   underlying	   rationale	   behind	   the	   economic	   shifts	   inaugurated	   in	   the	  early	  1990s:	  The	  main	  philosophy	  underlying	  Egypt’s	  neoliberal	  transformation	  was	  to	  achieve	   economic	   stabilisation	   and	   generate	   growth	   by	   reducing	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state	  and	  replacing	  it	  with	  market	  dynamics.	  As	  Alissa	  accurately	  summarises,	  the	  government	  has	  adopted	  reform	  programs	  based	  on	  a	  reduced	  role	  of	  the	  state	   in	   the	   economy	   (including	   liberalisation	   and	   privatization),	   adopting	  market-­‐based	   economic	   principles,	   increasing	   the	   global	   integration	   of	   the	  Egyptian	  economy	  by	  opening	   it	   to	  outside	  competition,	  encouraging	  exports,	  and	  increasing	  the	  economy’s	  dependence	  on	  domestic	  revenue.	  113	  	  The	   first	   decade	   of	   reform	  was	   successful	   in	   substantially	   increasing	   real	   GDP	  growth	  rates	  (from	  3.5%	  in	  1990-­‐91	  to	  5.9%	  in	  1997-­‐98),	  decreasing	  fiscal	  deficit	  (from	  17.7%	  in	  1990-­‐91	  to	  1%	  in	  1997-­‐98)	  and	  decreasing	  external	  debt	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  total	  GDP	  from	  107%	  to	  34.3%	  in	  that	  same	  period.114	  Simultaneously,	  and	  as	  a	  direct	  result	   of	   the	   reforms	   adopted,	   foreign	   direct	   investments	   started	   flowing	   in,	   steadily	  increasing	   from	   below	   USD	   200	  million	   in	   1990-­‐91	   to	   USD	   2.2	   billion	   in	   1997-­‐98.115	  These	   indicators	  were	  similarly	  positive	   in	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  as	  well,	   especially	   after	   Ahmed	  Nazif	   took	   office	   as	   Prime	  Minister	   in	   the	   summer	   of	  2004,	   forming	   a	   government	   which	  was	   closely	   linked	   to	   the	   political	   ascendance	   of	  Gamal	  Mubarak,	   the	   president’s	   son,	   the	   head	   of	   the	   ruling	   NDP’s	   Lagnat	  Al-­‐Siyyasat	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(Policies’	   Committee)	   and	   heir-­‐apparent	   to	   the	   presidency.	   By	   2005,	   the	   neoliberal	  transformation	  was	  well	  under	  way,	  and	  the	  new	  government	  was	  ready	  to	  announce	  a	  second	  generation	  of	  reforms	  to	  liberalise	  the	  economy	  even	  further.116	  	  
6.2	  Middle	  Class	  Splits	  in	  the	  Neoliberal	  Context	  The	  first	  decade	  of	  Mubarak’s	  rule	  witnessed	  the	  widening	  and	  expanding	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  reconfiguration	  process	  that	  had	  begun	  under	  Sadat.	  The	  new	  composition	  combined	   upper	   echelons	   of	   the	   state	   bourgeoisie	   with	   other	   strata	   of	   private	  entrepreneurs	   in	   the	   upper	   middle	   class,	   whose	   benefits	   from	   the	   infitah	   would	   not	  have	  been	  possible	  unless	  they	  remained	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  state	  sector.	  However,	  in	  a	   wider	   sense,	   the	   foundations	   of	   these	   relations	   must	   be	   understood	   as	   more	   than	  material	  or	  economic	  interests.	  These	  complex	  relationships	  were	  forged	  in	  the	  context	  of	   a	  wider	   transformation,	   in	  which	   the	   very	   socio-­‐economic	   –	   and	   in	   turn	   the	   socio-­‐political	  –	  role	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class	  changed.	  Disengaging	  from	  the	  state,	  or	  more	  accurately	  re-­‐defining	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  state,	  was	  at	  the	  heart	  of	   this	  transformation.	  	  Here,	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  an	  important	  split	  that	  took	  place	  within	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  era.	  	  The	  demise	  of	   the	  patrimonial	   state	   in	  Egypt	   in	   the	  1990s	  had	  a	   contradictory	  effect	  on	  various	  segments	  of	  the	  middle	  class.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  lower	  segment	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  continued	  to	  suffer	  under	  Mubarak	  due	  to	  the	  persistent	  failure	  of	  the	  state	  to	  uphold	  the	  same	  levels	  of	  welfare	  provisions	  as	  in	  earlier	  stages	  of	  the	  post-­‐1952	  era.	  The	   state's	   capacity,	   and	   indeed	   willingness,	   to	   provide	   vital	   social	   trajectories	   for	  middle	   class	   preservation	   of	   class	   position	   and	   upward	   social	   mobility	   was	   steadily	  shrinking.	  Such	  a	  state	  retreat	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  what	  Asef	  Bayat	  has	  referred	  to	  on	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one	   occasion	   as	   the	   ‘middle	   class	   poor’:	   a	   social	   group	   harbouring	   middle	   class	  aspirations,	  yet	  suffering	  from	  diminishing	  incomes	  and	  market	  positions,	  especially	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  context.117	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   during	   these	   times	   of	   rapid	   transformation,	   the	   upper	  segments	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  were	  blessed	  with	  useful	  social	  safety	  nets.	  Since	  the	  mid-­‐1970s,	   successive	   generations	   in	   these	   segments	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   middle	   class,	   who	  could	  no	   longer	   rely	   on	   the	   state,	  managed	   to	  deploy	   valuable	   social	   capital	   acquired	  and	   held	   since	   the	   1960s	   to	   preserve	   and	   develop	   their	   positions	   within	   the	   class	  structure.	  Vital	  social	  assets,	  such	  as	  high	  standard	  education	  with	  a	  foreign	  component,	  control	  and	  occupation	  of	  influential	  positions	  in	  the	  state	  sector,	  and	  integral	  social	  ties	  to	   the	   private	   sector	   and	   the	   newly	   emerging	   capitalist	   class,	   enabled	   the	   upper	  segments	  of	   the	  middle	  class	  to	  maintain	  their	  positions	   in	  a	  social	  structure	  that	  was	  undergoing	  noticeable	  changes.	  To	   speak	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   upper	  middle	   class,	   as	   will	   be	   done	   throughout	   this	  thesis,	   is	   therefore	   to	   point	   to	   those	   relatively	   economically	   affluent,	   highly	   educated	  (usually	   with	   a	   foreign	   component	   at	   school	   or	   university	   levels)	   echelons	   of	   the	  Egyptian	   bourgeoisie	   based	   primarily	   in	   Cairo	   and	   its	   surrounding	   new	  urban	   desert	  extensions	  (and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  in	  Alexandria	  and	  other	  major	  urban	  centres	  across	  the	  country).	  The	  expanding	  global	   ties	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  economy	   in	   the	  neoliberal	  era	  created	   an	   accommodating	   context	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	   segments	   of	   highly	  qualified	   and	   relatively	   highly	   paid	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   professionals.	   They	   are	   most	  commonly	  recognisable	  in	  today’s	  Egyptian	  context	  by	  material	  displays	  that	  represent	  clear	  markings	  of	  their	  class,	  but	  also	  by	  distinct	  and	  globalisation-­‐inspired	  normative	  conceptions	  of	  modernity,	  citizenry	  and	  lifestyle.	  They	  are	  the	  generational	  extension	  of	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those	  segments	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  middle	  class	  that	  formed	  the	  backbone	  and	  –	  not	  least	  importantly	  -­‐	  the	  legitimising	  social	  base	  for	  successive	  political	  orders	  of	  the	  post-­‐1952	  Egyptian	  state.	  	  Having	   employed	   social	   assets	   such	   as	   education	   and	   relatively	   privileged	  positions	   in	   the	   new	   socio-­‐economic	   structure	   since	   the	   early	   1990s,	   the	   social	  experience	   of	   a	   new	   generation	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   was	   increasingly	  shaped	   by	   different	   factors	   than	   those	   that	   influenced	   much	   of	   their	   predecessors’	  experiences.	   Anouk	   de	   Konig	   provides	   an	   accurate	   generic	   description	   of	   this	   divide	  between	   the	   upper	   and	   lower	   segments	   of	   today’s	   Egyptian	   middle	   class	   in	   the	  neoliberal	  context:	  These	  relatively	  recent	  entrants	  into	  the	  labor	  market	  and	  adult	  life	  are	  starkly	  confronted	  with	  Cairo’s	  contemporary	  segmentation	  of	   fortunes.	  New	   lines	  of	  exclusion	   and	   inclusion	   are	   strongly	   felt	   among	   those	   who	   can	   now	   look	  forward	   to	   the	   rewarding	   jobs	   in	   transnational	   companies	   and	   their	   local	  equivalents,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  upper-­‐middle	  class	  comforts	  they	  offer.	  They	  are	  even	  more	  pertinent	  for	  those	  young	  professionals	  who,	  in	  contrast,	  had	  hopes	  and	   expectations	   based	   on	   their	   educational	   achievements	   but	   now	   find	  themselves	  among	   the	  army	  of	  young	  unemployed,	  no	   longer	  expecting	  more	  than	   a	   small	   job	   with	   meager	   pay	   and	   long	   hours,	   even	   postponing	   their	  dreams	  of	  an	  independent	  life	  and	  the	   ‘opening	  of	  a	  home’	  (starting	  a	  family).	  They	  are	  confronted	  with	  a	   labor	  market	  where	  real	  wages	  and	  opportunities	  in	  the	  government	  sectors	  are	  declining,	  in	  a	  context	  where	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  golden	   chances	   for	   the	   happy	   few	   who	   are	   able	   to	   speak	   English	   at	   a	   near-­‐native	   level,	  have	   the	   right	  qualifications	   from	   the	   right	   college	  or	  university,	  and	  who	  quite	  literally	  embody	  the	  right	  social	  background.118	  	  In	   contrast	   to	   the	   dynamics	   surrounding	   the	   rise	   of	   various	   middle-­‐class	  segments	  to	  social	  prominence	   in	  the	  1960s,	   the	  neoliberal	  upper	  middle	  class	   is	  now	  characterised	   by	   a	   growing	   independence	   from	   the	   state.119	  It	   is	   no	   longer	   able	   to	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depend	  on	  the	  state	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  routes	  for	  social	  distinction.	  Today’s	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	   class	   is	   thus	   increasingly	   grappling	  with	   the	   challenges	   associated	  with	  having	   to	  negotiate	   the	  preservation	  of	   its	  social	   status	   in	   the	  now	  market-­‐dominated	  social	  fields	  in	  which	  the	  state	  was	  once	  a	  leading	  player.	  Private	   or	   foreign	   education,	   employment	   in	   the	   upmarket	   segment	   of	   the	  private	   sector,120	  and	   the	   maintenance	   of	   cosmopolitan	   lifestyle	   practices	   that	   echo	  perceived	   conceptions	   of	   modernity	   and	   globalised	   culture:	   all	   are	   essential	  requirements	  of	  preserving	  and	  reproducing	  social	  status.	  The	  acquisition,	  preservation	  and	   reproduction	  of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   status	   are	   almost	   exclusively	  negotiated	  with	  the	   neoliberal	   market,	   rather	   than	   the	   state.	   Of	   course,	   this	   does	   not	   imply	   a	   total	  withdrawal	   of	   the	   state	   from	   the	   social	   field,	   but	   rather	   a	   reconfiguration	   of	   the	  relationship	   between	   the	   state	   and	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   therein.	   Given	   their	  significant	  role	  in	  shaping	  socio-­‐political	  agency,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  this	  new	  relationship	  surrounding	   the	   upper	   middle	   class’	   struggle	   for	   social	   status	   preservation	   and	  reproduction	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  
6.3	  Political	  Calculations:	  Juggling	  Middle-­‐Class	  Segments	  	  	  	  As	   was	   outlined	   in	   some	   detail	   in	   the	   earlier	   conceptual	   framework,	   the	  neoliberal	   transformation	   in	   Egypt	   is	   much	   more	   comprehensible	   if	   considered	   a	  survival	   strategy	   for	   authoritarianism.	   In	   light	   of	   the	   economic	   shortcomings	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
chapters, reflects an ever-growing rift between the upper middle class and the state in vital areas of social status 
reproduction, especially compared to previous decades. Despite some continuous overlap in social positions 
between the upper middle class and the state, this structural change has had a profound effect on altering the 
general, class-common normative foundations of political agency within the upper middle class, leading, among 
other things, to wide participation in the upheaval of 2011.   
120 Some civil-service careers are still regarded as equivalent in social prestige to private-sector careers, most 
notably those with either an international focus and relatively high pay (such as the diplomatic service), and the 
regulatory bodies of the neoliberal economy, which seek to recruit highly educated and skilled graduates for fast 
-track careers within the state bureaucracy by providing schemes of employment significantly more rewarding 
than the traditional public administrative careers. This will be discussed more in chapter four. 
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state-­‐led	  development	  model,	  a	  social	  contract	  by	  which	  the	  state	  provides	  welfare	  and	  acts	  as	  a	  venue	  for	  social	  prominence	  for	  various	  segments	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  and	  rural	  middle	   classes	  was	  no	   longer	   sustainable	   in	   the	  post-­‐Nasser	   era.	   Sadat,	   as	   previously	  described,	  was	  aware	  that	  a	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  social	  base	  of	  the	  state	  was	  needed,	  and	   attempted	   to	   address	   this	   need	   by	   creating	   and	   including	   new	   segments	   in	   the	  middle	   class.	   This	   reconfiguration	   continued	   and	   sharpened	   under	   Mubarak,	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   a	   detectable	   divide	   between	   a	   lower	   and	   an	   upper	   middle	   class	  characterised	   most	   of	   the	   later	   years	   of	   his	   rule.	   	   In	   this	   context,	   it	   is	   fairly	   easy	   to	  understand	   that	   the	   lower	   segments	   of	   the	   middle	   class,	   whose	   socio-­‐economic	  conditions	   steadily	   deteriorated	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   era,	   would	   grow	   politically	  discontent.121	  Their	  participation	  in	  the	  January	  2011	  revolt	  is	  perfectly	  explicable	  and	  logical.	  However,	  what	  is	  more	  challenging	  to	  explain	  is	  why	  wide	  segments	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  played	  such	  an	  active	  role	  in	  mobilising,	  planning	  for	  and	  taking	  part	  in	  the	  revolt.	  After	  all,	  they	  were	  on	  the	  more	  favourable	  end	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  equation.	  	  	  Mubarak	  was	  not	   unaware	   of	   the	   social	   risks	   inherent	   in	   the	   intensification	   of	  liberalisation	  policies	  in	  the	  second	  and	  third	  decades	  of	  his	  rule.	  This	  was	  true	  to	  the	  extent	   that	   political	   calculations	   related	   to	   the	   regime’s	   perception	   of	   risks	   and	   its	  characteristic	   fear	   of	   threats	   to	   its	   stability	   (rather	   than	   economic	   rationale)	   in	  many	  instances	   provided	   the	   main	   framework	   for	   financial	   and	   economic	   decision-­‐making	  and	   the	   formulation	   of	   public	   policy.	   For	   example,	   even	   in	   the	   early	   stage	   of	  implementing	  the	  IMF-­‐prescribed	  reforms,	  while	  the	  international	  financial	  institutions	  were	  praising	  Egypt	  for	  the	  decline	  in	   its	  budget	  deficit,	   the	  regime	  was	  careful	  not	  to	  cut	   levels	   of	   public	   spending.	   In	   fact,	   a	   comparison	   of	   actual	   public	   expenditure	   from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Ahmad El-Sayed El-Naggar, Al-Inhiyyar Al-Iqtisady Fi ʻasr Mubarak [Economic Collapse under Mubarak] 
(Cairo: Dar Al-Mahrussa, 2008), 220-22. 
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1991-­‐92	  to	  1996-­‐97	  to	  the	  maximum	  public	  expenditure	  agreed	  upon	  with	  the	  IMF	  for	  those	   fiscal	   years	   reveals	   Egypt’s	   complete	   disregard	   of	   such	   agreements.	   Actual	  spending	   steadily	   increased,	   from	   8.5%	  more	   than	   the	   agreed	   levels	  with	   the	   IMF	   in	  1991-­‐92	  to	  a	  striking	  109%	  more	  than	  the	  agreed	  levels	  in	  1996-­‐97.122	  The	  government	  even	  went	   so	   far	   as	   to	   intentionally	  misinform	   international	   financial	   institutions	   on	  actual	  levels	  of	  public	  spending	  in	  official	  correspondences	  on	  the	  matter	  between	  those	  institutions	  and	  Egyptian	  ministerial	  officials.123	  	  	  Such	   behaviour	   points	   to	   the	   regime’s	   awareness	   of	   the	   socio-­‐political	   risks	  inherent	   in	   the	   transformation	   it	   was	   cornered	   into	   undertaking.	   A	   surge	   in	   state	  revenues	   enabled	   the	   regime	   to	   keep	   the	   deficit	   levels	   at	   bay	  while	   at	   the	   same	   time	  maintaining	  the	  spending	   levels	  needed	  to	  avoid	  socially	  painful	  cuts	   to	  subsidies	  and	  provisions.	   Policies	   and	   decisions	   aimed	   at	   increasing	   state	   revenues,	   such	   as	   the	  imposition	  of	  a	  sales	  tax	  and	  the	  devaluation	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  pound	  against	   the	  dollar	  (thus	  increasing	  the	  book	  value	  of	  Egypt’s	  oil	  exports	  and	  Suez	  Canal	  remittances),	  were	  taken	  with	  a	  view	  to	  avoid	  targeting	  vulnerable	  social	  segments	  and	  to	  spread	  out	  the	  burden	  of	  liberalisation	  as	  widely	  as	  possible	  within	  the	  social	  structure.	  	  	  In	  many	  cases,	  the	  interplay	  between	  economic	  policy-­‐making	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  regime	   stability	   resulted	   in	   fiscal	   decisions	   contrary	   to	   the	   interests	   of	   big	   industries	  and	   the	   affluent	   echelons	   of	   the	  middle	   class	   –	   those	  normally	   standing	   at	   the	   rather	  receiving	  end	  of	  neoliberal	  economics.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  speech	  in	  May	  2008,	  Mubarak	  announced	  his	  decision	  to	  raise	  the	  traditional	  Mayday	  annual	  increase	  in	  government	  salaries	   from	   a	   typical	   5-­‐15%	   to	   30%.124	  This	   decision	  was	  welcomed	   in	  many	   social	  ranks.	   Private	   media	   outlets	   influenced	   by	   the	   regime’s	   security	   apparatus	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship: Fiscal Crisis and Political Change in Egypt under Mubarak, 46. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Mohsen Abdelrazek and Mohamed Azouz, "Mubarak Announces a 30% Increase in the Social Bonus 
Starting May," Al-Masry Al-Youm, 1 May 2008. 
	  134	  
clientalistic	  networks,	  as	  well	  as	  state-­‐run	  media	  made	  sure	  the	  message	  was	  conveyed	  clearly	   to	   the	   wider	   public:	   The	   country’s	   leader	   was	   aware	   of	   the	   people’s	   growing	  economic	  hardship	  over	  increasing	  food	  prices	  and	  inflation,	  and	  he	  was	  willing	  to	  take	  appropriate	   measures	   to	   alleviate	   this	   hardship.	   A	   political	   point,	   keeping	   regime	  stability	   in	  mind,	  was	  well	   scored.	  However,	   economic	   logic	   suffered.	   For,	   in	   his	   own	  words	   to	   the	   press,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   Mubarak	   knew	   perfectly	   well	   that	   the	   cost	   of	   his	  newly	  announced	  social	  bonus	  would	  hardly	  be	  covered	  by	  the	  budget	  being	  prepared	  for	  the	  following	  fiscal	  year.125	  	  	  	  	  	  According	  to	  a	  legal	  advisor126	  to	  Minister	  of	  Finance	  at	  the	  time,	  Yousef	  Boutros	  Ghali,	   the	   Minister	   was	   baffled	   by	   the	   decision,	   as	   he	   had	   neither	   anticipated	   the	  percentage	   of	   the	   increase,	   nor	   had	   the	   President	   given	   him	   due	   notice	   of	   such	   an	  announcement.	  Facing	  the	  challenge	  of	  raising	  an	  estimated	  additional	  L.E.	  6	  billion	  to	  cover	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  announced	  bonus,	  Ghali	  convened	  urgent	  meetings	  at	  the	  ministry	  to	   consider	   ways	   of	   raising	   the	   needed	   money.127	  	   A	   few	   days	   later,	   a	   number	   of	  revenue-­‐increasing	  measures	  had	  been	  approved,	  including	  raising	  L.E.	  1.6	  Billion	  at	  the	  expense	   of	   certain	   high-­‐energy-­‐intensive	   industries	   by	   increasing	   the	   price	   of	  subsidised	  natural	   gas	  provided	   to	   their	   factories.	  Another	  L.E.	  600	  million	  was	   to	  be	  raised	  by	  ending	   ‘free	  zone	   licences’	   that	  entitled	  these	  factories	  to	  a	  number	  of	  other	  financial	   benefits	   and	   tax	   breaks	   from	   the	   public	   purse.	   An	   increase	   to	   the	   ‘resource	  development	  fee’	  on	  newly	  licenced	  cars,	  according	  to	  the	  motor’s	  size,	  also	  meant	  that	  mostly	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   motorists	   would	   share	   the	   burden	   of	   financing	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Sherif Ibrahim, "Mubarak: The Real Resources for the 30% Bounus Are Not Available" Al-Masry Al-Youm, 
5  May 2008.   
126 Osama Shalaby (Deputy Head of the Council of the State or Maglis Al-Dawla– Egypt’s administrative 
judiciary body), in discussion with the author, Cairo, November 2008. Mr. Shalaby also acted as a legal advisor 
to various cabinet ministers, as is routinely the case for the Council’s judges – including, at the time, to Youssef 
Boutrus Ghali. 
127 Mohsen Abdelrazek, "Exessive Meetings in the Ministry of Finance to Determine the Guidelines for 
Allocation of the New Bounus. An Official Estimates Its Annual Cost at L.E 6 Billion," Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2 
May 2008. 
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president’s	   generous	   increase	   in	   government	   salaries.	   Similarly,	   some	   tax	   exemptions	  for	   private	   education	   institutions,	   in	   which	   primarily	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   pupils	   and	  students	   enrolled,	   were	   abolished.128	  Members	   of	   Parliament	   of	   the	   ruling	   NDP	  were	  hurdled	   into	   a	   special	   parliamentary	   session,	   which	   passed	   legislation	   reflecting	   the	  necessary	  changes	  to	  the	  budget.	  But	   these	   and	   many	   other	   petty	   political	   manoeuvres	   were	   peripheral	   to	   the	  mainstream	   socio-­‐political	   evolution	   during	   Egypt’s	   neoliberal	   era.	   The	   fundamental	  change	   in	   the	  structural	   relationship	  between	   the	  upper	  middle	  class	  and	   the	  state	   in	  the	  neoliberal	  era	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  erosion	  of	  the	  former’s	  character	  as	  social	  base	  of	   the	   post-­‐1952	   political	   order	   in	   Egypt.	   As	   the	   pillars	   of	   the	   state’s	   social	   contract	  irreversibly	   eroded	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   transformation,	   the	   door	   was	  opened	  to	  a	  new	  chapter	  in	  the	  country’s	  political	  evolution.	  The	  wide	  participation	  and	  active	  role	  of	   the	  upper	  segments	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  middle	  class	   in	  the	  2011	  revolt	   that	  brought	   the	   downfall	   of	   Mubarak	   were	   the	   direct	   result	   of	   this	   collapse	   in	   the	   basic	  socio-­‐political	  pact	  with	  the	  state.	  The	  neoliberal	  transformation	  caused	  a	  deep	  rupture	  in	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   historic	   framework,	   within	   which	  middle-­‐class	   formation	   has	  traditionally	   taken	   place	   in	   Egypt	   over	   the	   past	   two	   centuries:	   In	   return	   for	   political	  consent	   and	   acquiescence	   to	   the	   political	   order,	   the	   state	  would	   act	   as	   a	   provider	   of	  routes	  for	  social	  and	  class	  status	  preservation	  and	  reproduction.	  	  
7.	  Conclusion	  Egypt’s	   recent	   history	   suggests	   an	   intimate	   relationship	   between	   structural	  changes	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  middle	  class.	  Since	  Mohamed	  Ali’s	  rule,	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Mahmoud Mohamed and Mohamed Hossam, "New Increases in the Prices of Petrol, Diesel and Cigarettes, 
and the Cancellation of Exemptions of Private Education " Al-Masry Al-Youm, 6 May 2008. 
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class	  emerged	  and	  evolved	  as	  an	  important	  player	  in	  the	  process	  of	  state	  building	  and	  modernisation.	  The	  type	  of	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  developed	  by	  the	  middle	  class	  varied	  at	  different	  historical	  stages,	  depending	  on	  the	  particularities	  of	  the	  political	  regime	  at	  each	  stage.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  role	  played	  by	  members	  of	  the	  middle	  classes	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  was	  always	  both	  active	  and	  central	  to	  the	  country’s	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  political	  advancement.	  It	  was	  also	  the	  product	  of	  a	  structural	  entwinement	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  middle	  class,	  one	  articulated	  by	  an	  unwritten	  yet	  effectively	  upheld	  social	  contract.	  The	  state	  would	  ensure	  that	  it	  acted	  as	  a	  harbour	  and	  facilitator	  for	  the	  realisation	  of	  middle	  class	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  socio-­‐cultural	  aspirations.	  For	  its	  part,	  the	  middle	  class	  would	  put	  a	  stamp	  of	  political	  consent	  on	  prevailing	  arrangements	  for	  what	  had	  mostly	  been	  an	  authoritarian	  system	  of	  rule.	  	  	  	  As	  this	  social	  contract	  was	  systematically	  undermined	  by	  the	  state’s	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  role	  described	  above	  after	  the	  inception	  of	  economic	  liberalisation	  policies	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  equation	  on	  which	  successive	  political	  regimes	  rested	  started	   to	   suffer.	   In	   the	   following	   chapters,	   the	   dynamics	   of	   this	   change	   in	   the	   areas	  considered	   most	   vital	   for	   the	   preservation	   and	   reproduction	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status	   will	   be	   examined.	   The	   historical	   flashback	   in	   this	   chapter	   was	   intended	   as	   a	  reminder	   of	   the	   frameworks	   of	   middle-­‐class	   formation	   in	   Egypt.	   By	   highlighting	   the	  close	   relationship	   between	   structural	   change,	   the	   state	   and	  middle	   class	   evolution	   in	  Egypt	   since	   the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	   century,	   this	   chapter	  aimed	   to	  provide	  an	   image	  with	  which	  the	  discussions	  in	  following	  chapters	  can	  be	  contrasted.	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Chapter	  Three:	  Preparing	  for	  Distinction:	  Education	  and	  Social	  Status	  Preservation	  in	  the	  Neoliberal	  Era	  
1.	  Introduction	  Education	  has	  traditionally	  been	  one	  of	  the	  most	  fundamental	  components	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   status	   in	   Egypt.	   Throughout	   the	   various	   stages	   of	   the	   socio-­‐historical	  evolution	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   middle	   class,	   education	   has	   always	   represented	   a	   clear	  criterion	   for	   the	   attainment,	   reproduction,	   and	   indeed	   the	   material	   expression	   of	  displaying	   prestige	   and	   class	   status.1	  In	   today’s	   Egypt,	   both	   the	   reputation	   of	   formal	  credentials	  and	  aspects	  of	  cultural	  capital	  acquired	  through	  various	  available	  education	  trajectories	  are	  shaping	  even	  sharper	  lines	  of	  distinctions	  within	  the	  middle	  class.2	  The	  growth	  of	   the	  bureaucratic	   structure	  and	   its	  accompanying	  expansion	   in	  non-­‐religious	   education	   under	   the	   British	   occupation	   in	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   and	   early	  twentieth	  centuries	  became	  key	  factors	  in	  defining	  the	  dynamics	  of	  structural	  formation	  of	  an	  urban	  extension	  of	  the	  traditional	   landed	  rural	  middle	  class.	  As	  demonstrated	  in	  chapter	   two,	   this	   emerging	   branch	   of	   the	   middle	   class	   profoundly	   influenced	   the	  discursive	   formation	   of	   a	   distinct	   Egyptian	   national	   identity	   in	   the	   early	   twentieth	  century.	   In	   this	   regard,	   education	  played	  a	  pivotal	   role	   in	   shaping	  middle	   class	   socio-­‐cultural	   and	   political	   agencies.	   As	   Joel	   Benin	   has	   stated,	   modern	   education	   ‘not	   only	  expanded	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  effendiya,	  but	  also	  provided	  a	  vocabulary	  for	  imagining	  Egypt	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Clement Henry Moore, Images of Development: Egyptian Engineers in Search of Industry (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1980), 8. Cited in: Hanna Papanek, "Class and Gender in Education-Employment Linkages," 
Comparative Education Review 29, no. 3 (1985): 322. 
2 Anouk De Konig, Global Dreams: Class, Gender, and Public Space in Cosmopolitan Cairo (Cairo, New 
York: American University in Cairo Press, 2009), 45-46. 
	  138	  
as	   a	   political	   space	   comparable	   to	   European	   nation	   states’.3	  In	   1925,	   the	   government	  took	   the	   first	   step	   to	  making	  elementary	   school	   admission	  both	   free	  and	   compulsory.	  Governments	   formed	   by	   the	   Wafd	   party	   in	   1936	   and	   1950	   made	   both	   primary	   and	  secondary	   schools	   free.4	  During	   this	  period,	   as	  Barak	  Salmoni	  has	   emphasised,	   school	  curricula	   acted	   as	   a	   powerful	   tool	   for	   crafting	   a	   collective	  middle-­‐class	   conception	   of	  history,	   citizenship,	   rights	   and	   nationalism,	   which	   informed	   subsequent	   generations,	  including	  those	  who	  rose	  to	  steer	  the	  Egyptian	  post-­‐1952	  state.5	  	  The	   considerable	   expansion	   of	   the	   state	   under	   Nasser	   provided	   a	   socio-­‐historical	  context	   in	  which	   the	  emphasis	  of	  education	  as	  a	  main	   indicator	  of	  middle	  class	  status	  developed	  even	   further.	  The	  growing	   role	  of	   the	   state	   in	  various	   social	   and	  economic	  sectors	  created	  a	  need	  for	  modern-­‐educated	  and	  technically	  qualified	  civil	  service	  and	  public	  sector	  cadres	  that	  would	  bear	  the	  responsibility	  of	  steering	  the	  bureaucracy	  and	  implementing	   the	   Nasserist	   state’s	   visions	   for	   industrialisation	   and	   modernisation.	  Naturally,	  Nasser	  horizontally	  expanded	  the	  education	  system	  considerably,	  providing	  opportunities	  for	  social	  mobility	  to	  wider	  segments	  of	  society.	  	  In	   July	   1962,	  Nasser	   abolished	   tuition	   for	   university	   education,	  making	   it	   entirely	  free.6	  Furthermore,	  in	  1964,	  he	  issued	  Presidential	  Decree	  No.	  185,	  formally	  obligating	  the	  state	   to	  provide	  employment	   for	  all	  graduates	  of	  universities	  and	  higher	   technical	  institutes.	  Those	  two	  measures	  are	  pivotal	  to	  understanding	  the	  shifts	  in	  the	  social	  role	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  foundations	  of	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  middle	  class	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Joel Beinin, "Egypt: Society and Economy, 1923-1952," in The Cambridge History of Egypt Volume Two: 
Modern Egypt from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century, ed. M.W. Daly (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 309.  
4 Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, 235. 
5 Barak A. Salmoni, "Historical Consciousness for Modern Citizenship: Egyptian Schooling and the Lessons of 
History During the Constitutional Monarchy," in Re-Envisioning Egypt, 1919-1952, ed. Arthur Goldschmidt, 
Amy J. Johnson, and Barak A.  Salmoni (Cairo, New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2005), 
166-69. 
6 Mahmud A Faksh, "The Consequences of the Introduction and Spread of Modern Education: Education and 
National Integration in Egypt," Middle Eastern Studies 16, no. 2 (1980): 46. 
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that	  have	  taken	  place	  since	  the	  early	  1970s.	  These	  two	  state	  commitments	  –	  universal	  education	  and	  employment	  –	  ought	  to	  be	  contextualised	  in	  the	  wider	  process	  of	  forging	  the	  social	  contract	  of	  post-­‐1952	  Egypt.	  By	  situating	  itself	  as	  the	  guarantor	  of	  universal	  education	  and	  employment,	  the	  Nasserist	  state	  effectively	  proclaimed	  itself	  the	  primary	  social	   arena	   for	   the	   attainment	   and	   reproduction	   of	   middle-­‐class	   status.	   Our	  understanding	   of	   the	   changing	   relationship	   between	   various	   segments	   of	   the	  middle	  class	  and	  the	  state	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  era	  must	  thus	  stem	  from	  a	  clear	  comprehension	  of	  the	   foundations	  of	   this	   social	   contract.	   Since	   the	   shift	   away	   from	   the	   statist	  paradigm	  after	  1973,	  as	  Waterbury	  asserts,	  despite	   its	  ever-­‐weakening	  capacity	  to	  sustain	  these	  legitimacy-­‐creating	  commitments,	  the	  Egyptian	  state	  has	  ‘never	  been	  able	  to	  put	  down	  the	  burden	   it	   shouldered	   in	  1964’7.	   It	   could	   therefore	  be	  argued	   that	   the	   relationship	  between	  the	  Egyptian	  middle	  class	  and	  the	  state	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  onwards	  has	  been	  primarily	  defined	  by	   the	  growing	   inability	  of	   the	   state	   to	  keep	   its	  main	   commitments	  under	   the	   Nasserist	   social	   contract	   –	   and	   simultaneously	   by	   its	   continuous	   efforts	   to	  manoeuvre	  around	  the	  naturally	  ensuing	  political	  consequences	  and	  risks.	  As	  early	  as	  1977,	   Faksh	  predicted	   the	   state’s	   growing	  predicament.	   By	   then	  university	   graduates	  were	  increasingly	  constituting	  a	  growing	   group	   whose	   substandard	   skills	   and	   mediocre	   talents	   are	   not	   in	  demand	  under	  Sadat's	  'Democratic'	  Socialist	  Republic,	  but	  whose	  expectations	  have	  been	  geared	   to	   the	  attainment	  of	  a	   'decent'	   job	  with	  status	  and	  security.	  […]They	   accordingly	   constitute	   a	   growing	   force	   of	   'marginal	   men'	   who	   are	  desperately	  in	  search	  of	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  their	  society	  but	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  able	  to	  find	  it.	  Their	  hopes	  and	  expectations	  have	  been	  raised	  to	  unrealistic	  levels	  by	  their	  educational	  attainments,	  thus	  increasing	  the	  level	  of	  frustration	  caused	  by	  the	   existing	   conditions	  which,	   in	   turn,	  makes	   their	   rapport	   with	   the	  military	  regime	  tenuous	  at	  best.8	  	  As	   argued	   in	   chapter	   one,	   the	   inception	   of	   liberalisation	   under	   Sadat’s	   infitah	  policies	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  a	  more	  elaborate	  neoliberal	  agenda	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, 236. 
8 Mahmud A Faksh, "The Chimera of Education for Development in Egypt: The Socio-Economic Roles of 
University Graduates," Middle Eastern Studies 13, no. 2 (1977): 238-39. 
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Mubarak	  era	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  structural	  shifts,	   that	  responded	  to	  the	  state’s	  continuous	  crisis	  arising	  from	  its	  inability	  to	  uphold	  previously	  made	  social	  commitments.	  Over	  the	  past	   two	  decades,	   the	   socio-­‐political	   agency	  of	  both	   the	   lower	  and	  upper	   segments	  of	  today’s	   Egyptian	  middle	   class	   has	   primarily	   been	   shaped	   by	   dynamics	   resulting	   from	  the	  state’s	  default	  on	  its	  traditional	  commitment	  to	  acting	  as	  an	  agent	  for	  the	  facilitation	  of	  social	  mobility	  and	  prominence	  for	  these	  social	  categories.	  Particularly	  in	  education,	  the	   two	   broad	   segments	   of	   the	   middle	   class	   have	   been	   left	   to	   negotiate	   the	  encroachment	   of	   chaotic,	   informal	   and	   loosely	   regulated	   mechanisms	   of	   the	   free	  market.	   Notably,	   in	   recent	   years,	   the	   majority	   of	   both	   upper	   and	   lower	  middle-­‐class	  families	  have	  had	  to	  endure	  considerable	  financial	  burdens	  resulting	  from	  an	  endemic	  (yet	   realistically	   inescapable)	   dependence	   on	   private	   tutoring.	   Since	   the	   early	   1980s,	  schools	   could	  no	   longer	  be	   trusted	  with	   the	  appropriate	  preparation	  of	   the	  young	   for	  the	   thanawiyya	   ‘amma,	   the	   notorious	   secondary	   school	   examination	   leading	   to	  university.	  State	  policies	  based	  on	   the	  regime’s	  conscious	  move	   to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  provision	   of	   social	   services	   bore	   considerable	   responsibility,	   as	   Hania	   Sobhy	   has	  argued:	   The	  growth	  of	  private	   tutoring	  was	  part	  of	  a	  deliberate	  policy	  of	   the	  deposed	  Mubarak	   regime	   of	   promoting	   privatization	   and	   reducing	   public	   spending	   on	  education.	  […]	  Middle	  and	  upper	  middle	  class	  families	  are	  equally	  pressured	  to	  enrol	  their	  children	  in	  tutoring	  to	  secure	  an	  acceptable	  level	  of	  education.9	  	  In	   today’s	   increasingly	   stratified	   Egyptian	   society,	   education	   remains	   one	   of	   the	  most	  significant	  markers	  of	  distinction,	  especially	  within	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  middle	  class.	  For	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   in	   particular,	   high-­‐standard,	   quality	   education	   is	   deeply	  intertwined	  with	  the	  stratum’s	  self-­‐proclaimed	  status	  as	  society’s	  modern	  avant-­‐garde.	  Securing	  a	  suitable	  education	  path	  is	  a	  fundamental	  prerequisite	  to	  the	  reproduction	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Hania Sobhy, "The De-Facto Privatization of Secondary Education in Egypt: A Study of Private Tutoring in 
Technical and General Schools," Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education 42, no. 1 
(2012): 47. 
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one’s	  cherished	  class	  position	  and	  status.	   It	   is	  also	  a	  precious	  formal,	  as	  well	  as	  socio-­‐cultural,	   credential	   for	   securing	   a	   place	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   private	   employment	  market	  and	  for	  the	  advancement	  therein,	  as	  chapter	   four	  will	  discuss	   in	  more	  detail.	  Securing	  high-­‐quality	  education	  has	   thus	  become	  one	  of	   the	  main	  arenas	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  social	   struggle	   in	   today’s	   Egyptian	   context.	   In	   this	   regard,	   social	   agency	   is	   played	   out	  amidst	   the	   growing	   control	   of	   neoliberal	   market	   dynamics	   over	   the	   surrounding	  structural	   environment	   in	   the	   area	   of	   education.	   Upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   find	  themselves	   entangled	   in	   the	   process	   of	   negotiating	   an	   emerging,	   expanding	   and	  exploitative	  private	  education	  market.	  This	  chapter	  will	  review	  some	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  this	  process.	  It	  will	  commence	  by	  tracing	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  public	  education	  as	  a	  state-­‐harboured	  field	  for	  social-­‐status	  preservation	  for	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  in	  the	  years	  since	  1952.	  It	  will	  then	  proceed	  to	  provide	   some	   representative	   dynamics	   from	   the	   growing	   ‘marketisation’	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  education.	  Finally,	  a	  typical	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  experience	  negotiating	  the	  private	   education	   market	   will	   be	   used	   as	   a	   qualitatively	   revealing	   framework	   for	  identifying	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  dynamics	  on	  creating	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  subjectivities.	  These	   subjectivities,	   which	   later	   inform	   the	   normative	   foundations	   of	   political	  conviction	   and	   agency,	   are	   indirectly	   generated	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   challenges	   and	  difficulties	  faced	  in	  negotiating	  the	  private	  education	  market.	  
2.	  Rise	  and	  Fall:	  Public	  Education	  from	  Nasser	  to	  Mubarak	  Nasser’s	   massive	   expansion	   of	   the	   state	   apparatus	   needed	   an	   equally	   sizable	  supply	   of	   human	   resources.	   Technical	   and	   managerial	   cadres	   were	   essential	   for	  carrying	   out	   the	   centrally	   planned	   and	   state-­‐led	   development	   vision.	   Naturally,	   this	  translated	  into	  a	  considerable	  horizontal	  expansion	  of	  modern	  non-­‐religious	  education	  
	  142	  
on	   all	   levels,	   across	   the	   country,	   since	   1952.	  While	   only	   45%	  of	   Egyptian	   children	   of	  primary-­‐school	  age	  attended	  school	  in	  1952,	  this	  proportion	  increased	  to	  65%	  in	  1960	  and	  continued	  to	  rise	  in	  the	  following	  years,	  reaching	  an	  unprecedented	  80%	  by	  1967.10	  In	   line	  with	   the	   state’s	   general	  orientation	   towards	   the	  establishment	  of	   an	  advanced	  industrial	  base,	   enrolment	   in	   technical	  and	  vocational	  primary	  and	  secondary	  schools	  also	  increased	  sharply	  between	  1953	  and	  1966.11	  Although	   this	   horizontal	   expansion	   led	   to	   some	   degree	   of	   administrative	  decentralisation	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  structure	  charged	  with	  the	  provision	  of	  education,	  policymaking	  and	  educational-­‐system	  content	  remained	  highly	  centralised,	  in	  the	  hands	  of	   the	   ministry	   of	   education.	   This	   high	   degree	   of	   control	   arguably	   characterised	   the	  Egyptian	  education	  system	  long	  before	  the	  1952	  change	  of	  regimes.	  Since	  the	  inception	  of	  modern	  non-­‐religious	  education	  under	  Mohamed	  Ali	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	   the	   system	   had	   followed	   the	   centralised	   pattern	   ‘characteristic	   of	   French	  education,	   a	   pattern	   which	   the	   British	   failed	   to	   change	   during	   their	   occupation	   of	  Egypt’.12	  Horizontal	  expansion	  thus	  fell	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Nasserist	  state’s	  attempts	  to	  use	  expanded	  bureaucratic	  structures	  to	  consolidate	  certain	  narratives	  of	  national	  identity	  and	  an	  Arab-­‐socialist	  ideology.	  Under	  Nasser,	  the	  indoctrination	  of	  new	  generations	  was	  the	   primary	   objective	   underlying	   the	   expansion	   of	   state	   education.	   As	   Hyde	   asserts,	  Nasser	  expanded	  the	  already	  highly	  centralised	  education	  system	  and	  employed	  it	  as	  a	  key	  tool	  for	  spreading	  the	  ideological	  foundation	  of	  his	  regime	  to	  younger	  generations.13	  	  	  	  The	   emergence	   of	   a	   state	   bourgeoisie	   class,	   in	   charge	   of	   managing	   and	  overseeing	   the	   state-­‐led	   development	   project	   under	   Nasser	   (as	   chapter	   two	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Faksh, "The Consequences of the Introduction and Spread of Modern Education: Education and National 
Integration in Egypt," 45. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Georgie D.M. Hyde, Education in Modern Egypt (London: Routledge, 1978), 61. 
13 Ibid. 
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demonstrated),	   was	   closely	   tied	   to	   a	   clear	   emphasis	   on	   the	   obtainment	   of	   higher	  education.	  Indeed,	  the	  most	  noticeable	  facet	  of	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  education	  system	  in	  Egypt	  under	  Nasser	  was	   the	  dramatic	   rise	   in	  university	   enrolment.	  While	   elementary	  education	   had	   been	   free	   since	   1950,	   Nasser	   extended	   universal	   free	   education	   to	  include	  higher	  education	  in	  1962.14	  The	  number	  of	  undergraduate	  students	  enrolled	  in	  public	  universities	   increased	   from	  35,016	   in	  1951-­‐52	  to	  152,382	   in	  1970-­‐71,	   jumping	  by	   almost	   435%. 15 	  In	   1964,	   Nasser	   decreed	   universal	   state	   employment	   for	   all	  university	   graduates.	  A	   clear	   connection	  between	   certification	   and	   state	   employment,	  which	  had	  previously	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  defining	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	   the	  middle	   class	   in	  Egypt,	  was	   strengthened	  and	   formally	   incorporated	   into	  the	   Nasserist	   social	   pact.	   State	   propaganda	   and	   cultural	   productions	   played	   an	  instrumental	   role	   in	   fuelling	  middle-­‐class	   expectations	   that	   ‘education	   should	   lead	   to	  prestigious	   employment	   in	   the	   army,	   the	   professions,	   particularly	   medicine	   and	  engineering,	  and	  the	  civil	  service’.16	  Within	  this	  considerable	  expansion,	  the	  state	  placed	  a	   special	   emphasis	   on	   the	   status	   of	   higher	   education	   in	   technical	   specialisations.	   ‘In	  order	   to	  meet	   the	  need	  of	   the	   country	   for	   trained	   specialists’,	   as	   Faksh	  points	   out,	   ‘it	  promoted	  an	  increased	  enrolment	  in	  science,	  engineering,	  agriculture,	  and	  medicine’.17	  Graduates	  of	  these	  institutions	  formed	   an	   elite	   technocratic	   civilian	   element,	  which	   increased	   in	   prominence	  after	  the	  socialist	  legislation	  in	  1961	  and	  1962	  expanded	  the	  public	  sector,	  and	  created	  a	   great	  need	   for	  qualified	  Egyptians	   to	   fill	   a	  wide	  variety	  of	   technical	  positions.	  18	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Sarah Hartmann, "The Informal Market of Education in Egypt: Private Tutoring and Its Implications," 
(Institut für Ethnologie und Afrikastudien Working Paper, 2008), 21. 
15 Faksh, "The Consequences of the Introduction and Spread of Modern Education: Education and National 
Integration in Egypt," 46. (Excluding Al Azhar and The American University in Cairo). 
16 Bill Williamson, Education and Social Change in Egypt and Turkey: A Study in Historical Sociology 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1987), 133. 
17 Faksh, "The Consequences of the Introduction and Spread of Modern Education: Education and National 
Integration in Egypt," 46. 
18 Judith Cochran, Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt (Cairo: American University Press, 2008), 71-
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The	   glorification	   of	   the	   highly	   educated	   technocratic	   individual	   as	   the	  cornerstone	  of	  society’s	  desire	  for	  development	  and	  progress	  found	  one	  of	   its	  clearest	  cultural	   articulations	   in	   the	   lyrics	   of	   the	   song	   Soura	   (picture)	   by	  Abdelhalim	  Hafez,	   a	  singer	  widely	   acknowledged	   as	   an	   icon	   of	  Nasserist	   era	   nationalist	  music.19	  The	   song	  was	  written	  in	  1966	  by	  Salah	  Jahin,	  another	  prominent	  poet	  of	  the	  Nasserist	  era	  on	  the	  occasion	   of	   the	   fourteenth	   anniversary	   of	   the	   July	   revolution.	   The	   lyrics	   describe	   an	  imagined	   group	   photo	   opportunity	   for	   representatives	   of	   various	   social	   categories,	  symbolising	  the	  nation’s	  diverse	  social	  composition	  under	  its	  proud	  flag	  in	  al-­‐midan,	  the	  field	   of	   struggle.	   The	   song	   describes	   the	   background	   of	   the	   nation’s	   snapshot	   as	  featuring	  the	  greenery	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  countryside	  on	  a	  bright	  day	  amidst	  the	  ‘breeze	  of	  freedom,	   peace,	   civilization	   and	   arts’.	   Peasants,	   soldiers,	   workers	   and	   clerics	   are	   all	  present	   in	  the	  picture.	  A	  metaphorical	  picture	  of	  a	   factory	   in	  which	  an	  engineer	  and	  a	  worker	   forge	   the	   nation’s	   ‘will	   of	   steel’	   is	   also	   described.	   Most	   notably,	   Abdelhalim	  Hafez’s	   voice	   praises	   engineers	   in	   the	   desert	   oil	   fields,	   doctors,	   scientists	   in	   their	  laboratories,	   and	   civil	   servants	   sitting	   at	   their	   desks	   as	   ‘the	   picture’s	   most	   visible	  people’.	   Indeed,	   the	   song’s	   artistic	  depictions	   are	   a	  perfect	   example	  of	  how	  education	  and	   technocratic	   specialisation	  during	   the	  Nasserist	   era	  became	  a	   ‘central	   part	   of	   the	  modernization	   project’,20	  spearheaded	   by	   the	   state	   and	   the	   public	   sector.	   As	   years	   of	  egalitarian	   education	   policies	   under	   Nasser	   bore	   fruit,	   members	   of	   ‘the	   new	   elite’,	  asserts	  Hargreaves,	  were	  to	  be	  ’the	  intellectual	  technocrats	  of	  the	  new	  military	  rulers’.21	  The	   political	   emphasis	   on	   the	   status	   of	   technocrats	   as	   the	   avant-­‐garde	   of	  society’s	   struggle	   for	   progress,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   intersection	   of	   such	   emphasis	  with	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 A complete video recording of the original song performed by Hafez onstage in Cairo can be viewed here: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ZbZSJ5G6_0. 
20 Louisa Loveluck, "Education in Egypt: Key Challenges," (London: Chatham House 2012), 4. 
21 Eleanore Hargreaves, "The Diploma Disease in Egypt: Learning, Teaching and the Monster of the Secondary 
Leaving Certificate," Assessment in Education 4, no. 1 (1997): 163. 
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very	  notion	  of	   upwards	   social	  mobility,	  was	   accompanied	  by	   a	   relative	  decline	   in	   the	  prestige	  attached	   to	  obtaining	  an	  education	   in	   foreign	  schools,	  especially	  amongst	   the	  newly	   emerging	   bureaucratic	   middle	   class	   during	   the	   Nasserist	   era.	   Immediately	  following	   the	   tripartite	  war	  with	  Britain,	   France	   and	   Israel,	   Egypt	  witnessed	   a	   nearly	  18%	  decline	  in	  the	  number	  of	  students	  enrolled	  in	  foreign	  language	  schools	  as	  British	  and	  French	  teachers	  left	  the	  country.22	  In	  the	  following	  years,	  ‘most	  foreign	  schools	  and	  colleges	   [had]	   either	   been	  nationalized	   or	   put	   under	   tight	   state	   control	   and	   forced	   to	  change	   their	   curriculum	   to	   conform	   with	   the	   government	   system’.23	  By	   1960,	   the	  number	  of	  Egyptians	  enrolled	   in	  American,	  French,	  English,	   Italian,	  and	  Greek	  schools	  	  	  had	  declined	  by	  almost	  52%	  from	  pre-­‐1956	  levels.24	  Subsequently,	  public	  education	  in	  government	   schools	   became	   more	   or	   less	   the	   norm	   amongst	   the	   expanding	   middle	  class.	  In	  this	  context,	  as	  De	  Konig	  points	  out,	  ‘a	  number	  of	  reputed	  state	  schools	  in	  Cairo	  and	  Alexandria	  came	  to	  represent	  the	  apex	  of	  learning	  in	  society.’25	  Notably,	  iconic	  state	  schools	   of	   this	   historical	   period	  were	   repeatedly	   discussed	   by	   several	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	   interviewed	   for	   this	   study	  as	  examples	  of	   state	  schools	   in	  which	   their	  parents	  or	  older	  generations	  in	  their	  families,	  unlike	  they	  or	  their	  children,	  were	  able	  to	  benefit	   from	   high	   quality	   education26.	   Examples	   of	   such	   schools	   include	   boys-­‐only	  schools	   such	   as	   al-­‐madrassa	   al-­‐Sa‘idiyya	   in	   Giza,	   near	   the	   Cairo	   University’s	   main	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Cochran, Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt, 71. 
23 Faksh, "The Consequences of the Introduction and Spread of Modern Education: Education and National 
Integration in Egypt," 47. 
24 Cochran, Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt, 71. 
25 De Konig, Global Dreams: Class, Gender, and Public Space in Cosmopolitan Cairo, 49-50. 
26 General statements on the generational shift in upper middle class schooling choices from state to private 
schools are fairly spread and have indeed been frequently expressed by upper middle class Egyptians during 
fieldwork in various contexts. More formally, this point was clearly articulated in particular by the following 
interviewees: Hisham Enan (interview, Cairo, 6 March 2010); Ahmed El Husseiny (interview, Giza, 19 
November 2009); Tarek El Alfy (interview, Cairo, 28 November 2008); Hisham Sweilam (interview, Cairo, 12 
November 2008); Mohamed Adel (interview, Sheikh Zayed City, 25 April 2009); Hisham Ezzeldin (interview, 
Cairo, 17 October 2009); Sherif El Leissy (interview, Cairo 1 July 2009); Soha Abdelaty (interview, Cairo, 16 
March 2009); and Ramy Mettias (interview, Cairo, 19 May 2009).  
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campus,	  al-­‐Urman	  in	  the	  middle-­‐class	  district	  of	  Dokki,	  or	  al-­‐Ibrahimiyya,	  located	  in	  the	  
Abbassiyya	  district,	  once	  one	  of	  the	  main	  hubs	  of	  Cairo’s	  middle	  class.	  	  In	  many	  aspects	  of	  Egypt’s	   socio-­‐economic	  and	  socio-­‐political	   evolution	  during	  the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   the	   country’s	   1967	   military	   defeat	   against	  Israel	   was	   a	   turning	   point.	   As	   far	   as	   education	   was	   concerned,	   asserts	   Cochran,	   this	  defeat	   ‘set	  back	  progress	  in	  state	  education	  development,	  as	  government	  funds	  had	  to	  be	   diverted	   to	   rebuilding	   the	   army	   and	   air	   force’. 27 	  Other	   demographic	   factors,	  especially	   population	   growth,	   also	   played	   a	   role	   in	   systematically	   undermining	   the	  state’s	  ability	  to	  provide	  quality	  public	  education	  by	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  1970s.	  By	  then,	  ‘children	   born	   in	   the	   1960s	   were	   ready	   to	   enter	   schools,	   causing	   increases	   in	   pupil-­‐teacher	  and	  pupil-­‐classroom	  rations.’28	  More	  and	  more	  poorly	  qualified	  teachers	  had	  to	  be	   hired,	   and	   the	   general	   condition	   of	   school	   facilities	   deteriorated	   as	   they	   were	  insufficiently	   equipped	   to	   cope	   with	   the	   increasing	   masses	   of	   students	   they	   had	   to	  accommodate.29	  The	  practice	  of	  public	   schools	  operating	   in	   shifts	  was	   introduced	  and	  expanded,	  especially	  in	  densely	  populated	  urban	  areas.30	  As	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   gradually	   disengaged	   from	   their	   structural	   relationship	   with	  state	  employment	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  as	  chapter	  four	  will	  describe	  in	  greater	  detail	  later	  on,	  they	  sought	  their	  social	  fortunes	  in	  the	  more	  economically	  appealing	  offerings	  of	  the	  new	   infitah	   (open	  door)	  socio-­‐economic	  environment.	  The	  prestige	  of	   the	   foreign	  and	  ‘language’	   schools	  was	   once	   again	   gradually	   restored,	   as	   they	   became	   the	   gateway	   to	  high-­‐paying	  jobs	  in	  the	  emerging	  private,	  multinational	  sector	  of	  the	  economy.	  Seeking	  private	  education	   in	   language	  and	   foreign	   schools	  became	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  upper-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Cochran, Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt, 72. 
28 Mustafa Kamal Helmy, Perspectives in Education in Modern Egypt (Cairo: Arab Republic of Egypt, 1979), 6. 
29 Hartmann, "The Informal Market of Education in Egypt: Private Tutoring and Its Implications," 21. 
30 Ghada F. Barsoum, The Employment Crisis of Female Graduates in Egypt: An Ethnographic Account, Cairo 
Papers, vol. 25 no.3 (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2004), 34. 
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middle-­‐class	  families’	  striving	  to	  enable	  their	  children	  to	  retain	  and	  preserve	  their	  social	  status.	   These	   foreign	   and	  private	   schools,	   concludes	  Cochran,	   ‘once	   again	  became	   the	  means	  of	  attaining	  higher	  economic	  and	  social	  status’.31	  The	  continuing	  deterioration	  of	  the	  public	  education	  system	  practically	  led	  to	  the	  de	   facto	   re-­‐establishment	   of	   what	   Hartmann	   describes	   as	   a	   ‘two-­‐class	   education	  system’32,	  one	  which	  in	  many	  respects	  echoed	  that	  of	  Egypt’s	  colonial	  past.	  As	  the	  socio-­‐economic	   effects	   of	   the	   infitah	   policy	   increasingly	   sharpened	   the	   lines	   of	   distinction	  between	   upper	   and	   lower	   strata	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   middle	   class,	   education	   as	   a	   tool	   of	  social	  status	  preservation	  became	  even	  more	  vital	  for	  middle	  class	  families:	  	  While	   poor	  masses	   now	  had	   to	   rely	   on	   the	   underfunded	   and	   deficient	   public	  system,	   the	   wealthier	   families	   could	   educate	   their	   children	   in	   an	   increasing	  number	   of	   private	   and	   “language	   schools”	   (madaris	   lughat),	   which	   became	   a	  prerequisite	  for	  getting	  a	  well-­‐paying	  job	  in	  the	  newly	  formed	  private	  sector.33	  	  When	  Egypt	   took	  a	  decisive	  neoliberal	   turn	  more	  than	  a	  decade	   into	  Mubarak’s	  rule	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   1990s,	   this	   trend	   accelerated.	   Over	   the	   last	   two	   decades,	  Egypt	   has	   thus	   seen	   a	   growing	   commodification	   of	   education	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	  state-­‐tolerated	  private	  education	  market.	  The	  extensive	  dependence	  on	  private	  tutoring	  to	  secure	  high	  scores	  in	  the	  vital	  thanawiyya	  ‘amma	  secondary	  school	  examinations	  has	  become	  an	  almost	  universal	  practice	  amongst	  various	  segments	  of	  the	  middle	  class.	  High	  scores	  in	  these	  examinations	  are	  the	  key	  to	  placement	  in	  one	  of	  the	  highly	  regarded	  top	  university	  faculties,	  kolliyyat	  al-­‐kimma,	  considered	  essential	   for	  career	  advancement	  in	  the	  lucrative	  private	  sector.	  An	  ever-­‐growing	  number	  of	  private	  educational	  institutions	  at	   all	   levels	   were	   established	   as	   profit-­‐making	   entities,	   from	   kindergartens	   and	  nurseries,	   to	  high	  schools	  offering	   foreign	  secondary	  school	  curricula	  and	  diplomas,	   to	  private	   universities.	   Even	   in	   public	   universities,	   which	   remained	   the	   main	   higher	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education	  destination	  for	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  youth,	  new	  lines	  of	  distinction	  were	  being	  formally	  put	  forward.	  ‘Language	  sections’,	  in	  which	  courses	  were	  designed	  according	  to	  foreign	  curricula	  and	  instruction	  was	  in	  English	  or	  French,	  were	  introduced,	  and	  offered	  in	  return	  for	  tuition	  fees.	  Galal	  Amin	  has	  accurately	  chronicled	  this	  development	  within	  the	   Egyptian	   university	   system	   as	   part	   of	   a	   wider	   pattern	   of	   institutionalising	   social	  division	   in	   Egypt’s	   society	   and	   economy.	   Such	   a	   division,	   Amin	   argues,	   is	   caused	   by	  neoliberal	  policies	  and	  deepened	  through	  the	  growing	  exposure	  to	  globalisation	  trends	  in	   the	   1990s.	   He	   points	   out	   that,	   pressured	   by	   the	   competition	   arising	   from	   newly	  established	  private	  higher	  education	  venues,	  	  [t]he	   national	   universities	   have	   reacted	   by	   succumbing	   to	   the	   temptation	   of	  accepting	   financial	   aid	   from	   some	   foreign	   countries	   and	   institutions	   to	   open	  new	   sections	   in	   several	   collages	   which	   would	   teach	  more	  modern	   syllabi,	   in	  English	   or	   French,	   and	   use	   imported	   text-­‐books.	   These	   new	   sections,	   while	  being	  subsidized	  by	   foreign	  aid,	  charge	  much	  higher	   fees	   from	  those	  students	  who	   are	   willing	   and	   able	   to	   join	   them,	   than	   paid	   by	   other	   students.	   A	   new	  divide	   is	   thus	   created	  within	  every	   college	  between	   those	  who	  can	  and	   those	  who	  cannot	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  modern	  global	  system.	  34	  	  But	   such	   encroachment	   of	   market	   mechanisms	   on	   the	   socially	   vital	   field	   of	  education	   has	   not	   been	   limited	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   privatised	   market	   catering	  primarily	  to	  the	  more	  affluent	  upper	  segments	  of	  the	  middle	  class.	  Indeed,	  Hania	  Sobhy	  has	   recently	   completed	   an	   in-­‐depth	   examination	   of	   the	   mechanisms	   of	   de-­‐facto	  privatisation	  of	  Egyptian	  public	  secondary	  schools	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  era.	  In	  conjunction	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  Mubarak’s	  son,	  Gamal,	  in	  the	  last	  few	  years	  as	  the	  political	  expression	  of	  a	   powerful	   neoliberal	   capitalist	   oligarchy,	   the	   state	   assumed	   a	   principal	   role	   in	   the	  process	  whereby	  schools	  across	  the	  system	  were	  practically	  given	  over	  to	  the	  market.35	  The	   widespread	   hegemony	   of	   a	   monstrous	   one-­‐billion-­‐pound	   industry	   of	   private	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tutoring	   at	   all	   educational	   levels,	   as	   well	   as	   other	   forms	   and	   practices	   of	   de	   facto	  privatisation	  of	  public	  education,	  led	  many	  Egyptians	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  Mubarak’s	  rule	  to	   habitually	   comment	   ‘on	   educational	   issues	   using	   the	   simple	   phrase:	  mafish	   ta‘lim:	  there	   is	  no	   education’.36	  This	  was	   a	  natural	   outcome	  of	   the	   state’s	   official	   orientation,	  reflected	   by	   Ministry	   of	   Education	   policies	   that	   boosted	   enrolment	   rates	   without	   a	  minimum	   level	   of	   adequate	   resources,	   teacher	   pay,	   teacher	   training	   or	   institutional	  support.	  The	  result,	  as	  Sobhy	  puts	  it,	  has	  been	  severely	  declining	  quality	  coupled	  with	  pervasive	  forms	  of	  corruption	  and	  extralegal	  practices,	  and	  the	  eventual	  desire	  to	  displace	  the	  system	  and	  its	  problems	  unto	  the	  citizens	  via	  various	  forms	  or	  tracking	  and	  privatizations.37	  	  Even	  formally	  ventured	  attempts	  under	  Mubarak	  to	  reform	  the	  education	  sector,	  while	   supported	  by	  generous	   funding	   from	  the	  USAID	  and	   the	  World	  Bank,38	  failed	   to	  restore	   public	   education	   as	   a	   valid	   and	   satisfactory	   venue	   of	   social	   mobility	   for	   the	  wider	  segments	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  in	  general	  and	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  in	  particular.	  The	  UNDP-­‐commissioned	  Egypt	  Human	  Development	  Report	  of	  2010	  touched	  upon	  the	  failure	   of	   the	   public	   education	   system	   to	   fulfil	   this	   function	   in	   recent	   years.	   Most	  notably,	  it	  underlined	  that	  the	  public	  education	  system	  was	  no	  longer	  fit	  for	  its	  purpose,	  in	   terms	   of	   its	   provision	   of	   the	   needed	   credentials	   for	   an	   employment	   market	  increasingly	  controlled	  by	  competitive	  free	  market	  dynamics:	  The	  demand	  for	  skills	  is	  probably	  increasingly	  as	  rapidly	  in	  Egypt	  as	  it	  is	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  world	   in	  response	  to	  globalization	  and	  technological	  change,	  but	   the	  question	   is	  whether	  the	  Egyptian	  education	  system	  is	  supplying	  these	  skills	  to	  the	  labor	  market.	  For	  decades	  the	  majority	  of	  educated	  workers	  in	  Egypt	  were	  headed	  for	  employment	  in	   the	   public	   sector	  where	  what	  mattered	   to	   get	   a	   job	  was	   not	   one’s	   skill	   level	   but	  one’s	   formal	   credentials.	   Responding	   to	   the	   signals	   they	   obtained	   from	   the	   labor	  market,	  parents	   strove	   to	  obtain	   these	  credentials	   for	   their	   children	  by	   investing	   in	  their	   ability	   to	   pass	   official	   exams	   and	   get	   degrees.	   The	   educational	   system	   in	   turn	  was	  shaped	  over	  many	  years	  by	  the	  same	  goal	  of	  maximizing	  the	  number	  of	  students	  it	  graduates	  at	  all	   levels,	  with	  little	  emphasis	  on	  what	  skills	  are	  actually	  learned	  and	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38 For a detailed outline of the programs and schemes through which this funding was channeled, see Cochran, 
Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt, Chapter 9, "Educational Reform with United States of America 
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how	   useful	   these	   skills	   are	   to	   the	   private	   job	   market.	   Now	   that	   government	  employment	   has	   been	   curtailed,	   Egypt	   continues	   to	   be	   saddled	   by	   an	   educational	  system	  that	  produces	  large	  number	  of	  degrees	  with	  limited	  value	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  labor	  market.39	  	  Towards	   the	   end	   of	   the	  Mubarak	   era,	   lower	   segments	   of	   the	   Egyptian	  middle	  class	  were	   left	   to	   negotiate	   the	   hardships	   resulting	   from	   the	   state’s	   growing	   leniency	  towards	   encroaching	   market	   mechanisms	   and	   the	   de-­‐facto	   privatisation	   of	   public	  education.	   As	   far	   as	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   was	   concerned,	   one	   might	   argue	   that	   a	  negotiation	   of	   a	   different	   kind	   was	   taking	   place.	   Rather	   than	   negotiating	   the	   ailing	  public	   or	   quality	   lacking	   lower-­‐private	   education	   sectors,	   the	  upper	  middle	   class	  was	  facing	   the	   full-­‐fledged	   forces	   of	   the	   formally	   privatised	   segment	   of	   the	   education	  market.	  Whereas	  thin	  threads	  of	  a	  damaged	  social	  contract	  still	  connected	  the	  state	  and	  the	  lower	  segments	  of	  the	  middle	  class,	  such	  connections	  were	  long	  gone	  for	  the	  upper	  middle	  class.	  In	  clear	  contrast	  with	  the	  1960s,	  the	  opportunities	  for	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  youth	   to	   preserve	   their	   social	   class	   status	   by	   seeking	   suitable	   and	   rewarding	  employment	  became	   increasingly	   tied	   to	  obtaining	   a	   foreign	  high	   school	   education	   in	  the	  upper	  segment	  of	  the	  education	  market.	  ‘Preuniversity	  language	  school	  trajectories’,	  observes	   De	   Konig,	   ‘have	   become	   decisive	   for	   chances	   in	   Cairo’s	   segmented	   labour	  market,	  and	  have	  become	  important	  markers	  of	  social	  distinction’.40	  These	  trajectories	  have	   indeed	   become	   an	   indispensable	   accreditation	   of	   social	   distinction,	   and	   an	  essential	   qualification	   in	   the	   search	   for	   a	   suitable	   place	   in	   the	   higher	   echelons	   of	   the	  employment	   market.	   As	   the	   Egyptian	   economy	   has	   been	   steered	   towards	   a	  predominantly	   neoliberal	   course	   of	   transformation	   in	   the	   last	   two	   decades,	   today’s	  Egyptian	   upper	   middle	   class	   finds	   itself	   more	   than	   ever	   in	   need	   of	   high	   quality	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 "Egypt Human Development Report 2010: Youth in Egypt, Building Our Future,"  (Cairo: United Nations 
Development Program, National Institute of Planning-Egypt, 2010), 156. 
40 De Konig, Global Dreams: Class, Gender, and Public Space in Cosmopolitan Cairo, 51. 
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education	   to	   secure	   employment	   in	   an	   increasingly	   demanding,	   globalist	   and	  competitive	  labour	  market.	  With	  the	  social	  role	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  provider	  of	  acceptable	  education	  alternatives	  having	  gradually	  diminished,	   the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  search	   for	  cultural	  capital	  is	  increasingly	  engulfed	  in	  the	  many	  nuances	  of	  negotiating	  the	  private	  education	  market.	  
3.	  The	  ‘Marketisation’	  of	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  Education	  
3.1	  	  Marketing	  Distinction:	  ‘International’	  and	  ‘Semi-­‐International’	  Schools	  The	   migration	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   upper	   middle	   class	   to	   private	   education,	   or	   to	  educational	   venues	   less	   inclined	   to	   suffer	   the	  decline	   in	  quality	   standards	   seen	   in	   the	  state-­‐provided	  education	  system,	  is	  part	  of	  a	  more	  global	  trend.	  Lynch	  and	  Moran	  argue	  that	   since	   the	   1980s,	   the	   international	   educational	   landscape	   has	   witnessed	   an	  ‘interrelated	   drive	   to	   increase	   choice,	   raise	   standards	   and	   shift	   control	   from	   the	  bureaucratic	   school	   to	   the	   sovereign	   consume’.	   Such	   a	   shift,	   they	   point	   out,	   is	   to	   be	  regarded	  as	   ‘representative	  of	  a	  broader	  political	  shift	  to	  the	  right,	  where	  a	  distinctive	  neo-­‐liberal	   interpretation	  of	   fairness	  and	  efficiency	  based	  on	   the	  moral	  might	  and	   the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  market	  has	  taken	  root’.41	  Similarly,	   the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class’	  reliance	   on	   private	   education	   as	   a	   pivotal	   tool	   for	   social	   re-­‐production	   must	   be	  contextualised	  within	  the	  broader	  process	  of	  disengagement	  from	  state-­‐provided	  social	  services	   that	   began	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1970s.	   However,	   such	   parallels	   to	   the	   increasingly	  dominant	  neoliberal	  social	  logic	  in	  the	  West	  should	  be	  also	  approached	  with	  some	  care.	  The	  indirect	  and	  gradually	  accumulating	  political	  effect	  of	  the	  state’s	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  social	  arena	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  generally	  and	  in	  Egypt	  specifically	  must	  be	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41 Kathleen Lynch and Marie Moran, "Markets, Schools and the Convertibility of Economic Capital: The 
Complex Dynamics of Class Choice," British Journal of Sociology of Education 27, no. 2 (2006): 221. 
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in	   light	  of	  the	  state’s	  adoption	  of	  neoliberalism	  as	  a	  political	  survival	  project	  since	  the	  1970s.	  As	  previously	  argued,	  neoliberalism	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  context	  must	  be	  understood	  as	   a	   historical	   context	   in	   which	   the	   foundations	   of	   a	   longstanding	   social	   contract	  between	   the	   state	   and	   the	  middle	   class	   deteriorated	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   corresponding	  political	  change.	  Therefore,	  unlike	   in	  the	  Western	  context,	   the	  ramifications	  of	   the	  on-­‐going,	   aggressive	   neoliberalisation	   of	   social	   services	   need	   to	   be	   appreciated	   for	   their	  formative	  consequences,	  not	  only	  on	  traditional	  approaches	  to	  social	  provision,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  very	  foundations	  of	  the	  political	  order	  in	  the	  country.	  	  	  Statistically,	  official	  or	  reliable	  data	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  private	  school	  and	  higher-­‐education	   market	   in	   contemporary	   Egypt	   is	   scarce	   and	   scattered,	   as	   is	   specific	   data	  regarding	   various	   stratifications	   within	   that	   market.	   An	   estimation	   by	   the	   British	  Council	   in	  Cairo,	   for	  example,	  states	  that	  the	  number	  of	  private	  schools	   in	  the	  country	  hovers	   around	   4,000.42	  Hartman	   records	   that	   while	   in	   2003/04,	   combined	   basic	   and	  secondary	  enrolment	  in	  Egypt	  had	  reached	  90%,	  only	  7%	  of	  those	  pupils	  were	  enrolled	  in	   private	   schools	   or	   madaris	   khassa,	   while	   the	   rest	   were	   enrolled	   in	   state-­‐run	   or	  religious	  Al	  Azhar	  schools.43	  	  More	  recently,	  another	  source	  estimated	  that	  around	  8%	  of	   all	   pupils	   in	   Egypt	   were	   enrolled	   in	   private	   schools.44	  In	   higher	   education,	   data	  published	  by	   the	  Egyptian	  Ministry	   of	  Higher	  Education	   indicates	   that	   the	  number	   of	  private	  universities	  operating	  in	  the	  country	  reached	  seventeen	  in	  2013.45	  In	  2007,	  an	  estimated	  50,000	  students	  were	  enrolled	  in	  privately	  owned	  and	  run	  universities,	  many	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 http://www.britishcouncil.org/learning-skills-for-employability-egyptian-education.htm, accessed 15 
February 2013.  
43 Hartmann, "The Informal Market of Education in Egypt: Private Tutoring and Its Implications," 23. 
44 Sarah Elmeshad, "Egypt's School System: Taking a Look at Schools, Their Cerricula, and Accreditation," 
Egypt Independent, 5 October 2012. http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-school-system-taking-
look-schools-their-curricula-and-accreditation, accessed 15 February 2013.    
45 http://www.egy-mhe.gov.eg/private-universities accessed 11 November 2013. 
	  153	  
of	  which	  boasted	  of	  partnerships	  with	  institutions	  in	  Europe	  and	  North	  America.46	  Far	  from	  being	  an	  accredited	  reflection	  of	  the	  size	  of	  the	  private	  education	  market	  in	  today's	  Egypt,	   these	   figures	   are	   nonetheless	   a	  meaningful	   indicator	   of	   the	   strong	  presence	   of	  such	  a	  market.	  This	  market	  caters	  primarily	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  an	  ever-­‐growing	  sector	  of	  the	  middle	  class,	  for	  whom	  state-­‐provided	  education	  is	  –	  	  and	  has	  indeed	  been	  for	  quite	  some	  time	  –	  no	  longer	  sufficient	  to	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  providing	  the	  quality	  education	  necessary	   for	   the	   preservation	   of	   social	   class	   position	   or	   for	   the	   enhancement	   of	  opportunities	  for	  upward	  social	  mobility.	  The	  importance	  of	  education	  as	  a	  social	  field	  for	   the	  acquisition	  and	  preservation	  of	   social	  and	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status	   is	   further	  highlighted	  by	   the	   existence	  of	   even	   sharper	   suitability	   criteria	  within	   the	  market	   for	  private	   schools.	  Whereas	   being	   'private'	   –	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   is	   not	   state-­‐run	   –	   is	   a	  prerequisite	  for	  a	  suitable	  school,	  different	  layers	  of	  distinction	  within	  this	  rather	  broad	  category	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  determining	  school	  destinations	  sought	  by	  upper	  middle	  class	   families.	   As	   Hartman	   asserts,	   ‘lower-­‐level	   private	   schools	   usually	   do	   not	   differ	  much	   from	   the	   public	   system’,	   except	   in	   their	   smaller-­‐sized	   classes	   and	   the	   slightly	  better	   condition	   of	   their	   buildings	   and	   facilities.	   A	   higher	   category	   of	   private	  educational	  destinations,	  which	  are	  primarily	  popular	  amongst	  the	   lower	  strata	  of	   the	  urban	   middle	   class,	   are	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘language	   schools’,	   which	   focus	   on	   enhanced	  language	  training,	  usually	  in	  English	  or	  French.47	  For	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians,	   however,	   not	   every	   'private’	   school	   is	  currently	   synonymous	   with	   satisfactory	   education.	   Since	   the	   early	   1990s,	   famous	  traditional	   Cairo	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   French,	   English	   and	  German	   schools48	  have	   been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 http://www.britishcouncil.org/learning-skills-for-employability-egyptian-education.htm, accessed 15 
February 2013. 
47 Hartmann, "The Informal Market of Education in Egypt: Private Tutoring and Its Implications," 23. 
48 Examples of renowned upper-middle-class schools traditionally included: the French College de la Sainte 
Famille and College de la Salle for boys, Sacre Coeur and Mere de Dieu for girls; the German mixed Deutsche 
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joined	   by	   a	   new	   breed	   of	   so-­‐called	   international	   and	   semi-­‐international	   schools	   in	  catering	   to	   the	   upper	   middle	   class’	   segment	   of	   the	   private	   education	   market.	   These	  schools,	  usually	  set	  up	  as	  investment	  companies,	  are	  more	  attuned	  to	  newer	  versions	  of	  the	   combined	   demand	   for	   social	   distinction	   as	  well	   as	   academic	   quality	   amongst	   the	  upper	  middle	  class.	  As	  such,	  most	  of	  them	  are	  ‘equipped	  with	  such	  luxury	  amenities	  as	  swimming	   pools,	   state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   computer	   labs	   and	   modern	   cafeterias,	   catering	   to	  upper	  classes	  living	  in	  the	  new	  upscale	  urban	  communities	  on	  the	  outskirts	  of	  Cairo’.49	  Some	  of	  these	  schools	  have	  also	  capitalised	  on	  the	  desire	  of	  some	  segments	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	   class	   to	   project	   displays	   of	   a	   neo-­‐liberalised	   brand	   of	   socio-­‐religious	   Islamic	  identity	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades.	  They	  provide	  the	  same	  level	  of	  material	  distinction,	  albeit	  with	  a	  considerably	  increased	  ‘Islamic’	  component,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  curricula	  and	  everyday	   collective	   school	   activities,	   such	   as	   obligatory	   observance	   of	   prayers,	  adherence	  to	  conservative	  dress	  codes	  for	  both	  pupils	  and	  staff,	  and	  an	  almost-­‐complete	  gender	  separation.50	  	  It	   is	   perhaps	   no	   coincidence	   that	   many	   of	   the	   most	   popular	   schools	   in	   this	  category	  are	  located	  in	  the	  western	  and	  eastern	  urban	  extensions	  of	  the	  Greater	  Cairo	  Area	  in	  the	  new	  towns	  of	  New	  Cairo,	  Sixth	  of	  October	  City	  and	  Sheikh	  Zayed	  City.	  These	  urban	   extensions,	   populated	   primarily	   by	   affluent	   and	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians,	  have,	   since	   the	   mid	   1990s,	   become	   urban	   spaces	   in	   which	   the	   lifestyle	   (and,	   more	  broadly,	   the	   social	   identity)	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   upper	   and	   upper	   middle	   classes	   have	  undergone	  a	  multifaceted	  process	  of	  re-­‐production.	  This	  point	  will	  be	  elaborated	  upon	  in	   chapter	   five.	   For	   the	   moment,	   in	   this	   context	   it	   is	   essential	   to	   point	   out	   how	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Evangelische Oberschule (DEO) and the girls-only Deutsche Schule der Borromaerinnen (DSB) in Cairo and 
Alexandria; The English Manor House, Misr Language, and Dar Al-Tarbiah. 
49 Hartmann, "The Informal Market of Education in Egypt: Private Tutoring and Its Implications," 23. 
50 See: Linda Herrera, "Islamization and Education: Between Politics, Profit, and Pluralism," in Arab Schooling: 
Critical Ethnographies from Egypt, ed. Linda Herrera and Carlos Alberto Torres (Albany: State University of 
New York  Press, 2006). 
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geographical	  concentration	  of	  educational	  venues	  popular	  with	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  in	   these	   parts	   of	   Greater	   Cairo	   draws	   a	   telling	   connection	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   these	  areas	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  as	  social	  safe	  havens	  or	  class-­‐cohesive	  enclaves	  for	  the	  upper	  middle	  class.	  Typically,	   word	   of	  mouth,	   shared	   experiences	   and	   subjective	   narratives	   about	  school	  reputations,	  as	  well	  as	  informal	  ratings	  by	  peers	  in	  the	  social	  circuit,	  remain	  the	  primary	  sources	  of	  information	  regarding	  school	  choices	  amongst	  today’s	  upper	  middle	  class51.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   some	   resources	   are	   available	   to	   those	  who	   seek	   to	   explore	  schooling	   options	   in	   this	   sector	   of	   the	   educational	   system.	   Notwithstanding	   the	  continued	   supremacy	   of	   these	   informal	   ratings	   in	   guiding	   school	   allocation	   decisions	  amongst	   the	   upper	   middle	   class,	   the	   projected	   images	   of	   these	   schools	   can	   also	  sometimes	   play	   a	   secondary	   role	   in	   this	   regard.	   International	   and	   semi-­‐international	  schools	   usually	   have	   marketing	   specialists	   amongst	   their	   staff,	   who	   supervise	   the	  schools’	   strategies	   for	   attracting	   parents	   searching	   for	   schooling	   options,	   including	  organising	  so-­‐called	  ‘open-­‐day’	  events	  and	  guided	  tours	  of	  the	  schools’	  facilities.	  Official	   school	   websites	   featuring	   visual	   and	   audio	   materials	   about	   student	  bodies,	  facilities	  and	  school	  cultures	  project	  an	  image	  of	  social	  and	  academic	  distinction.	  For	   example,	   an	   online	   visitor	   to	   the	   website	   of	   the	   ‘American	   International	   School’	  (AIS),	   one	  of	   the	  most	  highly	   regarded	  private	   schools	   amongst	   today’s	  upper	  middle	  class,	  would	  be	  greeted	  by	  a	  message	  clearly	  aimed	  at	  conveying	  an	  image	  of	  the	  school	  as	   a	   venue	   for	   the	   acquisition	  of	   cosmopolitan	   credentials.	   ‘A	   tradition	  of	   educational	  excellence’	   guarantees	   the	   school’s	   fulfilment	   of	   its	   mission	   to	   provide	   prospective	  students	  with	  ‘a	  comprehensive	  and	  challenging	  American	  and	  international	  education	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 The reference to word of mouth and peer-generated ratings as valuable inputs to interviewees’ appraisals of 
educational institutions was an indicatively repeated observation during both formal interviews conducted for 
this study, as well as in more informal encounters and interactions during fieldwork.  
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that	   fosters	   informed	   and	   engaged	   local,	   regional	   and	  global	   citizenship’.52	  The	   slogan	  greeting	   visitors	   of	   the	   webpage	   of	   ‘The	   International	   School	   of	   Egypt’,	   on	   the	   other	  hand,	  is	  keen	  to	  convey	  the	  international	  aspect	  clearly	  emphasised	  by	  the	  school’s	  very	  name,	  yet	  with	  a	  touch	  of	  originality.	  It	  suggests	  that	  the	  school	  is	  home	  to	  ‘guardians	  of	  the	   legacy’.	   In	   her	   message	   to	   visitors	   of	   the	   page,	   Ellen	   Griffiths,	   the	   headmistress,	  promises	  parents	   that	   the	   school	  will	   help	   ‘prepare	   [their	   students]	   to	   face	   the	  many	  challenges	   of	   a	   rapidly	   changing	   world’	   by	   placing	   special	   importance	   on	   the	  development	   of	   lifelong	   skills	   for	   pupils,	   including	   creativity,	   independence	   and	  curiosity,	   to	   help	   them	   ‘realize	   their	   full	   potential’.	   Importantly,	   her	   message	   to	  prospective	  parents	   includes	  an	  open	   invitation	   to	  visit	   the	  school’s	  modern	  premises	  and	   see	   its	   ‘completed	   Auditorium,	   gym,	   swimming	   pool,	   and	   cafeteria’.53	  A	   similar	  sense	  of	   internationalism	  combined	  with	   local	  authenticity	   is	  portrayed	  by	   the	   ‘Maadi	  British	  International	  School’,	  which	  describes	  itself	  on	  its	  webpage	  with	  the	  phrase,	  ‘an	  international	  community	  in	  a	  unique	  place’,	  written	  against	  a	  background	  picture	  of	  the	  Giza	   Pyramids.54	  In	   some	   cases	   in	   which	   promotional	   material	   is	   less	   commercially	  toned,	   schools	   demonstrate	   their	   academic	   standards	   by	   emphasising	   their	  accreditation	   from	   foreign	   educational	   institutions	   or	   authorities.	   The	   ‘Canadian	  International	   School	   of	   Egypt’,	   established	   in	   2002	   and	   located	   in	   Kattamiyya	   in	   the	  eastern	  extension	  of	  the	  capital,	  for	  example,	  boasts	  of	  its	  accreditation	  by	  the	  ‘Canadian	  Bureau	   of	   International	   Education	   (CBIE)’.	   The	   latter	   is	   an	   organisation	   ‘whose	  membership	  is	  made	  up	  of	  over	  200	  Universities,	  Colleges	  and	  District	  School	  Boards	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 http://www.aisegypt.com/,	  accessed	  11	  November	  2013. 
53 http://www.isegypt.org/index.php/about-­‐ise/message-­‐from-­‐the-­‐head-­‐of-­‐school,	  accessed	  11	  November	  2013 
54 http://mbisegypt.com/,	  accessed	  11	  November	  2013. 
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Canada’	  and	  which	  is	  said	  to	  provide	  ‘expertise	  in	  the	  modifications	  and	  additions	  to	  the	  facility	  to	  ensure	  that	  CISE	  is	  a	  world-­‐class	  school’.55	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  official	  school	  websites	  (which	  are	  naturally	  inclined	  to	  present	  a	  self-­‐projected	   image	   of	   social	   exclusivity	   and	   academic	   excellence),	   other	   online	  directories	   that	   list	   available	   international	   and	   semi-­‐international	   education	  destinations	   are	   also	   available.	  The	  website	   ‘egyptian-­‐schools.com’,	   for	   example,	   is	   an	  online	  portal	  with	  listings	  for	  many	  private	  nurseries,	  schools	  and	  universities	  located	  in	  Cairo.	  Notably,	  most	  of	  the	  listings	  of	  nurseries	  and	  schools	  featured	  on	  the	  website	  are	  located	  in	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  urban	  expansions	  of	  Cairo	  and	  Giza,	  such	  as	  Al-­‐Rehab	  
City,	   a	   private	   development	   adjacent	   to	   the	   Cairo-­‐Suez	   Road,	   or	   Al-­‐Shuruq,	   a	  government-­‐planned	  new	  town	  to	  the	  east	  of	  Cairo.	  The	  latter	  is	  primarily	  composed	  of	  land-­‐slots	  acquired	  and	  privately	  developed	  by	  middle-­‐class	  families	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades.	   Almost	   all	   other	   listings	   are	   located	   in	   traditionally	  middle-­‐class	   and	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  areas	  of	  Greater	  Cairo,	  such	  as	  Mohandessin,	  Maadi	  and	  Helipololis.	   In	  the	  section	   titled	   ‘About	   Us’,	   which	   details	   the	   website’s	   mission,	   its	   creators	   describe	  themselves	   as	   a	   ‘small	   group	   of	   people	   (Lawyers/Engineers/School	  Teachers/Accountants)’,	  who	  aim	  to	  provide	  parents	  with	  a	  better	  chance	   to	  make	  an	  informed	   choice	   about	   their	   children’s	   education,	   ‘because	   nowadays	   there	   are	  many	  choices	  and	  we	  must	  be	  careful	  in	  selecting	  the	  future	  of	  our	  kids’.56	  	  
3.2	  Shopping	  for	  Education:	  School	  Fairs	  Another	   format	   of	   marketing	   private	   education	   venues	   for	   prospective	   upper	  middle	   class	   families	   is	   the	   so-­‐called	   'school	   fair'.	   These	   are	   exhibitions	   organised	   by	  professional	  PR	  firms,	  usually	  held	  in	  one	  of	  Cairo’s	  five-­‐star	  hotels	  or	  other	  venues	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 http://cise-egypt.com/mod/resource/view.php?id=4, accessed 11 November 2013. 
56 http://egyptian-schools.com/en/about/, accessed 20 February 2013.  
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a	   typically	   consumerist	   character,	   such	   as	  major	   shopping	  malls.	   Private	   schools	   and	  universities	  are	  on	  display	  for	  visiting	  prospective	  customers	  from	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  families.	   Participating	   institutions	   rent	   booths,	   which	   they	   colourfully	   decorate	   with	  pictures,	   posters	   and	   other	   advertising	   materials	   presenting	   their	   facilities,	   curricula	  and	   services.	   Usually,	   some	  members	   of	   the	   institution’s	   teaching	   and	   administration	  staff	  are	  present	  to	  engage	  visitors	  and	  respond	  to	  their	  queries	  about	  courses,	  diploma,	  teaching	   methods,	   and	   (not	   least	   importantly)	   costs	   and	   the	   financial	   aspects	   of	  attending.	  Parents	  can	  also	  fill	  out	  applications	  for	  admission	  to	  schools	  and	  register	  for	  promotional	   events	   organised	   by	   schools	   to	   attract	   families	   with	   the	   ‘right’	   social	  profile.	  	  In	  general,	  young	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  families	  who	  visit	  these	  exhibitions	  as	  part	  of	  their	  search	  for	  education	  and	  schooling	  options	  for	  their	  children	  are	  by	  no	  means	  strangers	   to	   this	   format.	   In	   recent	   years,	   the	   format	   of	   'the	   fair'	   has	   evolved	   into	   a	  regular	   occurrence	   in	   various	   other	   fields	   essential	   to	  middle	   class	   status	   acquisition	  and	   reproduction.	   Over	   the	   past	   two	   decades,	   'employment	   fairs’,	   for	   example,	   have	  been	  a	  regular	  feature	  of	  the	  high-­‐end	  job	  market.	  They	  have	  been	  widely	  used	  by	  major	  private-­‐sector	   employers,	   such	   as	   multinational	   corporations,	   as	   recruitment-­‐pooling	  events	  for	  new	  cadres	  required	  for	  their	  expanding	  operations	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  market.	  Similarly,	  	  the	  boom	  of	  private	  real	  estate	  developments	  in	  the	  new	  urban	  extensions	  of	  Greater	  Cairo	  has	  prompted	  multiple	  versions	  of	  those	  fairs	  for	  the	  marketing	  of	  gated	  compounds	   to	   prospective	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   entrants	   into	   the	   property	  market,	   or,	  indeed,	   to	   those	   seeking	   a	   calculated	   escape	   from	   Cairo's	   deteriorating	   older	  middle	  class	  quarters	  (this	  latter	  phenomenon	  will	  be	  subject	  to	  more	  analysis	  in	  chapter	  five).	  School	  fairs	  as	  one-­‐stop	  education	  supermarkets	  targeting	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  families	  are	   thus	   but	   another	   articulation	   of	   a	   wider	   culture	   of	   a	   growing	   'marketisation'	   of	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typical	   social	   arenas	   of	   middle	   class	   status	   reproduction.	   The	   facilitation	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   status	   reproduction	  via	   consumerist	  practices	  has	   indeed	  been	  a	  distinct	  feature	  of	  Egypt's	  neoliberal	  transformation	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades.	  	  ‘Madrasty’	  (My	  School),	   for	   example,	   is	   a	   commercial	   school	   fair	   that	  has	  been	  organised	  twelve	  times	  since	  2003.57	  In	  2012,	  the	  self-­‐proclaimed	  education	  ‘expo’	  was	  set	  up	  under	  an	  ad-­‐hoc	  tent	  in	  the	  vast	  parking	  space	  of	  the	  ‘Maadi	  City	  Centre’,	  home	  to	  one	   of	   Cairo’s	   largest	   shopping	   malls	   that	   caters	   to	   the	   adjacent	   affluent	   districts	   of	  
Maadi,	  Kattamiyya	  and	  Digla	   in	   the	  eastern	  part	  of	   the	  capital	  (Figure	  1).	   In	  2013,	   the	  exhibition	  took	  place	   inside	   ‘Danddy	  Mall’,	  another	  major	  shopping	  centre	  serving	  the	  western	  urban	  extensions	  of	  Cairo	  and	   the	  gated	   compounds	  of	   the	  Sheikh	  Zayed	   and	  
Sixth	   of	   October	   cities.	   It	   is	   situated	   next	   to	   the	   ‘Smart	   Village’,	   the	   IT	   Park	   and	   pet	  project	   of	   the	   Ahmed	   Nazif	  government.	   Both	   malls	   are	  home	  to	  flagship	  branches	  of	  the	  French	   hypermarket	   retailer	  chain	  ‘Carrefour’,	  multiple-­‐screen	  cinema	   complexes,	   stores	   selling	  
international	   consumer	   brands,	  and	   Western-­‐style	   cafes	   and	  upmarket	  restaurants.	  Such	  venues	  for	  organising	  the	  school	  fairs	  are	  chosen	  carefully	  to	  attract	  and	  target	  potential	  customers	  amongst	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  families.	  Indeed,	  they	  are	  perfectly	  suited	  to	  this	  goal,	  as	  frequent	  visits	  to	  these	  neoliberal	  era	  temples	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Information and descriptions in this section are based on promotional materials produced by the organisers of 
the fair and posted to their pages on the social networking websites Facebook.com and Youtube.com: 
https://www.facebook.com/MadrastyExpo/; https://www.youtube.com/user/madrasty1/videos (both accessed 
several times between July and December 2013).  
Figure	  1:	  School	  exhibitors	  and	  visitors	  in	  the	  Madrasty	  
Exhibition,	  Cairo	  March	  2012.	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upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   consumerism,	   and	   spending	   considerable	   portions	   of	   leisure	   time	  there,	   has	   become	   an	   essential	   part	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   lifestyle	   in	   Egypt	   in	   recent	  years.	   Materials	  displayed	  at	   the	  busy	  booths	  of	   the	  schools	  participating	   in	   the	  ninth	  version	   of	   the	   Madrasty	   exhibition58	  clearly	   reflected	   the	   participating	   institutions’	  desire	   to	   project	   an	   image	   emphasising	   an	   international	   aspect	   –	   or,	   perhaps	   more	  accurately,	   an	   intentional	  discursive	  separation	   from	  an	   image	  of	   localism.	  Other	   than	  two	   of	   the	   participating	   22	   institutions,	   school	   names	   notably	   evoking	   a	   sense	   of	  originality	   and	   authenticity:	   such	   as	   ‘Al-­‐Kamal’	   (Perfection),	   or	   ‘Amjad’	   (Glories)	   are	  usually	   followed	   by	   the	   explanatory	   terms	   ‘international-­‐’	   or	   ‘language	   school’.	   The	  names,	  all	  of	  which	  were	  printed	   in	  Latin	   letters,	  are	  designed	   to	  appeal	   to	  an	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   audience	   increasingly	   searching	   for	   locally	   flavoured	   versions	   of	  international-­‐standard	  education	  that	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  failures	  of	  the	  non-­‐commercial	   education	   system.	   To	   that	   effect,	   most	   of	   the	   audio-­‐visual	   promotional	  materials	   displayed	   in	   various	   booths	   of	   participating	   schools	   constantly	   broadcasted	  pictures	  of	  children	  happily	  playing	  on	  school	  premises,	   taking	  part	   in	  extracurricular	  activities,	   or	   sitting	   in	   tidy	   and	   smart	   classrooms,	   projecting	   an	   image	   of	   academic	  excellence.	   Another	   important	   element	   of	   the	   symbolism	   of	   school	   names	   projects	   a	  tempting	  promise	  for	  future	  excellence	  and	  distinction:	  Names	  such	  as	  ‘Stars	  Language	  School’,	   ‘Rowad	   El	   Mostaqbal’	   (pioneers	   of	   the	   future),	   and	   ‘Manarat	   El	   Mostaqbal’	  (Beacons	  of	  the	  Future)	  arguably	  indirectly	  attempt	  to	  appeal	  to	  a	  deeply-­‐rooted	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   aspiration	   for	   social-­‐status	   reproduction	   through	   excellence	   and	  distinction	  in	  education.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Held in ‘Maadi City Centre’ from 8-10 March 2012. Description based on the Promotional Video for the 9th 
Madrasty School Fair: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fhqe_dcw6Tk, accessed on 23 August 2013. 
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4.	  The	  Case	  of	  Aliaa	  Abulnaga:	  Agency,	  Structure	  and	  Status	  
Reproduction	  in	  the	  Neoliberal	  Education	  Market	  	   The	  following	  case	  of	  ‘Aliaa	  Abulnaga’59	  will	  demonstrate	  two	  significant	  aspects	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  Egyptian	  education	  market.	  First,	  it	  testifies	  to	  the	  typical	  importance	  traditionally	  placed	  by	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  on	  education	  as	  a	  main	  tool	  for	  the	  retention	   and	   generational	   transferral	   of	   class	   status.	   Aliaa’s	   recollection	   of	   her	   own	  school	  years	  and	  her	  experience	  at	  university	  as	  defining	   for	  her	  self-­‐perceived	  social	  identity	  and	  position	  in	  the	  social	  structure	  helps	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  significance	  that	  she	   and	  other	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  place	  on	   education	   as	   a	   tool	   of	   social	   re-­‐production	   in	   today’s	  Egypt.	  These	  past	   experiences	  mostly	   took	  place	   in	   a	   structural	  environment	   in	   which	   the	   state’s	   role	   had	   not	   yet	   completely	   given	   way	   to	   the	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  market.	   In	  today’s	  setting,	  Aliaa’s	  generation	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	   increasingly	   faces	   the	   challenge	   of	   negotiating	   a	   fundamentally	   different	  structural	  environment	  with	  almost	  no	  state	  involvement	  to	  help	  secure	  paths	  for	  status	  reproduction.	  	  	  Secondly,	   Aliaa’s	   narrative	   of	   her	   experience	   searching	   for	   a	   school	   for	   her	  children	   demonstrates	   some	   of	   the	   challenges	   and	   subjectivities	   generated	   by	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   social	   agency	   in	   the	   predominantly	   neoliberal	   structural	   environment.	  Although	  several	  interviewees	  with	  similar	  experiences	  echoed	  many	  aspects	  of	  Aliaa’s	  narrative	   in	   the	   course	   of	   this	   research,	   Aliaa’s	   is	   an	   in-­‐depth	   demonstration	   of	   the	  dialectical	   constitution	  of	  modes	  of	   agency	  within	  a	  web	  of	   structural	   relations	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Unless otherwise cited or indicated, all the information in this section about Aliaa Abulnaga and her family, 
including direct quotes have been obtained through two interview sessions conducted with her on 7 and 10 
August 2010. 
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life	  of	  a	  typical	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptian.60	  Aliaa’s	  narrative	  was	  acquired	  through	  a	  semi-­‐structured	   interview,	   conducted	   over	   two	   sessions	   and	   further	   follow-­‐up	  communications.	  
4.1	  Producing	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  Status	  in	  Changing	  Times	  Born	   to	   a	   typical	   1960s	   bureaucratic	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   couple,	   Aliaa	   is	   a	  middle-­‐ranked	  diplomat	  at	  the	  Egyptian	  foreign	  ministry,	  one	  of	  the	  few	  public	  service	  occupations	   still	   widely	   regarded	   as	   prestigious	   and	   demanding	   cultural	   capital	  typically	  attached	  to	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status.	  Her	  late	  father,	  who	  descended	  from	  a	  merchant	  family,	  spent	  his	  formative	  years	  in	  a	  public	  school.	  He	  graduated	  from	  Cairo	  University	   in	   the	   late	   1950s	   and	   obtained	   a	   PhD	   in	   chemistry	   from	   an	   East	   German	  institution.	   Starting	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1960s,	   Mr.	   Abulnaga’s	   career	   in	   the	   petroleum	   sector	  saw	  him	  ascending	  to	  several	  positions	  in	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  the	  publicly	  owned	  Misr	  
Petroleum’s	  management,	  including	  those	  of	  CEO	  and	  board	  member.	  He	  then	  went	  on	  to	  head	  another	  major	  public	  sector	  petroleum	  company,	  Cooperation	  Petroleum.	  A	  few	  years	  before	   reaching	   retirement	   age,	   he	   chose	   to	   end	  his	   tenure	   in	   the	  public	   sector	  and	  established	  a	  private	  company	  called	  ‘Alexandria	  for	  Petroleum	  Additives’,	  albeit	  in	  close	  coordination	  with	  the	  Minister	  of	  Petroleum	  at	  the	  time.	  Aliaa’s	  mother,	  a	  public-­‐school	   and	   Cairo	   University	   graduate	   with	   a	   degree	   in	   chemistry,	   spent	   most	   of	   her	  career	   in	   the	   pharmaceutical	   sector,	   another	   major	   publicly-­‐owned	   industry	   in	   the	  Nasserist	  era.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Anecdotal recollections of situations and experiences similar to Aliaa’s - sometimes strikingly so - were 
repeatedly encountered during fieldwork for this study in interactions with the upper middle class community. 
Whether personal experiences or those of peers, stories of negotiating the challenging dynamics (for example, 
financial or regulatory) of the private education market are an ever-present subject of exchange in upper-middle-
class social circuits and gatherings, especially among young parents who have children of school age.    
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   Aliaa’s	  parents	  placed	  a	  high	  value	  on	  their	  children’s	  education	  as	  an	  essential	  tool	   for	   their	   future	  struggle	   to	  maintain	   their	  social	  position.	  When	  the	   time	  came	  to	  consider	  education	  options	  for	  their	  children,	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s,	  the	  choice	  of	   private	   language	   schools	   rather	   than	   government	   schools	   was	   one	   which	   did	   not	  warrant	  much	  consideration	  from	  the	  Abulnagas.	  Aliaa’s	  older	  brother	  was	  schooled	  in	  a	  private	  English	   language	  school,	  while	  she	  was	  sent	   to	  a	  private	  French	   ‘Lycée’.	  The	  latter	  was	  conveniently	  located	  near	  their	  home	  in	  the	  middle	  class	  Al-­‐Haram	  district	  in	  Giza,	   and	   Aliaa	   attended	   alongside	   many	   of	   their	   neighbours’	   and	   family	   friends’	  children.	  Over	  the	  previous	  decade,	  the	  quality	  of	  education	  provided	  in	  public	  schools	  had	   deteriorated	   to	   such	   a	   degree	   that	   it	   was	   deemed	   a	   categorically	   unacceptable	  choice	  for	  a	  family	  of	  their	  social	  profile.	  However,	  educational	  standards	  were	  not	  the	  only	  factor	  in	  choosing	  institutional	  affiliation.	  As	  Aliaa	  explains,	  there	  began	  to	  be	  a	  certain	  categorization	  in	  society.	  People	  like	  us	  started	  refraining	  from	  sending	   their	   children	   to	  government	  schools.	  All	  of	  my	  cousins	  also	  went	   to	  private	   language	   schools.	   It	   seems	   there	   was	   an	   implicit	   agreement	   amongst	   this	  social	  class	  at	  the	  time	  to	  choose	  private	  schools	  for	  their	  children	  since	  government	  schools	  did	  not	  produce	  graduates	  on	  the	  desired	  level	  anymore.	  [...]	  It	  was	  a	  general	  trend	   amongst	   all	   our	   relatives	   and	   within	   our	   social	   circle.	   All	   my	   father’s	  colleagues,	  for	  example,	  were	  graduates	  of	  government	  schools,	  but	  at	  the	  time	  they	  insisted	  on	  sending	  their	  children	  to	  private	   language	  schools.	   I	  know	  of	  no	  one	   in	  our	   social	   circuit	   that	   sent	   their	   children	   to	  government	   schools	  at	   that	   time.	  That	  applies	  to	  all	  of	  us	  born	  roughly	  between	  1975	  to	  1980.	  	  Aliaa’s	   testimony	   echoes	   previously	   discussed	   assertions	   of	   the	   shift	   in	   the	  Egyptian	   education	   system.	   In	   the	   education	   sector,	   from	   the	   1970s	   onwards,	   the	  upper/lower	  dichotomy	  that	  would	  define	  the	  social	  profile	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  in	  years	  to	   follow	  was	   reflected	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   ‘dual	   system	   in	  which	   overcrowded	   state	  schools	  provided	  education	  to	  a	  large	  majority	  of	  students,	  while	  the	  minority	  who	  could	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afford	   the	   tuition	   fees	   was	   educated	   in	   private	   schools,	   preferably	   in	   European	  languages’.61	  Aliaa	   then	   experienced	   the	   manifestations	   and	   practices	   of	   distinction	   in	   the	  educational	   field	   first-­‐hand	   during	   her	   university	   study.	   She	   studied	   in	   the	   French	  Section	  of	  Cairo	  University’s	  Faculty	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science.	  This	  section	  was	  one	   of	   several	   so-­‐called	   ‘language	   sections’	   established	   in	   various	   faculties	   of	   major	  Egyptian	   public	   universities	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s.	   The	   concept	   behind	   these	   revenue-­‐generating	   subdivisions	   of	   the	   original	   faculties	  was	   to	   offer	   affluent	   students	   foreign	  and	   internationally	   recognised	   curricula	   in	   their	   specialisations,	   in	   return	   for	  considerably	  higher	  tuition	  fees.	  Both	  the	  higher	  cost	  and	  the	  language	  requirements	  for	  joining	   these	   special	   departments	   ensured	   that	   almost	   exclusively	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  private	   language	   school	   graduates	   were	   able	   to	   join	   them.	   Language	   sections	   of	  traditional	  Cairo	  University	  faculties	  were	  an	  acceptable	  substitute	  for	  the	  unaffordable	  tuition	   costs	   of	   the	   American	   University	   in	   Cairo,	   which	   continued	   as	   the	   preferred	  higher-­‐education	  destination	  for	  richer	  categories	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  or	  the	  elite	  in	   general.	   Unlike	   the	   regular,	   typically	   overcrowded	   and	   educationally	   low-­‐rated	  ‘Arabic	   sections’,	   foreign-­‐language	   sections	   in	   these	   faculties	   had	   fewer	   students	   per	  class,	  modern	   refurbished	   and	   air-­‐conditioned	   classrooms	   equipped	  with	   state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   teaching	   aids	   such	   as	   projectors	   and	   computers.	   Students	   enrolled	   in	   these	  departments	   stood	   in	   stark	   contrast	   to	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	   students	   from	  other	   class	  backgrounds,	  who	  were	  destined	  to	  negotiate	  the	  traditional	  deficiencies	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  higher	  education	  system	  in	  pursuit	  of	  their	  university	  degrees.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Fayiz Murad Mina, Al-Taʻlim Fi Misr: Al-Waqiʻ Wa Al-Mustaqbal Hatta ʻam 2020 [Education in Egypt: The 
Present and the Future until the Year 2020] (Cairo: Al-Anglo Al-Misriyya, 2001), 36-37. Cited in: De Konig, 
Global Dreams: Class, Gender, and Public Space in Cosmopolitan Cairo, 51. 
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Social	  interaction	  between	  students	  in	  the	  language	  sections	  and	  their	  colleagues	  in	  the	  mainstream	  Arabic	  section	  was	  limited.	  Aliaa	  recalls	  how	  students	  in	  the	  French	  section	   created	   a	   virtual	   social	   border	   to	   separate	   themselves	   from	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  faculty's	  student	  body.	  Social	  gatherings	  and	  events	  such	  as	  parties,	  excursions	  and	  the	  like	  were	  advertised	  and	  kept	  exclusively	  within	  the	  group.	  Most	  students	  in	  the	  group	  ‘believed	   that	   this	  was	   right	   and	   they	  were	  happy	   this	  way’.	   The	   language	   sections	   of	  Cairo	  University’s	  Law,	  Political	  Science	  and	  Commerce	  faculties	  and	  their	  counterparts	  at	  other	  public	  universities	  such	  as	  Ain	  Shams	  and	  Alexandria	  continue	  to	  provide	  class	  enclaves	   for	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   students	   in	   public	   education	   institutions.	   Their	  university	   experience	   thus	   usually	   serves	   as	   further	   context	   for	   the	   assertion	   of	   class	  identity	  as	  much	  as	  it	  facilitates	  the	  acquisition	  of	  formal	  educational	  qualifications.	  	  Aliaa’s	  parents’	   choice	  of	  private,	   rather	   than	  government,	   schools,	  as	  well	  as	   their	  ability	  to	  pay	  a	  premium	  for	  her	  higher	  education	  in	  the	  enhanced	  ‘language’	  sections	  of	  a	  public	  university,	  posed	  less	  of	  an	  economic	  challenge	  for	  them	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  than	  it	  does	  to	  her	  today,	  as	  she	  looks	  for	  suitable	  schooling	  options	  for	  her	  two	  children.	  In	  the	  late	  1970s,	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  families,	  such	  as	  Aliaa’s	  parents,	  who	   worked	   in	   relatively	   high	   echelons	   of	   the	   public	   sector	   or	   occupied	   leading	  positions	  in	  the	  state	  bureaucracy,	  could	  still	  afford	  the	  reputable	  and	  most	  distinctive	  Cairo-­‐based	   private	   French	   or	   English	   language	   schools.	   The	   same	   can	   be	   said	   of	   the	  French	   language	   section	   of	   the	   Faculty	   of	   Economics	   and	  Political	   Science	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  ‘Today	  the	  story	  is	  different	  for	  people	  who	  work	  in	  jobs	  like	  mine.	  To	  school	  our	  children	  in	  private	  schools	  is	  a	  much	  bigger	  burden,’	  Aliaa	  complains	  bitterly.	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4.2	  Passing	  the	  Torch:	  Schooling	  as	  an	  Essential	  Route	  to	  Status	  Re-­‐Production	  Aliaa's	  older	  child,	  Omar,	  was	  born	  in	  2004.	  When	  he	  reached	  the	  schooling	  age	  of	  four,	  the	  family	  was	  based	  in	  Dubai,	  where	  her	  husband	  worked	  at	  the	  time.	  The	  first	  school	   Omar	   visited	   was	   the	   Choueifat,	   a	   Dubai	   branch	   of	   a	   network	   of	   international	  schools	   popular	   amongst	   young	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   professional	   Egyptian	   and	   Arab	  expatriates	   occupying	   high-­‐end	   jobs	   in	   the	   Gulf	   countries.62	  When	   the	   family	   moved	  back	  to	  Cairo,	  the	  quest	  to	  find	  a	  school	  for	  Omar	  commenced.	  Aliaa	  immediately	  started	  informally	   investigating	   how	   friends	   and	   family	   members	   in	   her	   social	   circuit	  approached	   this	   important	  decision.	   ‘The	   first	   thing	   I	  did	  was	   to	   look	  around	  and	   find	  out	  which	  schools	  my	  peers	  in	  my	  social	  circuit	  sent	  their	  children	  to,	  only	  to	  discover	  that	  schools	  in	  which	  we	  had	  studied	  have	  ceased	  to	  be	  good	  enough	  for	  our	  children,’	  recalls	  Aliaa,	  citing	  several	  school	  names	  that	  she	  considered	  famously	  popular	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  education	  destinations	  for	  her	  generation.	  In	   her	   particular	   case,	   the	   revelation	   of	   educational	   changes	   became	   more	  obvious	   as	   she	   contemplated	   transferring	   her	   son	   to	   the	   French	   system.	   Numerous	  people	  in	  her	  social	  circuit	  told	  Aliaa	  that	  schools	  with	  established	  reputations	  for	  social	  and	   academic	   distinction	   in	   her	   generation,	   such	   as	   Cairo’s	   infamous	   Jesuit	   French	  
College	  de	   la	  Sainte	  Famille,	   had,	   to	   a	   large	   extent,	   been	   'compromised'.	   The	   attractive	  status	   of	   these	   schools	   and	   the	   stability	   of	   their	   relatively	   low	   annual	   tuition	   fees	  (compared	   to	   the	   inflating	   costs	  of	  newer	   international	   schools)	  had	   facilitated	  access	  for	   lower	   strata	   of	   the	   middle	   class,	   as	   well	   as	   social	   categories	   deemed	   to	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The school is part of a network of educational institutions that follow a so-called SABIS education system. 
The school’s website boasts it being part of a ‘global education management system that is distinguished by a 
125+ year track record in the operation of pre-K and K-12 schools. The distinguishing mark of these schools is 
their implementation of the SABIS® Educational System.[…] The first school in what has grown to be the 
SABIS® School Network was the International School of Choueifat, which was founded in 1886 in the village 
of Choueifat, a suburb of Beirut, Lebanon. Currently, the SABIS® School Network consists of schools in 15 
countries on four continents.’ http://www.iscuae-sabis.net/Pages/World_Of_SABIS/, accessed 23 September 
2012.  
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inappropriately	   imposing	   on	   the	  much-­‐cherished	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   status	   that	   these	  institutions	   were	   traditionally	   renowned	   for	   upholding	   and	   indeed	   reproducing.	   Her	  boss,	  an	  ambassador	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  diplomatic	  service,	  himself	  a	  graduate	  of	  the	  French	  Jesuit	   school	   in	   the	   late	  1970s,	  has	  complained	   to	  her	   that	   the	  son	  of	  his	  bawab63	  was	  now	  schooled	  in	  a	  French	  school.	  He	  thus	  advised	  her	  to	  exclude	  those	  traditional	  school	  destinations	  from	  her	  consideration	  because	  they	  had	  become	  accessible	  to	  lower	  social	  classes,	   thus	   losing	   their	   status	   as	   socially	   accredited	   venues	   for	   the	   reproduction	   of	  distinction.	  Aliaa's	   own	   observations	   of	   an	   old	   friend	   and	   school	   colleague’s	   situation	  confirmed	  those	  concerns.	  The	  friend	  from	  her	  old	  French	  school	  in	  Al-­‐Haram	  is	  married	  to	  an	  armed	   forces	  officer,	  and	  could	   thus	  only	  afford	   the	  still-­‐reasonable	   fees	  of	   their	  old	  school.	  As	  Aliaa	  recalls:	  She	  was	  suffering.	  She	  had	  difficulty	  interacting	  with	  other	  parents	  who	  clearly	  belonged	   to	   lower	   social	   categories,	   as	   could	  be	   seen	   from	   their	   clothes,	   their	  values	   and	   the	   way	   they	   spoke.	   The	   children	   came	   home	   repeating	   certain	  vulgar	   expressions.	   This	  was	   not	   the	   case	  when	  we	  went	   to	   this	   school.	   Back	  then,	   the	  student	  body	  was	  more	  or	   less	  characterized	  by	  social	  cohesion,	  and	  so	  were	  the	  parents.	  As	  for	  this	  friend	  of	  mine,	  I	  sometimes	  feel	  that	  she	  is	  really	  troubled	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  could	  only	  afford	  this	  school	  for	  her	  children	  and	  that	   sometimes	   she	   is	   even	   ashamed	   of	   mentioning	   which	   school	   they	   are	  enrolled	  in.	  	  To	  Aliaa,	  her	   friend’s	   failure	  to	  uphold	  her	  children’s	  social	  position	  because	  of	  her	   inability	   to	   provide	   them	  with	   suitable	   education	  was	   a	   clear	   sign	   of	   downward	  social	   mobility,	   a	   nightmare	   which	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   families	   typically	   struggle	   to	  avoid.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Colloquial Arabic expression meaning the ‘guard of an apartment building’. In Egyptian middle-class urban 
areas, bawabin (plural of bawab) are typically direct or second generation immigrants from the countryside who 
live with their families in very small spaces on the premises (ground floor or garage) and are responsible not 
only for the protection of the premise but for the rendering of petty services to the building’s tenants, such as 
grocery shopping, car washing or the like in exchange for relatively low monthly or ad-hoc payments. They are 
hence commonly used in upper-middle-class discourse as a typical example of members of a lower class, or 
within the context of narrating acts of or attempts at upward social mobility.   
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4.3	  Window-­‐Shopping	  for	  Schools:	  Negotiating	  the	  Private-­‐School	  Market	  Aliaa	  found	  that	  the	  dominant	  trend	  in	  her	  social	  circle	  was	  to	  educate	  children	  in	  so-­‐called	   'international'	   and	   'semi-­‐international'	   schools.	  The	   former	   feature	   academic	  curricula	   that	   are	  usually	   formally	   accredited	  by	   certain	  European	  or	  North	  American	  education	   bodies,	   and	   are	   mostly	   run	   by	   foreign	   teachers	   and	   educators.	   However,	  despite	  being	  the	  typical	  preference	  for	  most	  young	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  families,	  annual	  tuition	   fees	   ranging	   between	   L.E.	   30,000	   and	   120,000	   per	   child	   often	   stand	   between	  these	  young	  families	  and	  the	  exclusive	  schools	  in	  this	  category.	  Semi-­‐international	  schools,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  offer	  translated	  Egyptian	  Ministry	  of	   Education	   curricula	   in	   all	   subjects,	   albeit	   adding	   the	   benefit	   of	   teaching	   language	  curricula	   accredited	   by	   foreign	   educational	   or	   cultural	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	  British	  Council	  or	  the	  French	  Cultural	  Centre.	  The	  modern	  facilities,	  relatively	  highly	  qualified	  teaching	   staff	   and	   normally	   broad	   range	   of	   extracurricular	   activities	   on	   offer	   in	   these	  privately	  owned	  and	  run	  schools	  still	  considerably	  distinguishes	  them	  from	  their	  state-­‐run	  counterparts	  and	  from	  those	  schools	  in	  the	  lower	  echelons	  of	  the	  private	  education	  market.	  The	  semi-­‐international	  schools	  represent	  an	  upgraded	  neoliberal-­‐era	  version	  of	  language	   schools	  popular	   among	   the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	   class	  until	   the	  mid1980s,	  when	  Aliaa	  herself	  received	  her	  primary	  and	  secondary	  education.	  With	  annual	  tuition	  fees	  ranging	  between	  L.E.	  10,000	  to	  20,000	  per	  child,	  these	  schools	  present	  themselves	  as	  a	  suitable	  and	  affordable	  option	  for	  many	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  families.	  	   After	  her	  initial	  informal	  investigation	  of	  educational	  options,	  Aliaa	  took	  the	  first	  practical	  step	  towards	  selecting	  a	  school	  by	  attending	  an	  annual	  'education	  fair'	  in	  one	  of	  Cairo's	  top	  five-­‐star	  hotels,	  the	  Cairo	  Sheraton.	  ‘It	  was	  like	  an	  employment	  fair.	  Many	  of	  those	  schools	  are	  there	  and	  there	  are	  sections	  for	  French,	  English	  and	  German	  schools,’	  she	   remembers.	  As	  previously	  discussed,	   this	  one-­‐stop	  school	   shop	  provides	  a	  kind	  of	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commercial	   display	   for	   young	  parents	   of	  what	   the	   private	   school	  market	   has	   to	   offer.	  ‘You	   can	   view	   schools’	   brochures,	   learn	   about	   their	   facilities	   and	   curricula,	   get	  introduced	  to	  extra-­‐curricular	  activities	  they	  offer,	  and	  talk	  to	  teachers	  who	  are	  present	  at	  those	  different	  booths,’	  Aliaa	  points	  out.	  She	  filled	  out	  several	  introduction	  forms	  with	  her	   contact	   details	   for	   various	   schools	   during	   her	   visit.	   These	   so-­‐called	   'applications'	  include	   the	  provision	  of	  details	   such	  as	   the	  parents'	  occupations,	   the	   family's	  address,	  sports	   clubs	   in	  which	   it	   has	   a	  membership,	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   contacts	   to	   references	  from	  other	  parents	  whose	  children	  are	  enrolled	  at	  the	  respective	  school.	  The	  provision	  of	   these	  details	   is	   primarily	   aimed	   at	   giving	   the	   school	   the	   opportunity	   to	   conduct	   an	  initial	   social	   filtering	  of	  prospective	   students,	   and	   in	   turn	   to	   invite	  only	   those	   families	  who	  are	  deemed	  to	  fall	  within	  the	  targeted	  social	  class	  by	  the	  schools’	  administrators	  to	  later	  visit	  the	  school	  for	  interviews	  or	  'open-­‐day'	  events	  at	  the	  school.	  Aliaa	  explains:	  It	   is	   very	   possible	   that	   they	   don't	   like	   someone	   and	   therefore	   don't	   contact	  them.	   I	   certainly	   got	   the	   feeling	   that	   schools	  were	   –from	   the	   very	   beginning-­‐	  doing	   social	   filtering.	   Some	   of	   the	   schools	   then	   later	   invited	  me	   for	   open	   day	  events	  and	  some	  of	   them	   insisted	  on	  conducting	  personal	   interviews	  with	   the	  parents	  without	  the	  children	  even	  present.	  	  	  	  	  	  One	   of	   Aliaa’s	   top	   choices	   was	   the	   French	   ‘L’Ecole	   Oasis’,	   a	   semi-­‐international	  school	   based	   in	   Maadi.	   She	   was	   invited	   for	   a	   personal	   interview	   with	   the	   school’s	  headmistress.	   The	   first	   impression	   she	   got	   was	   a	   positive	   one,	   which	   confirmed	   the	  informally	  circulated	  reputation	  of	  the	  school.	  The	  headmistress	  was	  welcoming,	  polite	  and	  ‘very	  presentable	  […]	  Her	  husband	  was	  a	  former	  ambassador	  or	  something	  similar,	  basically	  she	  had	  lived	  abroad	  for	  a	  while	  and	  spoke	  English	  and	  French.’	  In	  Aliaa’s	  view,	  this	   clearly	   meant	   that	   the	   principal	   had	   been	   hired	   by	   the	   school’s	   owners	   for	   her	  possession	   of	   an	   obviously	   proven	   ability	   to	   socially	   filter	   and	   categorise	   her	  interviewees,	  and	  rate	  them	  according	  to	  a	  set	  of	  criteria	  of	  socio-­‐cultural	  acceptability.	  In	  turn,	  the	  school’s	  head	  was	  evidently	  well	  positioned	  to	  supervise	  the	  preservation	  of	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a	   certain	   distinctive	   character	   in	   the	   school’s	   student	   body.	   ‘I	   think	   her	   background	  enabled	  her	  to	  rate	  those	  whom	  she	  interviewed	  and	  say	  these	  are	  wa’‘in,	  kuwayyesin	  or	  
kuwayyesin	   ’awy.’64	  The	   interview	   mainly	   consisted	   of	   questions	   from	   the	   school’s	  principal	   to	  Aliaa	  about	  her	   familial	  situation,	  her	   language	  skills,	  her	   lifestyle	  and	  her	  occupation.	   Aliaa	   was	   comfortable	   throughout	   the	   interview,	   as	   she	   was	   successfully	  able	  to	  portray	  her	  social	  credentials;	  the	  interviewer	  had	  realised	  from	  the	  start	  Aliaa’s	  profile	  fit	  the	  criteria	  for	  the	  school.	  Interviews	   for	   parents	   hoping	   to	   place	   their	   children	   in	   private	   semi-­‐international	   schools	   are	   in	   themselves	   a	   social	   filtering	   mechanism	   that	   aims	   to	  preserve	  a	  certain	  social	  profile	  for	  the	  school’s	  student	  body.	  Such	  preservation	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  major	  selling	  points	  for	  these	  schools	  within	  their	  targeted	  clientele	  of	  young	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  families.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  schools	  provide	  a	  much	  sought-­‐after	  medium	   for	   young	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptian	   parents	   to	   secure	   an	   educational	  environment	  for	  their	  child	  that	  meets	  academic	  standards	  hardly	  attainable	  in	  state	  or	  lower-­‐private	   schools.	   On	   an	   equally	   important	   note,	   these	   schools	   represent	   ‘class	  comfort	  zones’,	  in	  which	  the	  interaction	  with	  other	  children	  and	  families	  with	  a	  similar	  class	   background	   ensures	   the	   preservation	   and	   reproduction	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status,	   behaviour	   and	   domestic	   culture.	   The	   name	   of	   the	   children's	   school	   is	   an	  important	   indication	   of	   class	   status	   amongst	   young	   Egyptian	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  families.	   As	   Aliaa	   describes:	   ‘When	   people	   sit	   together	   they	   talk	   about	   the	   children's	  schools,	  what	  sort	  of	  activities	  they	  offer,	  what	  kind	  of	  school	  trips	  they	  organize	  and	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The expression wa’‘in (Egyptian Colloquial Arabic for ‘fallen’) is habitually used in upper-middle-class 
speech as a direct reference to persons considered of a lower-class background. Kuwayyesin (Egyptian 
Colloquial Arabic for ‘good’) and kuwayyesin ’awi (Egyptian Colloquial Arabic for ‘very good’) are used to 
refer to persons or groups who are considered within an acceptable proximity to one's own upper-middle-class 
social status. The expressions are discursively employed in a variety of everyday social references, such as 
describing the suitability of families of prospective marriage partners or socially categorizing colleagues in the 
workplace and so forth.   
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which	   venues	   these	   schools	   organize	   their	   parties.	   This	  makes	   a	   lot	   of	   difference.’	   In	  some	  cases,	  the	  social	  prestige	  derived	  from	  a	  school’s	  name	  is	  valued	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  upper-­‐middle	   class	   families	   compromise	   on	   important	   elements	   in	   the	   parents’	  relationship	  and	  leverage	  with	  the	  school.	  	  For	  example,	  when	  Aliaa's	   family	  moved	  back	  to	  Cairo	  from	  Dubai,	  her	  son	  was	  initially	  placed	  into	  the	  New	  Cairo	  City	  branch	  of	  the	  international	  Choueifat	  school	  that	  he	  attended	  in	  Dubai.	  As	  opposed	  to	  Dubai,	  she	  noticed	  that	  in	  Egypt	  ‘the	  Choueifat	  was	  considered	   something	   special’.	   The	   school’s	   environment	   reflected	   a	   sense	   of	   social	  distinction	   through	   a	   number	   of	   practices.	   Some	   of	   the	   children	   had	   mobile	   phones,	  school	  trips	  were	  overpriced,	  and	  end-­‐of-­‐the-­‐year	  parties	  were	  organised	  in	  extravagant	  venues.	   Moreover,	   the	   very	   management	   of	   the	   school	   seemed	   too	   commercial	   in	  character	  and	  practice	  to	  Aliaa:	  	  The	   school	   was	   owned	   by	   a	   profit-­‐making	   organization	   called	   the	   ‘Egyptian	  Educational	  Group’,	  to	  which	  I	  wrote	  all	  the	  checks.	  I	  have	  no	  idea	  who	  they	  are.	  Inside	  the	  school	  premise	  there	  was	  a	  branch	  of	  one	  of	   the	  commercial	  banks,	  the	   National	   Bank	   of	   Abu	   Dhabi	   (NBAD).	   When	   I	   tried	   asking	   the	   school	  management	  for	  ways	  of	  meeting	  and	  networking	  with	  other	  parents	  they	  were	  surprised	   and	   wondered	   why	   I	   wanted	   something	   like	   this.	   To	   me	   this	   was	  important,	   I	  mean	  even	  as	  a	  means	  of	   social	  pressure	   to	   take	  collective	  action	  with	  other	  parents	  if	  we	  didn’t	  like	  something	  at	  school.	  When	  I	  asked	  about	  a	  parents’	  council,	  the	  answer	  was	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  at	  this	  school.	  The	  only	   connection	   that	   existed	   was	   your	   connection	   to	   the	   child’s	   American	  teacher,	   whom	   you	   could	  meet	   by	  making	   an	   appointment.	   If	   you	   didn’t	   like	  something	   you	   had	   to	   go	   see	   the	   teacher	   and	   act	   alone,	   or	   see	   the	   school’s	  principal	  alone.	  	  Aliaa	  believes	   the	   lack	  of	   any	  organised	   framework	   for	  parental	   representation	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   school	   is	   a	   deliberate	   strategy	   to	   prevent	   parents	   from	   developing	   a	  capacity	  to	  apply	  pressure	  on	  the	  institution’s	  management.	  The	  school	  mainly	  relied	  on	  parents’	   desire	   to	   continue	   enjoying	   the	   social	   prestige	   bestowed	   on	   them	   by	   having	  their	  children	  enrolled	  there.	  Such	  was	  the	  much-­‐desired	  social	  capital	  associated	  with	  enrolment	  in	  the	  Choueifat,	  and	  of	  course	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  school	  had	  excellent	  academic	  standards,	   that	   parents	   were	   even	   ready	   to	   surrender	   to	   audaciously	   unfair	   financial	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conditions.	  Aliaa,	  who	  had	  paid	  L.E.	  37,000	   in	   tuition	   fees	   for	  her	  son	   in	  his	   first	  year,	  soon	  discovered	  that	  this	  amount	  did	  not	  include	  any	  of	  the	  sports	  activities:	  	  	  	  If	  you	  wanted	  your	  child	  to	  have	  swimming	  lessons	  in	  the	  school’s	  pool,	  you	  had	  to	  pay	  extra	  since	  the	  school	  hired	  a	  Russian	  trainer,	  and	  the	  same	  for	  squash	  and	  other	  sports.	  Over	  and	  above	  you	  had	  to	  bring	  them	  to	  the	  sports	  training	  and	  pick	  them	  up.	  […]	  It	  was	  absurd,	  you	  were	  supposed	  to	  pay	  these	  excessive	  fees	   in	   exchange	   for	   the	   child	   sitting	   in	   classes	   and	  using	   the	  playground	   and	  garden	   only.	   The	   pool,	   the	   squash	   courts,	   the	   football	   pitch	   and	   all	   the	   other	  facilities	  were	  all	  closed	  and	  if	  you	  wanted	  to	  benefit	  from	  them	  you	  had	  to	  pay	  extra	  surcharges.	  	  Aliaa’s	   experience	   was	   not	   unheard	   of	   in	   her	   social	   circuit.	   Bitter	   experiences	  with	   private	   international	   schools’	   financial	   policies	   are	   all	   too	   common	   amongst	   her	  circle	   of	   friends.	   These	   experiences	   are	   shared	   at	   almost	   every	   social	   gathering	   she	  attends.	  A	  case	  in	  point	  is	  another	  French	  school	  in	  Maadi	  that	  Aliaa	  considered	  after	  she	  had	  decided	  to	  transfer	  her	  son	  from	  the	  Choueifat.	  The	  French	  school	  has	  both	  a	  semi-­‐international	  and	  an	  international	  section.	  Pupils	  in	  the	  latter,	  paying	  an	  annual	  sum	  of	  approximately	  40,000	  L.E.	  for	  tuition,	  have	  access	  to	  a	  modern,	  air-­‐conditioned	  building	  and	   sports	   facilities,	   including	   a	   swimming	   pool.	   Sharing	   the	   same	   school	   premises,	  pupils	   enrolled	   in	   the	   semi-­‐international	   section	   pay	   tuition	   fees	   of	   almost	   half	   the	  amount	  of	  their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  international	  section,	  are	  placed	  in	  a	  much	  smaller	  and	  less-­‐equipped	  building,	  and	  don’t	  have	  access	  to	  the	  sports	  and	  leisure	  facilities	  that	  their	   counterparts	   enjoy.	   The	   school	   therefore	   provides	   what	   could	   be	   described	   as	  multi-­‐layered	  class	  hubs	  within	  the	  institution’s	  premises.	  Aliaa	   spent	   almost	   three	  months	   on	   her	   search	   for	   a	   suitable	   French	   school	   in	  which	  to	  place	  her	  son	  instead	  of	  the	  Choueifat.	  During	  this	  period,	  she	  was	  exposed	  to	  a	  glimpse	  of	  what	  one	  could	  comfortably	  describe	  as	  a	  set	  of	  processes	  and	  tools	  designed	  by	  the	  upper	  segment	  of	  the	  private-­‐school	  market	  in	  today's	  Egypt	  to	  filter	  new	  school	  entrants	  on	  various	  bases.	  Ensuring	   that	   the	   families	  of	  new	  students	   fit	  certain	  social	  profiles	  is	  no	  less	  than	  crucial	  for	  owners	  and	  managers	  of	  the	  schools,	  since	  the	  school’s	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social	  image	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  selling	  points	  for	  a	  future	  clientele	  in	  what	  is	  a	  primarily	  market-­‐driven	  mechanism.	  Aliaa	  went	  through	  a	  total	  of	  six	  school	  interviews	  before	  her	  son	  Omar	  was	  placed	  in	  a	  school	  that	  met	  both	  her	  educational	  and	  social	  standards.	  Her	  search	   was	   stressful	   and	   draining.	   Despite	   small	   differences	   in	   procedure,	   the	   main	  features	  of	  the	  application	  process	  for	  each	  of	  the	  schools	  were	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same.	  In	  this	  process,	  parents	  have	  to	  fill	  out	  initial	  application	  forms	  that	  are,	  in	  most	  cases,	   designed	   to	   appear	  neutral	   and	   formal.	  However,	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   information	  requested	  through	  several	  typical	  questions	  are	  implicit	  social	  filters	  par	  excellence.	  One	  typical	   example	   is	   the	   application	   to	   an	   increasingly	   popular	   international	   school,	   the	  
Smart	  International	  School.	  The	  school	  offers	  British	  curricula	  leading	  to	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  international	  G.C.S.E.	  examination,	  and	  is	  currently	  located	  on	  three	  acres	  of	  land	  on	  the	  Cairo-­‐Alexandria	  road	  in	  convenient	  proximity	  to	  many	  gated	  compounds	  in	  the	  area.	   It	   is	  most	  notably	   located	   inside	   the	   ‘Smart	  Village’,	   from	  which	   the	  name	  of	   the	  school	   derives.	   The	   school’s	   application	   form	   (Appendix	   1)	   includes	   questions	   about	  languages	   spoken	   at	   home,	   nationality,	   area	   of	   residence,	   and	   schools	   of	   the	   child’s	  siblings.	   These	   are	   common	   examples	   of	   formal	   pieces	   of	   information,	   which,	   if	  provided,	   nonetheless	   immediately	   categorise	   a	   family	   subjectively	   according	   to	  prevailing	  class	  divides	  in	  today’s	  Egyptian	  society.	  Admission	  decisions	   are	   entirely	   the	  prerogative	   of	   the	   school’s	   administration	  and	  no	  formal	  or	  regulatory	  frameworks	  are	  in	  place	  to	  guarantee	  equal	  opportunities.	  Personal	  interviews	  conducted	  with	  parents	  of	  prospective	  students	  then	  act	  as	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	  examination	  of	  the	  family’s	  social	  status	  credentials,	  including	  questions	  about	  socialisation	   habits,	   the	   family’s	   income	   level,	   consumption	   patterns	   and	   lifestyle	  components	   (such	   as	   sports	   clubs	   memberships),	   and,	   not	   least	   of	   all,	   property	  portfolios,	   such	   as	   ownership	   of	   summer	   vacation	   homes.	   In	   some	   cases,	   this	   vetting	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process	  is	   informed	  by	  additional	   ideological	  affiliations	  (Islamist	   in	  particular),	  rather	  than	  the	  purely	  class-­‐based	  filtration	  usually	  in	  place.	  Interviews	  are	  an	  opportunity	  for	  a	   first-­‐hand	   evaluation	   of	   the	   social	   credentials	   the	   school	   needs	   to	   sell	   its	   image	   to	  future	  clients.	  If	  the	  interview	  is	  passed	  successfully,	  a	  place	  is	  secured	  for	  the	  child	  and	  the	  terms	  of	  enrolment,	  including	  fees	  and	  other	  costs,	  are	  communicated	  to	  the	  family.	  In	  some	  cases,	  a	  contract	  is	  signed	  by	  the	  family	  to	  ensure	  its	  compliance	  with	  the	  terms	  of	   enrolment,	   including	   (most	   importantly)	   the	   annual	   percentage	   increase	   in	   tuition	  fees.	   Using	   a	   clearly	   commercial	   consumer-­‐market-­‐inspired	   approach,	   some	   newly	  established	   private	   schools	   try	   to	   attract	   young	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   parents	   by	  specifying	   fixed	   percentages	   of	   annual	   increases	   in	   school	   fees	   in	   advance	   in	   those	  contracts.	  This	   is	  supposed	  to	  act	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  the	  respective	  families	  since	  they	  would	  be	  speared	  the	  usually	  large	  annual	  increases	  in	  tuition	  rates	  for	  new	  entrants.	  	  Aliaa	  describes	  her	   journey	   in	  search	  of	  a	  suitable	  school	   for	  her	  son	  as	  a	   truly	  revealing	   experience	   as	   to	   the	   degree	   to	  which	   the	   governing	   dynamics	   of	   the	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   educational	   scene	   in	   today’s	   Egypt	   is	   an	   honest	   reflection	   of	   the	  mechanisms	  of	  social	  distinction	  –	  both	  within	  this	  class,	  and	  in	  contrast	  to	  other	  social	  categories.	   She	   sees	   the	  benefits	  of	   such	  a	   reality	  and	   is	   clear	  about	  her	  attribution	  of	  significance	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  social	  standard.	  Her	  guiding	  conviction	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  that	  the	  ‘school	  is	  essentially	  a	  social	  institution’.	  Hence,	  she	  wants	  her	  children	  ‘to	  interact	  with	   people	   who	   are	   socially	   proximate	   to	   them,	   so	   they	   don’t	   suffer	   from	   social	  estrangement	   when	   they	   find	   children	   in	   the	   school	   belonging	   to	   a	   different	   social	  environment’.	  For	  Aliaa,	  this	  clearly	  means	  that	  the	  upmarket	  private	  education	  market	  is	   her	   only	   alternative.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   she	   was	   clearly	   dismayed	   by	   the	   state’s	  absence	  from	  the	  scene.	  She	  expressed	  a	  clear	  desire	  to	  see	  an	  enhanced	  and	  stronger	  
	  175	  
state	   regulation	   of	   the	   private	   education	   market,	   instead	   of	   what	   she	   described	   as	   a	  process	  lacking	  any	  effective	  oversight	  by	  state	  regulation.	  	  	  So	  strong	  is	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class’	  regard	  for	  the	  social	  aspect	  of	  education	  as	   a	   field	   for	   the	   negotiation	   of	   social	   status	   and	   identity	   today,	   that	   young	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  families	  are	  ready	  to	  endure	  considerable	  financial	  hardship	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  afford	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  education	  in	  suitable	  schools.	  Aliaa	  observes	  that	  many	  of	  her	  friends	  go	  to	  remarkable	  lengths	  to	  raise	  the	  necessary	  money	  needed	  to	  pay	  school	  fees.	  She	  knows	  of	  no	  one	  in	  her	  circle	  of	   friends	  and	  family	  members	  who	  is	  ready	  to	  compromise	  on	  the	  provision	  of	  high	  quality	  education	  for	  their	  children.	  This	  is	  solidly	  based	  on	  a	  stern	  belief	  that	  education	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  means	  of	  preserving	  social	  status.	  In	  the	  process,	  many	  other	  aspects	  of	  lifestyle	  can	  be	  forsaken,	  and	  plenty	  of	  debt	  options	  explored	  by	  young	  families.	  Aliaa	  demonstrates	  this	  point	  by	  quoting	  one	  of	  her	   friends	  as	  directly	  stating:	   ‘To	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  my	  children	  with	  education	  of	  the	  same	  quality	  and	   facilities	   like	   the	  one	  we	  enjoyed,	   they	  must	  attend	   international	  schools.	  I	  am	  not	  prepared	  to	  give	  them	  less	  than	  what	  my	  parents	  gave	  me.’	  
5.	  Conclusion	  Education	   has	   traditionally	   represented	   an	   essential	   foundation	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status	  in	  Egypt.	  Historically,	  the	  institution	  of	  modern	  non-­‐religious	  education	  was	  an	   important	   catalyst	   for	   structural	  middle	   class	   formation	   in	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   and	  early	   twentieth	   centuries.	  The	   expansion	  of	   the	   state	  bureaucracy	   as	  part	   of	   the	  post-­‐1952	  statist	  approach	  to	  development	  was	  coupled	  with	  an	  extensive	  expansion	  of	  the	  education	  system	  across	  the	  country,	  at	  all	  levels.	  	  An	  almost	  complete	  domination	  of	  the	  state	   of	   the	   provision	   of	   various	   levels	   of	   education	   effectively	   wove	   middle-­‐class	  generations	   of	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s	   into	   an	   implicit	   social	   contract	  with	   the	   state,	   in	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which	   the	   state’s	   role	   as	   a	   social	   arena	   for	   the	   facilitation	   of	   social	   mobility,	   the	  attainment	  of	  status	  and	  the	  reproduction	  of	  prestige	  was	  provided	  in	  return	  for	  middle	  class	   political	   quiescence	   and	   passive	   consent.	   This	   social	   contract	   took	  many	   forms,	  including	  various	  direct	  social	  provisions	  and	  subsidies.	  However,	  most	   importantly,	   it	  was	  subjectively	  shaped	  as	  an	  implicit	  arrangement	  whereby	  a	  supposedly	  modernising,	  protective	  and	  patrimonial	  role	  of	  the	  state	  was	  the	  foundation	  of	  its	  legitimacy	  within	  the	   ranks	   of	   the	  middle	   class,	   despite	   its	   inherent	   authoritarianism.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  Egyptian	  state	  has	  been	  in	  crisis	  since	  the	  early	  1970s.	  For	  various	  reasons	  it	  has	  been	  unable	   to	   maintain	   the	   levels	   of	   social	   provision	   and	   public	   spending	   necessary	   to	  uphold	  this	  social	  contract	  with	  the	  middle	  class.65	  In	  education,	   this	  has	  been	   reflected	   in	   the	  ever-­‐deteriorating	  quality	  of	   the	  public	  education	  system.	  In	  the	  overall	  context	  of	  neoliberal	  transformation	  over	  the	  past	  three	  decades,	  various	  forms	  of	  de-­‐facto	  privatisation	  have	  shaped	  the	  dynamics	  of	  education	  as	  a	  vital	  social	  field	  for	  various	  segments	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  middle	  class.	  As	  Hania	  Sobhy	  has	   accurately	   observed,	   the	   deliberate	   leniency	   of	   the	   state	   with	   the	   persistent	  encroachment	   of	   profit-­‐oriented	   and	   loosely	   controlled	   market-­‐mechanisms	   and	  practices	  on	  the	  education	  field	  has	  severely	  undermined	  the	  very	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  ranks	  of	  different	  middle	  class	  segments.66	  For	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  the	  middle	  class,	   an	   even	  more	   overtly	  marketised	   private-­‐education	   sector	   is	   the	   only	   available	  trajectory	  leading	  to	  the	  acquisition	  of	  a	  quality	  education	  –	  an	  essential	  prerequisite	  for	  the	  future	  security	  of	  lucrative	  careers	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  private	  sector.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 For a thorough analysis of the reasons behind the growing crisis of the Egyptian state at that stage, see: John 
Waterbury, "The "Soft State" and the Open Door: Egypt's Experience with Economic Liberalization, 1974-
1984," Comparative Politics 18, no. 1 (1985). 
66 Sobhy, "Education and the Production of Citizenship in the Late Mubarak Era: Privatization, Discipline and 
the Construction of the Nation in Egyptian Secondary Schools," 275-76. 
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During	  this	  crucial	  stage	  of	  the	  process	  of	  class	  status	  reproduction,	  young	  Egyptian	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   families	  are	  exposed	  to	  the	  many	  nuances	  of	   the	   loosely	  regulated,	  commercially	   inspired	   and	   profit-­‐oriented	   practices	   in	   the	   private	   education	   market.	  The	   same	   pattern	   generally	   continues	   throughout	   the	   experience	   of	   managing	   the	  relationship	   between	   such	   families	   and	   the	   providers	   of	   the	   much-­‐needed	   social	  prestige	  arising	   from	  high-­‐standard	  private	  education.	  Despite	   the	   formal	  oversight	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  over	   international	   and	   semi-­‐international	   schools	   in	   today’s	  private-­‐education	  market,	  hardly	  any	  processes	  of	  effective	  control	  or	  regulation	  by	  the	  state	  are	  in	  place.	  There	  is	  an	  almost	  total	  lack	  of	  accountability	  from	  the	  schools	  to	  the	  state,	   and	   no	   frameworks	   in	   place	   to	   ensure	   effective	   oversight.	   In	   practice,	   this	  unbalanced	  relationship	  is	  subverting	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  families	  to	  those	  mechanisms,	  with	   little	   leverage	   by	  which	   to	   influence	   the	   policies	   of	   the	   schools	   and	   the	   growing	  strain	  on	  their	  resources	  that	  private	  education	  is	  causing.	  By	  allowing	  the	  social	  field	  of	  education	   to	   turn	   into	   a	   market,	   the	   state	   has	   gradually	   pushed	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	   to	   conceptualise	   themselves	   discursively	   as	   customers	   negotiating	   the	  market,	   rather	   than	  citizens	  beholden	   to	  or	   in	  need	  of	   the	  state.	  Politically,	  along	  with	  several	   other	   neoliberal	   social	   processes,	   this	   has	   considerably	   contributed	   to	   an	  accumulative	  de-­‐legitimisation	  of	  the	  political	  order.	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Chapter	  Four:	  The	  ‘Right’	  Job:	  Employment,	  Careers	  and	  the	  Preservation	  of	  Social	  Status	  
1.	  Introduction	  This	   chapter	   will	   focus	   on	   the	   changing	   dynamics	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   status	  preservation	  and	  reproduction	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  employment	  market.	  As	  this	  study	  has	  repeatedly	  pointed	  out,	  employment	  has	  traditionally	  comprised	  one	  of	  the	  foundations	  of	   the	   social	   contract	   between	   the	   post-­‐1952	   Egyptian	   state	   and	   segments	   of	   the	  Egyptian	  middle	   class.	   In	   this	   sense,	   employment	  ought	   to	  be	  understood	  as	  entailing	  and	  connoting	  far	  more	  than	  the	  direct	  commitment	  made	  by	  the	  state	  in	  1964	  for	  the	  universal	   placement	   of	   university	   graduates	   in	   occupations	   across	   the	   bureaucratic	  apparatus.	   In	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   underlying	   causes	   of	   the	   changing	   political	  agency	  of	  today’s	  upper	  middle	  class,	  employment	  needs	  to	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  social	  arena	   in	  which	   the	   state	   has	   previously	   committed	   itself	   to	   the	   provision	   of	   suitable	  trajectories	   and	   paths	   for	   the	   acquisition,	   preservation	   and	   reproduction	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  social	  capital	  through	  bureaucratic	  and	  public	  sector	  careers.	  Since	   the	   inception	  of	   liberalisation	  polices	  under	  Sadat	   in	  1974,	   this	  commitment	  has	  gradually	  been	  fading	  away.	  During	  the	  Mubarak	  years,	  the	  door	  was	  entirely	  open	  for	   neoliberal	   market	   mechanisms	   to	   control	   this	   socially	   vital	   venue	   for	   status	  reproduction	   for	   the	   Egyptian	   upper	   middle	   class.	   As	   in	   the	   case	   of	   education,	   the	  retreat	  of	  the	  state’s	  role	  as	  a	  prestigious	  employer	  has	  severely	  undermined	  its	  ability	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  political	  acquiescence	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  class.	  Moreover,	  the	  prolonged	  exposure	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   to	   and	   their	   continuous	   negotiation	   of	   the	  
	  179	  
mechanisms	   underpinning	   career	   advancement	   in	   the	   globally-­‐integrated	   corporate	  private	   sector	   have	   greatly	   contributed	   to	   the	   development	   of	   critical	   discourses	  surrounding	   the	   state’s	   failures	   in	   different	   areas,	   based	   on	   these	   defining	   career	  experiences.	   Such	   critical	   discourses	   of	   the	   state’s	   ‘corruption’,	   ‘incompetence’	   and	  ‘inefficiency’	  are	  widely-­‐echoed	  elements	  of	  the	  image	  of	  the	  state	  in	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  circles.	  Arguably,	   they	   are	  directly	   traceable	   to	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   identification	  with	  the	  work	  ethics	  and	  practices	  internalised	  in	  an	  emerging	  ‘corporate	  culture’	  in	  today’s	  neoliberal	  Egyptian	  employment	  market.	  At	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   struggle	   for	   acceptable	   employment	   among	   today’s	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  is	  the	  endeavour	  to	  secure	  a	  position	  in	  the	  rewarding	  echelons	  of	  the	  economy,	  which	  flourished	  considerably	  during	  the	  neoliberal	  transformation	  of	  the	   last	   two	   decades.	   The	   ideal	   job	   is	   one	  with	   relatively	   high	   pay,	   promising	   career	  development	  prospects	  in	  companies	  or	  entities	  belonging	  to	  what	  Anouk	  De	  Konig	  has	  descriptively	  termed	  ‘the	  internationally	  oriented	  up-­‐market	  segment’1	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  economy.	   Furthermore,	   one	   can	   argue	   that,	   in	   addition	   to	   being	   closely	   linked	   to	   the	  movement	   towards	   intensive	   liberalisation	   policies	   since	   the	   early	   1990s,	   the	  emergence	  of	  this	  new	  breed	  of	  jobs	  or	  ‘new	  employment	  domain’	  in	  the	  labour	  market	  has	  also	  caused	  a	  discursive	   shift	   in	   the	  upper	  middle	   class’	  perception	  of	   the	   type	  of	  employment	   needed	   for	   social-­‐status	   reproduction.	   In	   general,	   the	   quest	   for	  employment	  is	  a	  central	  stage	  in	  the	  process	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status	  reproduction,	  taking	  place	   in	   the	  context	  of	   the	  past	   two	  decades’	   structural	   changes.	   It	   is	   therefore	  another	  major	   social	  domain	   in	  which	  class	   identity	  becomes	  consolidated,	   and	  class-­‐typical	  courses	  of	  action	  and	  strategies	  are	  devised	  and	  implemented	  in	  the	  social	  space	  amidst	  the	  state’s	  ever-­‐shrinking	  presence.	  Understanding	  both	  the	  logic	  and	  workings	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 De Konig, Global Dreams: Class, Gender, and Public Space in Cosmopolitan Cairo, 74. 
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of	  this	  arena	  of	  social	  action	  is	  indispensable	  to	  developing	  our	  appreciation	  of	  how	  the	  social	   identity	   of	   today's	   Egyptian	   upper	   middle	   class	   is	   reproduced,	   distinction	   is	  secured	   and	   the	   normative	   foundations	   for	   political	   agency,	   including	   aspirations	   for	  change,	  are	  formed.	  The	  chapter	  will	  begin	  by	  exploring	  the	  changing	  character	  of	  employment	  from	  an	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   perception	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   era,	   including	   the	   parameters	   of	  what	   currently	   constitutes	   a	   socially	   accepted	   position	   in	   the	   labour	  market	   and	   the	  changing	   image	  of	   state	   employment	   amongst	   today’s	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	   class.	   It	  will	  then	  proceed	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  neoliberal	  structural	  changes	  have,	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  created	  a	  new	  breed	  of	  employment	  opportunities	  more	  conducive	  to	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  credentials	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  class.	  These	  opportunities,	  the	  emergence	  of	   which	   was	   directly	   facilitated	   by	   the	   growing	   integration	   of	   Egypt	   into	   the	   global	  economy	  over	   the	  past	   two	  decades,	  are	  also	  compatible	  with	   the	  upper	  middle	  class’	  self-­‐proclaimed	  representations	  of	  modernity	  and	  distinction.	  In	  a	  subsequent	  section,	  narratives	   and	   testimonies	   collected	   over	   the	   course	   of	   this	   research	  will	   be	   used	   to	  outline	   how	   the	   deliberate	   subjective	   practice	   of	   these	   representations	   guides	   the	  mechanisms	   of	   access	   to	   the	   neoliberal	   segment	   of	   the	   employment	   market,	   strictly	  ensuring	  its	  nature	  as	  an	  arena	  for	  the	  reproduction	  of	  status	  and	  distinction.	  In	   this	   role,	   the	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   employment	   domain	   has	   almost	   entirely	  come	  to	  dominate	  an	  arena	  that	  has	  traditionally	  been	  the	  social	  function	  of	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  state’s	  bureaucracy.	  Guided	  by	   the	  conceptual	   importance	  of	  considering	   the	   interplay	   between	   structure	   and	   agency	   in	   creating	   socio-­‐political	  awareness	   and	   eventually	   informing	   political	   agency,	   a	   case	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  career	  advancement	  in	  the	  banking	  sector	  will	  be	  examined	  as	  a	  typical	  example	  of	  how	  neoliberal	   structural	   changes	   have	   channelled	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   struggles	   for	   the	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reproduction	   of	   class	   status	   to	   the	   neoliberal	   private	   sector,	   rather	   than	   the	   state	  bureaucracy.	  
2.	  The	  Social	  Meaning	  of	  Employment	  
2.1	  The	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  ‘Employment	  Domain’:	  ‘Clean’	  Jobs	  for	  ‘Clean’	  
People	  Middle-­‐class	   status	   in	  Egypt	  has	   traditionally	  been	  associated	  with	  educational	  certification	   leading,	   naturally,	   to	   non-­‐manual	   labour.	   But	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   a	   finer	  demarcation	  of	  socially	  acceptable	  or	  desirable	  employment	  amongst	  today’s	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class,	  such	  basic	  differentiation	  between	  manual	  and	  non-­‐manual	  labour	  is	  not	  nearly	  sufficient.	  Conceiving	  of	  today’s	  Egyptian	  employment	  market	  in	  terms	  of	  socio-­‐culturally	  defined	  and	  discursively	  constructed	  ‘employment	  domains’	  within	  the	  economy	  is	  a	  more	  useful	  method	  of	  identifying	  categories	  of	  employment	  separated	  by	  subjectively-­‐created	  definitions	  of	  class,	  distinction	  and	  prominence.	  The	  term	   ‘upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  employment	  domain’	  thus	  describes	  a	  variety	  of	  positions	  and	  occupations	  in	  the	  labour	  market	  that	  range	  across	  professions,	  sectors,	  entity	  sizes	  and	  employers	  (foreign,	  Egyptian	  or	  mixed),	  and	  that	  carry	  specific	  and	  widely	  recognised	  attributions	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  social	  status.	  Boundaries	  of	  the	  position	  and	  size	  of	  this	  domain	  within	   the	  overall	  economy	  and/or	   labour	  market	  are	  blurry	  and	  difficult	   to	  define	   in	  strict	  quantitative	  terms	  (such	  as	  by	  job	  category,	  economic	  sector	  or	  income	  level).	  It	  is	  thus	   more	   useful	   to	   think	   of	   this	   ‘employment	   domain’	   as	   a	   subjectively-­‐defined	   or	  constructed	  sub-­‐division	  of	  a	  broader	  self-­‐defined	  and	  class-­‐typical	  social	  space.	  When	   most	   interviewees	   for	   this	   study	   cited	   the	   type	   of	   employment	   as	   an	  important	  marker	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status,	  they	  almost	  always	  immediately	  added	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the	   qualifier	   that	   employment	   is	   not	   only	   about	   the	   level	   of	   income	   a	   certain	   job	  generates	  or	  provides.	  Although	  occupations	  in	  other	  ‘domains’	  of	  the	  economy,	  such	  as	  handcrafts	   or	   certain	   trade	   sectors,	   might	   be	   financially	   more	   rewarding,2	  they	   are	  nevertheless	  considered	  sub-­‐par	  in	  terms	  of	  other	  requirements	  for	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status.	   The	   ‘butcher’,	   for	   example,	   was	   repeatedly	   cited	   as	   a	   typical	   example	   of	   an	  occupation	  with	   a	   relatively	   high	   income,	   but	  which	   fails	   to	  meet	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  standards	   of	   ‘socially	   acceptable’	   status.	   This	   specific	   occupation	   was	   often,	   perhaps	  problematically,	   linked	   to	   low	   educational	   requirements,	   low	   behavioural	   standards,	  and	  vulgarity.3	  To	   speak	  of	   an	   ‘upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   employment	  domain’,	   then,	   is	   to	  point	   to	   a	  constructed	   social	   domain	  within	   the	   employment	  market,	   in	  which	   an	   occupation	   is	  deemed	   worthy	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   status	   according	   to	   its	   financial	   remuneration	  combined	  with	  the	  cultural	  capital	  it	  requires	  and	  the	  symbolic	  capital	  it	  bestows	  on	  an	  individual.	  In	  this	  sense,	  symbolic	  capital	  or	  prestige	  attached	  to	  a	  certain	  occupation	  is	  just	   as	   important	   in	   bestowing	   social	   status	   on	   its	   holder	   as	   the	   job's	   income,	  which	  facilitates	   the	   lifestyle	  and	  consumption	  patterns	  associated	  with	  his	  or	  her	  particular	  social	  status.	  Among	  today’s	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians,	  executive	  and	  professional	  dress	   codes,	  modern	  business-­‐meeting	  venues	  and	  board	   rooms,	  work-­‐related	   travels	  to	  Western	  business	   capitals	   and	  global	  destinations,	  means	  of	   communications	  used,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In many of the formal interviews conducted, as well as informal interactions during fieldwork, relative 
economic relations in the country were often described as ironic and irrational. Examples were given of young 
professionals, such as dentists or accountants, whose monthly incomes would typically be a fraction of that of 
carpenters or plumbers (manual occupations which usually require fewer educational qualifications and cultural 
capital).     
3 A reasonable explanation for this repeated invocation of ‘the butcher’ in this context is probably the influence 
of an era of Egyptian film productions between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s. The ‘butcher’ and a range of 
other petty bourgeois occupations were repeatedly used in these productions as symbolic examples of the social 
rise of the value of money over the value of the intellect as a regrettable feature of the age of infitah (open-door 
policy). The 1982 production ‘ala Bab Al-Wazir (At the Door of the Minister), starring the prominent comedian 
Adel Imam, is a typical example. This production documented a decade of remarkable decreases in the real 
incomes of wage/government-dependent middle-class bureaucrats and professionals, in comparison with the 
enrichment of new segments of bourgeois merchants - such as butchers - benefiting primarily from high 
inflation rates, the rise in food prices, and increasing levels of corruption within the local state apparatus.    
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and	  business	  connections	  and	  networks	  involved	  in	  a	  certain	  job	  are	  pivotal	  factors	  in	  determining	   an	   occupation’s	   social	   prestige	   in	   their	   social	   circuit.	   Habitually,	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  professionals	  subjectively	  refer	  to	  a	  job	  which	  fulfils	  the	  criterion	  for	  being	  considered	  part	  of	  this	  ‘employment	  domain’	  as	  a	  shoghlana	  nidifa	  (clean	  job),	  thereby	  resorting	   to	   a	   telling	   discursive	   use	   of	   a	   typical	   colloquial	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  expression	  to	   indicate	  an	   individual’s	   familial	  background	  as	  worthy	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status	  by	  deeming	  him	  nedif	   (clean).	  A	  clean	  person	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status	  thus	   needs	   a	   clean	   job	   with	   certain	   characteristics	   to	   preserve	   and	   reproduce	   social	  status.	  In	  their	  vital	  struggle	  for	  securing	  positions	  in	  this	  employment	  domain,	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  new	  entrants	  to	  the	  current	  Egyptian	  labour	  market	  are	  armed	  with	  what	  De	   Konig	   describes	   as	   ‘cosmopolitan	   capital’,4	  composed	  mainly	   of	   fluency	   in	   foreign	  languages,	   mastery	   of	   professional	   skills	   and	   exposure	   to	   global	   culture.	   All	   of	   these	  components	   of	   cosmopolitan	   capital	   are	   typically	   acquired	   through	   distinctive	  education	   in	   international	   or	   private	   schools	   and	   distinguished	   universities,	   as	  previously	   discussed.	   However,	   equally	   importantly,	   they	   are	   acquired	   through	   the	  material	  and	  cultural	  displays	  of	  globalisation	  as	  part	  of	  everyday	  lifestyle	  practices	  and	  consumption	   patterns.	   Frequent	   travels,	   socialisation	   in	   Western-­‐styled	   cafés	   and	  world-­‐cuisine	   restaurants,	   extensive	   and	   organic	   usage	   of	   advanced	   consumer	  technologies,	   clothes	   from	   international	   designer	   brands,	   and	   state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  communication	   gadgets	   have	   –	   among	   numerous	   other	   elements5	  	   –	   become	   socially-­‐defining,	   everyday	   expressions	   of	   modernity	   and	   cosmopolitanism	   associated	   with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 De Konig, Global Dreams: Class, Gender, and Public Space in Cosmopolitan Cairo, 76. 
5 An interesting recent example in this regard is a growing trend amongst upper-middle-class football fans to 
express displays of loyalty to globally renowned European football clubs. Benign peer rivalries between upper-
middle-class youths are increasingly surpassing the traditional divide between Cairo’s classical rival football 
clubs Al-Ahly and Zamalek, only to be formed between fans of the rival Spanish clubs Real Madrid versus 
Barcelona, for example, or those of competing British clubs Manchester United, Arsenal or Chelsea.  
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upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status6.	  In	  due	  course,	  these	  formal	  and	  socio-­‐cultural	  credentials	  of	  modern	  cosmopolitanism	  are	  deployed	  through	  social	  and	  familial	  networks	  to	  secure	  a	  suitable	  position	  and	  progression	  within	  this	  desirable	  employment	  domain,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  The	   lines	   of	   distinction	  within	   the	   labour	  market	   should	  draw	  attention	   to	   yet	  another	   symptom	   of	   the	   growing	   lower/upper	   divide	   within	   the	   wider	   ranks	   of	   the	  Egyptian	  middle	  class,	  based	  on	  the	  possession	  of	  cosmopolitan	  capital	  or	  credentials.	  Here	  again,	  the	  ability	  to	  secure	  the	  right	  position	  in	  the	  labour	  market	  should	  not	  only	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  main	  feature	  of	  social	  distinction,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  tool	  thereof.	  In	  other	  words,	   the	   position	   of	   a	   person	   in	   the	   labour	   market	   is	   not	   only	   indicative	   of	   one’s	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status,	  but	  also	  useful	  as	  a	  social	  route	  for	  the	  preservation	  and	  the	  eventual	  reproduction	  of	  such	  status.	  Employment,	   therefore,	  remains	  one	  of	   the	  very	  important	  borderlines	  along	  which	  the	  social	  identity	  of	  Egypt’s	  upper	  middle	  class	  can	  be	  identified,	  especially	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other,	  less	  fortunate	  groupings	  of	  the	  middle	  class.	  At	  the	   time	  when	   the	   lower	  echelons	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  middle	   class	   still	   struggle	  with	   the	  meagre	   employment	   prospects	   tied	   to	   their	   lower-­‐standard	   state	   education,	   their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  are,	  by	  contrast,	  well	  equipped	  with	  social	  –	  or,	  as	  it	  were,	   ‘cosmopolitan’	  –	  capital.	  This	  bundle	  of	  skills,	  consumption	  patterns,	   and	   cultural	   and	   material	   displays	   represent	   essential	   tools	   for	   the	  continuation	  of	  the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  quest	  for	  social-­‐status	  preservation	  through	  the	  employment	  market.	  While	   for	   the	   lower	   strata	   of	   the	  middle	   class,	   state	   and	   public	  sector	  employment	  continues	  to	  represent	  a	  fairly	  secure	  and	  desirable	  labour	  market	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Description based on the multitude of encounters, interactions and informal engagements with the upper 
middle class community during fieldwork.   
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goal,	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   is	   almost	   entirely	   oriented	   towards	   the	   domain	   of	   the	  labour	  market	  described	  earlier.	  
2.2	  From	  Bureaucrats	  to	  Private	  Sector	  Executives:	  The	  Changing	  Image	  of	  
Employment	  
	   Our	  understanding	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  socio-­‐culturally	  defined	  Egyptian	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  ‘employment	  domain’	  in	  recent	  years	  is	  not	  complete	  unless	  supplemented	  by	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  serious	  erosion	  of	  the	  social	  prestige	  and	  status	  attributed	  to	  state	  careers	  amongst	  this	  class.	  As	  this	  study	  has	  pointed	  out,	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  the	  middle	   class	   had	   started	   a	   process	   of	   arguably	   well-­‐contemplated	   structural	  disengagement	   of	   fortunes	   with	   state	   employment	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1970s.	   Egypt’s	  more	  elaborate	  neoliberal	  economic	  shift	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  provided	  the	  economic	  and	  social	   contexts	   for	   the	   final	   demise	   in	   the	   social	   prestige	   of	   al-­‐wazifa	   al-­‐hukumiyya	  (governmental	   employment)	   among	   the	   upper	   echelons	   of	   the	   Egyptian	  middle	   class.	  Except	  for	  certain	  branches	  of	  government	  that	  have	  retained	  their	  prestigious	  status,7	  public-­‐service	  and	  public-­‐sector	  careers	  are	  linked	  to	  scanty	  pay,	  undesirable	  and	  poor	  working	  conditions	  in	  public	  offices,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  productivity	  and	  efficiency.	  In	   this	   regard,	   interviewees	   repeatedly	   invoked	   a	   stereotypical	   image	   of	   the	  Egyptian	  public	   employee	   or	   bureaucrat	  muwazzaf	  who	   spends	   a	   lifetime	  negotiating	  financial	  hardship	  and	  coping	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  professional	  achievement	  and	  fulfilment	  in	  his	   or	   her	   government	   career. 8 	  Public	   employment	   is	   discursively	   linked	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Noticeably, most public positions that are still considered socially prestigious are those within state branches 
directly related to ‘state power'. Institutions typically falling within this category include various branches of the 
security establishment often referred to in the Egyptian press as jihat siadiyya (sovereign institutions), the 
diplomatic service - mostly for its international scope, and the judiciary.     
8 Point made most notably by the following interviewees: Hisham Ezzeldin (interview, Cairo 17 October 2009); 
Ayman Hani (interview, Sixth of October City, 10 February 2008); Tarek Hamdy (interview, Cairo 26 
November 2009); Sherif El Leissy (interview, Cairo 1 July 2009); Rami Mettias (interview, Cairo 19 May 
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backwardness	  and	  failure	  to	  conform	  to	  globally	  acknowledged	  displays	  of	  the	  modern	  employee.	  This	  stereotype,	  of	   course,	  was	   invoked	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  career	  scenario	  interviewees	  wished	   to	  avoid.	  Although	  subjectively	  expressed	  and	  accumulated,	   such	  perceptions	  are	  arguably	  based	  on	  a	  well-­‐proved	  reality.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  substantial	  research	  has	  empirically	  demonstrated	  the	  decrease	  of	  real	  wages	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  and	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises	   in	   the	   age	   of	   liberalisation.9 	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   an	  important	  research	  project	  has	  combined	  an	  analysis	  of	  diminishing	  public	  wages	  with	  an	  empirical	  examination	  of	  deteriorating	  material	  working	  conditions	  in	  various	  parts	  of	   the	   state	   apparatus	   as	   the	   two	   origins	   of	   endemic	   corruption	  within	   the	   Egyptian	  state	  bureaucracy.10	  The	  negative	  image	  of	  the	  public	  servant	  is	  contrasted	  with	  that	  of	  the	  ‘modern’	  corporate	   executive,	   who	   has	   a	   high	   salary	   and	   related	   benefits,	   busy	   schedule,	   chic	  office	   or	   comfortable	   work	   environment,	   frequent	   work-­‐related	   travels,	   and	   exciting	  career	  prospects	  in	  a	  professional	  field	  with	  a	  globalist	  outlook.	  With	  the	  considerable	  increase	   in	  employment	  opportunities	   for	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  professionals	   in	  Egypt’s	  booming	   corporate	   private	   sector,	   a	   new	   discursive	   construction	   of	   the	   modern	  professional	   has	   emerged	   over	   the	   last	   two	   decades.	   It	   has	   become	   no	   less	   than	  fashionable	   for	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   to	   continually	   present	   themselves	   to	  friends	   and	   family	   members	   as	   suffering	   from	   typical	   corporate	   work-­‐related	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2009); Mohamed Adel (interview, Sheikh Zayed City, 25 April 2009)  Salah Ibrahim (interview, Giza, 13 May 
2009 ); Radwa Emad (interview, Giza, 11 March 2009); Soha Abdelaty (interview, Cairo, 16 March 2009); 
Hisham Sweilam (interview, Cairo, 12 November 2008); Rasha Zaatar (interview, Cairo, March 2010).   
9 Most notably: Ragui Assaad, "The Effects of Public Sector Hiring and Compensation Policies on the Egyptian 
Labor Market," The World Bank Economic Review 11, no. 1 (1997). See also: Mona Said, "A Decade of Rising 
Wage Inequality? Gender, Occupation, and Public-Private Issues in the Egyptian Wage Structure," in The 
Egyptian Labor Market in an Era of Reform, ed. Ragui Assaad (Cairo: the American University in Cairo Press, 
2002). 
10 Farouk Abdelkhalek, Juzur Al-Fassad Al-Idary Fi Misr: Bi'at Al-ʻamal Wa Siyyassat Al-Ujur Wa Al-
Murattabat Fi Misr (1963-2002) [the Roots of Administrative Corruption in Egypt: Work Environment and 
Renumeration Policies in Egypt (1963-2002)] (Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouk, 2008). 
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discomforts,	  such	  as	  increased	  workloads	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  time	  for	  recreational	  activities	  and	  personal	  life.	  Today,	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   university	   graduates	   are	   almost	   primarily	   oriented	  towards	   seeking	   employment	   in	   the	   private	   sector,	   especially	   in	   branches	   of	   the	  economy	  that	  are	  highly	  integrated	  into	  or	  influenced	  by	  the	  global	  economy.	  High	  pay,	  modern	  corporate-­‐like	  working	  premises,	   international	  work	  scope	  and	  opportunities	  for	   career	   development	   based	   on	   merit	   and	   social	   capital	   are	   characteristics	   that	  interviewees	   repeatedly	   cited	   as	   characteristic	   of	   this	   employment	   domain	   and	   thus	  much	  more	   attractive	   to	   young	  professionals	   in	   their	   struggle	   for	   the	  preservation	   of	  social	   position	   and	   status.	   For	   example,	   Hisham	   Ezzeldin,	   a	   thirty-­‐one-­‐year-­‐old	  marketing	   executive	   at	   the	   mobile	   phone	   services	   giant	   Vodafone,	   observed	   that	  employment	  outside	  a	  multinational	  company	  was	  unthinkable	  to	  him.	  His	  reasons,	  on	  the	   one	   hand,	   were	   purely	   economic:	   the	   income	   he	   was	   earning	   as	   a	   marketing	  executive	   at	   a	   multinational	   company	   with	   a	   modern	   management	   system	   (like	  
Vodafone)	   was	   effectively	   facilitating	   the	   affordability	   of	   his	   current	   lifestyle.	   These	  lifestyle	  components	  and	  consumption	  patterns,	  he	  stressed,	  were	  essential	  if	  he	  was	  to	  maintain	  a	   ‘suitable	  standard	  of	   living’11	  for	  his	  small	   family.	  But	  equally	   important	   to	  Hisham,	   a	   graduate	   in	  Business	  Administration	   from	   the	   ‘English	   language	   section’	   of	  Cairo	  University’s	  Faculty	  of	  Commerce,	  was	  the	  prestige	  he	  enjoyed	  among	  his	  and	  his	  wife’s	   friends.	   In	   his	   own	   words,	   it	   would	   be	   entirely	   inconceivable	   to	   work	   in	   the	  
hokuma	   (government),	   a	   career	   he	   described	   as	   a	  metaphorical	   grave	   for	   those	   ‘with	  professional	  skills	  and	  quality	  education,	  who	  want	  to	  realize	  their	  career	  potentials’.	  This	   discursive	   glorification	   of	   the	   modern	   private	   executive	   was	   arguably	   actively	  encouraged	  by	  state	  policies	  and	  political	  orientations	  during	  Mubarak’s	  rule.	  When	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Hisham Ezzeldin in discussion with the author, at the Gezira Club, Cairo, 17 October 2009. 
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budgetary	   burdens	   resulting	   from	   the	   employment	   guarantee	   of	   the	   early	   1960s	  (codified	  in	  Presidential	  Decree	  185	  and	  Law	  14	  of	  1964)	  considerably	  increased	  by	  the	  beginning	   of	   the	   1980s,	   the	   state	   started	   manoeuvring	   around	   that	   commitment.	   It	  implemented	  two	  deliberate	  policies	  to	  indirectly	  relieve	  itself	  of	  what	  had	  become	  an	  untenable	  component	  of	  the	  social	  contract,	  albeit	  without	  bearing	  the	  political	  cost	  of	  an	   outright	   retraction	   of	   this	   social	   commitment.	   The	   first	   policy	   was	   to	   curtail	   the	  number	   of	   university	   graduates;	   the	   second	   was	   to	   increase	   waiting	   times	   for	   job	  placements	   in	   the	   government,	   in	   the	   hope	   that	   graduates	   would	   drop	   out	   of	   the	  queue.12	  	  	  However,	   more	   recently,	   in	   the	   later	   years	   of	   Mubarak’s	   rule,	   the	   regime	   has	  pushed	   this	   glorification	   of	   the	   ‘executive’	   as	   a	   modern,	   enlightened	   and	   prosperous	  prototype	  of	  an	  emerging	  future	  generation	  to	  new	  levels.	  The	  depiction	  of	  the	  modern	  executive	   as	   representative	   of	   a	   social	   category	   at	   the	   cutting	   edge	   of	   society	  was	   an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  eventually	  failed	  attempts	  to	  create	  a	  constituency	  for	  the	  political	  rise	  of	  Gamal	  Mubarak	  as	  the	  heir	  apparent	  to	  his	  father’s	  presidency.	  These	  attempts	  were	  not	  only	  targeted	  at	  the	  upper,	  but	  also	  at	  the	  wider	  base	  of	  the	  lower,	  echelons	  of	  the	  middle	  class,	  still	  struggling	  to	  cope	  with	  neoliberal	  policies.	  The	  ‘Future	  Generation	  Foundation’	   was	   established	   1998,	   officially	   as	   a	   non-­‐profit	   organisation	   for	   creating	  high-­‐level	   professional	   training	   and	   qualification	   opportunities	   for	   young	   and	   rising	  leaders	  in	  the	  business	  community.	  In	  practice,	  it	  was	  the	  forum	  that	  brought	  together	  most	  of	  the	  country’s	  heavyweight	  capitalists13	  to	  pool	  resources	  and	  rally	  support,	  both	  domestically	   and	   internationally,	   for	   Gamal’s	   succession	   plans.	   It	   was	   an	   implicit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Assaad, "The Effects of Public Sector Hiring and Compensation Policies on the Egyptian Labor Market," 89. 
13 Some of the Foundation’s prominent board members, such as Rashid M. Rashid and Ahmed El Maghraby 
later became cabinet ministers in in the Ahmed Nazif government in 2004. Widely ladled hokumat rigal al-
a’mal (businessmen government), it was charged with administering the implementation of a more aggressive 
neoliberal economic agenda in close collaboration with the powerful NDP Policies Committee, headed by 
Gamal Mubarak since 2002.  
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political	  vessel	  for	  what	  El-­‐Naggar	  called	  the	  ‘nepotistic	  networks’14	  of	  businessmen	  and	  high	   state	   officials	   that	   came	   to	   dominate	   Egyptian	   politics	   in	   the	   last	   years	   of	  Mubarak’s	  rule.	  Material	  promoting	  the	  foundation’s	  role	  features	  one	  of	  the	  clearest	  expressions	  of	  the	  elevation	  of	  the	  image	  of	  the	  modern	  professional,	  and	  its	  depiction	  as	  a	  desirable	  example	   for	   Egyptian	   middle	  class	   entrants	   into	   to	  employment	   market	   to	   follow	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  era.	   In	  one	  of	  these	   clips,15	  the	   audio-­‐visual	  conception	   of	   a	   future	  
Egyptian	   generation	   is	  tellingly	   presented	   through	  aerial	  images	  of	  Cairo,	  followed	  by	  a	  scene	  in	  which	  suit-­‐wearing	  young	  executives	  carry	  leather	  cases	  outside	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  modern	  executive	  office	  building.	  The	  song	  playing	  in	  the	  background	  calls	  upon	  the	  ‘youth	  of	  the	  Nile’	  to	  hurry	  to	  the	  realisation	  of	  their	  aspirations	  through	  knowledge,	  for	  therein	  lies	  power	  and	  hope.	  This	  call	  is	  made	  against	   the	   backdrop	   of	   images	   of	   professionally	   dressed	  men	   and	   women	   sitting	   at	  their	  desktop	  computers	  or	  appearing	  to	  discuss	  the	  contents	  on	  a	  computer	  screen	  in	  a	  modern	  business	  surrounding.	  As	   part	   of	   the	   foundation’s	   celebration	   of	   its	   tenth	   anniversary,	   another	  production16	  placed	  an	  even	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  prestige	  of	  occupations	  within	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 El-Naggar, "Economic Policy: From State Control to Decay and Corruption," 49. 
15 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cBISmvfFPIU, accessed 11 November 2013. 
16 The clip was viewed during the author’s discussion with Noha Hatata, ‘Corporate Development Manager’ at 
the Future Generation Foundation, conducted in the foundation’s headquarters in Dokki, Cairo on 7 April 2009. 
Figure	  2:	  Gamal	  Mubarak	  (upper	  row,	  fourth	  from	  left)	  with	  graduates	  
of	  one	  of	  the	  Future	  Generation	  Foundation’s	  business	  courses,	  2009.	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modern	  neoliberal	  segment	  of	  the	  economy.	  The	  clip	  features	  anecdotes	  of	  two	  young,	  Egyptian,	  middle-­‐class	  brothers.	  The	  elder	  had	  graduated	  from	  what	  the	  clip	  (tellingly)	  admits	   is	   an	   education	   system	   ill-­‐suited	   to	   equip	   its	   graduates	   with	   needed	   skills	   to	  negotiate	  the	  labour	  market.	  After	  a	  period	  of	  despair	  caused	  by	  his	  fruitless	  efforts	  to	  find	  a	   job,	  he	  heard	  of	   the	   foundation’s	  English,	  computer	  and	  business	  skills	  courses.	  Having	  successfully	  completed	  these	  courses,	  the	  young	  man	  (dressed	  smartly	  in	  a	  shirt	  and	  tie)	  proudly	  announces	  that	  he	  easily	  found	  a	  job	  in	  ‘a	  big	  bank’.	  The	  clip	  then	  goes	  on	   to	   feature	   computer-­‐generated	   images	   of	   a	   group	   of	   performers	   –	   all	   dressed	   in	  business	   suits	   –	   carrying	   and	   climbing	   metal	   ladders,	   symbolising	   social	   ascendance	  through	  private-­‐sector	  employment.	  These	   clips	   are	   representative	   of	   a	   wider	   discourse	   engulfing	   the	   state’s	  consciously	  adopted	  strategies	  over	  the	  Mubarak	  years	  that	  conceal	  its	  practical	  retreat	  from	   the	   Nasserist	   social	   contract.	   These	   attempts	   intensified	   with	   the	   adoption	   of	  further	  liberalisation	  policies	  in	  the	  last	  years	  of	  Mubarak’s	  rule.	  As	  far	  as	  employment	  is	   concerned,	   the	   proliferation	   of	   a	   glorified	   image	   of	   the	   modern	   neoliberal	  professional	   became	   a	   sign	   of	   an	   almost-­‐total	   discursive	   shift	   away	   from	   the	  correspondent	  glorification	  of	  the	  technocratic	  state	  employee	  of	  the	  1960s.	  
2.3	  Egypt’s	  Neoliberal	  Shift:	  The	  Birth	  of	  a	  New	  Breed	  of	  
Employment	  As	  the	  discussion	  thus	  far	  suggests,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  too	  difficult	  to	  accept	  the	  link	  between	   the	   emergence	   of	   an	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   ‘employment	   domain’	   and	   Egypt’s	  neoliberal	  transformation	  –	  initially	  beginning	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  but	  gaining	  speed	  from	  the	   early	   1990s	   onwards.	   The	   domain,	   as	   pointed	   out	   earlier,	   is	   a	   rather	   conceptual	  social	   space	   that	   cuts	   across	   economic	   sectors,	   occupations	   and	   income	   levels.	   It	   can	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hardly	   be	   defined	   by	   sector,	   ownership	   (Egyptian,	   foreign	   or	   mixed),	   or	   size.	   As	   De	  Konig	  points	  out,	  it	  basically	  consists	  not	   only	   of	   multinationals,	   but	   also	   of	   large	   Egyptian	   corporations	   organized	  along	   the	   same	   lines	   as	   their	   multinational	   counterparts,	   for	   example,	   the	  mobile	  phone	   companies	   and	   the	   commercial	   banks.	   It	   also	   included	  agencies	  that	   provided	   business	   producer	   services	   to	   the	   former,	   NGO’s	   with	   foreign	  funding,	   and	   private	   firms	   that	   provided	   services	   to	   an	   affluent	   clientele,	   for	  example	  doctors	  in	  private	  clinics	  or	  architects.[...].	  It	  is	  comprised	  of	  companies	  in	   different	   sectors	   (though	   generally	   the	   ‘global	   growth	   sectors’	   of	   ICT,	  consultancy,	   business	   producer	   services,	   development	   and	   the	   like,	  with	   local	  and	  foreign	  ownership.17	  	  De	   Konig’s	   description	   clearly	   aims	   to	   delineate	   a	   conceptual	   domain	   of	  employment,	   a	   certain	   type	   of	   occupation	   in	   the	   labour	   market,	   the	   demarcation	   of	  which	   is	   subject	   to	   criteria	   generated	   from	   the	   attributes	   of	   a	   self-­‐inflicted	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   identity.	   Demarcating	   this	   employment	   domain	   in	   strictly	   quantitative	  terms	  is	  therefore	  quite	  a	  difficult	  task,	  as	  pointed	  out	  before.	  Nonetheless,	  to	  this	  end	  and	  building	  on	  chapter	  two’s	  demonstration	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  structural	  economic	  shift	  towards	  neoliberalism	  since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  it	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  highlight	  some	  relevant	  features	   of	   this	   transformation.	   The	   aim	   is	   to	   paint	   a	   picture	   of	   the	   changing	   socio-­‐economic	   structural	   environment	   within	   which	   the	   state’s	   role	   as	   an	   arena	   for	   the	  acquisition	  and	  reproduction	  of	  career-­‐related	  social	  prestige	  and	  status	  has	  gradually	  faded.	  As	  current	  generations	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class	  still	  view	  employment	  as	   a	   vital	   element	   of	   social	   preservation	   and	   reproduction,	   they	   are	   faced	   with	  negotiating	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  private	  sector	  rather	  than	  traditional	  career	  trajectories	  and	  networks	  within	  the	  state.	  After	   the	   October	   war	   of	   1973	   and	   with	   the	   inception	   of	   the	   liberalisation	  transformation	   under	   Sadat’s	   infitah	   policies,	   prominent	   bureaucrats	   who	   rose	   to	  positions	   of	   influence	   and	   control	   of	   the	  means	   of	   production	   in	   the	   state	   apparatus	  during	   the	  Nasser	   era	   started	   disengaging	   from	   the	   state	   as	   a	   primary	   employer	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 De Konig, Global Dreams: Class, Gender, and Public Space in Cosmopolitan Cairo, 75. 
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adjusting	   to	   the	   times	   looming	   ahead.	   Their	   position	   within	   the	   still-­‐powerful	   state	  apparatus	  had	  been	  consolidated	  in	  previous	  years	  not	  only	  through	  the	  dominant	  role	  the	  state	  played	  in	  the	  economy,	  but	  also	  through	  the	  nourishment	  of	  their	  ties	  with	  a	  private	  sector	  that	  was	  kept	  closely	   linked	  to	  and	  dependent	  on	  the	  state,	  and	  equally	  through	   the	   development	   of	   relations	   with	   various	   foreign	   benefactors.	   As	   the	  transformative	  movement	  away	  from	  the	  state	   led-­‐development	  model	  was	  imminent,	  the	  upper	  echelon	  of	  the	  state	  bourgeoisie	  was,	  as	  Waterbury	  accurately	  notes,	   ‘out	   in	  the	  open,	  courted	  by	  foreign	  businessmen,	  praised	  for	  its	  perseverance	  under	  Nasserist	  socialism,	   and	   promised	   a	   vanguard	   role	   in	   the	   development	   of	   Egypt’s	   mixed	  economy’.18	  As	  many	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  bureaucrats	  started	  seeking	  lucrative	  posts	  in	  the	   emerging	   private	   sector,	   a	   trend	   was	   set	   that,	   over	   the	   following	   years,	   would	  become	  the	  norm	  among	  the	  succeeding	  generations	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  class.	  Writing	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  only	  a	  few	  years	  after	  the	  inception	  of	  the	  infitah	  policy,	  Waterbury	  pointed	  to	  the	  early	  development	  of	  this	  trend,	  predicting	  that:	  The	  possibility	  that	  has	  opened	  up	  since	  1974	  is	  that	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  economic	  activity	   will	   shift	   to	   private	   Egyptian	   and	   foreign	   interests,	   sustained	   by	   a	  migration	  of	  the	  state	  bourgeoisie	  out	  of	  the	  state.19	  	  By	   1990,	   the	   underlying	   contradictions	   of	   the	   economy	   resulting	   from	   the	  politically	  wary	  approach	  to	  liberalisation	  and	  the	  accumulated	  heritage	  of	  Nasserist	  era	  welfare	   commitments,	   including	   the	   employment	   guarantee,	   had	   proven	   too	  fundamental	   to	   overcome.	   Egypt	   had	   no	   alternative	   but	   to	   embark	   on	   a	   plan	   for	  structural	   adjustment	  prescribed	  by	   the	   IMF	  and	   closely	  monitored	  by	   the	  Paris	  Club	  countries.	   At	   the	   heart	   of	   this	   structural	   adjustment	  was	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   legislative	  infrastructure	   to	   support	   wide	   privatisation	   of	   state-­‐owned	   economic	   enterprises.	  These	  reforms,	  as	  Rutherford	  points	  out,	   ‘included	  several	  laws	  that	  began	  to	  alter	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, 259-60. 
19 Ibid., 261. 
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role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  economy.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  legislation	  was	  the	  much-­‐celebrated	  privatization	   law	  of	  1991’.20	  Privatisation	  was	  a	  centrepiece	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  structural	  adjustment	   program.	   By	   June	   2000,	   the	   government	   had	   sold	   controlling	   shares	   in	  almost	   one-­‐third	   of	   publicly	   owned	   economic	   entities,	  with	   a	   value	   close	   to	   L.E.	   12.3	  billion.21	  The	  World	   Bank	   actively	   encouraged	   this	   emphasis	   on	   privatisation	   and	   the	  sale	   of	   publicly	   owned	   economic	   enterprises,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   subsequent	  evaluation	  of	  the	  economic	  reform	  program	  by	  the	  Bank,	  as	  Ikram	  asserts,	  ‘appeared	  to	  regard	  structural	   reform	  as	   synonymous	  with	  privatization’.22	  Total	   labour	   in	  publicly	  owned	  enterprises	  dropped	  from	  approximately	  one	  million	  in	  1993	  to	  under	  600,000	  in	  2000.23	  The	  extensive	  privatisation	  of	  publicly	  owned	  economic	  entities	  was	  not	  the	  only	  active	  measure	   that	   boosted	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   private	   sector.	   Over	   the	   course	   of	   the	  1990s	   and	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	   new	  millennium,	   a	   set	   of	   laws	  was	   promulgated	   to	  create	   investment-­‐	   and	   business-­‐friendly	   legislative,	   as	   well	   as	   macro-­‐economic	  conditions.	   ‘Investments	   incentives	  and	  guarantees’	  Law	  8	  of,	   for	  example,	   lifted	  price	  controls	   on	   products	   produced	   by	   companies	   formed	   thereunder	   and	   considerably	  reduced	   the	   bureaucratic	   procedures	   for	   opening	   and	   operating	   businesses.24	  A	   new	  arbitration	  law	  (27/1994);	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  revitalised	  stock	  market	  through	  Law	  95	  of	  1993;	  the	  issuance	  of	  Laws	  3	  of	  1998	  and	  155	  of	  2002,	  which	  abolished	  most	  red-­‐tape	  administrative	  obstacles,	   including	  prior	   licensing	  requirements	   for	  opening	  new	  companies;	   and	   Law	   10	   of	   2003,	   which	   unleashed	   the	   growth	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Bruce K. Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World (Priceton, 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 197-98. 
21 Ibid., 198. 
22 Khalid Ikram, The Egyptian Economy, 1952-2000: Performance Policies and Issues (New York: Routledge, 
2006), 84. 
23 Ibid., 81. 
24 Tarek F. Riad, "The Legal Environment for Investment in Egypt in the New Millenium," Arab Law Quarterly 
15, no. 2 (2000): 117-19. Cited in: Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the 
Arab World, 198. 
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telecommunications	  sector;	  all	  provided	   the	  necessary	  groundwork	   for	  expanding	   the	  role	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  the	  economy.	  As	  Rutherford	  asserts,	  ‘collectively,	  these	  laws	  curtailed	   the	   state’s	   role	   in	   economic	   production	   and	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   jobs	   and	  services’.25	  Our	  sense	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  these	  measures	  of	  creating	  a	  new	  breed	  of	  employment	  opportunity	  for	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  can	  be	  further	  sharpened	  by	  taking	  note	  of	  the	  considerable	   increase	  in	  private	  companies	  operating	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  market	  over	  the	  past	   twenty	   years	   in	   various	   sectors,	   but	   especially	   within	   legislative	   and	   regulatory	  frameworks	   designed	   to	   facilitate	   and	   attract	   both	   foreign	   and	   domestic	   private	  investment.	   Figures	   from	   the	  General	  Authority	  of	   Investment	   and	  Free	  Zones26	  show	  that	   in	   the	   period	   from	   January	   1980	   to	   April	   2009,	   inclusive,	   a	   total	   of	   63,197	  companies	  were	  established	  within	  the	  legislative	  frameworks	  of	  Laws	  159	  of	  1980	  and	  8	   of	   1997,	   specially	   devised	   to	   facilitate	   foreign	   direct	   and	   local	   private-­‐sector	  investment.	  Of	  this	  number,	  only	  3,099	  companies	  were	  established	  between	  1980	  and	  1991	  (inclusive)	  –	  i.e.	  less	  than	  5%	  of	  the	  total.27	  The	  very	  rate	  of	  increase	  in	  the	  annual	  establishment	   of	   these	   entities	   (Figure	   3),	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	  neoliberal	  economic	  agenda,	  strongly	  suggests	  a	  close	  relationship	  between	  this	  agenda	  and	  the	  facilitation	  of	  unprecedented	  growth	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  along	  with	  a	  growing	  rate	   of	   integration	  with	   the	   global	   economy.	   By	   2000,	   the	   contribution	   of	   the	   private	  sector	   to	   the	   total	   GDP	   reached	   slightly	   over	   70%,28	  and	   in	   2006,	   Finance	   Minister	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World, 199. 
26The main state institution responsible for the attraction and regulation of foreign investments in Egypt in 
accordance with the respective legislative frameworks (comprised mainly of Laws 159/1980, 8/1997 and their 
amendments and complementing presidential decrees). For more details of these legislative frameworks, see: 
http://www.investment.gov.eg/ar/Investment/Pages/maininvestlaws.aspx, accessed 16 July 2012.  
27 General Authority for Investment (GAFI) Database, 9 June 2009.  
28 Ikram, The Egyptian Economy, 1952-2000: Performance Policies and Issues, 84. 
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Youssef	  Boutros	  Ghali	  told	  the	  press	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  now	  accounted	  for	  80%	  of	  the	  economy.29	  
Figure	  3:	  Annual	  Number	  of	  Established	  Companies	  under	  Laws	  159/80	  and	  8/97,	  1980-­‐2009.	  
Source:	  General	  Authority	  for	  Investment	  (GAFI)	  Database,	  9/6/	  2009	  	  Important	   an	   indicator	   as	   they	   may	   be,	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   size	   of	   the	   private	  sector	   and	   the	   number	   of	   operating	   companies	   under	   the	   aforementioned	   legislative	  umbrellas	  are	  not	  the	  only	  features	  to	  consider	  in	  this	  context.	  Equally	  important	  is	  an	  appreciation	  of	   the	  enmeshment	  of	   the	  newly-­‐emerging	  private	  sector	  with	   the	  global	  economy,	   especially	   after	   Egypt	   joined	   the	   WTO	   in	   1995.	   Since	   then,	   globalisation-­‐related	  cultural	  and	  business	  practices,	  as	  well	  as	  technology	  trends,	  have	  created	  and	  shaped	  an	  employment	  domain	  in	  which	  the	  cosmopolitan	  capital	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  was	  well	  suited	  to	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  social	  reproduction.	  The	  development	  of	  Arab	   and	   foreign	   capital	   investments	   in	   companies	   established	   within	   the	  aforementioned	   legislative	   frameworks	   stands	   as	   a	   testimony	   to	   a	   growing	   structural	  integration	  with	   the	   global	   economy.	   In	   1980,	   for	   example,	   only	   L.E.	   182.9	  million	   of	  private	   capital	   investment	   (out	   of	   a	   total	   of	   L.E.	   two	   billion)	   came	   from	   foreign,	   non-­‐Arab	  sources.	  The	  Arab	  contribution	  was	  a	  mere	  L.E.	  116.5	  million.	  Such	  contributions	  rose	  dramatically	   as	   the	  neoliberal	   transformation	  was	  underway	   at	   the	  beginning	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 N. Moussa, "Private Sector's Share of GDP Rises Sharply," Daily News, 20 July 2006. Cited in: El-Naggar, 






































































































the	  1990s.	   In	  1996,	   these	  contributions	  were	  L.E.	  1.6	  and	  L.E1.7	  billion;	   in	  2001,	   they	  jumped	   to	   L.E.	   two	   billion	   and	   L.E.	   1.8	   billion,	   respectively.	   The	   growth	   picked	   up	   its	  pace	  in	  the	  following	  years:	  In	  2005,	  the	  foreign	  capital	  investment	  was	  L.E	  11.7	  billion,	  whereas	  Arab	  capital	   investments	  reached	  L.E	  4.9	  billion.	  Combined,	  both	   foreign	  and	  Arab	  capital	   investments	  reached	  a	   total	  of	  L.E	  22.88	  billion	  (L.E	  12.32	  billion	   foreign	  and	  LE.10.56	  billion	  Arab)	  in	  2008.30	  In	   this	   context,	   it	   is	   also	   quite	   telling	   to	   take	   note	   of	   the	   dramatic	   increase	   in	  companies	   established	   in	   economic	   sectors	   usually	   associated	  with	   globalisation	   and	  the	   new	   information	   age,	   such	   as	   the	   financial,	   service,	   telecommunication	   and	   IT	  sectors.	   As	   the	   following	   figure	   (Figure	   4)	   shows,	   the	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	  companies	  established	  in	  Egypt	  within	  the	  legislative	  framework	  previously	  mentioned	  in	  these	  sectors	  is	  remarkable.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  1980s,	  a	  meagre	  36	  companies	  were	  established	   in	   the	   telecommunication	   and	   IT	   sectors	   under	   Law	  159.	   In	   line	  with	   the	  advent	  of	  the	  information	  age,	  the	  following	  two	  decades	  (from	  1991	  to	  2009	  inclusive)	  saw	  the	  sector	  remarkably	  booming,	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  companies	  to	  3,255	  near	  the	  end	  of	  that	  period.	  
Figure	  4:	  Number	  of	  established	  companies	  under	  Laws	  159/80	  and	  8/97	  in	  selected	  sectors.	  
Source:	  General	  Authority	  for	  Investment	  (GAFI)	  Database,	  6/9/	  2009	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













	   Far	   from	  a	  comprehensive	  description	  of	   the	  quantitative	  characteristics	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  private	   sector	  or	   the	  number	  of	   jobs	   created	   in	   the	   indicated	   sectors	  during	  this	  period,	  the	  above	  figures	  are	  valuable	  in	  that	  they	  clearly	  point	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  qualitatively	  different	  employment	  domain.	  One	  could	  hence	  argue	  that	  a	  new	  ‘breed’	  of	   Egyptian	   businesses	   and	   companies	   emerged	   within	   the	   context	   of	   this	   macro-­‐economic	  transformation.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  traditional	  major	  public-­‐sector	  companies	  of	   the	   1960s,	   companies	   and	   corporations	   of	   the	   1990s	   were	   organised	   along	   the	  guidelines	   of	   Western	   management	   systems	   and	   structures,	   creating	   an	   Egyptian	  ‘corporate	  culture’	  in	  the	  labour	  market.	  Furthermore,	  in	  many	  cases,	  these	  companies	  and	   corporations	   either	  pioneered	  or	  dramatically	   transformed	  areas	  of	   the	   economy	  and	   the	  market	   that	   in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  stood	   for	   the	   ‘modern’	  or	   the	  spirit	  of	   the	  ‘global’.	   Examples	   certainly	   included	   companies	   operating	   in	   sectors	   such	   as	  telecommunications	  and	  mobile	  phone	  services,	  fast	  moving	  consumer	  goods	  (‘FMCGs’)	  and	   fast	   food.	   Businesses	   specialised	   in	   providing	   support	   services	   to	   these	   growing	  sectors,	  such	  as	  marketing,	  advertising,	  and	  public	  relations	  agencies,	  for	  example,	  can	  also	   be	   added	   to	   the	   same	   category.	   The	   ‘modern’	   as	   a	   conceptual	   description	   here	  should	  be	  understood	  to	  comprise	  every	  aspect	  of	  society	  that	  reflects	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  age	  of	  globalisation	  and	  the	  communication	  revolution.	  The	  emergence	  of	   this	  domain	   is	   closely	   tied	   to	  an	  ever-­‐growing	   integration	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  economy	   into	   the	  global	  market,	   and	   the	   increasing	   infiltration	  of	  a	  new	  cultural,	   lifestyle,	   consumption	  and	  employment	  ethos	  generated	  by	  globalisation	  and	  new	   technologies,	   into	   the	   socio-­‐cultural	   constitution	   of	   wide	   strata	   of	   the	   Egyptian	  middle	  class.	  The	  aforementioned	  structural	  changes	  represented	  the	  context	  for	  wide-­‐reaching	   discursive	   changes	   regarding	   employment	   and	   careers	   as	   tools	   for	   social	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reproduction	  within	   the	   Egyptian	   upper	  middle	   class.	   Securing	   a	   position	  within	   the	  employment	  domain	  that	  emerged	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  Egypt’s	  movement	  towards	  a	  neoliberal	  economy	  became	  one	  of	   the	  main	  stations	   in	  the	  cycle	  of	  consolidation	  of	  social	   identity	  and	  the	  preservation	  of	  social	  status.	  As	  the	  country	  moved	  towards	  its	  third	  decade	  of	  economic	   liberalisation,	  Egypt’s	  upper	  middle	  class’	   immigration	   from	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	   the	   state	  bureaucracy	  and	   state-­‐related	  employment	   in	  general	  was	  in	  full	  sway.	  As	  the	  venue	  for	  social	  reproduction	  through	  employment	  moved	  away	  from	   the	   state,	   resulting	   similar	   changes	   to	  political	   agency	  were	   slowly	   taking	  effect.	  The	  foundations	  of	  social,	  and	  hence	  eventually	  political,	  agency	  were	  being	  shaped	  and	  informed	   by	   new	   mechanisms	   developed	   throughout	   the	   experience	   of	   negotiating	  social	   reproduction	   through	   the	   neoliberal	   market,	   rather	   than	   the	   through	   the	  continuation	  of	  a	  structural	  relationship	  with	  the	  state.	  Whereas	  the	  latter	  was	  heavily	  relied	   on	   in	   the	   past	   to	   produce	   political	   consent	   to	   authoritarian	   rule,	   the	   former	   is	  currently	  informing	  a	  growing	  appetite	  for	  a	  different	  composition	  and	  function	  of	  the	  ‘political’.	  The	   following	   section	   will	   examine	   some	   of	   the	   mechanisms	   by	   which	   this	  process	   of	   negotiating	   the	   neoliberal	   employment	  market	   takes	   place	   in	   practice.	   By	  focusing	  on	  recruitment	  processes	  in	  the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  ‘employment	  domain’	  and	  the	   dynamics	   of	   social	   filtration	   embedded	   within	   these	   processes,	   the	   nature	   of	  employment	  as	  an	   important	  component	  of	  social	  reproduction	  becomes	  clear,	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  social	  action	  of	  class	  reproduction	  forms	  the	  normative	   foundation	   of	   the	   political	   agency	   of	   Egypt’s	   upper	   middle	   class	   in	   the	  neoliberal	  era.	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3.	  Social	  Status	  Reproduction	  in	  the	  Neoliberal	  Employment	  Market	  
3.1	  Job	  Recruitment	  Mechanisms	  as	  De	  Facto	  Social	  Filters	  Entrance	   into	   the	   job	  market	   is	   an	   important	   step	   for	  newly	   graduated	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   in	   their	   struggle	   to	   reproduce	   their	   social	   status.	   The	   main	  objective	  at	  this	  stage	  is	  to	  secure	  a	  place	  within	  the	  domain	  of	  neoliberal	  employment.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  vital	  to	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  entry	  into	  this	  domain	  to	  gain	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  employment	  functions	  as	  a	  social	  space	  for	  the	  consolidation	  and	  reproduction	  of	   social	   identity	  and	  status.	  The	  dynamics	  by	  which	  a	   fresh	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   graduate	   enters	   the	   employment	   market	   act	   as	   a	   social	   filtration	   tool,	  eventually	  leading	  to	  a	  further	  consolidation	  of	  social	  distinction	  through	  limiting	  access	  to	  certain	  types	  of	  careers	  to	  those	  who	  have	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  social	  credentials.	  Formally	   speaking,	   most	   neoliberal,	   private-­‐sector	   employers	   have	   relatively	  advanced,	  Western-­‐like	   Human	   Resources	   (HR)	   systems	   in	   place	   for	   the	   recruitment	  and	  professional	  development	  of	  their	  employees.	  The	  HR	  professionals	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  design	   and	   implementation	   of	   these	   systems	   interviewed	   for	   this	   research	   usually	  adamantly	   insisted	   that	  measures	  of	  professional	  excellence,	  or	   the	  prospects	   thereof,	  are	   the	  main	   guiding	   criteria	   for	   recruitment	  within	   these	   entities.	  However,	   a	   closer	  examination	  of	  typical	  recruitment	  processes	  and	  practices	  in	  this	  employment	  domain	  reveals	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  set	  of	  almost-­‐generic	  social	  filters	  within	  these	  processes.	  The	  failure	   of	   the	   public	   education	   system	   to	   provide	   its	   graduates	   with	   suitable	  ‘cosmopolitan	   capital’	   has	   a	   direct	   impact	   on	   determining	   which	   routes	   into	   the	  employment	   market	   are	   open	   or	   closed	   to	   graduates	   from	   different	   middle-­‐class	  backgrounds.	   Upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   in	   possession	   of	   foreign	   or	   private	  education	   have	   enough	   cultural	   capital	   to	   invest	   in	   the	   search	   for	   a	   place	  within	   the	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‘domain’.	  Vitally,	  the	  point	  of	  entrance	  into	  the	  employment	  market	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	   crossroads	  on	   the	   route	   to	   social	   distinction.	   It	   is	   a	   social-­‐filtering	  point	   in	  which	  an	  individual’s	  cultural	  capital	  plays	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  determining	  his/her	  future	  route	  within	  the	  employment	  market,	  either	  towards	  the	  high-­‐end	  employment	  domain	  or	  towards	  the	  lower	  strata	  of	  the	  employment	  market.	  Laila	  Hassan	  Bur,	  a	  senior	  Human	  Resources	  executive	  at	  Exxon	  Mobil	  Egypt	  has	  years	   of	   experience	   in	   designing,	   implementing	   and	   overseeing	   the	   oil	   giant’s	  recruitment	   and	   HR	   activities	   in	   Egypt.31	  According	   to	   Bur,	   Exxon	   Mobil	   Egypt	   has	  committed	  to	  a	  global	  recruitment	  policy	  designed	  by	  the	  parent	  company,	  which	  aims	  to	   attract	   recent	   graduates	   who,	   in	   the	   future,	   could	   assume	   higher	   responsibilities	  within	   the	   corporate	   structure.	   Through	   the	   corporation’s	   characteristic	   policy	   of	  promoting	   from	   within,	   newly	   recruited	   graduates	   are	   hired	   with	   a	   view	   to	   their	  prospective	  future	  development	  within	  the	  company,	  up	  to	  the	  top	  management	   level.	  Around	   60%	   of	   the	   company’s	   new	   recruits	   have	   a	   foreign-­‐school	   educational	  background.	   This	   includes	   both	   graduates	   of	   entirely	   foreign	   schools	   as	   well	   as	  graduates	   of	   reputable	   private	   schools	   in	   which	   the	   educational	   process	   is	   designed	  according	  to	  British,	  American,	  French	  or	  German	  specifications.	  The	  pool	   from	  which	  the	  company	  recruits	  its	  employees	  is	  therefore	  naturally	  limited	  to	  certain	  educational	  institutions	   that	  provide	   their	  graduates	  with	  a	  solid	  knowledge	  of	  a	   foreign	   language	  (in	   this	   case	   mainly	   English	   and	   French,	   given	   the	   company’s	   regional	   scope	   of	  operations),	  and	  a	  set	  of	  skills	  and	  attributes	  generally	  scarce	  in	  the	  wider	  pool	  of	  new	  graduates	   (such	   as	   critical	   thinking	   abilities,	   advanced	   computer	   skills	   and	  interpersonal	  skills).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Laila Hassan Bur in discussion with the author, in her office in the Exxon Mobil building in Cairo on 12 
November 2008. As of 2010, Bur has been promoted to head of the company's HR operations. Unless otherwise 
referenced, information and figures cited pertaining to Exxon Mobil Egypt were obtained from Laila Bur during 
this interview. 
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Bur	  gave	  a	  clear	  instance	  of	  how	  this	  policy	  of	  focusing	  on	  recruiting	  candidates	  from	   certain	   institutions	   has	   proven	   to	   be	   of	   long-­‐term	   benefit	   to	   the	   company.	   For	  example,	   the	   company’s	   operations	   in	   Alexandria,	   the	   country’s	   second-­‐largest	   city,	  requires	  the	  hiring	  of	  engineers	  with	  a	  solid	  knowledge	  of	  both	  English	  and	  French.	  For	  years,	   the	   company	   has	   recruited	   a	   high	   percentage	   of	   its	   required	   employees	   from	  amongst	  graduates	  of	  the	  College	  Saint	  Marc,	  a	  private	  French	  Roman-­‐Catholic	  school32	  with	   one	   of	   the	   highest	   reputations	   for	   educational	   excellence	   in	   the	   city.	   In	   Bur’s	  words,	   the	   reason	   behind	   such	   preference	   is	   that	   the	   quality	   and	   the	   calibre	   of	   the	  candidates	  have	  been	  proven:	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  most	  of	  the	  people	  who	  have	  succeeded	  in	  our	  company	  (in	  Alexandria)	  are	  graduates	  of	  Saint	  Marc.	  So	  there	   is	  a	  precedent,	  and	   it	  makes	  your	  search	  easier.	  [...]	  Over	  the	  years	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  amongst	  the	  graduates	  of	   Alexandria	   University	   whom	   we	   hire,	   graduates	   of	   that	   school	   and	   the	  individual	  competencies	  and	  qualities	  they	  possess	  help	  them	  to	  succeed	  in	  our	  company.	  	  This	  logic	  applied	  to	  Exxon	  Mobil	  Egypt’s	  corporate	  recruitment	  process	  is	  widely	  representative	   of	   other	   recruitment	   practices	   in	   corporations	   with	   similar	   western	  managerial	  structures.	  Of	  course,	  the	  example	  of	  College	  St.	  Marc	   in	  Alexandria	  applies	  to	   other	   reputable	   educational	   institutions	   primarily	   located	   in	   Cairo,	   the	   access	   to	  which	  is	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  dependant	  on	  a	  family’s	  ability	  to	  secure	  such	  education	  for	  their	   children,	   as	   chapter	   three	   discussed	   in	   some	   detail.	   Hence,	   the	   possession	   of	   a	  secondary	  school	  or	  university	  degree	   from	  a	   limited	  pool	  of	   schools	  and	  universities	  that	   are	   widely	   labelled	   as	   providing	   ‘quality	   education’	   is	   the	   first	   step	   towards	  enabling	  a	  typical	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptian	  to	  embark	  on	  the	  re-­‐production	  of	  social	  status	  through	  his	  or	  her	  career.	  It	  is	  thus	  fair	  to	  infer	  that,	  while	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Founded in 1928. 
 
	  202	  
candidate	   to	   have	   the	   right	   secondary	   school	   or	   university	   background	   (as	   other	  subjective	  and	  objective	  factors	  play	  a	  role	  in	  career	  advancement	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  section),	  the	  candidate	  must	  have	  such	  a	  background	  to	  be	  considered	  for	  the	  job	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Such	  a	  qualification	  is	  thus	  necessary,	  but	  not	  sufficient,	  to	  achieving	  desired	  employment.	  The	  consideration	  of	  educational	  qualifications	   from	  a	  relatively	   well-­‐defined	   pool	   of	   socially	   accredited	   institutions	   therefore	   serves	   as	   a	  social	   filter	  between	  a	  university	   graduate	   and	  a	   career	  within	   the	  desired	  neoliberal	  domain	  of	  the	  employment	  market.	  The	   categorisation	   of	   candidates	   by	   their	   secondary	   school	   or	   university	  certificates	  is	  the	  first	  of	  several	  other	  HR	  filtering	  practices	  that	  ultimately	   lead	  to	  an	  offer	  of	  a	  career	  opportunity	  at	  a	  corporation	  like	  Exxon	  Mobil.	  Should	  a	  candidate	  for	  a	  job	   there	   pass	   the	   first	   screening	   process,	   he	   or	   she	   is	   subjected	   to	   a	   series	   of	   panel	  interviews	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  testing	  technical	  skills	  and	  personal	  qualities.	  In	  Exxon	  Mobil	  
Egypt’s	   case,	   this	  process	   is	   tellingly	  called	   ‘Behavioural	  Event	   Interviewing’.	  A	   typical	  interview	  may	   take	   up	   to	   three	   hours.	   In	   addition	   to	   testing	   a	   candidate’s	   fluency	   in	  foreign	  languages	  and	  technical	  skills,	  the	  interview	  also	  requires	  candidates	  to	  cite	  life	  situations	   that	   could	   demonstrate	   the	   degree	   to	  which	   they	   are	   blessed	  with	   certain	  ‘corporate-­‐life	  essential’	  qualities	  such	  as	  problem	  solving,	  creativity,	  ability	  to	  work	  as	  part	  of	  a	  team,	  leadership	  and	  so	  forth.	  Job	  interviews	  remain	  de	  facto	  social	  filters	  by	  which	  corporations	  and	  companies	  within	  the	  domain	  effectively	  determine	  the	  general	  class	   character	  of	   their	  body	  of	  employees	  and	  executives.	  Even	  when,	   in	   some	  cases,	  the	   recruitment	   process	   features	   initial	   objective	   filtration	   steps	   for	   applicants,	   these	  are	   usually	   comprised	   of	   American-­‐designed	   examinations	   such	   as	   GMAT,	   GRE	   or	  TOEFL.	  Naturally,	  candidates	  with	  the	  educational	  profiles	  and	  language	  skills	  acquired	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in	   the	   private	   international	   or	   semi-­‐international	   segments	   of	   the	   education	   system	  have	  more	  realistic	  odds	  of	  progressing	  to	  further	  recruitment	  stages.	  A	   case	   in	   point	   is	   Rasha	   Zaatar,	   a	   35-­‐year-­‐old	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   corporate	  banking	   executive	   at	   HSBC	   Egypt.	  33	  Rasha	   joined	   the	   bank	   directly	   after	   graduating	  from	   the	   English-­‐language	   section	   of	   the	   Faculty	   of	   Commerce	   at	  Ain	   Shams,	   Egypt’s	  second	  largest	  public	  university.	  As	  she	  approached	  graduation,	  she	  envisaged	  her	  ideal	  job	  as	  being	  part	  of	  a	  multinational	  company	  offering	  a	  relatively	  high	  salary,	  where	  her	  fellow	  employees	  would	  be	  of	  the	  certain	  social	  standard	  she	  chose	  to	  describe	  as	  nidif	  (clean).	  She	   had	   filed	   an	   application	   to	   work	   for	   HSBC	   Egypt	   in	   an	   employment	   fair	  organised	  on	  campus	  during	  her	  final	  year	  of	  study	  (in	  2001).	  The	  bank	  selected	  Rasha’s	  application	   and	   asked	   her	   to	   sit	   an	   initial	   examination	   specially	   designed	   for	  recruitment	  purposes,	  testing	  numerical	  skills,	  IQ,	  English	  language	  ability,	  and	  critical	  and	  verbal	  reasoning.	  Rasha	  successfully	  passed	  the	  tests;	  and	  since	  she	  had	  specified	  the	   bank’s	   corporate	   banking	   division	   as	   her	  main	   preference	   for	   employment	   in	   the	  bank	  in	  her	  application,	  she	  was	  required	  to	  take	  the	  GMAT	  examination	  as	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  recruitment	  process.	  Her	  score	  was	  high	  enough	  to	  allow	  her	  to	  proceed	  to	  the	  final	  stage	  of	  the	  process,	  which	  involved	  a	  personal	  interview.	  The	  interview	  panel	  was	  comprised	  of	  five	  of	  the	  bank’s	  top	  executives,	  including	  its	  managing	   director,	   the	   deputy	  managing	   director,	   the	   head	   of	   the	   credit	   and	   risk	  department,	   the	  head	  of	   corporate	  banking,	   and	   the	  head	  of	   the	  HR	  department.	   ‘The	  interview	  day	  was	  very	  difficult’,	  remembers	  Rasha:	  They	  intentionally	  put	  you	  under	  stress	  by	  letting	  you	  wait	  for	  two	  hours	  before	  the	  interview.	  The	  interview	  took	  place	  in	  the	  bank’s	  boardroom.	  I	  sat	  facing	  the	  panel	   and	   during	   the	   interview	   they	   kept	   their	   straight	   faces	   all	   the	   time,	   no	  matter	  what	  you	  said.	  The	  chairman	  asked	  all	   the	  questions.	   [...]	  He	  asked	  me	  many	   questions	   about	   my	   family’s	   background,	   who	   my	   parents	   were,	   what	  they	  did	  for	  a	  living,	  my	  siblings,	  what	  their	  occupations	  were,	  everything.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Interview with Rasha Zaatar, Cairo, March 2010. 
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  Overall,	  Rasha’s	  recollection	  of	  the	  questions	  she	  was	  asked	  during	  the	  interview	  shows	  that	  they	  fall	  into	  two	  broad	  categories:	  namely,	  social	  profiling	  and	  professional	  skills	   questions.	   During	   the	   interview,	   professional	   excellence	   was	   not	   nearly	   as	  emphasised	   as	   the	   scrutiny	   of	  Rasha’s	   social	   background.	   The	  proceedings	   of	  Rasha’s	  interview	   represent	   a	   common,	   informal	   social-­‐filtering	   practice	   of	   recruiters	   in	   the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   employment	   domain.	   It	   is	   a	   consciously	   executed,	   yet	   unwritten,	  strategy	   to	   secure	   the	   coherence	   of	   the	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   character	   of	   the	   body	   of	  employees,	   in	  addition	  to	  maintaining	  standards	  of	  professional	  excellence.	   In	  Rasha’s	  own	  words,	  her	  later	  years	  working	  for	  the	  bank	  in	  Cairo	  clearly	  demonstrated	  that	  a	  very	  big	  part	  of	  the	  foundation	  for	  selection	  at	  HSBC	  was,	  and	  probably	  still	  is,	  that	   all	   the	   people	   there	   have	   to	   be	   of	   a	   certain	   social	   standard.	   I	   have	   never	  seen	  anyone	  recruited	  who	  lived	  in	  Imbaba	  34	  for	  example,	  perhaps	  only	  in	  jobs	  like	  drivers	  etc.	  	  In	   Rasha’s	   case,	   of	   the	   620	   candidates	  who	   took	   the	   GMAT	   test	   as	   part	   of	   the	  application	  process,	  only	  24	  made	   it	   through	  the	  process,	   to	  start	   the	  so-­‐called	   ‘credit	  course’.	   This	   course	   is	   an	   extensive	   professional	   training	   course,	   an	   essential	  requirement	  to	  work	  in	  the	  prestigious	  credit-­‐related	  departments	  of	  the	  bank	  (such	  as	  corporate	  or	  investment	  banking),	  and	  is	  only	  offered	  to	  the	  few,	  recruited	  candidates.	  Practices	   aiming	   to	   preserve	   a	   certain	   social,	   primarily	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class,	  characteristic	  of	  the	  body	  of	  employees	  in	  this	  segment	  of	  the	  economy	  are	  by	  no	  means	  confined	  the	  local	  branches	  of	  multinational	  giants	  such	  as	  Exxon	  Mobil	  or	  HSBC.	  Smaller	  private	   sector	   companies,	   often	   the	   creation	   of	   joint	   Egyptian	   and	   Arab	   or	   foreign	  investment,	   engage	   in	   similar	   practices.	   Deljane	   Kumnaksh 35 	  heads	   the	   human	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 A popular quarter of the Giza governorate, located in close proximity to the typically upper-middle-class 
neighborhood of Mohandessin.  
35 Deljane Kumnaksh in discussion with the author, in her office in Heliopolis, Cairo on 4 November 2008. All 
information related to the company, its policies and recruitment practices and activities are based on this 
interview. 
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resources	  department	  at	  Amiral	  (Arabic	  for	  Admiral),	  a	  multinational	  corporate	  group36	  that	   owns	   and	   operates	   several	   companies	   and	   employs	   around	   five	   hundred	  employees.	  The	  group's	  headquarters	  are	  based	   in	  Cairo’s	  affluent	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  
Heliopolis	  quarter.	   Given	   the	   group's	   scope	   of	   operations	   and	   its	   ambitious	   plans	   for	  future	   growth,	   HR	   planning	   to	   anticipate	   and	   cater	   to	   the	   company’s	   future	   human	  resources	  needs	  is	  being	  given	  special	  attention	  at	  the	  corporate	  level.	  Selection	  of	  new	  employees	  is	  based	  on	  a	  ‘competency	  matrix’,	  which	  comprises	  a	  set	  of	  basic	  criteria	  for	  hiring,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  specific	  requirements	  of	  the	  positions	  being	  filled.	  The	  group’s	  top	  management	  agreed	   to	  a	   set	  of	  basic	  criteria	  on	  which	   the	   ‘competency	  matrix’	   is	  based	   in	  several	  prolonged	  sessions.	  The	   facilitation	  of	   these	  sessions	  was	  carried	  out	  by	  an	  expert	  from	  a	  leading	  American	  consultancy	  firm	  that	  was	  especially	  hired	  by	  the	  group	  to	  design	  an	  advanced	  human	  resources	  system	  and	  to	  set	  forth	  the	  group’s	  HR	  strategy	   looking	   several	   years	   into	   the	   future.	   This	   process	   generated	   a	   set	   of	   core	  competencies	   that	   an	   ideal	   candidate	   would	   possess;	   albeit,	   with	   each	   competency	  weighted	   differently,	   according	   to	   the	   requirement	   of	   a	   specific	   job.	   Kumnaksh	  describes	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  process	  as	  follows:	  We	  said	  that	  we	  want	  our	  people	  to	  have	  communication	  skills,	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  fluency	   in	   English,	   teamwork,	   integrity,	   initiative,	   leadership	   skills,	   customer	  service	  skills,	  problem	  solving	  ability,	  and	  conceptual	  thinking.	  These	  are	  more	  or	  less	  the	  core	  competencies	  any	  company	  would	  look	  for	  in	  a	  candidate.	  The	  different	  levels	  of	  these	  competencies	  required	  for	  a	  specific	  job	  we	  recruit	  for	  is	  what	  makes	  up	  our	  competencies	  matrix.	  	  In	  practice,	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  formalised	  HR	  system	  consolidates	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  recruitment	  process	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  the	  reproduction	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The group’s majority shareholder is a Jordanian investor with equity shared by several other Arab and 
European investors. The group owns several companies working in various fields such as shipment logistics and 
port management, IT services and the development of bio-fuels. Some of these companies had had separate 
operations since 1992 but were all assembled into one corporate structure in 2000. The group’s diverse 
investment portfolio also seizes on opportunities that may arise from its main area of operations. One of its main 
operations, for example, is managing the port of Al-‘Ain Al-Sukhna on the Red Sea coast some 120km east of 
Cairo and 50km south of Suez. But the group also owns an electronic butchery located in the concession area 
around the port, where cattle imported through the port is butchered and the meat processed for sale in markets 
in Cairo and the Nile Delta region. 
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status.	   The	   very	   pool	   of	   recruitment	   –	   whether	   for	   entry-­‐level	   jobs	   or	   more	   senior	  positions	  in	  the	  corporate	  structure	  –	  is	  itself	  an	  initial	  social	  filter,	  since	  it	  is	  primarily	  comprised	   of	   recruitment	   agencies,	   CVs	   collected	   during	   employment	   fairs	   in	   higher-­‐education	   institutions,	   professional	   head-­‐hunters,	   as	   well	   as	   feedback	   and	  recommendations	   of	   counterparts	   in	   the	   corporate	   sector.	   Access	   to	   such	   channels	  leading	  to	  the	  employment	  domain	  in	  question	  remains	  fairly	  limited	  to	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   with	   the	   necessary	   social	   capital,	   as	   previously	   pointed	   out.	   The	  aforementioned	  set	  of	   formal	  criteria	  on	  which	  recruitment	   is	  based	   in	   itself	   suggests	  that	   candidates	   of	   primarily	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   social	   backgrounds,	   typically	  possessing	   a	   private	   education	   and	   the	   necessary	   cultural	   capital,	   are	   likely	   to	   be	  considered.	   Finally,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   structural	   social	   filtration	   embedded	   in	   the	  formalised	  HR	   system,	   the	   subjective	   assessment	   of	   the	   group’s	  HR	  department	   staff,	  who	  implement	  the	  recruitment	  steps	  for	  new	  employees,	  is	  yet	  another	  implicit	  social	  filter.	   Ensuring	   a	   certain	   level	   of	   social	   cohesion	   and	   harmony	   among	   the	   body	   of	  employees	  is	  even	  regarded	  as	  a	  requirement	  for	  the	  smooth	  and	  problem-­‐free	  conduct	  of	  business.	  To	  this	  end,	  Kumnaksh	  tellingly	  points	  out	  that:	  By	  experience	  you	  gain	  an	  eye	  for	  who	  will	   fit	   in	  or	  not,	   […]	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  sometimes	   when	   I	   see	   someone	   coming	   in	   for	   an	   interview	   or	   when	   I	   am	  passing	  by	  an	  interview	  being	  conducted	  I	  take	  a	  look	  at	  the	  candidate	  and	  from	  their	  appearance,	  their	  clothing,	  or	  the	  way	  they	  are	  sitting	  in	  the	  chair	  I	  wave	  from	  behind	  their	  back	  to	  the	  panel	  indicating	  that	  this	  person	  is	  not	  going	  to	  fit	  in.	   Sometimes	   I	   get	   a	   professional,	   who	   is	   very	   qualified,	   but	   I	   know	   that	   if	   I	  instate	   him	   into	   the	   place	   where	   he	   would	   professionally	   fit,	   neither	   his	  manager	  nor	  his	  co-­‐workers	  would	  be	  able	  to	  deal	  with	  him.	  Because	  when	  you	  hire	  someone	  in	  a	  certain	  position	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  who	  he	  is	  going	  to	  work	  with	  and	  whether	  there	  will	  be	  harmony	  amongst	  them	  or	  not.	  	  In	   conclusion,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   contextualise	   the	   process	   of	   recruitment	   of	   new	  entrants	  into	  the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  employment	  domain.	  This	  process	  is	  governed	  by	  an	   indicative	   mixture	   of	   structural	   and	   agency-­‐related	   mechanisms,	   both	   of	   which	  ensure	   the	   continuation	   of	   this	   employment	   domain	   as	   a	   main	   social	   area	   of	   upper-­‐
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middle-­‐class	   social	   status	   preservation	   and	   reproduction.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   Egypt’s	  neoliberal	  transformation,	  employment	   in	  the	   ‘domain’	  has	  replaced	  the	  upper	  middle	  class’	   traditional	   reliance	   on	   employment	   routes	   in	   influential	   echelons	   of	   the	   state	  bureaucracy	   as	   a	   preservation	   strategy	   for	   social	   status.	   The	   formal	   managerial	  recruitment	   processes	   of	   corporations	   and	   multinational	   companies	   in	   the	   domain	  arguably	   conceal	   implicit,	   yet	   systematically	   and	   persistently	   followed,	   strategies	   for	  social	  distinction	  based	  on	   the	  possession	  of	  social	  capital.	  Such	  mechanisms	  not	  only	  firmly	  control	  points	  of	  entry	  into	  the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  employment	  domain,	  but	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  also	  control	  the	  mechanism	  of	  advancement	  and	  success	  therein.	  The	  following	  section	  will	  provide	  an	  example	  of	  how	  such	  mechanisms	  function	  practically	  within	  the	  general	  structural	  environment	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  transformation.	  It	  will	   commence	  by	  reviewing	   the	  structural	   changes	   in	   the	  Egyptian	  banking	  sector,	  and	   will	   then	   draw	   on	   the	   case	   of	   Sherif	   El	   Leissy,	   an	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   banking	  professional,	   to	   provide	   an	   in-­‐depth	   demonstration	   of	   some	   dynamics	   engulfing	   the	  negotiation	  of	  prospects	  of	  upwards	  mobility	  in	  the	  corporate	  employment	  domain.	  
3.2	  Securing	  Status	  Reproduction	  Through	  Career	  Advancement	  in	  a	  
Transforming	  Banking	  Sector	  
	   Along	  the	  many	  changes	  to	  Cairo’s	  urban	  setting	  in	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  has	  been	  the	   proliferation	   of	   branches	   of	   numerous	   commercial	   banks	   that	   have	   entered	   the	  Egyptian	   market	   in	   the	   past	   decade.	   Within	   the	   Egyptian	   capital’s	   fast-­‐changing	   and	  transforming	  urban	  outlook	  in	  recent	  years,	  these	  branches	  are	  quite	  visible,	  occupying	  street	   corners	   and	   distinctive	   locations	   on	   the	   city’s	   main	   roads.	   The	   banners,	  advertisements	  and	  interior	  designs	  of	  these	  branches	  echo	  those	  of	  similar	  enterprises	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in	  any	  major	  Western	  metropolis.	  Indeed,	  many	  of	  these	  banks	  are	  franchises	  of	  major	  Western	  banking	  corporations	  (including	  HSBC,	  Citibank,	  Barclays,	  and	  BNP	  Paribas,	  to	  name	   a	   few).	   Over	   the	   past	   decade,	   on	  weekend	  mornings,	   Egyptian	   newspapers	   are	  usually	   full	   of	   advertisements	   for	   these	   institutions,	   offering	   various	   retail	   financial	  products,	  such	  as	  credit	  cards	  or	  consumer	  loan	  schemes.	  These	  products	  are	  primarily	  designed	   to	   commercially	   capitalise	   on	   the	   ever-­‐growing	   market	   appetite	   for	   the	  acquisition	   of	   consumer	   items	   that	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   typical	   components	   of	   the	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   lifestyle,	   ranging	   from	   homes	   and	   vacation	   chalets	   in	   exclusive	   gated	  compounds	   to	   cars	  and	  high-­‐tech	  gadgets.	  This	   refurbished	   image	   is	  but	  one	  material	  manifestation	  of	  a	  major	  structural	  transformation	  that	  the	  Egyptian	  banking	  sector	  has	  undergone	  in	  previous	  years	  as	  part	  of	  the	  country’s	  neoliberal	  economic	  shift.	  The	  issuance	  of	  ‘The	  Central	  Bank,	  Banking	  System,	  and	  Money’	  Law	  88	  of	  2003	  prepared	   the	   stage	   for	   ambitious	   reforms	   in	   the	   banking	   sector.	   The	   new	   legislation	  introduced	  several	   important	  changes,	   including	  complete	   independence	  and	  stronger	  oversight	   powers	   for	   the	   Central	   Bank,	   the	   discontinuation	   of	   special	   treatment	   for	  state-­‐owned	  banks	  to	  encourage	  competition,	  and	  the	  assertion	  of	  the	  right	  of	  private-­‐sector	   parties	   to	   hold	   shares	   in	   state-­‐owned	   banks.	   However,	   it	   was	   not	   until	   the	  appointment	   of	   Ahmed	   Nazif’s	   government	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   2004	   that	   a	  comprehensive	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  reform	  program	  for	  the	  banking	  sector	  was	  designed	  and	  implemented.	  Mahmoud	  Mohieldin,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Investment	  from	  2004	  to	  2010	  and	   one	   of	   the	   main	   proponents	   of	   neoliberalism	   in	   Egypt	   over	   the	   past	   decade,	  described	  the	  ‘Financial	  Sector	  Reform	  program’,	  endorsed	  in	  late	  2004,	  as	  the	  ‘most	  far	  reaching,	   and	   comprehensive	   program	   ever	   conducted	   in	   Egypt’. 37 	  The	   intended	  program	  was	  to	  establish	  independent	  audits	  of	  state-­‐owned	  banks,	  divest	  public	  sector	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Mohieldin and Nasr, "On Bank Privatization: The Case of Egypt," 709. 
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shares	   in	   joint	   venture	   banks,	   restructure	   and	   merge	   some	   state-­‐owned	   banks,	   and	  prepare	  one	  of	   the	  major	  public	  banks	   for	  privatisation.38	  The	  overall	  objective	  of	   the	  program	  was	   to	   ‘foster	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   sound,	   efficient,	   and	   diversified	   financial	  system,	  increasingly	  private-­‐sector	  led,	  that	  could	  contribute	  more	  effectively	  to	  Egypt’s	  growth	  performance’.39	  The	   restructuring	   of	   the	   banking	   sector	   went	   forward	   as	   envisaged.	   At	   the	  commencement	  of	  the	  reform	  program,	  the	  banking	  sector	  comprised	  57	  banks,	  seven	  of	   which	   were	   completely	   state-­‐owned.	   Four	   of	   these	   were	   the	   major	   commercial	  banks,40	  which	  held	   some	  80%	  of	   the	   country’s	   commercial	  deposits.41	  The	   remaining	  three	   were	   specialised	   banks,42	  accounting	   for	   some	   6%	   of	   total	   bank	   deposits	   and	  about	  45%	  of	  Egypt’s	  bank	  branch	  network.	  Furthermore,	  the	  state	  owned	  substantial	  shares	   in	   23	   joint-­‐venture	   banks,	   which	   accounted	   for	   some	   20%	   of	   the	   system’s	  deposits	  and	  assets.43	  The	  first	  phase	  of	  the	  reform	  program,	  from	  2004	  to	  2008,	  saw	  a	  substantial	   reduction	   of	   state	   ownership	   and	  management	   of	   banks.	   One	   of	   the	   four	  major	   commercial	   banks,	   the	   Bank	   of	   Alexandria,	   was	   privatised	   through	   the	   sale	   of	  80%	  of	   its	   equity	   to	  Bank	  San	  Paolo,44	  while	   the	  other	   three	  major	   commercial	   banks	  (which	   remained	   state-­‐owned)	   were	   subject	   to	   major	   financial,	   institutional	   and	  operational	   restructuring,	   with	   a	   view	   to	   potential	   future	   privatisation.45	  More	   than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid. 
39 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), "Program Document for a Proposed Loan in 
the Amount of U.S.$500 Million to the Arab Republic of Egypt for a Third Financial Sector Development 
Loan,"  (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2010), 13. 
40 National Bank of Egypt, Banque Misr, Banque Du Caire and Bank of Alexandria. 
41 OECD, "Egypt National Investment Reform Agenda Workshop, Privatisation Session: Reforming State 
Owned Banks, Background Document," 1.   
42 Egyptian Arab Land Bank, Industrial Development Bank of Egypt and the Principle Bank for Development 
and Agricultural Credit. 
43 IBRD, "Program Document for a Proposed Loan in the Amount of U.S.$500 Million to the Arab Republic of 
Egypt for a Third Financial Sector Development Loan,"  12. 
44 Which later merged with Intesa to form Intesa San Paolo. 
45 Although not part of the reform plan, a decision was taken in 2007 to privatise another major state-owned 
commercial bank, Banque Du Caire. In July 2007, the government selected JP Morgan as advisors for the sale 
of 70% of the bank to a strategic investor, and three bids were received by May 2008. However, the transaction 
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94%	  of	  state-­‐owned	  bank	  shares	  in	  joint-­‐venture	  banks	  were	  divested.	  The	  sector	  was	  further	   restructured	   and	   consolidated	   through	   the	   enforcement	   of	   a	   number	   of	  measures	   such	   as	   higher	  minimum	   capital	   requirement,	  which	   resulted	   in	   the	   exit	   of	  small	  and	  weak	  banks	  through	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions.	  By	  2008,	  the	  total	  number	  of	  banks	   in	   the	   sector	   fell	   from	   57	   to	   39.	   Equally	   importantly,	   these	   major	   structural	  changes	   in	   the	   Egyptian	   banking	   system	   were	   further	   strengthened	   by	   an	   in-­‐depth	  program	   for	   the	   improvement	   of	   staff	   skills,	   the	   incorporation	   of	   information	  technology,	  and	  the	  enhancement	  of	  governance	  and	  management,	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  the	  sector	  to	  operate	  on	  a	  competitive	  and	  commercially	  viable	  basis.46	  A	  new	  generation	  of	  professionals	  was	  to	  lead	  the	  banking	  sector	  into	  a	  new	  era.	  Sherif	  El	  Leissy47	  is	  a	  31-­‐year-­‐old	  corporate	  banking	  professional	  at	  HSBC	  Egypt.	  Coming	   from	   an	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   family	   background,	   Sherif	   studied	   business	  administration	   at	   Cairo	   University’s	   Faculty	   of	   Commerce	   after	   obtaining	   an	   IGCSE	  secondary	  school	  degree.	  When	  he	  started	  his	  university	  studies	  in	  1997,	  he	  joined	  the	  newly	  opened	  ‘English	  Language	  Section’	  of	  the	  faculty,	  in	  which	  courses	  were	  taught	  in	  English,	  using	  American	  curricula	  and	  textbooks.	  According	  to	  Sherif,	  the	  establishment	  of	  these	  language	  sections	  in	  traditional	  public	  universities	  created	  new	  opportunities:	  It	   was	   something	   new.	   People	   were	   talking	   much	   about	   how	   only	   a	   limited	  number	  of	  students	  were	  admitted	  to	  it.	  At	  the	  time	  it	  seemed	  like	  a	  good	  choice	  for	  studying	  these	  subjects;	  a	  new	  college,	  easy,	  cheaper	  than	  AUC48	  but	  just	  as	  good.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
was not completed, mainly due to the receipt of offers that were substantially below the value determined by an 
evaluation committee headed by the Central Audit Agency. The global financial crisis, which broke out that 
year, further postponed the privatisation.  
46 IBRD,"Program Document for a Proposed Loan in the Amount of U.S.$500 Million to the Arab Republic of 
Egypt for a Third Financial Sector Development Loan," 14. 
47 Unless otherwise referenced, all information and quotes pertaining to this case are drawn from two extended 
interview sessions with Sherif at his home in Maadi, with approximately one year separating the sessions on 1 
July 2009 and 11 August 2010.  
48 American University in Cairo 
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Students	  were	   only	   admitted	   to	   this	   course	   of	   study	   if	   they	   had	  demonstrated	  fluency	   in	  English	   and/or	   foreign	   secondary	   school	   degrees,	   requirements	   that	   Sherif	  met	   with	   ease,	   given	   his	   pre-­‐university	   educational	   background	   in	   an	   international	  school.	   Special	   tuition	   fees	   applied.	   Notably,	   the	   ‘English	   section’	   of	   the	   notoriously	  crowded	   Faculty	   of	   Commerce	   resided	   in	   a	   specially-­‐established,	   chic,	   and	   air-­‐conditioned	  building	   located	   steps	   away	   from	   the	   faculty's	   old	   premises	   on	   the	  Cairo	  University	   campus.	   Establishing	   a	   special	   ‘English	   language	   unit’	   in	   which	   mainly	  foreign	   curricula	   and	   textbooks	   were	   taught	   was	   not	   unique	   to	   the	   Faculty	   of	  Commerce:	   As	   chapter	   three	   discussed,	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	   witnessed	   several	   other	  university	  institutions	  taking	  similar	  steps.	  A	   year	   and	   a	   half	   after	   his	   graduation,	   Sherif	   began	   his	   banking	   career	   as	   a	  customer	   service	   officer	   at	   HSBC	   Egypt.	   A	   female	   friend	   who	   already	   worked	   there	  recommended	  him	  to	  the	  bank’s	  recruiters.	  However,	  this	  position	  did	  not	  represent	  the	  ceiling	  of	  Sherif’s	  ambitions.	  Joining	  HSBC	  was	  the	  first	  step	  towards	  realising	  his	  goal	  of	  becoming	  an	  analyst	  in	  a	  leading	  bank’s	  corporate	  credit	  department.	  His	  strategy	  was	  to	   wait	   for	   the	   bank	   to	   advertise	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘credit	   course’,	   the	   competitive	   and	  demanding	   nine-­‐month	   course	   designed	   to	   train	   a	   selection	   of	   young	   banking	  professionals	   to	   join	   the	   prestigious	   corporate	   arm	   of	   the	   bank’s	   operations.	   Seven	  months	   later,	   he	   learned	   from	  an	  old	   college	   friend	   that	   another	  bank,	  MIBank,49	  was	  about	  to	  advertise	  such	  a	  course;	  he	  decided	  to	  apply	  immediately.	  However,	  MIBank’s	  course	  was	  postponed	  twice	  and	  Sherif	  had	  to	  put	  his	  ambitions	  temporarily	  on	  hold.	  Sherif’s	   entrance	   in	   the	   job	   market	   demonstrates	   the	   mechanisms	   by	   which	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	   approach	   the	   vital	   issue	   of	   finding	  proper	   employment.	  Unlike	   lower	   strata	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   middle	   class,	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   finds	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 MIBank was later acquired by National Socite Generale Bank Egypt (NSGB). 
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starting	   a	   career	   by	   finding	   a	   job	   worthy	   of	   one’s	   qualifications	   presents	   fairly	   few	  challenges.	   Fluency	   in	   foreign	   languages,	   one’s	   social	   profile,	   networks	   of	   friends,	   old	  colleagues	   and	   family	  members	   are	   all	   factors	   that	   facilitate	   the	   search	   for	   a	   suitable	  point	  of	  entry	   into	   the	  higher	  segments	  of	   the	  private	  employment	  market.	   In	  Sherif’s	  case,	   in	   the	   summer	  of	  2004,	  HSBC	   advertised	   the	   long-­‐awaited	   credit	   course,	   and	  he	  applied.	  He	  was	  selected	  to	  join	  the	  course	  after	  several	  rounds	  of	  tests	  and	  interviews,	  all	   of	   which	   were	   conducted	   in	   English.	   Sherif	   describes	   most	   of	   his	   colleagues	   who	  were	   admitted	   to	   the	   credit	   course	   as	   being	   ‘from	  good,	   decent	   backgrounds’.	   This	   is	  natural,	  after	  all,	  since	  admission	  requirements	  for	  the	  course	  included	  specific	  levels	  of	  scores	  in	  English	  proficiency	  and	  professional	  qualification	  tests	  such	  as	  the	  IELTS	  and	  GMAT,	   the	   attainment	   of	  which	   is	   highly	   unlikely	   for	   a	   graduate	  with	   a	   purely	   state-­‐education	  background.	  Although	  Sherif	  points	  out	  that	  there	  were	  hardly	  any	  direct	  admissions	  through	  
kosa50	  to	   the	   credit	   course,	   one	   cannot	   help	   but	   yet	   again	   take	  note	   of	   the	   embedded	  filtering	  conditions	  leading	  to	  the	  de	  facto	  preference	  for	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  candidates	  with	   the	   appropriate	   cultural	   and	   cosmopolitan	   capital.	   The	   advanced	   education	   and	  professional	   admission	   requirements	   to	   the	   credit	   course	   in	   themselves	   represent	   a	  social	  separation	  barrier	  between	  certain	  social	  categories	  and	  the	  career	  path	  to	  which	  the	  course	   itself	   leads.	  Recruiting	  techniques,	  such	  as	  critical-­‐thinking	  evaluation	  tests	  and	  interviews	  conducted	  in	  English,	  serve	  as	  natural	  social-­‐class	  filters	  for	  those	  who	  apply	   to	   jobs	   in	   this	   employment	   ‘domain’,	   even	   if	   their	  use	   is	  mostly	   justified	  by	  HR	  experts	  (as	  pointed	  out	  earlier)	  as	  a	  professional	  necessity,	  rather	  than	  a	  mechanism	  for	  the	  purposeful	  preservation	  of	  a	  certain	  social	  character	  in	  their	  establishments.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 A modern colloquial evolution of the popular expression wasta (intermediary), which describes a person (or a 
group of people) who intervene on behalf of another person to facilitate access to a certain position or service 
otherwise difficult to obtain.  
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The	  corporate	  arm	  of	  the	  bank,	  which	  candidates	  join	  by	  successfully	  completing	  the	   credit	   course,	   is	   a	   prestigious	   and	   fast-­‐tracked	   banking	   career	   path.	   Upon	  completion	   of	   the	   course,	   new	   entrants	   are	   directly	   admitted	   to	   the	   professional	  ranking	   of	   ‘clerk	   four’,	   a	   stage	   that	   is	   usually	   reached	   after	   a	  minimum	   of	   five	   years	  serving	  in	  other	  departments	  of	  the	  bank.	  Sherif’s	  first	  position	  in	  the	  bank’s	  credit	  arm	  was	  as	  a	  financial	  and	  credit	  analyst;	  he	  has	  since	  been	  promoted	  twice.	  At	  the	  time	  he	  was	  interviewed	  for	  this	  study,	  he	  was	  leading	  a	  team	  of	  credit	  professionals	  in	  charge	  of	  managing	  the	  accounts	  of	  some	  of	  the	  bank’s	  major	  clients	  in	  the	  real	  estate,	  cement	  and	  building	  materials,	  and	  steel	  industries.	  Sherif	   notes	   that	  most	   of	   his	   co-­‐workers	   belong	   to	   the	   upper	   or	   upper	  middle	  classes.	  ‘They	  come	  from	  respectable	  families	  which	  [were]	  originally	  well	  off’,	  he	  states.	  While	   none	   are	   graduates	   of	   government	   schools,	   their	   university	   backgrounds	   vary	  from	   the	   American	   University	   (AUC)	   to	   Cairo	   University’s	   top	   schools,	   such	   as	   the	  English	  sections	  of	  the	  Faculty	  of	  Commerce	  and	  the	  Faculty	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science.	   The	   exclusive	   nature	   of	   these	   areas	   of	   the	   bank’s	   workforce	   is	   further	  consolidated	   by	   the	   existing	   recruiting	   mechanisms.	   Even	   the	   institution’s	   HR	  department	  has	  little	  say	  in	  newly	  recruited	  professionals	  in	  the	  credit	  department.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  recruitment	  processes	   in	  other	  areas	  of	   the	  bank’s	  operations	  (such	  as	  personal	   banking	   or	   customer	   service),	  managing	   directors	   and	   division	   heads	   of	   the	  credit	   department	   are	   personally	   involved	   in	   the	   selection	   of	   new	   entrants,	   as	   the	  previously	  featured	  case	  of	  Rasha	  Zaatar	  demonstrated.	  Exceptions	   to	   the	   general	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   social	   backgrounds	   of	   those	  working	   in	   the	   credit	   department	   do	   occur,	   but	   their	   contrast	  with	   the	   predominant	  class	   character	   of	   the	   workplace	   is	   more	   than	   obvious.	   One	   of	   Sherif’s	   senior	   co-­‐workers,	   a	   female	   head	   of	   one	   of	   corporate	   banking’s	   eight	   main	   departments,	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originates	   from	   the	   Nile	   Delta	   town	   of	   Al-­‐Mansura.	   According	   to	   Sherif,	   despite	   her	  undeniable	   success	   as	   a	   banking	   professional,	   her	   background	   is	   ‘completely	   hidden,	  you	  hear	  things.	  She	  doesn’t	  say,	  and	  she	  never	  raises	  the	  issue.’	  Although	  his	  colleague	  represents	   an	   example	   of	   possible	   career	   advancement,	   despite	   beginning	   from	   a	  different	  social	  stratum	  than	  most	  others,	  Sherif	  mentioned	  how	  she	  feels	  out	  of	  place	  among	   fellow	  professionals	   in	   the	  credit	  department,	  especially	   ‘when	   it	  comes	   to	   the	  area	  of	  backgrounds,	  outings	  and	  the	  social	  scene	  in	  general’.	  That	  her	  different	  social	  background	   did	   not	   hinder	   her	   career	   advancement	   leaves	   Sherif’s	   conviction	  unshaken;	  he	  still	  believes	  that	  it	  is	  much	  easier	  both	  to	  blend	  in	  socially	  and	  to	  advance	  professionally	   if,	   in	   addition	   to	   possessing	   the	   necessary	   professional	   qualities,	   one	  comes	  from	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  a	   ‘decent	  background,	  with	  better	  English	  and	  better	  presentation’.	   To	   elaborate	   on	   his	   point,	   Sherif	   points	   out	   that	   ‘it	  makes	   a	   difference	  when	  someone	  says	  za,	  zis	  and	  bibol.’51	  This	  mispronunciation	  of	  spoken	  English,	  which	  Leissy	  uses	   to	  point	   to	  his	  colleague’s	  non-­‐upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  background,	   is	  perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  most	  widespread	  social	  litmus	  tests	  among	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class.	  It	   is	  often	  used	  to	  establish	  even	  finer	  hierarchies	  and	  categorisations	  within	  the	  class	  itself.	   The	   correct	   pronunciation	   of	   spoken	   English	   is	   not	   only	   a	   matter	   of	   language	  knowledge,	  but	  also	  a	  sign	  of	  a	  person’s	  degree	  of	  engagement	  with	  ‘the	  modern’,	  or	  the	  ‘global’.	   De	   Konig	   captures	   this	   tendency	   to	   use	   a	  mixture	   of	  material,	   but	   also	   (and	  equally)	  cultural	  measures,	   for	   finer	  subjective	  social	  classifications	  within	   the	  middle	  class,	  when	  she	  accurately	  points	   to	   the	  use	  of	   the	  word	  mustawa	   (level),	   rather	   than	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 These are relatively widespread mispronunciations of the three English words ‘the’, ‘this’ and ‘people’, used 
in this context as an example of the inability to pronounce certain English syllabi by non-native speakers such as 
the ‘th’ and the ‘p’ and their replacement by ‘z’ or ‘s’, and ‘b’, respectively.   
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the	  more	   objective	   demarcation	   of	   tabaqa	   (class)	   by	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   to	  describe	  their	  self-­‐defined	  class	  position.52	  In	   a	   client-­‐chasing	   business	   environment	   such	   as	   corporate	   banking,	   the	  projection	   of	   a	   certain	   social	   image	   plays	   a	   considerable	   role	   in	   the	   ability	   of	   a	  professional	   like	   Sherif	   to	   succeed	   outside	   the	   immediate	   boundaries	   of	   the	   bank’s	  offices.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  attracting	  high-­‐profile	  clients	  to	  the	  bank’s	  portfolio	  ultimately	  depends	  on	  a	  prospective	  client’s	  assessment	  of	  expected	  benefits	  from	  his	  cooperation	  with	   the	  bank.	  However,	   social	   networks	   forged	  by	   a	   commonly	  perceived	   inter-­‐class	  proximity	  are	  essential	  to	  facilitating	  access	  to	  important	  decision-­‐makers	  and	  clients	  in	  major	  industries.	  The	  social	  and	  cultural	  capital	  of	  the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  professional	  are	   essential	   to	   drawing	   potential	   clients’	   attention.	   Upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   professionals	  like	  Sherif	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  value	  of	  their	  social	  capital	  in	  their	  careers,	  and	  make	  every	  effort	   to	   exploit	   it	   to	   the	  maximum.	   ‘I	   gained	   access	   to	   a	   number	  of	  my	  major	   clients	  through	  social	  connections,	  which	  led	  to	  very	  big	  transactions,’	  he	  recalls.	  ‘At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  my	  social	  background	  is	  not	  going	  to	  make	  a	  client	  enter	   into	  a	  half-­‐a-­‐billion-­‐pounds	  transaction	  with	  my	  bank,	  it	  all	  depends	  on	  whether	  you	  can	  offer	  competitive	  banking	   services.’	   However,	   initially,	   networks	   and	   connections	   give	   Sherif	   the	  opportunity	   to	   access	   important	   executives	   and	   decision-­‐makers.	   In	   many	   incidents,	  these	  networks	   lead	   to	  professionals	  working	  under	   significant	  decision-­‐makers,	  who	  may	  very	  well	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  ex-­‐colleagues,	  acquaintances	  from	  social	  circuits,	  or	  friends	  of	   friends.	   In	  short,	  social	  circuits	  developed	  over	  the	  years	   in	  typically	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   social	   spaces	   such	  as	   sports	   clubs,	   schools,	   and	  holiday	  destinations	  prove	   to	  be	  valuable	   currency	   in	   the	   career	  market.	   In	  due	   course,	   they	   are	  deployed	   to	   facilitate	  career	  advancement	  as	  an	  essential	  tool	  for	  securing	  social	  class	  position	  and	  status.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 De Konig, Global Dreams: Class, Gender, and Public Space in Cosmopolitan Cairo, 46. 
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Sherif	   is	  aware	   that	  his	   career	  path	  and	   future	  prospects	  are	  closely	   related	   to	  the	  structural	  changes	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  banking	  industry	  over	  the	  past	  few	  years.	  The	  banking	   industry	  of	  today,	  which	  is	   less	  owned,	  yet	  better	  regulated,	  by	  the	  state,	  features	   a	   ‘corporate	   culture’	   in	   which	   young	   professionals	   like	   him	   have	   a	   better	  chance	   of	   ‘shining’.	   Meetings	   with	   professionals	   from	   other	   commercial	   banks,	  conference	   calls,	   and	   working	   on	   joint	   transactions	   on	   large	   economic	   scales	   are	   all	  means	  of	  becoming	  known	  on	  the	  professional	  scene.	  Sherif	  makes	  a	  point	  of	  comparing	  the	   state	   of	   the	   banking	   industry	   today	   to	   a	   time	   when	   there	   were	   only	   a	   few	  multinational	  banks	  operating	  in	  the	  country	  amongst	  the	  predominantly	  state-­‐owned	  financial	   sector.	  Back	   then,	  welad	  el	  nass53	  in	   the	   field	  were	  all	   employed	   in	   the	   state-­‐owned	  banks,	  as	  there	  was	  no	  other	  alternative.	  Today,	  the	  overall	  scope	  of	  the	  industry	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  it	  is	  integrated	  with	  regional	  and	  foreign	  capital	  has	  turned	  it	  into	   one	   of	   the	   most	   attractive	   employment	   areas	   in	   which	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	   like	   Sherif	   can	   find	   a	   path	   for	   realising	   their	   career	   aspirations.	   In	   Sherif’s	  case,	   these	   aspirations	   amount	   to	   being	   one	   of	   the	   leading	   figures	   in	   the	   country’s	  financial	   sector.	   An	   occupation	  with	   these	   features	   is	   not	   only	   a	   sign	   of	   professional	  excellence,	  but	  (more	  importantly	  from	  a	  social	  point	  of	  view)	  also	  considered	  socially	  worthy	  of	  a	  person	  belonging	   to	   the	  upper	  middle	  class.	  Among	   friends,	   relatives	  and	  within	   the	   wider	   social	   scene,	   a	   job	   in	   the	   corporate	   banking	   department	   of	   one	   of	  Egypt’s	  leading	  banks	  with	  a	  foreign	  name	  accounts	  for	  more	  than	  just	  an	  advantageous	  position	   in	   the	   labour	   market.	   It	   is	   a	   class	   marker	   par	   excellence,	   a	   social	   route	  absolutely	  essential	  to	  the	  preservation	  and	  reproduction	  of	  prestige	  and	  status.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 (Sons/daughters of people): An expression used to describe people from an accepted social background, or of 
bon famille.  
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3.3	  The	  ‘Parallel	  Universe’:	  Extending	  the	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  Employment	  
Domain	  Within	  the	  State	  Bureaucracy	  As	   the	   discussion	   so	   far	   suggests,	   an	   important	   impact	   of	   Egypt’s	   neoliberal	  transformation	  on	  the	  upper	  segments	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  has	  been	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  ‘employment	   domain’	   within	   the	   multinational	   private	   sector.	   This	   domain,	   as	  previously	   described,	   represents	   an	   alternative	   route	   for	   the	   reproduction	   of	   social	  status	   for	   the	   upper	   middle	   class,	   drawing	   them	   away	   from	   the	   state	   bureaucracy,	  which	   traditionally	  played	   this	   role	   in	  previous	  decades.	  However,	  bearing	  witness	   to	  the	   complex	   nature	   of	   the	   changing	   (yet	   still	   intertwined)	   relationship	   between	   the	  upper	  middle	  class	  and	  the	  state	  in	  Egypt	  is	  another	  area	  of	  employment	  that	  warrants	  some	  attention.	  What	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  equal-­‐opportunity	  rules	  and	  procedures	  formally	  regulate	  admission	   to	   traditionally	   prestigious	   branches	   of	   state	   employment	   (such	   as	   the	  diplomatic	   service	   and	   the	   judiciary,	   for	   example).	   However,	   in	   actual	   practice,	   these	  institutions	   have	   maintained	   informal	   recruiting	   ethics	   in	   which	   social	   background,	  client	   networks,	   and	   family	   connections	   play	   a	   decisive	   role	   in	   the	   admission	   of	   new	  entrants.	   More	   recently,	   other	   branches	   of	   the	   government	   bureaucracy	   in	   charge	   of	  implementing	   the	   neoliberal	   transformation,	   such	   as	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Finance,	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Trade	   and	   Industry,	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Investment	   and	   the	   Central	   Bank	   of	  Egypt,	  have	  followed	  suit	  in	  their	  own	  unique	  fashions.	  When	   the	   state	   officially	   adopted	   the	   neoliberal	   agenda	   after	   concluding	   its	  agreement	   with	   the	   IMF	   in	   1991,	   many	   threatened	   interest	   networks	   and	   divisions	  within	   the	   inflated	   state	   bureaucracy	   generated	   typical	   resistance	   to	   neoliberal	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changes.54 	  As	   part	   of	   the	   desire	   to	   overcome	   such	   bureaucratic	   resistance,	   some	  ministers	  used	  foreign	  funding	  to	  adopt	  employment	  practices	  that	  effectively	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  mechanisms	  of	  social	  distinction	  within	  the	  state	  bureaucracy	  itself.	  In	   most	   cases,	   socially	   biased	   recruitment	   practises	   were	   justified	   by	   the	   need	   to	  overcome	   the	   shortages	  of	   skilled	   cadres	  within	   those	  bureaucratic	   structures.	  As	   the	  executive	  burden	  of	   implementing	  Egypt’s	  neoliberal	   economic	   transformation	   fell	   on	  this	   group	   of	   institutions,	   they	   recruited	   highly	   skilled	   and	   educated	   young	  professionals	   with	   noticeably	   preferential	   financial	   packages	   and	   corporate-­‐like	  working	  conditions.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  enclaves	  around	   ministerial	   and	   influential	   posts	   in	   the	   state	   bureaucracy,	   thus	   virtually	  extending	  the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  ‘employment	  domain’	  into	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  ailing	  state	  apparatus.	  Injy	  Amr55	  is	  a	  young	  professional	   in	  her	   late	   twenties	  who	  works	   for	  Link	  Dot	  
Net,	  a	  communication	  and	  online	  services	  company	  that	  is	  the	  country’s	  second-­‐largest	  Internet	  provider.	  Before	  working	  there,	  Injy	  held	  a	  position	  in	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  Trade	  and	   Industry,	  Rashid	  Mohamed	  Rashid.	  Rashid	  was	   appointed	   to	  his	   cabinet	  post	  in	  2004	  and	  had	  been	  a	  prominent	  figure	  in	  the	  business	  community.	  He	  was	  also	  widely	  perceived	  as	  part	  of	  Gamal	  Mubarak’s	   like-­‐minded	  entourage,	  who	  were	  put	   in	  charge	   of	   several	   pivotal	   economic	   administration	   posts	   both	   inside	   and	   outside	   of	  Ahmed	  Nazif's	  cabinet.	  Injy	  recalls	  the	  striking	  contrast	  between	  the	  working	  situation	  in	   the	   minister’s	   office	   and	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   ministry’s	   bureaucratic	   structure.	   The	  relatively	  young	  professional	   staff	   in	   the	  minister’s	  office	  was	  all	  of	   similar	   social	  and	  educational	  backgrounds:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Hans Lofgren, "Economic Policy in Egypt: A Breakdown in Reform Resistance?," International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 25, no. 3 (1993): 410. 
55 Injy Amr in discussion with the author, Shooting Club in Cairo, November 2008. All direct citations and 
information pertaining to Injy's experience are based on this interview.  
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They	  were	   all	   presentable,	  well	   educated,	   fluent	   in	   various	   foreign	   languages.	  Most	   importantly,	   they	   were	   well	   suited	   to	   carry	   out	   tasks	   assigned	   to	   them	  quickly,	   efficiently	   and	   with	   high	   levels	   of	   precision	   and	   quality.	   Even	   their	  offices	   were	   strikingly	   well	   equipped	   and	   clean	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   neglected	  offices	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  ministry’s	  departments.	  	  Handpicked	  senior	  members	  of	  staff	  in	  the	  minister’s	  office,	  some	  of	  whom	  had	  been	   among	   the	   minister’s	   associates	   in	   his	   previous	   corporate	   career,	   enjoyed	  exceptionally	  high	  financial	  packages	  in	  their	  government	  appointments.	  Salaries	  of	  the	  more	   junior	   staff	  members	  were	   not	   as	   high,	   but	   still	   considerably	   higher	   than	   their	  counterparts	  in	  other	  traditional	  departments	  of	  the	  ministry.	  That	  did	  not	  matter	  much	  according	   to	   Injy;	   most	   of	   those	   junior	   members	   of	   staff	   came	   from	   ‘good’	   social	  backgrounds	   and	   ‘did	   not	   really	   care	   about	   money	   as	   much	   as	   they	   were	   keen	   on	  gaining	  professional	  experiences	  which	  would	  later	  help	  them	  find	  rewarding	  positions	  in	  the	  private	  sector’.	  In	  Injy’s	  experience,	  though	  the	  most	  important	  work	  portfolios	  and	  tasks	  were	  assigned	  to	  members	  of	  staff	  in	  the	  minister’s	  office	  to	  ensure	  expedient	  and	  qualitative	  performance,	  the	  same	  tasks	  would	  often	  be	  simultaneously	  forwarded	  to	  the	  ministry’s	  traditional	   bureaucracy	   to	   avoid	   friction	   and	   turf	   wars	   –	   but	   with	   the	   clear	  understanding	   that	   little	  was	  expected	   from	   the	   latter	  departments.	   	  Relying	  on	  what	  Injy	  called	  ‘the	  secret	  formula	  of	  the	  parallel	  universe’	  within	  the	  bureaucratic	  structure	  was	   the	   only	   way	   the	   ministry	   could	   run	   effectively	   and	   efficiently	   to	   perform	   its	  prescribed	   role	   in	   the	   government’s	   overall	   agenda.	   The	   ‘parallel	   universe’	   model	   of	  carrying	   out	   government	   business	   has	   been	   quite	   remarkably	   replicated	   by	   several	  other	   ministries	   and	   government	   agencies	   in	   recent	   years,	   most	   notably	   in	   those	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branches	   of	   the	   government	   charged	  with	   administering	   economic	   liberalisation	   and	  structural	  transformation	  to	  the	  free-­‐market	  economy.56	  Many	  aspects	  of	  this	  phenomena	  which,	  if	  examined	  thoroughly,	  would	  perhaps	  reveal	   much	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   bureaucratic	   structure	   as	   a	   conflicting	   arena	   of	  interests	  between	  those	  advancing	  neoliberal	  changes	  and	  those	  in	  traditional	  networks	  of	  power	  and	  influence	  within	  the	  Egyptian	  state	  apparatus.	  However,	  as	  far	  this	  study	  is	  concerned,	  noting	  the	  existence	  of	  these	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  enclaves	  within	  the	  state	  bureaucracy	   is	   less	   analytically	   ambitious.	   It	   is	  meant	   as	   an	   example	   of	   a	   hegemonic	  neoliberal	  logic	  amongst	  young	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  that	  guides	  the	  choice	  of	  career	   trajectories	   perceived	   to	   serve	   the	   purpose	   of	   social	   status	   reproduction	   and	  preservation.	   The	   creation	   of	   ‘parallel	   universes’	   within	   the	   state	   bureaucracy	   in	   the	  interest	   of	   an	   expedited	   implementation	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   economic	   restructuring	  agenda	   in	   recent	   years	   has	   attracted	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   youth	   to	   state	   employment	  only	  inasmuch	  as	  these	  jobs	  were	  created	  as	  extensions	  of	  the	  modes	  and	  practices	  of	  employment	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  private	  sector.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 To put this practice in its proper context, it is significant to note that the issue of appointed ‘advisors’ or 
mustasharun, to various ministers has drawn much overt criticism to the government during the past two 
decades. As mentioned above, this practice included appointing qualified professionals with a view to 
outflanking bureaucratic resistance and incompetence in implementing a speedy neoliberal agenda, creating an 
enclave for bureaucratic occupations within the emerging upper middle class 'employment domain'. The size 
and spread of the practice across government departments and ministries with little to do with the economic 
portfolio, however, suggests the use of appointments to advisory roles as a tool for the establishment of complex 
clientalistic networks across the government. Favoured employees beyond the retirement age, former armed 
forces or police officers, and connected experts with a wide range of specialisations would be appointed as 
‘advisors’ to ministers with lucrative financial compensation packages, often funded through foreign aid 
programs. The phenomenon of ‘advisors’ and their roles is notably under-researched in literature on Egypt’s 
neoliberal experience, policies and practices, despite being the subject of much public and media attention as 
part of the discourse surrounding ‘corruption’ both during the Mubarak era and after the 2011 revolt. For a 
somewhat detailed descriptive account on the subject, see: Siddik Al-Issawi, "Rawatib Dawlat Al-Mustasharin 
Allaty Tahkum Misr [The Salaries of the Advisors' State that Rules Egypt] " Al-Tahrir, 20 July 2014. 
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4.	  Conclusion	  P.J	  Vatikiotis	  once	  wrote	  that	  the	  break	  Nasser	  made	  with	  Egypt’s	  pre-­‐1952	  past	  was	  such	   that,	   in	   less	   than	   fifteen	   years,	   the	   Egyptian	   economy	   was	   changed	   ‘from	   free	  private	  enterprise	  to	  a	  massively	  state-­‐controlled	  and	  centrally	  planned	  one’.57	  Nasser’s	  statist	  approach	  to	  progress	  and	  development	  needed	  a	  corresponding	  social	  alliance	  to	  underpin	   his	   rule.	   In	   addition	   to	   strengthening	   the	   rural	   middle	   class	   through	   land-­‐distribution	   policies,	   such	   an	   alliance	   was	   forged	   by	   the	   expansion	   of	   education	   and	  state	   employment	   –	   and	   hence,	   the	   expansion	   and	   empowerment	   of	   an	   influential	  bureaucratic	   middle	   class.	   The	   political	   formula	   of	   authoritarian	   rule	   in	   post-­‐1952	  Egypt	  thus	  rested	  on	  a	  clear	  arrangement	  with	  the	  middle	  class,	  in	  which	  the	  state	  acted	  as	  a	  distributer	  of	  social	  benefits	  and	  the	  guarantor	  of	  social	  mobility	  and	  prominence,	  in	   return	   for	  middle-­‐class	   political	   consent.	  With	   virtually	   all	  modern	  production	   and	  service	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy	  under	  state	  control,	  various	  branches	  of	  the	  expanding	  state	   bureaucracy	   became	   the	   de	   facto	   career	   trajectory	   for	   successive	   middle-­‐class	  generations	  from	  the	  late	  1950s	  to	  the	  mid-­‐1970s.	  This	  trend	  was	  then	  codified	  as	  part	  of	   the	   implicit	  social	  contract	  when	  the	  state	  guaranteed	  the	  universal	  employment	  of	  graduates	  of	  higher	  education	  in	  1964.	  These	  graduates’	  role	  as	  the	  avant-­‐garde	  agents	  of	  the	  state-­‐led	  modernisation	  project	  was	  shaped	  and	  defined	  through	  work	  ethics	  and	  career	  dynamics	  experienced	  primarily	  in	  the	  context	  of	  their	  ascendance	  to	  the	  higher	  echelons	   of	   the	   state	   bureaucracy.	   By	   playing	   the	   role	   of	   chief	   employer,	   the	   state	  effectively	   positioned	   itself	   as	   the	  primary	   venue	   for	   social	  mobility,	   and	   as	   the	  main	  social	   arena	   for	   the	   attainment,	   preservation	   and	   reproduction	   of	  middle-­‐class	   social	  status.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 P.J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation (London: Croom Helm 1978), 211. 
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The	  image	  and	  perceived	  social	  function	  of	  state	  employment	  changed	  profoundly	  as	  part	   of	   the	   shift	   away	   from	   the	   statist	   development	   model	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1970s.	   The	  inception	   of	   liberalisation	   policies	   under	   Sadat	   started	   a	   series	   of	   socio-­‐economic	  changes	   that	   accumulatively	   led	   to	   far-­‐reaching	   transformations	   in	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   middle	   class	   and	   the	   state.	   The	   state’s	   manoeuvres	   around	   the	  commitment	   to	   employ	   new	   graduates,	   slumping	   real	  wages	   in	   the	   public	   sector,	   the	  gradual	   growth	   of	   the	   private	   sector,	   and	   immigration	   opportunities	   for	   lucrative	  employment	  in	  the	  Arab	  Gulf	  countries	  in	  the	  1980s	  all	  prompted	  a	  change	  in	  the	  image	  of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   desirable	   employer	   amongst	   the	   upper	   segment	   of	   the	  middle	   class.	  Sensing	  the	  developments	  ahead,	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  bureaucrats	  began	  forging	  formal	  and	   informal	  alliances	  and	  networks	  of	   interests	  outside	   the	  state’s	  bureaucracy,	  with	  up-­‐and-­‐coming	  business	  elites.	  As	  Egypt	   adopted	  a	  neoliberal	   economic	   reform	  agenda	   in	   the	   early	  1990s,	   a	  new	  employment	   domain	   emerged	   as	   the	   primary	   arena	   for	   the	   reproduction	   and	  preservation	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  position	  and	  status.	  The	  economy	  was	  invaded	  by	  a	  new	   breed	   of	   companies	   that	   were	   structurally	   integrated	   with	   the	   world	   economy,	  internally	  organised	  according	  to	  western	  management	  practices,	  and	  inherently	  more	  attuned	  to	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  credentials	  of	  distinction	  possessed	  by	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians.	  Over	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  the	  modern	  professional	  business	  executive	  has	  developed	   as	   the	   discursive	   image	   of	   an	   employment	   style	   considered	   best	   suited	   to	  ensure	  the	  preservation	  and	  reproduction	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status.	  Indeed,	  as	  this	  chapter	   has	   demonstrated,	   the	  mechanisms	   of	   access	   to	   and	   advancement	  within	   the	  neoliberal	  private	  employment	  market	  are	   important	   factors	   in	  ensuring	   its	  nature	  as	  an	   arena	   for	   the	   consolidation	   of	   class	   identity,	   the	   practice	   of	   distinction	   and	   the	  preservation	  of	  prestige	  and	  status.	  Although	  formal	  managerial	  procedures	  are	  usually	  
	  223	  
in	  place	  to	  regulate	  recruitment	  and	  promotion	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  corporate	  sector,	  their	  practical	   implementation	   turns	   them	   into	   de	   facto	   social	   filtration	   processes	   that	  protect	  the	  class	  cohesion	  of	  this	  domain	  of	  the	  employment	  market.	  Significantly,	  in	  the	  last	  years	  of	  Mubarak’s	  reign,	  as	  his	  son	  Gamal	  led	  an	  effort	  to	   expedite	   the	   neoliberal	   transformation	   of	   the	   economy,	   the	   ruling	   elite	   in	   many	  respects	  actively	  encouraged	  and	  fuelled	  this	  discursive	  shift	   towards	  the	  glorification	  of	   the	  private	   sector	  and	   the	  modern	  business	  professional.	   Such	  encouragement	  was	  even	   embodied	   as	   prominent	   figures	   from	   the	   business	   elite	   were	   appointed	   to	  ministerial	  posts.	  As	  part	  of	  their	  attempt	  to	  overcome	  bureaucratic	  resistance	  to	  their	  policies,	  these	  figures	  created	  hubs	  around	  their	  posts	  in	  the	  ailing	  bureaucracy,	  which	  were	  administered	  according	  to	  approximately	  the	  same	  ethics	  found	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  private	  sector.	  Politically,	   during	   the	   years	   of	   Egypt’s	   neoliberal	   transformation,	   the	   signals	  picked	  up	  by	  various	  segments	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  were	  arguably	  clear:	  the	  state	  was	  no	  longer	  willing	  or	  prepared	  to	  function	  as	  an	  arena	  for	  the	  attainment	  of	  career-­‐related	  class	  status	  and	  social	  prestige.	  These	  qualities	  would	  have	  to	  be	  acquired,	  secured	  and	  reproduced	  in	  the	  emerging	  neoliberal	  private	  sector.	  As	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  drew	  on	   its	   accumulated	   generational	   investments	   in	   high-­‐quality	   private	   education	   and	  cosmopolitan	  and	  cultural	  capital	  to	  do	  just	  that,	  the	  political	  configuration	  of	  the	  state	  suffered	   a	   serious	   blow	   to	   its	   very	   entitlement	   to	   rule.	   Such	   a	   blow	   can	   be	   directly	  attributed	  to	  the	  erosion	  of	  yet	  another	  fundamental	  component	  of	  the	  traditional-­‐post	  1952	   social	   contract:	   Just	   as	   the	   state	   had	   long	   ceased	   to	   provide	   trajectories	   for	  training	   and	   preparing	   for	   social	   distinction	   in	   primary,	   secondary	   and	   higher	  education,	  so	  too	  did	  it	  cease	  to	  act	  as	  a	  social	  field	  for	  securing	  the	  preservation	  of	  such	  distinctions.	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Moreover,	   as	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   six,	   the	   migration	   of	   the	   Egyptian	  upper	   middle	   class	   to	   the	   neoliberal	   private	   sector	   in	   search	   of	   the	   reproduction	   of	  social	  distinction,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  discursive	  shift	  in	  the	  image	  of	  employment,	  facilitated	  the	   emergence	   of	   new	   modes	   of	   socio-­‐political	   critiques	   of	   the	   state’s	   performance.	  These	  modes	  were	  primarily	   informed	  by	  concepts	  and	  principles	  borrowed	   from	  the	  western	   capitalist	   management	   dictionary,	   such	   as	   ‘efficiency’	   and	   ‘goal-­‐driven	  performance’.	   Over	   the	   past	   few	   years,	   the	   upper	  middle	   class	   has	   increasingly	   used	  such	  modes	   to	   conduct	  an	   intricate	  accumulative	  appraisal	  of	   the	   state’s	  performance	  on	  many	   levels,	   including	   the	   political.	   Eventually,	   these	  modes	   of	   critique	   led	   to	   the	  development	   of	   a	   fatally	   powerful	   sentiment	   of	   political	   displeasure	   that	   broke	   out	  unexpectedly	  in	  2011.	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Chapter	  Five	  Living	  Your	  Class	  Identity:	  	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  Lifestyles	  in	  the	  Neoliberal	  Era	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  neoliberal	  transformation	  in	  Egypt	  since	  the	  early	  1990s	  can	  be	   characterised	   as	   the	   direct	   response	   to	   an	   ever-­‐growing	   economic	   and	   legitimacy	  crisis	  by	  the	  ruling	  elite	  of	  an	  ailing	  postcolonial	  state.	  The	  era	  of	  Egyptian	  liberalisation	  that	   began	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   October	   1973	  war	   has	   stimulated	   enormous	   academic	  interest.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  has	  inspired	  a	  sizable	  body	  of	  literature	  by	  both	  academics	  and	  international	  financial	  organisations.	  Until	  the	  late	  1990s,	  most	  of	  this	  literature	  focused	  primarily	   on	   providing	   technical	   macroeconomic	   and	   institutional	   analyses	   of	   the	  progress	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  experience	  in	  implementing	  neoliberal	  policies	  and	  structural	  adjustments.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   academic	   focus	   on	   Egypt’s	   neoliberal	   experience	  became	  trapped	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	  public	  issues	  ‘which	  has	  been	  framed	  in	  the	  language	  of	  neoclassical	  economics’.1	  	  In	   recent	   years,	   however,	   scholarly	   attention	   has	   increasingly	   turned	   towards	  the	  socio-­‐political	  implications	  of	  liberalisation	  policies	  adopted	  by	  the	  Mubarak	  regime	  in	  response	  to	  the	  state’s	  enduring	  structural	  predicaments.	  This	  focus	  in	  turn	  brought	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  social	  and	  political	  consequences	  of	  neoliberalism	  to	  the	  top	  of	  the	  academic	  agenda	  on	  the	  politics	  of	  change	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  The	  underlying	  cause	  of	  this	   scholarly	   interest	   stems	   from	   the	   somewhat	  basic	   recognition	   that	   such	   strategic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ismail, Political Life in Cairo's New Quarters: Encountering the Everyday State, xx. 
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paradigm	   shifts	   by	   states	   or	   ruling	   regimes	   at	   certain	   historical	   junctures	   eventually	  lead	  to	  far-­‐reaching	  consequences	  and	  changes	  in	  the	  fabric	  of	  society.	  Decisions	  taken	  in	  political	  quarters,	   in	   cabinet	   rooms	  and	   in	   consultation	  with	   international	   financial	  donors	  eventually	   lead	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  and	  its	  social	   institutions,	  to	  varying	   degrees	   of	   change	   in	   the	   structure	   of	   advantaged	   and	   disadvantaged	   social	  strata,	   and	  –	  not	   least	  of	   all	   –	   to	  deep	   reconfigurations	  of	   the	  modes	  whereby	  society	  negotiates	  and	  deals	  with	  notions	  of	  state	  power,	  distribution,	  politics	  etc.	  In	   the	   Egyptian	   case,	   many	   works	   have	   focused	   on	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   issues	  surrounding	  Egypt’s	  metamorphosing	  socio-­‐political,	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  socio-­‐cultural	  landscapes	   in	   the	   age	   of	   liberalisation	   under	   both	   Sadat	   and	   Mubarak.	   Of	   particular	  relevance	   to	   this	   chapter	   is	   the	  emergence	  of	   remarkable	   interest	  within	   this	  body	  of	  research	   in	  what	   can	   broadly	   be	   described	   as	   the	   ‘politics	   of	   urban	   space’.	   This	   term	  refers	   to	   various	   scholarly	   attempts	   to	   examine	   visual,	   physical	   and	   cultural	  transformations	   to	   living	   spaces,	   lifestyles	   and	   social	   ethics	   in	  major	   Egyptian	   urban	  centres	   (and	   especially	   the	   largest,	   Cairo)	   over	   the	   past	   two	   decades.	   Indeed,	   an	  examination	   of	   the	   socio-­‐political	   implications	   of	   people’s	   dialectic	   relationships	  with	  their	  urban	  surroundings	  can	  provide	  a	  gateway	  to	  understanding	  the	  deeper	  changes	  that	  have	  occurred	  in	  the	  social	  fabric	  and	  political	  agency	  of	  various	  Egyptian	  classes	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  context.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  meanings	  and	  symbols	  contained	  in	  the	  patterns	  of	  expansion	  and	  feature	  changes	  in	  Cairo	  as	  a	  material	  space	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  have	  become	  enmeshed	  within	  the	  wider	  logic	  underlying	  neoliberalism	  itself.	  Within	  the	  neoliberal	  context,	  as	  Timothy	  Mitchell	  argues,	  the	  public	  debate	  mainly	  pertains	  to	  the	  ‘economic’,	  and	  hence	  the	  ‘collective	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  nation	  is	  depicted	  only	  in	  how	  it	  is	  adjusted	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in	   gross	   to	   the	   discipline	   of	   monetary	   and	   fiscal	   balance	   sheets’.2	  What	   follows	   is	   a	  neglect	  of	  the	  ‘actual	  concerns	  of	  any	  concrete	  local	  or	  collective	  community’,	  situating	  neoliberalism	  as	   a	   socio-­‐economic	   context	   for	   the	   creation	  and	  encouragement	  of	   the	  ‘most	   exuberant	   dreams	   of	   private	   accumulation	   –	   and	   the	   chaotic	   allocation	   of	  collective	  resources’.3	  In	  Egypt,	  where	  such	  neoliberal	  logic	  has	  reigned	  supreme	  since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  Mitchell	   concludes	   that	  a	   formal	  emphasis	  on	   financial	  discipline	  has	  been	   accompanied	   by	   a	   ‘contrasting	   image	   of	   uncontrolled	   expansion	   and	   unlimited	  dreams’,	  the	  most	  dramatic	  of	  which	  is	  ‘Egypt’s	  rapidly	  expanding	  capital	  city’.4	  	  	  	  Contextualising	  changes	  to	  the	  Cairene	  urban	  space	  within	  the	  wider	  structural	  transformations	  in	  Egypt’s	  political	  economy	  allows	  us	  to	  more	  easily	  detect	  changes	  to	  the	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  of	  various	  social	  groups.	  A	  recent	  attempt	  to	  consolidate	  the	  link	  between	  urban	  transformations	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  neoliberal	  context	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  of	  various	  forces	  on	  the	  other,	   justified	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  ‘Cairo	   School	   of	   Urban	   Studies’5.	   Emphasising	   the	   importance	   of	   incorporating	   space	  into	  the	  analysis	  of	  political	  changes	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  era,	  the	  two	  scholars	  leading	  this	  effort,	  Diane	  Singerman	  and	  Paul	  Amar,	  recognised	  that	  in	  the	  second	  decade	  of	  Egypt’s	  neoliberal	  era,	  it	  became	  unmistakable	  that:	  Cairene	  socio-­‐cultural	  collectives,	  urban	  communities,	  popular	  movements-­‐and	  even	   semi-­‐autonomous	   state	   projects	   and	   renegade	   elite	   factions-­‐	   act	   in	  contradictory	   ways.	   They	   move	   within,	   through	   and	   against	   dominant	   state	  institutions	   and	   spatial	   and	   economic	   structures,	   articulating	   forms	   of	  subjectivity	   and	   agency,	   but	   under	   conditions	   not	   of	   their	   own	   choosing,	   and	  within	   relations	   of	   power	   that	   can	   radically	   dehumanize	   and	  militarize	   daily	  existence.6	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Mitchell, "Dreamland: The Neoliberalism of Your Desires," 28. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Diane Singerman and Paul Amar, eds., Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Urban Space in the New 
Globalized Middle East (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2006), 17-18. 
6 Ibid., 10. 
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The	   Egyptian	   capital	   is	   indeed	   a	   laboratory	   of	   social	   and	   political	   agency.	   The	  sheer	  size	  of	  Cairo	  as	  a	  human	  mass,	  the	  metropolis’	  very	  centrality	  to	  Egyptian	  life,	  and	  its	   challenging	   intensity	   as	   a	   material	   space,	   suggest	   the	   existence	   of	   various	   social	  worlds,	   each	   of	   which	   represents	   –	   in	   its	   own	   right	   –	   a	   valuable	   source	   for	  understanding	   social	   agency	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   context.	   In	   her	   examination	   of	   socio-­‐political	   life	   in	  one	  of	   the	   city’s	   very	  dense	   ‘popular’	   quarters,	  Bulaq	  Al-­‐Dakrur,	   Salwa	  Ismail	  stresses	   the	  significance	  of	  space	  as	  a	  departure	  point	   for	   the	  analysis	  of	  social	  agency.	  Ismail	  demonstrates	  how	  Bulaq’s	  spatial	  separation	  from	  and	  physical	  contrast	  to	  its	  Cairene	  urban	  surroundings	  affects	  its	  residents’	  construction	  of	  their	  identity	  and	  stimulates	  the	  development	  of	  discourses	  regarding	  their	  self-­‐perceived	  position	  in	  the	  wider	   socio-­‐economic	   structure.	   She	   concludes	   that,	   from	   these	   discourses	   and	  narratives	  surrounding	  the	  quarter’s	  relation	  to	  the	  outside,	  emerge	   ‘images	  depicting	  modes	  of	  life	  and	  forms	  of	  social	  organization	  in	  various	  spaces’.7	  The	   same	   conceptual	   framework	   is	   valuable	   to	   this	   chapter’s	   attempts	   to	  understand	   the	   process	   of	   reproducing	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   social	   identity	   in	   the	  neoliberal	   context.	   Moreover,	   it	   helps	   to	   explain	   how	   the	   normative	   foundations	   of	  political	   agency	   are	   shaped	   in	   the	   process.	   The	   value	   of	   examining	   the	   relationship	  between	   changing	   urban	   settings	   in	   the	   context	   of	   neoliberal	   transformations	   and	  shaping	  political	   convictions	   in	   subsequently	   evolving	  middle-­‐class	   identities	  has	   also	  been	   recognised	  beyond	   the	   context	  of	   the	  Middle	  East.	   Conceptually,	  Doreen	  Massey	  argues	   that	  globalisation	  can	  generally	  be	  understood	   to	   stimulate	   ‘changing	   forms	  of	  the	   spatial	  organization	  of	   social	   relations’.8	  In	   the	   case	  of	   India,	  where	   the	  neoliberal	  transformation	  has	  prompted	  a	  scholarly	  focus	  on	  the	  resulting	  consolidation	  of	  a	  ‘new’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ismail, Political Life in Cairo's New Quarters: Encountering the Everyday State, 18-19. 
8 Doreen Massey, Space, Place and Gender (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 168. Cited in 
Leela Fernandes, India's New Middle Class: Democratic Politics in an Era of Economic Reform (Minneapolis, 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 138. 
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middle-­‐class	   identity	   beyond	   traditional	   lines	   of	   social	   organisation,	   Leela	   Fernandes	  argues	   that	   ‘[n]ew	  middle	   class	   identity	   [...]	   is	   not	   simply	   a	   product	   of	   individualistic	  responses	  to	  advertising	  images	  of	  changing	  lifestyles’,	   	  and	  that	  an	  analytical	  focus	  on	  changes	  taking	  place	  in	  urban	  spaces	  is	  thus	  necessary.	  For,	  she	  argues,	  these	  spaces	  are	  the	   ‘central	   arena	   in	   which	   negotiations	   over	   national	   identity,	   development,	   and	  middle	  class	  formation	  unfold’.9	  In	   the	  Egyptian	  case,	  various	  components	  of	   the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   lifestyle	   in	  the	  Cairene	  urban	   space	   form	  a	   rich	  area	  of	   inquiry.	  They	  offer	  valuable	   insights	   into	  some	   of	   the	   mechanisms	   and	   dynamics	   by	   which	   components	   of	   a	   distinct	   social	  identity	   for	   this	   class	   are	   consolidated	   and	   reproduced.	  This	   chapter	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	  examine	   how	   conceptions	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   lifestyles	   facilitated,	   and	   indeed	  
promoted,	  within	   the	  neoliberal	   context,	  help	   lay	   the	   foundation	   for	   the	  emergence	  of	  normative	   foundations	   of	   political	   agency.	   In	   today’s	   Cairo,	   class-­‐typical	   lifestyle	  practices	  reflecting	  internalised	  conceptions	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  identity,	  represent	  a	  collective	  social	  field	  in	  which	  Egyptians	  constantly	  come	  in	  touch	  with	  manifestations	  of	   state	   power,	   as	   well	   as	   its	   weaknesses	   and	   failures.	   This	   experience	   is	   embedded	  within	   various	   modes	   of	   reconstituting	   identities	   and	   processes	   that	   develop	   the	  criteria	  of	   socio-­‐political	  critique,	  as	  well	  as	   formulations	  of	  distinct	   logics	   for	  various	  types	  of	  political	   agency.	   In	   this	   context,	  many	   components	  of	   the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  lifestyle	   come	   into	   play,	   some	   of	   which	   have	   drawn	   recent	   scholarly	   attention.	   For	  example,	   Anouk	  De	  Konig	   looks	   at	  Western-­‐style	   coffee	   shops	   proliferating	   in	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   areas	   of	   Cairo	   such	   as	   Mohandessin,	   Maadi	   or	   Heliopolis,	   offering	   new	  spaces	   for	   the	   socio-­‐cultural	   expression	   and	   consumption	   of	   different	   variations	   of	   a	  quasi-­‐globalised	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   social	   identity.	   These	   venues,	   she	   argues,	   have	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Fernandes, India's New Middle Class: Democratic Politics in an Era of Economic Reform, 138. 
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recent	  years	  become	   ‘spatial	  orientation	  points,	   as	  well	   as	   social	  markers	  of	   a	   certain	  belonging	  and	  self-­‐evident	  normality’10	  for	  Cairo's	  upper	  middle	  class.	  Similarly,	  Mona	  Abaza	   has	   conducted	   important	   research	   on	   the	   proliferation	   of	   American-­‐style	  shopping	   malls	   in	   Cairo,	   witnessing	   a	   growing	   consumerist	   appetite,	   especially	   in	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   areas	   such	   as	   Nasr	   City. 11 	  In	   recent	   years,	   these	   ‘temples’	   of	  neoliberal	  consumerism	  have	  emerged	  not	  only	  as	  essential	  leisure	  venues	  for	  various	  sectors	   of	   the	   middle	   class,	   but	   also	   as	   social	   spaces	   where	   components	   of	   a	   self-­‐constituted	  ‘modernity’	  can	  be	  expressed	  through	  certain	  lifestyle	  practices.	  	  This	   chapter	   will	   focus	   on	   one	   of	   the	   main	   trends	   in	   today’s	   Egyptian	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  lifestyle:	  namely,	  the	  growing	  phenomenon	  of	  residential	  relocation	  to	  the	  urban	  desert	  extensions	  of	  Cairo.	  This	  phenomenon	  characteristically	  entails	  moving	  to	  properties	   within	   the	   proliferating	   residential	   gated	   compounds	   in	   those	   extensions,	  but	  –	  equally	  importantly	  –	  to	  private	  family	  homes	  or	  apartment	  buildings	  on	  smaller	  land	   lots	  allocated	  for	  private	  development	  to	   individuals	  by	  the	  state,	  at	  near-­‐market	  prices,	   over	   the	   past	   two	   decades.	   As	   in	   previous	   chapters,	   the	   discussion	   will	   be	  divided	  into	  several	  parts	  with	  a	  view	  to	  emphasising	  the	  interplay	  between	  agency	  and	  structural	  factors	  in	  informing	  the	  normative	  foundations	  of	  socio-­‐political	  agency.	  The	  chapter	  will	  commence	  by	  providing	  a	  general	  description	  of	  today's	  changing	  Cairene	  urban	  setting	  and	  the	  growing	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  dissatisfaction	  with	  urban	  conditions	  in	   Cairo.	   The	   aim	   in	   this	   section	   is	   to	   contextualise	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   urban	  extensions	  as	  desired	   relocation	  destinations	   for	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  within	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Anouk De Konig, "Cafe Latte and Caesar Salad: Cosmopolitan Belonging in Cairo's Coffee Shops," in Cairo 
Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Urban Space in the New Globalized Middle East, ed. Diane Singerman 
and Paul Amar (Cairo, New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2006), 221. 
11 See both: Mona Abaza, "Egyptianizing the American Dream: Nasr City's Shopping Malls, Public Order, and 
the Privatized Military," in Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Urban Space in the New Globalized 
Middle East, ed. Diane Singerman and Paul Amar (Cairo, New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 
2006). And: Abaza, "Shopping Malls, Consumer Culture and the Reshaping of Public Space in Egypt," Theory, 
Culture & Society 18, no. 5 (2001). 
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the	  wider	  context	  of	  urban	  changes	  to	  the	  city	  in	  the	  past	  decades.	  These	  changes	  have	  been	  marked	  by	  the	  state’s	  ever-­‐weakening	  capacity	  and	  willingness	  to	  enforce	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  conceptions	  of	  the	  public	  space.	  Such	  conceptions	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  directly	  attributable	   to	   self-­‐developed	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   perceptions	   about	   the	   nature	   of	  modern	  city	  living	  and	  socio-­‐cultural	  progress.	  The	  chapter	  will	  then	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  state	  has	  deliberately	  conditioned	  its	  urban	  planning	  strategy	  to	  facilitate	  and	  serve	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  neoliberal	  luxury	  real	  estate	  market.	  Real	  estate	  projects	  in	  the	  new	  urban	  extensions	  have	  been	  discursively	  immersed	   with	   a	   promise	   of	   a	   lifestyle	   free	   of	   the	   insurmountable	   difficulties	   and	  inconveniences	   of	   traditional	   middle-­‐class	   Cairene	   neighbourhoods.	   Once	   again,	   the	  state	   was	   deliberately	   involved,	   handing	   over	   a	   vital	   arena	   for	   the	   construction,	  expression	   and	   reproduction	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   status	   to	   the	   mechanisms	   of	   the	  neoliberal	   free	   market.	   In	   this	   context,	   a	   frustrating	   citizen-­‐state	   relationship	   has	  unwittingly	   been	   replaced	   by	   a	   commercially	   conditioned,	   customer-­‐service	   provider	  arrangement.	   In	   commonly	   constructed	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   perceptions,	   such	   a	  replacement	  has	  eroded	  yet	  another	  considerable	  portion	  of	  the	  state’s	  legitimacy,	  and	  that	   of	   its	   political	   order	   as	  well.	   Just	   as	   in	   education	   and	   employment	   the	   state	   had	  handed	   social	   processes	   for	   the	   preparation	   and	   safeguarding	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status	  and	  distinction	  to	  the	  neoliberal	  market,	  so	  too	  has	  it	  turned	  over	  the	  processes	  of	  expressing	  and	  practicing	  such	  status	  and	  distinction.	  
	  232	  
2.	  Cairo:	  A	  Changing	  Habitat	  of	  the	  Upper	  Middle	  Class	  
2.1	  The	  Extent	  of	  ‘Cairo’	  There	   is	   little	   better	   demonstration	   of	   Cairo’s	   perceived	   centrality	   to	   Egyptian	  life	   than	   the	   all-­‐too-­‐common	   reference	   to	   it	   in	   the	   everyday	   language	   of	   ordinary	  Egyptians	   as	  masr,	   or	   'Egypt'.	   This	   is	   hardly	   any	   exaggeration:	   The	   city	   is	   indeed	   the	  undisputed	  centre	  of	  the	  country’s	  political,	  economic	  and	  cultural	  lives.	  By	  one	  account,	  the	  Greater	  Cairo	  area	  features	  45%	  of	  Egypt’s	  industrial	  facilities,	  40%	  of	  its	  workforce,	  and	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  nation’s	  commercial	  and	  cultural	  activities	  and	  services.12	  It	  is	  Egypt’s	   most	   populous	   urban	   area,	   with	   a	   population	   of	   approximately	   16.1	   million	  people	   (according	   to	   the	   2006	   census),	   a	   striking	   22%	   of	   the	   country’s	   total	  inhabitants.13	  Naturally,	  it	  is	  the	  main	  habitat	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class.	  But	  what	  exactly	  is	  the	  extent	  of	  Cairo,	  and	  where	  should	  the	  boundaries	  of	  this	  metropolis	   be	   drawn?	   Answering	   this	   question	   is	   not	   only	   important	   as	   background	  information.	  As	  far	  as	  this	  study	  is	  concerned,	  gaining	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  size	  of	  Cairo	  as	  both	  an	  urban	  space	  and	  a	  human	  mass	  is	  helpful	  to	  put	  into	  perspective	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  living	  within	  this	  space	  is	  fundamental	  to	  shaping	  the	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  class.	  The	  Cairo-­‐based	  upper	  middle	  class’	  everyday	  life	  is	  an	  intensive	  struggle	  to	   practice	   a	   class-­‐common	   lifestyle	   within	   a	   space	   highly	   contested	   by	   many	   other	  claims	  to	  the	  character	  and	  shape	  of	   the	  public	  space.	  The	   importance	  of	   lifestyle	  as	  a	  continuous	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   exercise	   that	   shapes	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   agency	   is	   thus	   better	  understood	   when	   contextualised	   within	   the	   wider	   process	   of	   the	   daily	   interplay	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Galila El-Kadi, Al-Tahaddur Al-ʻashwa'y [Translated from French: L'urbanisation Spontanee Au Caire. 
Tours: Urbama & Orstom, 1987], trans. Menha Al-Batrawy (Cairo: Al-Markaz Al-Qawmy Li-l-Targama, 
2009), 9. 
13 David Sims, Understanding Cairo: The Logic of a City out of Control (Cairo: American University Press, 
2010), 35. 
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between	  the	  multitude	  of	  social	  classes	  and	  forces	  that	  occupy	  and	  contest	  the	  Cairene	  urban	  space.	  The	  size	  of	  Cairo,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  space	  and	  human	  population,	  varies	  according	  to	   the	   administrative	   demarcation	   used	   to	   define	   the	   city’s	   boundaries	   or	   population	  count	   at	   a	   certain	   recorded	   point	   in	   time.	   In	   terms	   of	   area,	   Cairo	   is	  most	   commonly	  understood	   as	   referring	   to	   what	   administrators	   and	   urban	   planners	   describe	   as	   the	  ‘Greater	  Cairo	  Region’.	  According	   to	  a	  benchmark	  study	  of	  Cairo’s	  urban	  development	  by	   the	   Japanese	   International	   Cooperation	   Agency	   (JICA),	   the	   Greater	   Cairo	   Region	  includes	   three	   main	   clusters	   of	   urban	   areas.	   ‘Greater	   Cairo	   Proper’	   is	   the	   biggest	   of	  those	   clusters	   and	   includes	   the	  whole	   of	   the	  Cairo	   governorate,	  Giza	   city	   (part	   of	   the	  Giza	   governorate)	   and	   Shubra	   Al-­‐Khiyma	   (part	   of	   Al-­‐Qalyubiyya	   governorate).	   These	  areas,	   as	  David	   Sims	  points	   out,	   ‘correspond	   to	   the	  main	  metropolitan	   agglomeration	  and	   to	   almost	   all	   of	   what	   the	   Central	   Agency	   for	   Public	   Mobilization	   and	   Statistics	  (CAPMAS)	   classified	   as	   ‘urban’	   in	   the	   2006	   census’.	   CAPMAS	   records	   the	   total	  population	  of	   these	  areas	  as	  11.7	  million	   inhabitants.14	  However,	  equally	   important	   to	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  chapter	  are	  two	  other	  clusters	  within	  the	  defined	  boundaries	  of	  the	  Greater	  Cairo	  Region.	  The	   first	   is	   composed	   of	   nine	   districts,	   or	  marakiz,	  which	   are	   administratively	  classified	  as	  parts	  of	  either	  the	  Giza15	  or	  the	  Al-­‐Qalyubiyya16	  governorates.17	  These	  areas	  on	  the	  outskirts	  of	  Cairo	  are	  traditionally	  classified	  as	  rural.	  However,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  population	  growth,	  extensive	  and	  unregulated	  building	  practices	  on	  agricultural	  lands,	  and	  sporadic	  expansion	  of	  informal	  communities	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  they	  have	  become	  a	  de	  facto	  part	  of	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  fabric	  of	  the	  capital.	  The	  construction	  of	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid. 
15 Namely: Giza, Imbaba, Usim, Al-Badrashyn, Al-Hawamdiyya. 
16 Namely: Al-Qanatir Al-Khayriyya, Qalyub and Al-Khusus, Al-Khanka, Shibin Al-Qanatir. 
17 Sims, Understanding Cairo: The Logic of a City out of Control, 7. 
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‘ring	  road’,	  a	  highway	  encircling	  Greater	  Cairo,	   in	   the	   late	  1990s,	  has	  made	  driving	  by	  some	   of	   these	   areas	   a	   near-­‐daily	   part	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Cairenes'	   commute	   to	   or	  from	  middle-­‐class	  areas,	  especially	  the	  new	  urban	  extensions	  around	  the	  city.	  In	  recent	  years,	   the	   everyday	   visual	   and	   physical	   encounters	  with	   the	   capital’s	   changing	   urban	  setting	  has	  played	  a	  fundamental	  role	  in	  sharpening	  the	  construction	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  social	  identity	  and	  normative	  conceptions	  of	  the	  public	  space.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  in	  contrast	  to	  other	  dwellers	  in	  the	  Cairene	  urban	  space.	  In	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  as	  this	   chapter	   will	   later	   demonstrate,	   the	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   lifestyle	   has	   effectively	  become	  a	  constant	  movement	  between	  spatially	  confined	  (and,	  most	  importantly,	  class-­‐cohesive)	   urban	   spaces,	   in	   which	   both	   tangible	   and	   intangible	   aspects	   of	   an	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   identity	   are	   comfortably	   displayed	   and	   practised.	   During	   this	   constant	  movement	  between	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  enclaves	  (such	  as	  gated	  residential	  compounds,	  Western-­‐styled	  shopping	  malls	  and	  cinema	  complexes,	  exclusive	  sports	  and	  social	  clubs,	  and	  affluent	  summer	  resorts	  on	  the	  north-­‐western	  coast	  to	  the	  west	  of	  Alexandria),	  the	  components	   of	   the	   desirable	   lifestyle	   attributed	   to	   the	   self-­‐perceived	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  identity	  is	  sharply	  contrasted	  with	  the	  urban	  displays	  of	  other	  social	  compositions.	  Such	   lifestyle	   patterns	   inevitably	   generate	   subjective	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   preferences	  for	  the	  material	  configuration	  and	  arrangement	  of	  public	  space	  and,	  in	  turn,	  how	  state	  authority	  ought	  to	  be	  deployed	  to	  enforce	  certain	  conceptions	  of	  order	  therein.	  	  	  The	   second	  of	   the	   two	  additional	   clusters	   that	  make	  up	   ‘Greater	  Cairo’	   is	  what	  David	   Sims	   labels	   the	   ‘Greater	   Cairo	   Desert’.18	  This	   includes	   the	   eight	   so-­‐called	   ‘new	  cities’	  around	  Cairo:	  The	  Sixth	  of	  October	  City,	  Sheikh	  Zayed	  City,	  Al-­‐‘Ubur,	  Al-­‐Shuruq,	  New	  
Cairo	  City,	  The	  Fifteenth	  of	  May	  City,	  Badr	  City,	  and	  the	  Tenth	  of	  Ramadan	  City.	  The	  2006	  census	  numbered	  the	  total	  population	  of	  these	  urban	  extensions	  west	  and	  east	  of	  Cairo	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at	   603,000	   inhabitants.	   This	   cluster	   is	   of	   particular	   importance	   to	   the	   discussion	   at	  hand,	  especially	  The	  Sixth	  of	  October	  and	  Sheikh	  Zayed	  Cities	  to	  the	  west,	  and	  New	  Cairo	  
City,	  Al-­‐‘Ubur	  and	  Al-­‐Shuruq	  to	  the	  east	  of	  Cairo.	  Home	  to	  most	  of	  the	  gated	  residential	  compounds	  or	  privately	  developed	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  housing,	  these	  desert	  extensions	  have	   evolved	   over	   the	   past	   two	   decades	   to	   become	   ‘safe	   havens’	   for	   the	   display	   and	  practice	  of	  aspirational	  middle-­‐class	  lifestyles	  and	  identities.	  As	  this	  chapter	  will	  subsequently	  demonstrate,	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class’	  desire	   to	  move	  or	   to	  plan	   to	  move	   from	   traditional	  middle-­‐class	   areas	   in	   the	  heart	  of	  Cairo	  to	  the	  new	  desert	  extensions	  represents	  one	  of	  the	  last	  two	  decades’	  most	  notable	  practical	   manifestations	   of	   the	   rift	   which	   has	   characterised	   the	   upper	   middle	   class’	  relationship	   with	   the	   state	   within	   the	   urban	   space.	   The	   state’s	   perceived	   and	   actual	  failure	   to	  act	  as	  a	  regulator	  of	   the	  public	  space	   in	  conformity	  with	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  subjective	   conceptions	   of	   modern	   city	   living	   has	   extensively	   contributed	   to	   the	  accumulation	  of	  political	  discontent.	  Over	  the	  past	  years,	  Cairo’s	  upper	  middle	  class	  has	  watched	  as	  traditional	  quarters	  were	  allowed	  to	  descend	  into	  an	  ever-­‐growing	  state	  of	  ungoverned	  chaos,	  fuelled	  by	  the	  administrative	  corruption	  of	  local	  authorities	  and	  the	  resented	  encroachment	  of	  other	  social	  strata.	  By	  actively	  encouraging	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  private	  real	  estate	  market	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  the	  state	  once	  again	  exported	  its	  crisis	   by	   referring	   the	   resolution	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   frustration	   with	   the	  deteriorating	   conditions	   of	   the	   urban	   space	   to	   neoliberal	   mechanisms	   infested	   by	  corruption	  and	  political	  cronyism.	  	  
2.2	  Growing	  Frustration:	  A	  City	  out	  of	  Control	  	  Most	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   have	   grown	   increasingly	   dissatisfied	   with	  what	  they	  are	  convinced	  is	  a	  steady	  deterioration	  of	  living	  conditions	  in	  their	  traditional	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residential	  quarters	  in	  Cairo	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  previous	  years.	  There	  is	  no	  shortage	  of	   professional	   studies	   that	   suggest	   (and,	   indeed,	   convincingly	   prove)	   that	   the	   urban	  development	  of	  Cairo	  over	  the	  last	  three	  decades	  has	  been	  characterised	  by	  what	  Galila	  El-­‐Kadi	   has	   described	   in	   its	   totality	   as	   ‘haphazard	   urbanization’.	   Between	   the	   81	  informal	   urban	   areas	   (‘ashwa’iyyat	   )	   that	   have	   infringed	  on	   agricultural	   lands	   around	  the	  Greater	  Cairo	  area	  in	  the	  last	  30	  years,	  the	  161	  rural	  areas	  around	  the	  capital	  which	  have	  grown	  into	  de	  facto	  integrated	  towns	  within	  Greater	  Cairo,	  and	  the	  proliferation	  of	  law-­‐evading	   and	   corruption-­‐fuelled	   building	   practices	   in	   most	   Cairene	   quarters,19	  Cairo’s	   urban	   outlook	   has	   descended	   into	   a	   state	   where	   ‘boundaries	   between	   the	  haphazard	  city	  and	  the	  planned	  city	  are	  omitted’.20	  Moreover,	  El-­‐Kadi	  suggests	  that	  such	  an	   intertwined	   pattern	   of	   urban	   development	   leads	   to	   the	   virtual	   disappearance	   of	  clearly	   recognisable	   boundaries	   between	   effectively	   planned	   and	   governed	   urban	  quarters	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  and	   informal	  settlements	  on	   the	  other.	   In	  practice,	   this	  has	  resulted	   into	   the	   physical	   hybridisation	   of	   both	   types	   of	   spaces	  within	   Cairo's	   urban	  setting,	   despite	   other	   socio-­‐economic	   and	   class-­‐related	   lines	   of	   separation	   still	  persistent	  between	  communities	  therein.	  ‘Although	  we	  cannot	  compare	  between	  Bulaq	  
Al-­‐Dakrur	   and	   Mohandessin’,	   argues	   El-­‐Kadi,	   citing	   examples	   of,	   respectively,	   a	  notoriously	   popular	   and	   an	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   quarter,	   ‘the	   takeover	   of	   the	   public	  space	  and	  commercial	  activities	  between	  buildings	  causes	  synchronization	  between	  the	  urban	   characteristics	   of	   Mohandessin	   and	   its	   informal	   neighbouring	   quarter’. 21	  
Mohandessin	   is	   a	   typical	   socio-­‐geographic	   space	   that	   has	   harboured	   the	   evolution	   of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   lifestyle	   patterns	   over	   the	   past	   decades.	   Like	   most	   other	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   areas,	   it	   has	   been	   ‘interrupted’	   by	   increasingly	   diffuse	  manifestations	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 El-Kadi, Al-Tahaddur Al-ʻashwa'y [L'urbanisation Spontanee Au Caire], 29-30. 
20 Ibid., 30. 
21 Ibid. 
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informality,	   poverty,	   weak	   governance,	   and	   state	   retrenchment	   in	   recent	   years.	   The	  realisation	   and	   maintenance	   of	   subjective	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   conceptions	   of	   the	  material	  shape	  of	  the	  public	  space	  there	  have	  been	  increasingly	  compromised	  in	  favour	  of	   other	   forces	   that	   have	   proved	  more	  willing	   and	   able	   to	   negotiate	   the	   state	   on	   the	  municipal	  level.	  	  The	   upper	  middle	   class'	   perception	   of	   a	   steady	   decline	   in	   living	   conditions	   in	  Cairo	  is	  central	  to	  understanding	  the	  role	  of	  lifestyle	  practices	  in	  building	  the	  normative	  foundation	  for	  this	  class'	  political	  agency.	  The	  decline	  in	  the	  level	  of	  provision	  of	  basic	  governance	  services	  is	  widely	  interpreted	  as	  the	  state’s	  clear	  failure	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  the	  demands	   of	  modernisation	   and	   global	   standards	   of	   living	   quality.	   Such	   attribution	   of	  responsibility	   is	   not	   unfounded.	   In	   fact,	   it	   has	   been	   echoed	   in	   scholarly	   attempts	   to	  contextualise	   the	  material	  retreat	  of	  state	  presence	  and	   leverage	   in	   the	  Cairene	  urban	  space	   over	   the	   past	   few	   decades	  within	   the	  wider	   dynamics	   that	   have	   controlled	   the	  development	   and	   evolution	   of	   Egyptian	   authoritarianism	   since	   1952.	   For	   example,	  addressing	   the	   question	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   state’s	   inability	   to	   intervene	   with	   effective	  governance	   in	   Cairo’s	   informal	   communities,	   the	   ‘ashwayyat,	   Judson	   Dorman,	   has	  accurately	  attributed	  this	  retreat	  of	  the	  state	  from	  the	  basic	  task	  of	  governance	  in	  Cairo	  as	  being	  part	  of	   a	   systemic	  approach	   to	  what	  he	   terms	   ‘neglectful	   rule’.22	  This	   type	  of	  rule	  is	  dictated	  by	  the	  structural	  characteristics	  and	  shortcomings	  of	  authoritarianism.	  Dorman	  argues	  that	  the	  capacity	  of	  authoritarian	  rule	  to	  penetrate	  and	  mobilize	  society,	  including	   its	   ability	   to	   establish	   an	   effective	   presence	   in	   the	   public	   space,	   is	   severely	  curtailed	   by	   its	   inherent	   weaknesses.	   State-­‐society	   disengagement	   and	   the	   resulting	  techniques	   of	   indirect	   rule,	   the	   subordination	   of	   state	   capacities	   to	   the	   exigencies	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Judson Dorman, "The Politics of Neglect: The Egyptian State in Cairo, 1974-98" (PhD Thesis, School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2007), 20. 
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regime	   reproduction,	   and	   the	   ever-­‐dominant	   desire	   to	   avert	   risks	   of	   bottom-­‐to-­‐top	  discontent	  in	  social	  ranks,	  are	  all	  elements	  that	  inform	  a	  deliberate	  laissez-­‐faire,	  laissez-­‐
passé	  attitude	  in	  managing	  the	  urban	  space.	  He	  asserts	  that	  [t]ogether,	   these	   three	   elements	   represent	   a	   logic	   of	   state	   inaction,	  incompetence,	   and	   indifference	   […]	   which	   is	   itself	   part	   of	   a	   broader	   logic	   of	  authoritarian	  power	   relations.	  While	   contributing	   to	   the	   reproduction	  of	   non-­‐democratic	  rule	  in	  Egypt,	  it	  had	  a	  debilitating	  effect	  on	  state	  capacity.23	  	  While	  Dorman's	  work	  primarily	  concentrates	  on	  the	  state’s	  incapacity	  to	  govern	  in	   informal	   areas	   of	   Cairo,	   the	   same	   dynamics	   of	   authoritarian	   rule	   have	   arguably	  played	   an	   essential	   role	   in	   shaping	   the	   urban	   developments	   of	   other,	   traditionally	  middle-­‐	   and	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   areas	   of	   Cairo.	   The	   result	   is	   an	   urban	   space	   highly	  contested	  by	  different	  virtual	  and	  physical	  manifestations	  of	  competing	  social	  identities,	  practices,	   and	   lifestyles	   that	   evolved	   amidst	   an	   ever-­‐growing	   state	   absence	   or	  indifference.	   In	   other	  words,	   one	   important	   angle	   of	   appreciating	   the	   changes	   in	   the	  Cairene	   urban	   scene	   as	   a	  whole,	   and	   not	   just	   its	   informal	   communities	   (according	   to	  Dorman's	  study's	  analytical	  scope),	  is	  that	  they	  can	  be	  considered,	  in	  part,	  a	  product	  of	  the	   post-­‐1952	  dispensations	   of	   power;	  which	   ‘over	   fifty	   years	   of	   autocratic	   rule	   have	  'informalized'	  Egyptian	  society’.24	  Over	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  this	  'informalisation'	  of	  the	  Cairene	  urban	  space	  and	  the	   increasingly	   weakened	   governance	   capacity	   of	   the	   state	   has	   coincided	   with	   an	  intensive	  invasion	  of	  material	  manifestations	  of	  globalisation	  in	  various	  quarters	  of	  the	  city.	  This	   is	  particularly	   true	   in	   those	  areas	  heavily	  populated	  by	  various	  strata	  of	   the	  middle	   class.	   Hyper-­‐supermarkets,	   shopping	   malls,	   cinema	   complexes,	   and	   fast-­‐food	  chains	  have	  become	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  middle-­‐class	  Cairo’s	  urban	  outlook.	  Coffee	  shops	  similar	   to	  those	   found	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  any	  Western	  metropolis,	  and	  pricy	  dining	  and	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leisure	  venues	  offering	  different	   international	  cuisines,	  have	  widely	  proliferated.	  They	  are	  catering	  to	  a	  middle-­‐	  and	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  clientele	  with	  a	  growing	  appetite	  for	  consuming	  goods	  and	  services	  understood	   to	   constitute	  a	  modern	  globalised	   lifestyle.	  Billboards	  advertising	  everything	  from	  mobile	  phones	  and	  other	  technological	  gadgets	  to	   European	   and	   Asian	   car	   brands	   promote	   the	   elements	   of	   a	   lifestyle	   considered	  worthy	  of	  middle-­‐class	  status.	  These	  outdoor	  advertisements	  have	  effectively	   invaded	  the	  streets	  of	  middle-­‐class	  areas	  both	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  Cairo	  (such	  as	  Mohandessin,	  Nasr	  
City,	  Maadi,	  Zamalek	  and	  Heliopolis),	  and	  in	  the	  desert	  extensions	  of	  New	  Cairo,	  The	  Sixth	  
of	  October	  and	  Sheikh	  Zayed	  Cities.	  They	  are	  now	  a	  generic	  component	  of	   the	  material	  composition	  of	  middle-­‐class	  Cairo’s	  streets	  and	  squares.	  During	   this	   period,	   two	   contradicting	   changes	   to	   the	   urban	   habitats	   of	   the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class	  have	  therefore	  been	  developing	  in	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  each	  other.	  The	  invasion	  of	  the	  Cairene	  urban	  space	  by	  cultural	  and	  material	  manifestations	  of	  globalisation	  has	  taken	  place	  parallel	  to	  the	  steady	  deterioration	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  local	   services	   by	   the	   government.	   The	   ever-­‐worsening	   garbage-­‐collection	   services,	  virtually	  non-­‐existent	  traffic-­‐control	  systems	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  Cairo,	  and	  the	  weakening	  grip	  of	  local	  law-­‐enforcement	  authorities	  in	  the	  face	  of	  infringements	  on	  public	  space	  by	  shop	  owners	  and	  local	  notables	  are	  but	  examples	  of	  persistent	  everyday	  challenges	  to	  the	   conceptions	   of	   a	   modern	   city	   lifestyle	   projected	   by	   today’s	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians.	   Such	   urban	   governance	   failures	   are	   often	   contrasted	  with	   images	   of	   clean	  and	   effectively	   governed	   Western	   metropolises.	   Frequently,	   they	   are	   also	   compared	  enviously	   to	   the	   tidy	   and	   modern	   urban	   setting	   in	   major	   cities	   in	   the	   Arab	   Gulf	  countries,25	  or	  even	  to	  a	  nostalgic	  construction	  of	  a	  belle	  époque	  Cairo,	  which	  –	  as	  elders	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Dubai is by far the most frequently cited example in this regard. Like many major Arab Gulf cities, the city 
has had a traditionally sizable Egyptian expatriate community. However, unlike other Gulf destinations, which 
have attracted mostly cheap Egyptian labour since the mid-1970s, a considerable part of this community is 
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constantly	   remind	   younger	   generations	   of	   the	   upper	  middle	   class	   –	   once	   existed.	   As	  David	  Sims	  describes:	  The	  Egyptian	  middle	  classes	  and	   intelligentsia,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  sizable	  slice	  of	   the	  foreign	   community,	   loves	   to	   deplore	   what	   Cairo	   has	   become.	   Crowds	   and	  congestion,	   pollution,	   garbage,	   chaos,	   gridlocked	   traffic,	   horrendous	  architecture,	  and	  no	  green	  space,	  all	  are	  endlessly	  invoked	  to	  describe	  the	  mess	  Cairo	   has	   become	   [...]	   In	   fact	   for	   many	   cultural	   and	   professional	   elites,	   Cairo	  would	  have	  remained	  a	  civilized	  place,	  had	  it	  not	  been	  for	  those	  ‘peasants’	  who	  keep	  on	  coming,	  bringing	  with	   them	  backward	  behaviour	  unsuited	   to	  modern	  city	  living.26	  	  	  At	   this	   point,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   further	   emphasise	   that	   the	   disenchantment	   of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   with	   the	   deteriorating	   standards	   of	   city	   living	   in	   Cairo	  needs	   to	   be	   understood	   as	  more	   than	   just	   a	   grievance	   towards	   failed	   governance	   or	  corruption	   and	  mishandling	   of	   local	   service	   provision.	   In	   essence,	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  define	  such	  deterioration	  as	  an	  obstacle	   in	   the	   realisation	  and	  practice	  of	  a	  lifestyle	  considered	  worthy	  of	  their	  self-­‐perceived	  social	  identity.	  Mohamed	  Adel,	  a	  32-­‐year-­‐old	   marketing	   executive	   at	   Vodafone,	   expressed	   this	   sentiment	   clearly	   by	  attributing	  his	  plan	  to	  live	  in	  one	  of	  the	  gated	  compounds	  when	  he	  starts	  a	  family	  to	  his	  desire	  to	  practice	  a	  different	  lifestyle	  worthy	  of	  his	  class	  status.	  The	  people	  who	  live	  in	  the	  compounds,	  he	  says,	  are	  usually	   from	  a	  high	  social	   level	  and	  once	  you	  have	   that,	  you	  will	   find	   that	  the	   culture	   and	  behaviour	  of	   those	   around	  you	  and	   in	   your	   area	   are	   good,	   as	  opposed	   to	  when	  you	  go	   live	   in	  a	  popular	  or	  crowded	  area,	  you	  will	   find	   that	  you	  are	  not	  content27	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
increasingly comprised of young upper-middle-class professionals. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many of 
them have been attracted not only by better career prospects, but also, equally by the promise of a modern, 
global and convenient urban lifestyle. Frequent travels to Dubai for meetings, workshops, and professional 
trainings etc. are also part of the work routines of many upper-middle-class professionals whose occupations in 
Egypt's corporate and private sectors have regional scopes of operation. Much of the discourse surrounding life 
in the Gulf amongst today’s Egyptian upper middle class can thus be described as embedded in class-common 
narratives of an unfortunately deteriorating here and a modern emerging there. For more analysis of the various 
elements of the discursive construction of Dubai as a destination of modernity in a new globalised Middle East, 
see: Yasser Elsheshtawy, "Redrawing Boundaries: Dubai, an Emerging Global City," In Planning Middle 
Eastern Cities: An Urban Kaleidoscope in a Globalizing World, ed. Yasser Elsheshtawy (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2004).   
26 Sims, Understanding Cairo: The Logic of a City out of Control, 15. 
27 Mohamed Adel in discussion with the author, in Sheikh Zayed City, 25 April 2009. 
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At	   the	   time	   of	   the	   interview,	   although	  Mohamed	   had	   not	   yet	  married,	   he	   had	  already	   started	   taking	   practical	   steps	   towards	   buying	   a	   villa	   in	  Al-­‐Shuruq,	   one	   of	   the	  middle-­‐class	  urban	  extensions	  east	  of	  Cairo	  mentioned	  earlier.	  There,	  the	  logic	  argues,	  he	  would	  have	  a	  good	  chance	  to	  live	  within	  a	  ‘good	  community’.	  The	  collective	  trend	  of	  younger	  generations	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  moving	  to	  the	  desert	  extensions	  of	  Cairo	  is	  therefore	  best	  contextualised	  within	  the	  wider	  agony	  of	  what	   has	   become	   an	   urban	   space	   failing	   to	   evolve	   consistently	   with	   normative	  expectations	  related	  to	  neoliberal	  and	  globalised	  lifestyles.	  In	  some	  cases,	  as	  previously	  discussed,	  this	  agony	  is	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  discourse	  of	  nostalgically	  mourning	  the	  loss	  of	  a	  bourgeois	   character	   that	   once	   dominated	   the	   public	   space	   in	   Cairo.	   In	   a	   series	   of	  columns	   in	   the	   state-­‐owned	   Al-­‐Ahram	   newspaper	   in	   2007,	   the	   columnist	   Amr	  Abdelsamie	  even	  coined	  the	  negatively-­‐connoted	  term	  shawari‘ism	  to	  describe	  a	  state	  of	  utter	   disenchantment	   with	   socio-­‐cultural	   practices	   on	   the	   streets	   of	   Cairo	   that	   have	  been	   associated	   with	   the	   multifaceted	   evolution	   of	   the	   city's	   public	   space	   in	   the	  neoliberal	  era.	  Shawari‘ism	   is	  a	   judgemental	  term	  derived	  from	  the	  Arabic	  word	  shari‘	  (street),	   describing	   a	   way	   of	   conduct	   that	   is	   vulgar	   and	   ill-­‐mannered,	   and	   that	   has	  departed	  from	  general	  values	  of	  good	  citizenry	  and	  respect	  that	  are	  said	  to	  have	  once	  prevailed	   in	   the	   Cairene	   public	   space.	   In	   a	   book	   assembling	   this	   set	   of	   columns,	  Abdelsamie	  uses	  a	  narrative	  style	  to	  draw	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  chaotic	  Cairene	  urban	  space.	  Quite	   tellingly,	   he	   insists	   that	   shawari‘ism	   is	   a	   concept	   that	   can	   be	   considered	   ‘to	  accurately	  capture	  the	  entire	  scene	  of	  contemporary	  life	  in	  Cairo’.28	  	  Hany	   Gaafar, 29 	  an	   advertisement	   executive	   and	   entrepreneur,	   echoed	   this	  widespread	  despair	  of	   the	  upper	  middle	   class	  with	   the	   invasion	  of	   the	  Cairene	  public	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Amr Abdelsamie, Al-Shawariʻism (Cairo: Dar Al-ʻAin, 2008). 
29 The second of two interview sessions with Hany, conducted in Mohandessin, Cairo on 6 November 2008.  
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space	   by	   patterns	   inspired	   by	   the	   socio-­‐cultural	   identity	   of	   other	   social	   strata.	   At	   the	  time	   interviewed	   for	   this	   study,	   he	   had	   recently	   bought	   a	   flat	   in	   ‘Opera	   City’,	   a	   gated	  compound	   of	   fifty	   small	   apartment	   buildings	   in	   the	   Sheikh	   Zayed	   City.	   For	   Hany,	   his	  planned	  move	  to	  the	  compound	  was	  prompted	  by	  his	  and	  his	  wife’s	  growing	  frustration	  at	  their	  inability	  to	  enjoy	  ‘decency	  and	  order’,	  in	  their	  surrounding	  urban	  environment.	  ‘All	  I	  want’,	  he	  stated,	  ‘is	  not	  to	  hurt	  my	  eyes	  and	  ears	  when	  I	  am	  walking	  in	  the	  street.	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  see	  ugly	  buildings,	  or	  the	  litter	  lying	  around	  everywhere.	  I	  want	  to	  live	  in	  a	  place	  where	  my	  wife	  and	  I	  don’t	  have	  to	  hear	  people	  swearing	  vulgarly	  in	  loud	  voices	  on	  the	  street	  all	  the	  time.’	  	  	  	  	  	  Hany’s	   remarks	   draw	   attention	   to	   a	   dynamic	   that	   has	   fuelled	   growing	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   frustration	   over	   the	   past	   few	   years.	   The	   upper	   middle	   class	   has	  persistently	  failed	  to	  develop	  mechanisms	  with	  which	  it	  can	  exercise	  leverage	  on	  local	  state	  authorities	  to	  ensure	  some	  degree	  of	  representation	  or	  influence	  on	  decisions	  and	  policy	  making	   in	   local	   governance.	  Much	   can	   be	   said	   about	   this	   failure,	   including	   the	  practical	   impossibility	   of	   building	   such	   mechanisms,	   in	   light	   of	   successive	   regimes’	  characteristic	   intolerance	   of	   any	   such	   socio-­‐political	   initiatives.	   In	   contrast	   to	   such	  political	   impotence,	   intermediate	   strata,	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘lesser	   notables’,	   argues	  Menza,	   have	   in	   various	   forms	   been	   woven	   into	   the	   clientalistic	   networks	   used	   by	  subsequent	  Egyptian	   regimes	   since	  1952	   to	  mediate	   and	   secure	  political	   control	  over	  increasingly	   complex	   and	   hard-­‐to-­‐penetrate	   communities.30	  The	   Muslim	   Brotherhood	  has	   used	   similar	   networks	   over	   the	   years	   to	   inflict	   ever-­‐widening	  holes	   in	   the	   state’s	  legitimacy,	  both	   in	  poor	  and	   lower-­‐middle-­‐class	  areas.	   In	  practice,	   these	   tactics	   led	   to	  the	  emergence	  of	  various	  layers	  and	  networks	  of	  urban	  dwellers	  that	  not	  only	  occupied	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Mohamed Fahmy Menza, "Neoliberal Reform and Socio-Structural Reconfiguration in Cairo's Popular 
Quarters: The Rise of the Lesser Notables in Misr Al Qadima," Mediterranean Politics 17, no. 3 (2012). 
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growing	  shares	  of	  the	  public	  space,	  but	  also	  were	  more	  effective	  in	  shaping	  its	  material	  outlook.	   Cafes	   illegally	   occupying	   large	   chunks	  of	  pedestrian	  pavements,	   shopkeepers	  preventing	   parking	   in	   front	   of	   their	   shops,	   peddlers,	   informal	   car	   parking	   valets,	   and	  many	  others	  emerged	  as	   the	  new	  kings	  of	  middle	  class	  Cairo.	  Their	  growing	  presence	  and	   influence	   in	   the	   urban	   space	   represents	   a	   daily	   challenge	   to	   the	   realisation	   of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  constructed	  conceptions	  of	  modern	  urban	  lifestyles.	  
2.3	  Exodus:	  Immigration	  to	  the	  Gated	  Compounds	  Whatever	  the	  underlying	  reasons	  for	  the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  failure	  to	  influence	  the	   material	   evolution	   of	   Cairo’s	   public	   space,	   of	   more	   interest	   here	   is	   the	   resulting	  class-­‐common	  perception	  that	  moving	  to	  the	  gated	  communities	  is	  the	  solution	  to	  this	  dilemma.	  As	  Eric	  Denis	  points	  out,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  formal	  political	  field	  was	  hard	  to	  penetrate	   because	   of	   the	   seemingly	   unbeatable	   authoritarian	   nature	   of	   the	   Mubarak	  regime,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   almost-­‐complete	   absence	   of	   a	   tradition	   of	   political	   practice	   in	  middle	  class	  circles,	  	  gated	   communities	   represent(ed)	   the	   socio-­‐political	   result	   of	   economic	  neoliberalization.	   Here	   private	   democracy	  materializes.	  While	   estimating	   that	  public	   institutions	   cannot	   assure	   the	   well-­‐being	   and	   the	   defense	   of	   the	  collective,	  a	  restrained	  community	  of	   like-­‐minded	  people	   itself	   takes	  charge	  of	  the	  management	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  its	  own	  way	  of	  life.31	  	  	  	  	  	  Moving	   to	   the	   residential	   gated	  compounds	   in	   the	  desert	   extensions	  of	   greater	  Cairo	   ought	   therefore	   to	   be	   understood	   as	  more	   than	   a	   socio-­‐economic	   phenomenon	  fuelled	  by	  the	  natural	  growth	  in	  housing	  demand	  in	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  ranks.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  better	  understood	  as	  a	  state-­‐sponsored	  transferral	  of	  the	  responsibility	  to	  condition	  the	  public	  space	  to	  conform	  to	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  expectations	  to	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  neoliberal	   real	   estate	  market.	   Although	   such	   a	   referral	   has	   arguably	   contributed	   to	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  Eric Denis, "Cairo as Neo-Liberal Capital? From Walled City to Gated Communities," in Cairo 
Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture and Urban Space in the New Globalized Middle East, ed. Diane Singerman and 
Paul Amar (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2006). 
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persistent	   accumulation	   of	   political	   frustration,	   in	   recent	   years,	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	   seeking	   to	   realise	   their	   subjective	   construction	   of	   the	   modern	   urban	  environment	  seemed	  to	  have	  little	  choice	  but	  to	  go	  along	  with	  this	  prevailing	  trend.	  Tarek	   El	   Alfy,	   a	   33-­‐year-­‐old	   entrepreneur	   and	   former	   sales	   executive	   at	   the	  multinational	   oil	   company	   Exxon	   Mobil,	   for	   example,	   considerably	   stretched	   his	  financial	  resources	  to	  buy	  a	  property	  in	  one	  of	  the	  most	  exclusive	  gated	  compounds	  on	  the	   Cairo-­‐Alexandria	   desert	   road.32	  The	   compound,	   a	   luxurious	   collection	   of	   villas	  scattered	  around	  a	  golf	  course	  and	  green	  areas,	  was	  built	  by	  a	  real	  estate	  development	  company	   owned	   by	   Gamal	   Mubarak’s	   father-­‐in-­‐law.	   It	   is	   situated	   on	   a	   piece	   of	   land	  carefully	  selected	  by	  the	  developers,	  approximately	  two	  kilometres	  off	  the	  main	  Cairo-­‐Alexandria	   desert	   road	   to	   the	  west	   of	   Giza.	   The	   development	   is	   conveniently	   located	  near	  a	  future	  road	  link	  that	  will	  connect	  Ahmed	  Orabi	  street	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  Mohandessin	  to	  the	  desert	  road	  between	  Egypt's	  two	  largest	  cities.	  When	  the	  new	  road	  is	  completed,	  it	  will	  make	   the	   compound’s	   luxurious	   cluster	   of	   villas	   and	   golf	   course	   a	  mere	   35km	  drive	   from	   the	   nearest	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   enclave	   in	   the	   heart	   of	   Cairo.	   Tarek	  articulated	  the	  logic	  behind	  such	  a	  move	  from	  his	  social	  class’	  perspective.	  In	  previous	  years,	  he	  had	  grown	  disenchanted	  by	   the	  ever-­‐deteriorating	   state	  of	   traffic	   chaos	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  green	  areas	  in	  the	  middle-­‐class	  neighbourhood	  of	  Al–‘Aguza	  where	  he	  lived	  with	  his	  mother	  in	  a	  spacious	  flat	  that	  has	  traditionally	  much-­‐valued	  views	  of	  the	  Nile.	  Tarek’s	   decision	   to	   buy	   a	   property	   in	   a	   gated	   compound	   outside	   of	   Cairo	   has	   been	  greatly	   influenced	   by	   his	   conviction	   that	   the	   state	   has	   given	   up	   any	   serious	   effort	   to	  upgrade	  essential	  services	  in	  the	  capital	  as	  part	  of	  a	  clear,	  class-­‐inspired	  rationale:	  One	   can	   sense	   that	   over	   the	  past	   years	   there	  has	  been	   an	   implicit	   decision	   to	  turn	  Cairo	   into	  a	   capital	   for	   the	  poor.	   [..]	  This	  means	   that	   the	  elite	   (ministers,	  governors,	   businessmen,	   their	   relatives	   and	   social	   circuits)	   is	   escaping	   old	  Cairo.	   It	   will	   be	   left	   behind	   to	   the	   poor	   with	   its	   crowdedness	   and	   problems,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Tarek El Alfy in discussion with the author, in his office in Mohandessin, Cairo, 28 November 2008. 
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while	  the	  elite	  enjoy	  their	  villas	  and	  properties	  in	  the	  gated	  compounds.[...]	  I	  am	  part	  of	  this	  class	  and	  that	  is	  why	  I	  also	  want	  to	  move.	  	  Tarek	   El	   Alfy	   and	   Mohamed	   Adel’s	   remarks	   are	   representative	   of	   the	  predominant	   perception	   within	   the	   ranks	   of	   today’s	   upper	   middle	   class	   in	   Egypt.	  Indeed,	  this	  perception	  was	  repeatedly	  expressed	  in	  various	  forms	  in	  several	  interviews	  conducted	   for	   this	   research33.	   In	   this	   context,	   an	   important	   question	   emerges:	   What	  aspects	  helped	  to	  create	  the	  perception	  reflected	  in	  the	  testimonies	  above	  (namely,	  that	  moving	  to	  and	  residence	  in	  the	  gated	  compounds	  of	  Cairo’s	  desert	  urban	  extensions	  will	  bring	   about	   the	   realisation	   of	   the	   desired,	   modern	   lifestyle	   considered	   by	   the	   upper	  middle	  class	  as	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  its	  social	  status)?	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  mechanisms	  are	  entailed	  in	  creating	  a	  'promised	  land'	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  gated	  compounds	  in	  the	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   imagination?	   Exploring	   possible	   answers	   to	   this	   question	   is	  important	  to	  developing	  our	  appreciation	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  involved	  in	  the	  processes,	  both	  structural	  and	  individual,	  that	  create	  class-­‐specific	  perceptions	  of	  social	  identity	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  context.	  
3.	  Creating	  an	  Image	  of	  a	  New	  Cairo	  
3.1	  Desert	  Urban	  Expansion	  in	  Popular	  Culture	  Just	  as	  much	  as	  educational	  institutions,	  professions,	  and	  employers	  traditionally	  constitute	   important	   markers	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   status	   in	   Egypt,	   so	   too	   does	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 In addition to being habitually expressed in various informal contexts amongst upper middle class Egyptians 
encountered during this research, this view was also clearly expressed by the following interviewees: Tarek El 
Alfy (interview, Cairo, 28 November 2008); Mohamed Adel (interview, Sheikh Zayed Ciy, 25 April 2009); 
Ahmed El Husseiny (interview, Cairo 19 November 2009); Ayman Hany (interview, Sixth of October City, 
Cairo 10 February 2008); Hany Gaafar (interview, Cairo 6 November 2008); Rami Mettias (interview, Cairo, 19 
May 2009); Khaled Bahig (interview, Cairo 20 October 2008); Hisham Sweilam (interview, Cairo, 12 
November 2008); Radwa Emad (interview, Giza, 11 March 2009); Youssef Abdelwahab (interview, Sixth of 
October City, 17 November 2009); Sherif El Leissy (interview, Cairo, 1 July 2009); Hisham Ezzeldin 
(interview, Cairo 17 October 2009); Sameh El Sayyed (interview, Sheikh Zayed City, 14 April 2010); and 
Hisham Enan (interview, Cairo, 6 March 2010). 
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place	  of	  residence	  within	  Cairo.	  In	  previous	  decades,	  the	  much-­‐cherished	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status	  was	  considered	  safely	  preserved	  should	  the	  family	  secure	  suitable	  housing	  for	  its	  marrying	  young34	  in	  characteristic	  Cairene	  apartment	  buildings	  in	  the	  traditional	  middle-­‐class	  or	  affluent	  areas	  of	  the	  city	  (such	  as	  Heliopolis,	  Dokki,	  Mohandessin,	  Maadi,	  
Nasr	  City,	  Garden	  City,	   or	  Zamalek).	  While	   this	  was	   relatively	   easy	   to	   realise	   until	   the	  mid-­‐1970s,	   in	  recent	  years,	   the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  generation	   that	  entered	  adulthood	  during	   the	  1990s	  has	   been	   faced	  with	   the	   growing	  difficulty	   of	   continuing	   this	   trend,	  ever	  so	  important	  to	  the	  re-­‐production	  of	  its	  social	  status.	  Of	  course,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	   objective	   and	   macroeconomic	   reasons	   behind	   such	   difficulties	   that	   relate	   to	   the	  overall	  evolution	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  housing	  market	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades.35	  In	   general,	   however,	   these	   macro-­‐level	   developments	   within	   this	   admittedly	  limited	   segment	   of	   the	   housing	   market	   in	   Egypt	   have	   taken	   place	   in	   parallel	   to	   the	  previously	   discussed	   diminishment	   of	   the	   quality	   of	   life	   in	   Cairo	   generally,	   and	   in	  middle-­‐class	  neighbourhoods	  in	  particular.	  Combined,	  these	  two	  factors	  created	  a	  niche	  in	   the	  housing	  market,	   generated	  by	  a	   genuine	  appetite	   in	   the	  upper	  middle	   class	   for	  new	  solutions	  or	  alternative	  approaches	  to	  the	  socially	  important	  issue	  of	  housing.	  It	  is	  within	   this	   context	   that,	   in	   the	   early	   1990s,	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   early	   stages	   of	  Egypt’s	   neoliberal	   transformation,	   the	   new,	   gated	   compounds	   in	   Cairo’s	   desert	  extensions	  were	  introduced	  to	  the	  Egyptian	  housing	  market.	  Almost	  a	  decade	  into	  this	  phenomenon,	  Timothy	  Mitchell	  wrote	  about	  Dreamland,	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  of	  the	  then-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Middle-class Egyptian families consider it one of their main familial duties to facilitate the marriages of their 
sons and daughters. A set of informal, yet strictly followed, codes regulate the process of starting new families. 
These include many elements, from dowry values to forms and venues for the celebration of engagement and 
wedding parties. Of particular relevance here, they include the parents of the groom’s responsibility to provide a 
‘suitable’ habitat for the new couple, usually a sizable apartment in one of the aforementioned neighborhoods. 
Reciprocally, the bride’s family is considered responsible for the acquisition of the main furnishings of the new 
home.   
35 For a thorough anatomy of the Egyptian housing market, see: David Sims, Hazem Kamal, and Doris 
Solomon, "Housing Study for Urban Egypt," (Cairo: USAID, 2008). 
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newly	   developing	   gated	   compounds,	   notably	   contextualising	   it	   as	   part	   of	   an	  unprecedented	  boom	  in	  affluent	  housing	  compounds	  in	  Cairo’s	  desert	  extensions:	  "Dreamland,"	   the	   TV	   commercials	   for	   the	   most	   ambitious	   of	   the	   new	  developments	  promise,	  "is	  the	  world's	  first	  electronic	  city".	  Buyers	  can	  sign	  up	  now	   for	   luxury	   fiberoptic-­‐wired	   villas,	   as	   shopping	   malls,	   theme	   parks,	   golf	  courses	  and	  polo	  grounds	  rise	  out	  of	  the	  desert	  west	  of	  the	  Giza	  pyramids	  but	  only	  minutes	  from	  central	  Cairo	  via	  newly	  built	  bridges	  and	  ring	  roads.	  Or	  one	  can	  take	  the	  ring	  road	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction,	  east	  of	  the	  Muqattam	  Hills,	  to	  the	  desert	  of	   “New	  Cairo,"	  where	  speculators	  are	  marketing	  apartment	  blocks	  to	  expatriate	  workers	  saving	  for	  their	  future	  in	  the	  Gulf.	  […]	  .	  “No	  factories,	  no	  pollution,	   no	   problems"	   is	   the	   advertisement's	   promise,	   underlined	   with	   the	  developer's	  logo,	  "The	  Egypt	  of	  My	  Desires”.	  The	  development	  tracts	  spreading	  out	   across	   the	   fields	   and	   deserts	   around	   Greater	   Cairo	   represent	   the	   most	  phenomenal	  real	  estate	  explosion	  Egypt	  has	  ever	  witnessed.36	  	  
Dreamland	  is	  a	  vast	  gated	  compound	  of	  villas	  adjacent	  to	  the	  Cairo-­‐Oasis	  desert	  road.	   It	   was	   developed	   by	   companies	   owned	   by	   Ahmed	   Bahgat,	   one	   of	   the	   Mubarak	  era’s	  most	  notable	  business	  tycoons,	  who	  also	  owned	  one	  of	  the	  country's	  first	  private	  television	  networks,	  Dream	  TV.	  Villas	  and	  units	  in	  the	  compound	  could	  be	  described	  as	  the	   first	  generation	  of	  products	   in	  a	  market	   that	  would	  considerably	  expand	  over	   the	  following	   years	   in	   Egypt.	   This	   market,	   mainly	   targeting	   Egypt's	   upper-­‐middle	   and	  affluent	   classes,	   still	   flourishes	   even	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   post-­‐January	   2011	   general	  economic	  slow-­‐down.	   In	  today’s	  Cairo,	  as	  Sims	  accurately	  points	  out,	   ‘[b]illboards	  and	  advertisements	   announce	   in	   glowing	   terms	   the	   schemes	   of	   private	   developers	  promising	  a	  quality	  of	   life	   in	  the	  desert	  that	   is	  the	  antithesis	  of	  the	  crowded,	  polluted,	  and	   noisy	   life	   found	   inside	   Cairo’. 37 	  In	   addition	   to	   these	   billboards	   and	   outdoor	  advertisements,	  which	  by	  now	  comprise	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  middle-­‐class	  Cairo’s	  urban	  outlook,	  television	  commercials	  marketing	  properties	  in	  the	  gated	  compounds	  have	  for	  years	   constituted	  one	  of	   the	  main	   items	   in	   lengthy	  prime-­‐time	   commercial	   breaks	  on	  Egyptian	  private	   television	   channels.	  This	   is	   especially	   true	  during	   the	   evening	   in	   the	  Islamic	   holy	  month	   of	   Ramadan,	   traditionally	   the	   all-­‐year-­‐round	   peak	   for	   viewership	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Mitchell, "Dreamland: The Neoliberalism of Your Desires," 28-29. 
37 Sims, Understanding Cairo: The Logic of a City out of Control, 170. 
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rates	   and	   the	   high	   season	   for	   the	   introduction	   of	   popular	   television	   series	   and	   soap	  operas.	  Moreover,	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  escaping	  the	  aforementioned	  evils	  of	  Cairo’s	  urban	  setting	  and	  the	  promise	  of	  a	  future	  free	  from	  these	  perils	  for	  the	  desired	  healthy,	  clean	  and	   modern	   lifestyle	   found	   in	   the	   new	   desert	   extensions	   has	   been	   an	   oft-­‐repeated	  theme	   in	   many	   film	   and	   television	   productions.	   One	   of	   them,	   titled	   ‘Al-­‐Nawm	   Fil-­‐
‘Assal’,38	  a	   1996	   production	   starring	   the	   famous	   comedian	   Adel	   Imam,	   went	   even	  farther,	  depicting	  ‘going	  out	  to	  the	  desert’	  as	  a	  strategic	  solution	  for	  the	  country’s	  socio-­‐political	  impasse	  under	  the	  Mubarak	  regime.	  In	  the	  film,	  a	  politically	  loaded	  comedy	  of	  metaphoric	   events	   typical	  of	  many	  of	   Imam’s	  works,	   the	   star	  plays	   the	   role	  of	  Cairo’s	  chief	  of	  the	  mabahith,	  or	  criminal	  police.	  He	  is	  investigating	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  sudden	  breakout	  of	  a	  plague	  of	  sexual	  impotence	  among	  Cairo’s	  men.	  Panicked	  by	  the	  discovery	  that	  he	  himself	  is	  suffering	  from	  the	  very	  condition	  he	  is	  investigating,	  he	  takes	  his	  wife	  on	   a	   car	   trip	   to	   a	   romantic	  picnic	   in	   the	  desert	   outskirts	   of	   Cairo.	  There,	  much	   to	  his	  delight,	  he	  finds	  himself	  able	  to	  perform	  once	  again.	  He	  returns	  to	  report	  the	  results	  of	  his	   little	  experiment	  and	  the	  solution	  of	   ‘going	  out	  to	  the	  desert’	  to	  his	  superiors,	  who	  have	   been	   pre-­‐occupied	   with	   the	   spreading	   condition,	   which	   they	   considered	  threatening	   to	   national	   security	   –	   only	   to	   be	   shrugged	   off.	   The	   spreading	   sexual	  impotence	   is	   an	   unmistakably	  metaphoric	   theme	   throughout	   the	   film	   for	   a	   projected	  dim	   fate	   of	   Egyptian	   society	   under	   the	   Mubarak	   regime,	   characterised	   mainly	   by	  stagnation,	   despair	   and	   a	   readiness	   to	   explode	   in	   discontent.	   As	   if	   predicting	   future	  events,	  the	  final	  scene	  of	  the	  film	  is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  officer	  resigns	  his	  post	  and	  leads	  a	  popular	  mass	  demonstration	  of	  ordinary	  Egyptians	  rebelling	  against	  a	  government	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Translation: ‘Sleeping In the Honey’. The phrase is a colloquial expression, indicating someone's absence of 
concentration or lack of attention while an undesirable occurrence takes place, suggesting carelessness, 
irresponsibility, and helplessness. In this instance, the film's title is revealing in its self-critique of Egyptian 
society's complacency and its tolerance of Mubarak’s authoritarianism.  
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refuses	  to	  acknowledge	  a	  deep	  and	  widening	  social	  crisis,	  choosing	  instead	  to	  supress	  it	  politically.	  Film	   themes	  and	   countless	  other	   cultural	  productions	  have	  played	  an	   effective	  role	  in	  discursively	  relating	  the	  urban	  expansion	  in	  the	  desert	  to	  the	  effective	  solution	  of	  a	   wide	   range	   of	   the	   country’s	   problems.	   Desert	   expansion	   has	   even	   been	   used	   as	   a	  theme	  for	  the	  production	  of	  imageries	  to	  consolidate	  Mubarak’s	  political	  legitimacy	  and	  his	   image	  as	  a	   leader.	  Egyptian	  generations	  of	   the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  are	   familiar	  with	  many	   state-­‐television-­‐produced	   nationalist	   songs	   that	   featured	   images	   of	   Hosni	  Mubarak	  gazing	  hopefully	  from	  behind	  his	  sunglasses	  into	  the	  open	  desert	  in	  one	  of	  the	  new	   towns,	   or	   standing	   amidst	   a	   field	   of	   newly	   cultivated	   desert	   lands	   with	   an	  optimistic	   smile	   on	   his	   face.39	  Such	   discourse-­‐generating	   cultural	   productions	   were	  arguably	  effective	  in	  supporting	  the	  state’s	  implicit	  orientation	  to	  shifting	  the	  burden	  of	  providing	   well-­‐governed	   communities	   and	   urban	   spaces	   entirely	   to	   the	   neoliberal	  market.	   However,	   there	   was	   another,	   arguably	   equally	   powerful	   factor	   at	   play:	   The	  image	  and	  myth-­‐building	  power	  of	  the	  market	  itself.	  
3.2	  The	  Promised	  Land	  on	  Display	  The	   creation	   and	   promotion	   of	   a	   ‘promised	   land’-­‐discourse	   surrounding	   the	  phenomenon	   of	   the	   gated	   compounds	   in	   Cairo’s	   desert	   extensions	   has	   not	   been	  restricted	  to	  advertisements	  and	  cultural	  productions.	  As	  previously	  discussed,	  Egypt's	  neoliberal	   era	   saw	   the	   introduction	   of	   one-­‐stop	   shopping	   venues	   for	   social-­‐status	  reproduction	   tools	   in	   the	   vital	   areas	   of	   employment	   and	   education	   in	   the	   form	   of	  	  'employment	   fairs'	  and	   'school	   fairs'.	  Similarly,	   the	  past	  years	  have	  also	  witnessed	  the	  regular	   organisation	   of	   'fairs'	   for	   real	   estate	   offerings.	   By	   visiting	   these	   exhibitions,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Observation derived from the author’s personal experience.   
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usually	   held	   in	   one	   of	   Cairo’s	   extravagant	   five-­‐star	   hotels	   or	   in	   the	   city’s	   main	  convention's	   centre	   in	  Nasr	  City,	  Egyptian	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   families	  and	   individuals	  can	   get	   a	   taste	   of	  what	   the	   gated-­‐compounds	  market	   has	   to	   offer.	  Moreover,	   some	  of	  these	   exhibitions	   represent	   annual	   conventions	   for	   various	   local,	   regional	   and	  international	  stakeholders	   in	  the	  affluent	  Egyptian	  real	  estate	  market.	   In	  recent	  years,	  the	   boom	   in	   the	   affluent	   housing	   sector	   in	   Egypt	   has	   prompted	   the	   organisation	   of	  several	   similar	   annual	   exhibitions.	   One	   of	   them,	   which	   has	   been	   held	   annually	   since	  2008,	  is	  the	  exhibition	  ‘Next	  Move’,40	  part	  of	  a	  series	  of	  similar	  real	  estate	  conventions	  titled	   ‘Cityscape’	   held	   annually	   in	   Riyadh,	   Jeddah,	   Abu	   Dhabi,	   Doha,	   and	   Cairo.41	  This	  series	  of	  events	   is	  organised	  by	   ‘Informa’,	  a	  global	  exhibition-­‐organising	  business	   that	  describes	   itself	   as	   ‘the	   largest	   publicly-­‐owned	   organiser	   of	   conference	   and	   training	  events	   in	   the	   world	   providing	   inspiring	   marketplaces	   and	   the	   opportunity	   for	  knowledge	   to	   be	   shared’.42	  According	   to	   a	   publication	   (Appendix	   2)	   by	   the	   Egyptian	  partner-­‐organisers	   of	   the	   ‘Next	   Move’	   exhibition	   promoting	   the	   2010	   event,	   the	   first	  version	   of	   the	   convention	   held	   in	   Egypt	   in	  April	   2008	   attracted	   the	   forty	   largest	   real	  estate	  developers	  operating	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  market,	  some	  20,000	  visitors	  and	  occupied	  16,000	  square	  metres	  of	  exhibition	  space.	  In	  2009,	  when	  the	  event	  was	  organised	  under	  the	  promotional	   slogan	   ‘Window	   to	   the	  Future’,	   the	  number	  of	   visitors	   surpassed	   the	  previous	  year’s,	   and	  more	  companies	  operating	   in	   the	   real	  estate	  market	   took	  part	   in	  the	  exhibition.43	  	  	  	  Although	   entrance	   to	   the	   exhibition	   is	   initially	   advertised	   as	   free,	   visitors	   are	  allowed	   to	   enter	   only	   if	   they	   purchase	   a	   finely	   designed	   and	   published	   booklet	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Unless otherwise referenced, information, photographs and descriptions in this section are based on a visit to 
the exhibition ‘Next Move: The Real Estate Show of Egypt’, held in the Cairo International Convention and 
Exhibition Centre in Nasr City, Cairo on 1 May 2010. 
41 http://www.cityscapeglobal.com, accessed 15 June 2013.  
42 http://www.informaexhibitions.com/Who-We-Are/, accessed 15 June 2013. 
43 "Next Move: The Real Estate Show of Egypt,"  (Cairo: Lead Marketing Solutions, 2010), 5. 
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features	  real	  estate	  projects	  developed	  by	  companies	  participating	  in	  the	  exhibition,	  as	  well	  as	  advertisements	  and	  contact	  details	  of	  these	  companies.	  The	  price	  of	  the	  booklet	  in	  this	  instance	  was	  EGP	  75,	  at	  the	  time	  almost	  equivalent	  to	  the	  price	  of	  a	  full	  tank	  of	  petrol	  for	  a	  typical	  1600cc	  middle-­‐class	  family	  car.	  The	  exhibition	  is	  comprised	  of	  two	  giant	   halls	   in	   the	   ‘Cairo	   International	   Convention	   and	   Exhibition	   Centre’,	   in	   which	  visitors	   navigate	   their	   way	   between	   dozens	   of	   booths	   of	   participating	   real	   estate	  developers,	   each	   boasting	   a	  distinct	  design	  that	  clearly	  aims	  to	  reflect	   a	   certain	   sense	   of	  modernity	   and	   sophistication.	  Many	   feature	   audio-­‐visual	  demonstrations	   of	   the	   respective	  company’s	   promotional	   materials.	  Large	   LCD	   television	   screens,	   3D	  maps,	   posters,	   and	   smartly	  dressed	   and	   smiling	   marketing	  representatives	   attract	   the	   attention	   of	   potential	   homebuyers.	   Major	   players	   in	   the	  Egyptian	   gated-­‐compounds	  market,	   such	   as	   SODIC,	  Talaat	  Moustafa	  Group,	  Palm	  Hills	  
Developments,	   Orascom,	   show	   a	   strong	   presence,	   as	   do	   a	   number	   of	   other	   giant	  developers	   from	   the	   Gulf,	   such	   as	   EMMAR	   and	   DAMAC.	   Notably,	   the	   first	   set	   of	  developers	   all	   have	   the	  majority	   of	   their	   shares	   controlled	   by	   top	   Egyptian	   business	  families	  with	   direct	   links	   to	   the	  Mubarak	   regime	   and	   the	   National	   Democratic	   Party,	  whereas	  the	  two	  latter	  ones	  are	  controlled	  by	  UAE	  ruling	  families.	  The	  exhibition	  is	  also	  full	  of	  other	  companies,	  perhaps	  smaller	  in	  size,	  but	  also	  offering	  various	  types	  of	  gated-­‐development	  properties.	  	  
Figure	  5:	  'Next	  Move'	  Exhibition-­‐	  a,	  May	  2010.	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On	   offer	   are	   residential	   units	   of	   different	   sizes	   and	   designs	   to	   suit	   the	   many	  variations	   of	   the	   promoted	   modern,	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   and	   affluent	   lifestyles.	   From	  stand-­‐alone	  villas	  with	  wide	  gardens	  and	  swimming	  pools	  for	  more	  wealthy	  customers,	  to	   terraced	   houses	   and	   apartments	   of	   different	   sizes	  more	   attuned	   to	   the	   needs	   and	  budgets	   of	   young	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   families,	   the	   exhibition	   has	   something	   for	  everyone.	   Considerable	   exhibition	   space	   is	   also	   occupied	   by	   booths	   promoting	  developments	   of	   gated	   summer	   retreats,	   either	   on	   the	   north-­‐western	   coast	   or	   on	   the	  Red	  Sea	  strip	  stretching	  from	  Ain	  Sukhna	  to	  Za‘farana,	  south	  of	  the	  Suez	  Canal.	  In	  each	  booth,	   representatives	   of	   the	   developers	   are	   constantly	   busy	   engaging	   visitors	   and	  informing	  them	  about	  the	  detailed	  specifications	  of	  the	  properties	  on	  offer,	  the	  location	  of	  the	  compounds,	  services	  and	  facilities	  that	  they	  feature,	  and	  their	  location	  within	  the	  network	   of	   roads	   connecting	   Cairo’s	   desert	   extensions	   with	   the	   old	   city.	   Next	   to	   the	  wide	  ensemble	  of	  real	  estate	  developers	  in	  the	  first	  bigger	  exhibition	  hall,	  and	  lined	  up	  in	   the	   second	   exhibition	   hall	   through	   which	   visitors	   pass	   on	   the	   way	   out,	   are	   the	  commercial	   banks	   offering	   housing	   loans	   and	   mortgages.	   These	   are	   quite	   visible,	  ensuring	   that	  various	   financing	  options	   for	  new	  properties	  do	  not	  escape	   the	  visitors’	  attention	  before	  leaving.	  The	   spatial	   organisation	   and	   material	   features	   of	   the	   exhibition	   in	   the	  Convention	   Centre	   in	   Nasr	   City	   are	   not	   the	   only	   aspects	   indicative	   of	   a	   specific	  conceptualisation	  of	   lifestyle	  being	  marketed	  to	  potential	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  property	  buyers.	   The	   sophistication	   of	   the	  material	   settings	   and	   features	   of	   the	   exhibition	   are	  coupled	   with	   an	   extensive	   normative	   content	   designed	   to	   overwhelm	   visitors	   and	  aspiring	   homeowners	   with	   an	   image	   of	   a	   ‘promised	   land’	   in	   the	   gated	   compounds.	  Names	   of	   the	   gated	   compounds	   or	   real	   estate	   developments	   promoted	   are	   in	  themselves	   suggestive	   of	   a	   move	   away	   from	   a	   regressive	   backward	   ‘here’	   (i.e.,	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traditional	  middle-­‐class	  Cairo)	  that	  is	  no	  longer	  fit	  for	  its	  purposes,	  to	  another	  place,	  or	  ‘there,’	   which	   is	   more	   compatible	   with	   a	   clean,	   calm	   and	  modern	   lifestyle	   worthy	   of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   status.	   In	  many	   cases,	   developers	   transcend	   this	   implicit	  message	  by	   giving	   the	   real	   estate	   developments	   or	  the	   gated	   compounds	   the	   names	   of	  recognisable	   foreign	   urban	   landmarks,	  usually	   equated	   in	   global	   culture	   with	   a	  modern	   lifestyle.	   For	   example,	   potential	  homeowners	  are	  invited	  to	  consider	  buying	  a	  villa	  in	  ‘Beverly	  Hills’,	  a	  flagship	  compound	  of	   the	   real	   estate	   giant	   SODIC	   in	   the	   Sheikh	  
Zayed	  City,	  or	  a	  townhouse	  in	   ‘Hyde	  Park’,	  or	   ‘Park	  Avenue’,	  two	  gated	  compounds	  built	  in	  New	  Cairo	  City	   and	   adjacent	   to	   the	   Cairo-­‐Alexandria	   desert	   road.	   Images	   of	   urban	  Western	   landmarks	   are	   bluntly	   used	   to	   invoke	   links	   between	   ownership	   in	   the	  respective	   compounds	   and	   the	   realisation	   of	   an	   aspirational	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  lifestyle.	  In	  other	  instances,	  the	  compounds’	  names	  reflect	  a	  more	  abstract	  invocation	  of	  a	  much-­‐sought	  escape	  from	  an	  ugly	  local	  to	  a	  beautiful	  and	  exotic	  foreign.	  Such	  is	  the	  case	  in	  the	  gated	  summer	  resorts	  of	   ‘Hacienda’	  on	  the	  North	  Coast,	  developed	  by	  Palm	  Hills	  
Developments,	   the	   real	   estate	   giant	   controlled	   by	   one	   of	   the	   country’s	   top	   business	  dynasties,	   the	   Mansour	   family.	   ‘Hacienda’	   is	   not	   the	   only	   one;	   there	   are	   also	   other	  developments	  built	  by	  smaller	  companies,	  in	  which	  names	  such	  as	  ‘La	  Vista’	  or	  ‘Cascada’	  are	  used	  to	  invoke	  similar	  images	  of	  the	  beautiful	  exotic	  foreign	  on	  Egyptian	  soil.	  Another	   interesting	   variation	   of	   this	   trend	   is	   giving	   the	   gated	   development	   a	  classic	  Arabic	  name,	   relating	   to	   the	  notion	  of	   immigrating	   from	  a	  dim	  present	   (urban	  
Figure	  6:	  'Next	  Move'	  Exhibition-­‐	  b,	  May	  2010.	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living	   situation)	   and	   re-­‐living	   a	   glorious	   past	   through	   a	   revived	   living	   situation.	  Examples	  of	   this	   category	   include	   compounds	   such	   as	   the	   villa	   complex	  of	   ‘Al	  Rabwa’	  (The	   Hill)	   in	   the	   Sheikh	   Zayed	   City	   and	   or	   ‘Ofok’	   (Horizon)	   on	   the	   Cairo-­‐Alexandria	  desert	  road.	  Both	  names	  suggest	  the	  image	  of	  a	  topographically	  high	  place	  from	  which	  new	  homeowners	  can	  look	  back	  on	  the	  old	  city	  they	  left,	  from	  the	  comfort	  of	  an	  elevated	  living	  situation.	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   carefully	   chosen	   names	   of	   the	   new	   gated	   compounds,	   the	  discourse	  surrounding	  making	  the	  ‘next	  move’	  from	  an	  old	  Cairo	  no	  longer	  compatible	  with	   the	  standards	  or	  requirements	  of	  a	  global	  and	  modern	  urban	  existence	   to	  a	  new	  living	  environment	  worthy	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  lifestyle	  aspirations,	  is	  nowhere	  more	  obvious	   than	   in	   the	   slogans	   developers	   associate	   with	   these	   compounds'	   names.	  Consider,	   for	  example,	   the	  new	  urban	  development	  of	  Madinaty	   (My	  City),	  adjacent	   to	  the	  Cairo-­‐Suez	   road,	   created	  by	   the	   construction	   company	  boasting	   of	   Egypt’s	   largest	  land	   bank,	   the	   Talaat	   Moustafa	   Group.	   The	   group	   is	   named	   for	   its	   late	   founder	   and	  controlled	  by	  his	  family,	  which	  has	  maintained	  a	  considerable	  political	  presence	  within	  the	   NDP	   and	   ruling	   circles.	   By	   being	   a	   resident	   in	   Madinaty,	   potential	   buyers	   are	  consistently	   told	   through	   the	   company’s	   promotional	   material	   (including	   a	   rigorous	  television	  advertisement	  campaign)	  that	   they	  would	  be	   living	   in	  an	   ‘international	  city,	  on	  Egyptian	  land’.	  If	  you	  are	  an	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptian	  searching	  for	  a	  move	  away	  from	  crowded	  and	  polluted	  urban	  Cairo,	   you	  are	  also	   invited	   to	  have	  a	   ‘Better	  Home,	  Better	   Lifestyle’,	   or	   even	   to	   ‘Make	   Luxury	   Yours’,	   in	   various	   gated	   compounds	   in	   the	  desert	   extensions	   east	   and	   west	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   capital.	   One	   slogan	   summarises	   the	  market’s	  rationale	  behind	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  gated	  compounds;	   it	  claims	  that	  the	  developer	   is	   ‘creating	   lifestyle	   landmarks’.	  The	   slogan	  belongs	   to	   the	  Amer	  Group,	   the	  developer	  behind	  the	  Porto	  series	  of	  recreational	  developments	  in	  the	  North	  Coast,	  Ain	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Sukhna,	  New	  Cairo	   and	  The	  Sixth	  of	  October	  City,	  which	  combine	   luxury-­‐hotel	   facilities	  and	   time-­‐share	   ownership	   schemes	   with	   shopping	   arcades	   featuring	   products	   from	  international	  consumer	  and	  fashion	  brands,	  as	  well	  as	  upmarket	  dining	  outlets.	  	  	  	  	  In	  general,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  exhibitions	  such	  as	  ‘Next	  Move’	  are	  events	  that	  feature	   intensive	   samples	   of	  methods	   and	  mechanisms	   that	   create	   a	  wider	   discourse	  surrounding	   gated	   compounds.	   This	   discourse,	   essentially	   built	   around	   the	  representation	  of	   the	  gated	  compounds	  as	  a	   route	  of	   escape	   to	  a	  new	   life	  beyond	   the	  failed	  governance	  of	  old	  Cairo,	  is	  flourishing	  within	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  an	  existing	  and	  growing	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  deterioration	  of	  living	  conditions	  in	  the	  capital.	  Gated	  residential	  compounds	  in	  the	  desert	  extensions	  east	  and	  west	  of	  Cairo	  are	  being	  crafted	  in	  the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  imagination	  and	  awareness	  as	  a	   ‘promised	  land’	  where	  an	  alternative	   lifestyle,	  worthy	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status,	  can	  be	  safely	  enjoyed	  away	  from	  a	  decaying	  Cairene	  urban	  setting	  no	  longer	  fit	  for	  that	  purpose.	  As	  Jack	  Shenker	  has	  accurately	  observed,	  the	  proliferation	  of	  gated	  compounds	  has	  indeed	  handed	  Egypt’s	  upper	  middle	  class	  a	  chance	   to	  enter	  what	  he	  calls	  a	   ‘new	  age	  of	   self-­‐	  agency	  and	  creativity,	  where	  the	  physical	  walls	  and	  social	  restrictions	  of	  the	  traditional	  city	  have	  melted	  away	  to	  allow	  fresh	  identities	  to	  flourish’.44	  	  The	  desire	  to	  create	  an	  urban	  setting	  that	  conforms	  to	  standards	  of	  modern	  city	  living	  is	  in	  great	  part	  a	  construct	  directly	  resulting	  from	  various	  extended	  exposures	  to	  global	   culture	   over	   the	   last	   generation.	   This	   desire	   has	   become	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   a	  larger	   lifestyle	   attached	   to	   the	   maintenance	   and	   reproduction	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  social	  status.	  The	  rationale	  behind	  actions	  and	  struggles	   in	  the	  social	   field	  undertaken	  by	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  in	  realisation	  of	  this	  objective	  are	  therefore	  an	  essential	  input	  to	   shaping	   its	   socio-­‐political	   agency.	  However,	   in	   order	   to	   fully	   comprehend	   how	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Jack Shenker, "Divided: Cairo, a Megacity Turns Itself inside Out," Cairo Divided, 2011. 
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socio-­‐political	   agency	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   upper	  middle	   class	   is	   shaped	   by	   the	   actions	   it	  takes	   to	   ensure	   the	   reproduction	   of	   social	   status	   in	   this	   context,	   understanding	   this	  rationale	   will	   not	   suffice.	   Once	   again,	   inasmuch	   as	   human	   agency	   and	   collective	  rationale	  behind	  class-­‐wide	  convictions	  matter	  in	  shaping	  agency,	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	   formation	   of	   the	   normative	   foundations	   of	   political	   convictions	   would	   not	   be	  complete	  without	  a	  glimpse	  at	  the	  structural	  environment	  in	  which	  such	  social	  struggles	  take	  place.	  
4.	  Handing	  Over	  to	  The	  Market:	  The	  State	  and	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  
Housing	  in	  the	  Liberalisation	  Era	  Despite	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   considerable	   body	   of	   literature	   regarding	   urban	  planning	   in	   Egypt,	   hardly	   any	   statistics	   or	   information	   can	   be	   found	   regarding	   the	  extent	   and	   scope	   of	   the	   phenomenon	  of	   gated	   compounds	   since	   it	   began	   in	   the	   early	  1990s.	   Accumulated	   official	   and	   informal	   statistics	   regarding	   the	   number	   of	  compounds,	   the	   number	   of	   built	   units	   within	   the	   compounds,	   and	   their	   estimated	  populations	   are	   very	  hard	   to	   come	  by	   or	   lacking	   altogether.	  At	   best,	   figures	   available	  from	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Housing	   describe	   the	   growth	   of	   individual	   new	   towns	   and	  settlements	  around	  Cairo	  and	  elsewhere,	  collectively	  accounting	  for	  gated	  compounds,	  other	   residential	   units	  developed	   through	   land	   sales	   to	   individuals,	   and	  publicly	  built	  affordable-­‐housing	   projects.	   In	   spite	   of	   this	   data	   deficit,	   this	   section	   will	   attempt	   to	  demonstrate	   the	   steady	   takeover	   of	   state	   housing	   policy	   by	   a	   neoliberal	   rationale	   in	  post-­‐Nasser	   Egypt.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   state’s	   gradual	   yet	   systematic	   disengagement	  from	   the	  provision	  of	   affordable	  housing	   alternatives	   for	   various	   strata	   of	   the	  middle	  class	   and	   equally	   from	   conditioning	   the	   public	   space	   in	   conformity	   with	   evolving	  middle-­‐class	   conceptions.	   In	   parallel,	   the	   state	   has	   steadily	   and	   deliberately	   allowed	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loosely	   regulated	   and	   often-­‐corrupt	   market	   mechanisms	   to	   gain	   control	   of	   this	  important	  area	  for	  the	  realisation	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status	  and	  practice	  of	  identity,	  thus	   creating	   an	   even	  wider	   hole	   in	   its	   legitimacy	  while	   allowing	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  political	  discontent	  to	  build	  even	  further.	  Egypt’s	   experience	   with	   state-­‐subsidised	   public	   housing	   began	   in	   the	   early	  1950s,	  when	   the	   first	   law	   regulating	   social	   housing	   (Law	   206	   of	   1951)	  was	   adopted.	  Housing	  projects	  undertaken	  within	   this	  regulatory	   framework	  were	   initially	   targeted	  at	   poorer	   social	   categories	   and	   were	   comprised	   mostly	   of	   traditional	   walk-­‐up	  apartment	   blocks	   for	   lower-­‐middle-­‐class	   public-­‐sector	   employees	   and	   industrial	  workers.	  While	  the	  largest	  of	  these	  developments	  were	  built	   in	  popular	  Cairo	  suburbs	  such	   as	   Imbaba,	  Hilwan,	   Al-­‐Zawya	   Al-­‐Hamra,	   Al-­‐Sharabiyya	   and	   Al-­‐‘Abbassiyya,	   many	  other	   smaller	   projects	   were	   built	   on	   vacant	   state-­‐owned	   land	   pockets	   around	   the	  capital.	   By	   1965,	   the	   Cairo	   governorate	   had	   built	   nearly	   15,000	   public	   housing	   units,	  designated	  as	  iskan	  iqtisadi	  (economic	  or	  affordable	  housing).45	  Later	  in	  the	  1960s,	  the	  higher	   echelons	   of	   the	   middle	   class	   and	   the	   state	   bourgeoisie	   were	   also	   catered	   for	  through	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  new	  categories	  of	  mutawassit	  (middle),	  fawq	  al-­‐mutawassit	  (above-­‐middle),	   and	   fakhir	   (luxurious)	   in	   the	   government’s	   plans	   for	   publicly	  subsidised	   housing	   projects.	   Contractual	   conditions	   for	   occupancy	   of	   these	   different	  categories	  of	  state-­‐provided	  housing	  were	  notoriously	  favourable	  for	  their	  middle-­‐	  and	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   tenants.	   Most	   of	   these	   housing	   units	   were	   rent-­‐based,	   with	   only	  nominal	   rents	   charged.	   Moreover,	   rental	   contracts	   gave	   the	   tenants	   and	   their	   heirs	  absolute	  and	  perpetual	  rights	  against	  eviction	  as	  long	  as	  rents	  were	  paid	  regularly.46	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Sims, Understanding Cairo: The Logic of a City out of Control, 50. 
46 Ibid., 51. 
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The	  boom	  in	  state-­‐provided	  affordable	  and	  middle-­‐class	  housing	  that	  had	  begun	  in	  the	  early	  1950s	  came	  to	  an	  abrupt	  end	  with	  Egypt’s	  military	  defeat	  in	  the	  1967	  war	  against	   Israel.	  Plunged	  into	  a	  wartime	  economy	  with	  hardly	  any	  public	   funds	  to	  spare	  for	  housing,	  and	  with	  much	  of	  the	  construction-­‐industry	  labour	  force	  conscripted	  in	  the	  army	   from	   1967	   until	   the	   end	   of	   the	   October	   war	   in	   1973,	   the	   urban	   expansion	   of	  Cairo’s	  middle-­‐class	  housing	  came	  to	  an	  almost	  total	  standstill.	  With	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  
infitah	  policy	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  under	  Sadat	  and	  well	  into	  the	  1980s,	  following	  the	  Camp	  David	  accords	  and	  the	  commencement	  of	  Hosni	  Mubarak’s	  rule,	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  middle-­‐class	   housing	   started	   to	   flood	   Cairo.	   This	   wave,	   concentrating	   mainly	   on	   the	   city’s	  eastern	   extension	   (the	   Nasr	   City	   suburb),	   was	   driven	   by	   far-­‐less-­‐directly	   state-­‐subsidised	  projects.	  Instead,	  the	  main	  engine	  of	  the	  new	  housing	  boom	  in	  this	  area	  was	  mainly	  fuelled	  by	  the	  flow	  of	  remittances	  of	  Egyptian	  professionals	  who	  worked	  in	  the	  Gulf	   via	   other	   forms	   of	   developing	   enterprises,	   such	   as	   cooperatives,	   private	  construction	   companies,	   and	   individual	   developers.47	  The	   construction	   boom	   in	  Nasr	  
City	   and	  other	  growing	  middle-­‐	   and	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  neighbourhoods	  east	  of	  Cairo	  included	  many	  other	  subdivisions	  of	  constructions	  that	  were	  not	  residential,	  yet	  clearly	  catered	   to	   the	   upper-­‐middle	   and	   investor	   classes	   in	   this	   part	   of	   the	   city,	   such	   as	  shopping	  malls	  and	  private	  business	  offices.	  From	  1986	  to	  2006,	  Nasr	  City’s	  population	  grew	   almost	   fourfold,48 	  making	   it	   one	   of	   Cairo’s	   most	   typical	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  quarters.	  	  	  	  	  
4.1	  Advent	  of	  the	  ‘New	  Towns’	  	  Both	  the	  dynamics	  and	  features	  of	  urban	  development	  along	  the	  eastern	  axis	  of	  Cairo	   during	   this	   period	   clearly	   indicated	   a	   retreat	   of	   the	   state	   from	   its	   1960s	   active	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Ibid., 52-53. 
48 Ibid., 57. 
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involvement	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   housing	   alternatives	   for	   various	   strata	   of	   the	  middle	  class.	  However,	  an	  even	  clearer	  demonstration	  of	  this	  retreat	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  shifts	  that	  took	  place	  within	  the	  state’s	  approach	  to	  what	  has	  become	  most	  commonly	  known	  as	  the	  ‘New	  Towns’.	  The	  term	  ‘New	  Towns’	  refers	  to	  a	  group	  urban-­‐settlement	  projects	  across	   the	   country,	   usually	   planned	   and	   constructed	   on	   desert	   lands	   adjacent	   to	   the	  main	   cities	   or	   urban	   centres,	   adopted	   by	   the	   Egyptian	   state	   in	   response	   to	   the	   rapid	  population	   increase	   and	   in	   projection	   of	   future	   demographic	   and	   urban	   expansion.	  Originally,	   the	   new	   towns	   policy	  was	   launched	   by	   the	   state’s	   adoption	   of	   the	  Greater	  Cairo	   Region	   Master	   Scheme	   in	   1969	   under	   Nasser.49	  The	   initial	   plan	   envisaged	   the	  creation	   of	   four	   satellite	   cities	   in	   the	   desert	   surrounding	   Cairo	   by	   1990,	   to	   ‘absorb	  Cairo’s	   growth,	   provide	   alternative	   sites	   for	   urban	   development,	   and	   redirect	   the	  distribution	  of	  Egyptian	  population’.50	  The	  ‘New	  Towns’	  evolved	  as	  the	  landmark	  urban	  expansion	  policy	  of	  the	  state	  in	  post-­‐1973	  Egypt,	  even	  mentioned	  in	  the	  document	  Sadat	  presented	  to	  the	  nation	  in	  1974	  under	  the	  title	  ‘The	  October	  Paper’,	  following	  the	  war.	  The	  document	  set	  forth	  his	  overall	  vision	  for	  the	  social,	  economic	  and	  political	  future	  of	  Egypt.51	  In	   general,	   the	   overall	   aim	   of	   the	   new	   towns	   policy	   was	   to	   break	   with	   the	  ancient	  pattern	  of	  demographic	  expansion	  in	  Egypt	  within	  the	  narrow	  Nile	  Valley.	  	  The	  envisaged	   new	   self-­‐sufficient	   industrial	   towns	   would	   attract	   foreign	   and	   domestic	  investments,	   and,	   most	   importantly,	   act	   as	   population-­‐absorbing	   urban	   centres.	   In	  September	   1977,	   Hasaballa	   Al-­‐Kafrawy,	   the	   governor	   of	   Damietta,	   was	   appointed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Dona J Stewart, "Cities in the Desert: The Egyptian New-Town Program," Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 86, no. 3 (1996): 462. 
50 General Organization for Physical Planning, "Greater Cairo Region Long Range Urban Development 
Scheme, Master Plan," (Cairo: Arab Republic of Egypt, 1983). Cited in: Stewart, "Cities in the Desert: The 
Egyptian New-Town Program," 462. 
51 Anwar Sadat, October Working Paper (Cairo: Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Information, 1974), 77-
78. 
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Minister	  of	  Housing	  and	  New	  Urban	  Communities.	  He	  was	  a	  prominent	  advocate	  of	  the	  new	  towns	  policy	  as	  the	  solution	  for	  Egypt’s	  future	  urban	  expansion	  needs.	  	  During	  Al-­‐Kafrawy’s	  tenure,	  the	  legislative	  and	  institutional	  frameworks	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  new	  towns	  was	  set	  forth	  in	  1979,	  when	  the	  New	  Communities	  Law	  No.	   59	   was	   promulgated.	   The	   law	   created	   the	   New	   Urban	   Communities	   Authority	  (NUCA)	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Housing,	  to	  be	  charged	  with	  planning	  and	  developing	  the	   new	   towns.	   NUCA	   was	   given	   the	   right	   to	   determine	   the	   potential	   sites	   for	   the	  development	  of	  new	  towns	   in	  cooperation	  with	   the	  Armed	  Forces	  and	   the	  Antiquities	  Authority,	  lest	  there	  be	  any	  concerns	  related	  to	  the	  chosen	  sites	  from	  a	  national	  security	  viewpoint,	  or	   in	  connection	  with	  Egypt’s	  underground	  ancient	   treasures.	  The	   law	  also	  gave	  NUCA	   the	   right	   to	  develop	  and	  sell	   lands	  within	   the	  new	   towns,	   the	   revenues	  of	  which	  would	  be	  allocated	  for	  further	  development.	  Each	  of	  the	  new	  towns	  was	  to	  be	  run	  by	   a	   town	   agency	   overseen	   by	   the	   NUCA,	   with	   the	   view	   that,	   when	   sufficiently	  developed,	   governance	  would	   revert	   to	   conventional	  municipal	   administration	   under	  the	  respective	  governorates.52	  The	   first	   generation	   of	   new	   towns	   had	   already	   been	   announced	   by	   the	   mid-­‐1970s.	  In	  this	  regard,	  The	  Tenth	  of	  Ramadan	  City	  was	  the	  first	  venture.	  Launched	  by	  the	  government	  in	  1976,	  it	  was	  located	  approximately	  halfway	  between	  Cairo	  and	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  city	  of	  Al-­‐Isma‘iliyya.	  It	  was	  soon	  followed	  by	  The	  Sixth	  of	  October,	  Al	  ‘Ubur,	  Sadat	  and	   New	   ‘Amiriya	   Cities.53	  The	   vision	   was	   to	   create	   five	   new	   industrial	   towns	   with	  populations	  ranging	  from	  250,000	  to	  500,000	  inhabitants,	  where	  workers	  would	  live	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 David Sims, "Arab Republic of Egypt: Towards an Urban Sector Strategy," (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 
2008), 51. 
53 The names given to the first generation of new towns are intended to establish discursive connections with the 
Egyptian Army’s Crossing of the Suez Canal on 6 October 1973, seen by the regime under both Sadat and 
Mubarak (as he was the head of the air force during the war) as a source of important political legitimacy. This 
applies to four out of the five first-generation new towns: Sadat City, The Sixth of October City, The Tenth of 
Ramadan City (The Islamic Calendar date for 6 October 1973), and Al-‘Ubur city (Arabic for ‘crossing’, i.e., 
crossing of the Suez Canal).    
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government-­‐built	  housing	  blocks.	  In	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  a	  ‘second	  generation’	  of	  new	  urban	  population	   centres	   was	   launched	   which	   was	   comprised	   of	   nine	   new	   satellite	  settlements,	   or	   tagamu‘at,	   in	   the	   desert	   surrounding	   Cairo.	   Initially,	   these	   satellites	  were	   given	   numbers	   rather	   than	   names	   (the	   first,	   second,	   third,	   fourth	   and	   fifth	  
tagamu‘,	  etc.).	  These	  settlements,	  scattered	  around	  Cairo,	  were	  initially	  designed	  to	  act	  as	   urban	   extensions	   that	   would	   attract	   populations	   and	   decrease	   the	   density	   of	   the	  overcrowded	  Greater	  Cairo	  by	  providing	  affordable	  housing	  units	  of	  between	  45	  and	  65	  square	  meters	  for	  young	  families.	  The	  main	  difference	  between	  a	  ‘settlement’	  and	  a	  new	  town	  was	  that,	  while	  the	  former	  would	  still	  be	  economically	  and	  socially	  integrated	  with	  Greater	  Cairo,	  the	  latter	  would	  have	  an	  industrial	  and	  economic	  foundation	  of	  its	  own.	  In	  parallel,	  a	  ‘third	  generation’	  of	  new	  towns	  was	  established	  in	  the	  desert	  hinterlands	  of	  many	  densely	  populated	  Egyptian	  cities,	  both	  in	  upper	  Egypt	  and	  on	  the	  periphery	  of	  the	  Nile	  Delta,	  as	  sister	  towns	  or	  twins	  of	  provincial	  cities.	  Examples	  include	  New	  Assiut,	  
New	  Thebes,	  New	  Minya,	   and	  New	  Damietta,	   bringing	   the	   number	   of	   new	   towns	   and	  settlements	   to	   a	   total	   of	   20	   in	   2008,	   with	   24	   more	   being	   planned.54 	  The	   social	  philosophy	  underlying	  the	  planning	  of	  urban	  extensions	  around	  Greater	  Cairo,	  however,	  never	  really	  materialised.	  	  In	  a	  thorough	  study	  of	  the	  urban	  sector	  in	  Egypt	  (previously	  referenced),	  David	  Sims	  records	  what	  he	  describes	  as	  a	  ‘fundamental	  shift’	  in	  the	  state’s	  thinking	  towards	  these	   urban	   expansions	   around	   Greater	   Cairo	   in	   the	   early	   1990s,	   as	   Egypt	   was	  embarking	  on	   its	  path	   towards	  economic	   liberalisation.55	  This	   assessment	   is	   accurate,	  according	  to	  Hamdy	  Shaaban,	  the	  former	  deputy	  head	  of	  the	  NUCA.56	  The	  original	  idea	  was	   to	   link	   these	   new	   communities	   economically	   to	   the	   industrial	   new	   towns	   on	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Sims, "Arab Republic of Egypt: Towards an Urban Sector Strategy," 51. 
55 Ibid., 52. 
56 Hamdy Shaaban in discussion with the author, Dokki, Cairo, 15 February 2009. 
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outskirts	  of	  Cairo,	  while	  building	  the	  infrastructure	  necessary	  to	  keep	  their	  links	  to	  the	  capital.	  ‘Indeed,	  many	  government	  investments	  went	  into	  a	  program	  aimed	  at	  building	  10,000	  housing	  units	  in	  each	  of	  the	  new	  towns	  or	  new	  settlements,	  for	  example	  in	  the	  third	  settlement	  in	  the	  Kattamiyya	  area.’57	  The	  slow	  development	  of	  the	  new	  industrial	  towns	   and	   the	   government’s	   insufficient	   investment	   in	   the	   needed	   infrastructure	  caused	  the	  evident	  failure	  to	  achieve	  the	  declared	  population	  goals	  for	  these	  new	  urban	  extensions.	  Figures	  produced	  by	  the	  General	  Organization	  of	  Physical	  Planning	  (GOPP)	  reveal	   that	  by	  1996,	   the	  populations	  of	   the	  new	  settlements	  and	  towns	   in	   the	  Greater	  Cairo	  Region	  totalled	  no	  more	  than	  149,992	  people,	  representing	  a	  meagre	  1.1%	  of	  the	  total	  population	  of	  this	  area.58	  In	  addition,	   the	  government’s	  need	   to	   face	  urgent	  situations	  and	  crises	  created	  other	   uses	   for	   its	   investments	   in	   building	   housing	   units	   in	   the	   new	  urban	   extensions	  around	  the	  capital.	  When	  a	  strong	  earthquake	  hit	  Egypt	  in	  1992,	  thousands	  of	  people	  in	  informal	   settlements	  within	   Greater	   Cairo	   lost	   their	  makeshift	   homes	   or	   poorly	   built	  basic	   red-­‐brick	   apartment	   buildings	   in	   popular	   areas.	   They	   needed	   to	   be	   relocated	  quickly	   to	   avoid	   a	   potentially	   explosive	   social	   crisis	   that	   could	   have	   been	   politically	  damaging	   to	   the	   regime.	   ‘Only	   this	   stock	   of	   housing	   units	   was	   available’,	   remembers	  Shaaban,	   ‘and	  hence	  the	  people	  affected	  by	  the	  earthquake	  were	  mostly	  relocated	  and	  accommodated	   in	   those	   units	   in	   the	  Kattamiyya	   area’,	   he	   states.	   Shaaban	   also	   adds	   a	  third	  use	  for	  the	  new	  settlements,	  which	  was	  less	  in	  response	  to	  pressing	  emergencies,	  yet	  still	  far	  off	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  conformity	  with	  their	  original	  planning.	  In	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  1990s,	  the	  government	  once	  again	  drew	  on	  the	  housing	  stock	  already	  built	  as	  part	  of	  its	  programs	  to	  relocate	  those	  removed	  from	  their	  informal	  settlements	  in	  the	  heart	  of	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Cairo	   (such	   as	   the	   Torgoman	   area	   downtown	   near	   Tahrir	   square	   or	   the	   ‘Arab	   Al-­‐
Muhammady	  area	  in	  the	  ‘Abassiyya	  district).	  
4.2	  Marketisation	  in	  Full	  Swing:	  Neoliberalising	  Urban	  Expansion	  A	  ministerial	   change	   in	   1993,	  which	   saw	  Mohamed	   Ibrahim	   Soliman	   replacing	  Hasaballa	  Al-­‐Kafrawy	  as	  Minister	  for	  Housing	  and	  New	  Urban	  Communities,	  was	  a	  final	  turning	  point	   towards	   the	  neoliberalisation	  of	  urban	  development	  policies	   in	   the	  new	  towns	  and	  settlements	  around	  Cairo.	  Al-­‐Kafrawy	  was	  the	  long-­‐serving	  minister	  whose	  name	  was	  attached	  to	  the	  more	  socially	  conscious	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  new	  towns	  policy	   (as	   discussed	   above).	   Al-­‐Kafrawy	   also	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   fending	   off	  attacks	  and	  criticisms	  of	  the	  new	  towns	  policy	  from	  opposing	  factions	  within	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  the	  state	  bureaucracy.59	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Soliman	  represented	  a	  radically	  different,	  essentially	  neoliberal	  approach	  to	  the	  development	  of	  these	  urban	  extensions.	  As	   Sims	   has	   accurately	   pointed	   out,	   since	   the	   change	   of	   ministers,	   ‘a	   much	   more	  “capitalist”	  mode	  of	  development	  was	  applied’:60	  First,	   the	  boundaries	  of	   existing	  new	   towns	  and	   settlements	  were	   rearranged	  and	  dramatically	  extended,	  particularly	  in	  those	  cities	  around	  Cairo	  which	  were	  considered	  to	  have	  development	  potential.	  Huge	  tracts	  of	  land	  were	  subdivided	  and	   sold	   at	   near	  market	   prices	   both	   to	   individuals	   and	   to	   developers.	   Three	  “second	   generation”	   satellite	   settlements	   were	   amalgamated	   and	   boundaries	  extended	   to	   create	  New	  Cairo	   in	   the	   desert	   east	   of	   the	  metropolis	   that	   has	   a	  target	  population	  of	   two	  million.	  Also,	   huge	  new	   settlements	  of	   Sheikh	  Zayed	  and	   El	   Shorouk	   (both	   with	   target	   populations	   of	   500,000	   inhabitants)	   were	  created.61	  	  The	  following	  figure	  is	  a	  map	  published	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Housing.	  It	  clearly	  shows	  the	  extent	   to	   which	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   new	   settlements	   expanded	   under	   Mohamed	  Ibrahim	  Soliman,	  compared	  to	  their	  original	  plans.	  Many	  big	  land	  slots	  were	  allocated	  to	  newly	   formed	   real	   estate	   developers	   and	   more-­‐established	   construction	   companies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Stewart, "Cities in the Desert: The Egyptian New-Town Program," 461. 
60 Sims, "Arab Republic of Egypt: Towards an Urban Sector Strategy," 52. 
61 Ibid. 
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What	   became	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   upmarket,	   gated	   residential	   compounds	   was	   thus	  born.	  
	  	   	  
Figure	  7:	  Original	  and	  Extended	  Boundaries	  of	  New	  Towns	  and	  Urban	  Extensions	  around	  Cairo.	  	  
Source:	  Ministry	  of	  Housing	  	  Additionally,	   thousands	   of	   smaller	   land	   slots	   were	   sold	   at	   market	   prices	   to	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  individuals	  who	  could	  afford	  to	  build	  small	  villas	  or	  family	  houses.	  The	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class’	  exodus	  from	  its	   traditional	  neighbourhoods	   in	  Cairo	  was	   therefore	  not	  only	   facilitated,	  but	  also	  actively	  and	  practically	  encouraged,	  by	   the	  state	   from	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	   onwards.	   Whereas	   this	   fundamental	   policy	   change	   has	  generated	   welcome	   and	   much-­‐needed	   revenues	   for	   the	   state’s	   treasury,	   it	   most	  importantly	   signalled	   the	   state’s	   strategic	   decision	   to	   hand	   over	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  housing	  provision	  and	  urban	  development	  to	  the	  free	  market.	  As	  Sims	  asserts,	  ‘the	  new	  settlements	   around	   Cairo	   have	   become	   the	   preferred	   location	   for	   the	   new	   middle	  classes	   and	   the	   rich	   through	   the	   creation	   of	   gated	   communities	   and	   up-­‐market	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subdivisions’.62	  The	   structural	   shift	   towards	   an	   urban	   expansion	   policy	   embedded	   in	  neoliberal	   logic	   in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  is	   indicative	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  state’s	  overall	  approach	  to	   its	  relationship	  with	   the	  upper	  middle	  class	  over	   the	  past	   three	  decades.	  The	  state,	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  solve	  costly	  problems	  in	  social	  areas	  considered	  crucial	  to	  social-­‐status	   reproduction	   by	   the	   upper	   middle	   class,	   deliberately	   refers	   them	   to	   a	   poorly	  regulated	  market	  plagued	  by	  shadow	  alliances	  and	  modes	  of	  cooperation	  between	  state	  officials	  and	  big	  business	  players.	  	  In	   this	   particular	   case,	   there	   is	   enough	   evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   neoliberal	  shift	   in	   the	   government’s	   urban	   planning	   policies	   was	   the	   result	   of	   direct	   influences	  exerted	  by	  major	  players	  in	  the	  construction	  and	  real	  estate	  industries.	  Hamdy	  Shaaban	  remembered	  that,	  as	  a	  high-­‐ranking	  official	   in	  the	  NUCA,	  he	  witnessed	  time	  and	  again	  how	   the	   Minister	   overstepped	   the	   formal	   bureaucratic	   structure.	   Shaaban	   describes	  how	  Soliman	  practically	  operated	  two	  structures:	  [A]n	   official	   one	   to	  which	   he	   gave	   orders	   to	   implement	   policies,	   and	   another	  one	  comprised	  mainly	  of	  big	  contractors	  like	  Hassan	  Dorra	  and	  Hisham	  Talaat	  Moustafa.	  Ideas	  and	  strategic	  orientations	  came	  from	  this	  back-­‐street	  board	  or	  office	   and	  were	   endorsed	   politically	   at	   the	   highest	   level,	   especially	   given	   the	  minister’s	  excellent	  relations	  with	  the	  President	  and	  First	  Lady	  at	  the	  time.63	  	  The	  above	  observation	  by	   the	   former	  deputy	  head	  of	   the	  NUCA	   is	  not	   the	  only	  evidence	  on	  the	  depth	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  man	  at	  the	  helm	  of	  the	  planning	  and	  policy-­‐implementation	  process	  of	  Cairo’s	  urban	  expansion	  from	  1993	  to	  2005	  and	  some	  of	   the	  major	  business	  players	   in	   the	   industry	  behind	   the	  mushrooming	  of	  gated	  compounds	   in	   Cairo’s	   desert	   extensions.	   In	   early	   2010,	   47	   members	   of	   Parliament	  brought	  charges	  against	  Soliman,	  accusing	  him	  of	  profiteering	  and	  allocating	  vast	  areas	  of	  lands	  in	  the	  new	  towns	  to	  real	  estate	  companies	  developing	  gated	  compounds	  based	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Ibid., 51. 
63 Hamdy Shaaban in discussion with the author, Dokki, Cairo, 15 February 2009. 
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on	  extremely	   favourable	  conditions	  and	  at	   the	  expense	  of	  public	   interest.64	  More	   than	  two	   years	   later,	   as	   figureheads	   of	  Mubarak’s	   ruling	   elite	  were	   faced	  with	  many	   legal	  pursuits	  and	  charges	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  corruption	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  regime,	  Soliman	  was	   convicted	   of	   corruption	   and	   sentenced	   to	   eight	   years	   in	   prison.	   The	   court	   also	  ordered	   him	   to	   return	   L.E.	   970	   million	   to	   the	   public	   treasury	   in	   March	   2012.	   The	  conviction	   came	   as	   the	   court	   found	   him	   guilty	   of	   not	   holding	   the	   giant	   real	   estate	  company	  SODIC65	  to	   its	   commitments	   as	  part	  of	   a	   contract	   in	  which	  a	  2,550-­‐acre	  plot	  was	   allocated	   to	   it	   for	   development	   in	   the	   Sheikh	   Zayed	  City.	   The	   company	   had	   only	  developed	   part	   of	   the	   land,	  while	   reserving	   the	   bulk	   of	   it	   for	   speculation.	   It	   had	   also	  failed	  to	  pay	  the	  whole	  of	  a	  10%	  advance	  tranche	  of	  the	  land’s	  price	  to	  the	  state,	  a	  delay	  which	   the	   court	   ruled	   should	   have	   prompted	   the	   Minister	   to	   revoke	   the	   land’s	  allocation.66	  Land-­‐allocation	  decisions	  surrounded	  by	  corruption	  during	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  of	  the	  Mubarak	  era	  demonstrate	  far	  more	  than	  individual	  cases	  of	  profiteering	  officials.	  For	  example,	  Amr	  Adly	  has	  shown	  how	  Mubarak’s	  sons	  have	  been	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  capitalist	  network	  of	  ‘cronies’	  that	  has	  actively	  tailored	  urban	  expansion	  policies	  to	   its	   business	   interests.	   At	   times,	  members	   of	   this	   network	   have	   even	   been	   directly	  placed	  at	   the	  helm	  of	   the	   state	  apparatus	   in	   charge	  of	  urban	  planning	  and	  expansion.	  Ahmed	  El	  Maghraby,	  for	  example,	  was	  Minister	  of	  Housing	  from	  2009-­‐2011.	  His	  family,	  along	  with	   the	  Mansour	   family	   (another	  major	   business	   dynasty),	   owned	   55%	  of	   the	  real	  estate	  developing	  company,	  Palm	  Hills.	  The	  company,	  already	  the	  owner	  of	  many	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Mahmoud Mossallam, "The Public Funds Prosecutor Calls in a Former Ministry of Housing Official and 
Seven Businessmen in Mohamed Ibrahim Soliman's Case," Al-Masry Al-Youm 4 January 2010. 
65 The company is controlled by the ‘Rasekh’ Family, and headed by ‘Magdy Rasekh’. The latter is the father-
in-law of Mubarak’s elder son ‘Alaa’, and was also convicted in the case, along with Mohamed Ibrahim 
Soliman. 
66 Fatma Abu-Shanab, "The Criminal Court Sentences Mohamed Ibrahim Soliman to 8 Years in Prison in the 
Two Cases of SODIC and New Cairo, and 5 Years for Rasekh," Al-Masry Al-Youm 30 March 2012. 
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the	  most	  luxurious	  housing	  compounds,	  was	  allocated	  a	  million	  square	  meters	  of	  land	  in	  
New	  Cairo	  by	  direct	  ministerial	  decree	  signed	  by	  Mohamed	  Ibrahim	  Soliman	  in	  August	  2006.67	  The	  price	  per	  meter	  was	  a	   fraction	  of	   the	  market	  price	  of	  adjacent	   land	   in	   the	  area	  at	  the	  time.	  Alaa	  Mubarak,	  the	  president’s	  elder	  son,	  owned	  5%	  of	  the	  company	  at	  the	   time.	   In	   2011,	   the	   high	   administrative	   court	   ruled	   to	   revoke	   the	   allocation	   of	   the	  land,	  deeming	  it	  ‘in	  direct	  violation	  of	  the	  law’68.	  	  As	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class	  continued	  to	  negotiate	  the	  reproduction	  of	  its	  social	  status	  amidst	  the	  neoliberal	  transformation	  of	  the	  1990s,	  the	  shifts	  in	  the	  state’s	  approach	  to	  areas	  intersecting	  with	  this	  social	  process	  were	  changing	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  structural	  environment	   in	  which	  this	  negotiation	  was	  taking	  place.	  The	  result	  was	  that	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  found	  itself	  in	  yet	  another	  social	  field,	  compelled	  to	  face	  the	  forces	   of	   the	   free	   market.	   As	   if	   this	   was	   not	   enough	   to	   erode	   the	   state’s	   traditional	  legitimacy	   as	   an	   institutional	   power	   arrangement	  with	   the	   perceived	   raison	   d’être	   of	  cementing	   and	   reproducing	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   distinction	   and	   social	   prominence,	  there	  was	  also	  the	  crony	  capitalism	  embedded	  in	  the	  persisting	  authoritarianism	  of	  the	  Mubarak	  regime	  to	  deepen	  bitterness	  even	  further.	  	  
5.	  Commercialising	  Governance	  in	  Gated	  Compounds	  	  The	  previous	   sections	  have	  demonstrated	  how	   the	   state’s	  deliberate	   structural	  reconfiguration	   of	   urban	   planning	   policies	   has	   served	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   neoliberal	  private	   real	   estate	   market	   over	   the	   past	   two	   decades.	   Packaging	   their	   marketing	   of	  gated	  compounds	  in	  Cairo’s	  desert	  extensions	  in	  a	  carefully	  crafted	  discursive	  prophecy	  of	   a	   ‘promised	   land’,	   big	   players	   in	   the	   luxury	   real	   estate	   market	   have	   effectively	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Amr Adly, "Mubarak (1990-2011): The State of Corruption," Arab Reform Initiative Thematic Studies (March 
2011), 8. 
68 Ibid., 7. 
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capitalised	   on	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians’	   growing	   disenchantment.	   This	  disenchantment	  has	  centred	  on	  the	  progressively	  weakening	  capacity	  of	  the	  state	  to	  act	  as	   an	  enforcer	  of	   their	   subjective	   conceptions	  of	  material	   configurations	  of	   the	  public	  space,	  in	  traditional	  middle-­‐class	  quarters.	  By	  moving	  to	  the	  gated	  compounds,	  an	  ever-­‐growing	   number	   of	   middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   are	   essentially	   aspiring	   to	   replace	   their	  evaporating	  leverage	  on	  local	  authorities	  as	  citizens,	  with	  a	  more	  favourable	  commercial	  relationship	   as	   customers.	   As	   argued	   throughout	   the	   previous	   section,	   this	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   inclination	   to	   reconfigure	   relationships	   with	   the	   authority	   in	   charge	   of	  enforcing	   certain	   conceptions	   of	   the	   public	   space	   is	   not	   entirely	   generic.	   Rather,	   it	  should	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   dialectical	   interplay	   between	   various	   factors,	  including	  deliberately	  devised	  policy	  orientations	  adopted	  by	  the	  state’s	  urban	  planning	  bodies	  and	  the	  powerful	  myth-­‐creating	  ability	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  market.	  
5.1	  Realities	  of	  the	  ‘Promised	  Land’	  	  The	  logically	  arising	  question	  here	  is	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  urban	  relocation	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	   class	   has	   actually	   fulfilled	   its	   generating	   prophecy.	   In	   other	  words,	   has	  replacing	   the	   state	   as	   a	  municipal	   authority	  with	   commercial	   arrangements	  with	   real	  estate	  developers	  managed	  to	  satisfy	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  aspirations	  for	  the	  realisation	  of	  a	  public	  space	  that	  conforms	  to	  class-­‐common	  conceptions	  of	  modern	  city	  living?	  The	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   is	   as	   complex	   as	   the	   very	   reality	   of	   living	   in	  emerging	   communities	   on	   the	   outskirts	   of	   Cairo.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	  many	   compounds	  have	  offered	  residents	  many	  of	  the	  components	  that	  they	  were	  promised:	  namely,	  calm,	  tidy	   and	   class	   cohesive	   gated	   quarters	   in	  which	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   identities	   can	   be	  displayed	  and	  practised	  in	  safe	  harbours.	  Moreover,	  the	  proximity	  of	  privileged	  schools,	  nearby	   hypermarkets	   and	   exclusive	   sports	   clubs	   increasingly	   facilitates	   access	   to	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desired	  lifestyle	  elements	  and	  practices	  within	  a	  relatively	  confined	  urban	  setting,	  well	  away	   from	   interruptions	   caused	  by	   the	   increasing	   inconveniences	   of	   old	  middle-­‐class	  Cairo.	  However,	   to	   suggest	   that	   such	   access	   has	  minimised	   everyday	   exposure	   to	   the	  failures	  of	  state	  governance	  that	  prompted	  the	  move	  to	  the	  urban	  extensions	  in	  the	  first	  place	  is	  to	  fall	  into	  a	  trap	  of	  oversimplifying	  real-­‐life	  conditions.	  A.	  G.	  is	  a	  physician	  who	  relocated	  from	  an	  apartment	  building	  in	  Mohandessin	  to	  a	  newly	  built	  multi-­‐flat	  family	  home	  in	  one	  of	  the	  residential	  compounds	  in	  the	  Sixth	  of	  
October	   City.	   Although	   he	   would	   never	   contemplate	  moving	   back	   to	  Mohandessin,	   he	  described	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  reasons	  behind	  his	  relocation	  and	  the	  realities	  of	  living	  in	  Cairo’s	  exclusive	  gated	  compounds:	  We	   have	   been	   constantly	   told	   that	   it	   is	   best	   to	   leave	   dirty	   crowded	   and	  suffocated	   Mohandessin	   to	   get	   a	   house	   with	   a	   garden	   and	   streets	   with	   less	  traffic	   jams	   and	   more	   breathing	   space.	   Look	   what	   we	   have	   ended	   up	   with.	  Living	   in	   deserts,	   in	   houses	   with	   gardens	   we	   never	   use	   and	   leave	   to	   our	  domestic	  workers	  to	  enjoy.	  We	  spend	  most	  of	  the	  day	  in	  our	  cars	  travelling	  for	  long	  distances	  so	  we	  can	  go	  about	  our	  lives.	  Going	  to	  work,	  university	  or	  even	  to	  see	  a	  relative	  or	  friends	  all	  takes	  place	  there	  (in	  the	  old	  quarters).69	  	  	  	  As	   the	   statement	   reflects,	   a	   substantial	   proportion	   of	   the	   traditional	   social	  network	  of	  many	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  has	  still	  not	  physically	  relocated	  to	  the	  urban	  extensions.	  Much	  of	   the	  movement	  within	   the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  social	   sphere	  thus	   still	   requires	   constant	   commutes	   to	  or	   from	   these	   traditional	  quarters.	  Everyday	  undertakings,	   such	   as	   visiting	   family,	   seeing	   a	   doctor	   or	   even	   the	   daily	   commute	   to	  work,	  entail	   long	  drives	  that	  mean	  daily	  exposure	  to	  even	  more	  intensive	  forms	  of	  the	  torturous	   inconveniences	   of	   Cairo’s	   poor	   governance	   and	   ailing	   transport	  infrastructure.	   A.G.	   unequivocally	   blames	   the	   state	   for	   its	   failure	   to	   provide	   basic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 A.G. in discussion with the author, Sixth of October City, Cairo, 25 August 2010. I have chosen to refer to this 
informant by his initials, since no separate statement of consent has been obtained to use these specific views in 
the thesis’ text. However, it is important to stress that at the time these views were expressed by the informant in 
discussion with the author, there was no indication that he may object to this, in fact quite the contrary is true.    
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services	  to	  the	  vast	  urban	  spaces	  surrounding	  the	  compounds.	  ‘We	  practically	  live	  in	  a	  modern	  day	  oasis	  in	  the	  desert’,	  he	  asserted,	  continuing:	  The	   government	   has	   thrown	   us	   out	   of	   Cairo	   against	   our	   will	   because	   of	   its	  failures	   and	   it	   is	   every	  man	  alone	  out	  here.	  They	  have	  handed	  us	  over	   to	   the	  truck	  drivers	  on	   the	  desert	  highways	   to	  kill	  us	  with	   their	   insane	  driving.	  And	  you	  have	  the	  thieves	  who	  come	  to	  steal	  from	  our	  homes	  out	  in	  the	  nowhere.	  	  Some	   of	   the	   compounds	   and	   developments	   in	   the	   new	   urban	   extensions	   still	  struggle	  with	  basic	  security,	  adding	  yet	  another	  area	  of	  growing	  disenchantment	  to	  the	  complaints	  directed	  at	  the	  state.	  Police	  presence	  is	  not	  strong	  enough	  to	  cover	  the	  vast	  geographic	   area	   of	   the	   new	   towns.	   This	  was	   the	   case	   in	   the	   small	   villa-­‐compound	   of	  
Green	  Hights,	   where	   Youssef	   Abdelwahab,	   a	   30-­‐year-­‐old	   dentist,	   lives.	   Located	   in	   the	  
Sixth	  of	  October	  City,	   adjacent	   to	   the	  building	   site	  of	  what	   later	  became	  one	  of	  Cairo’s	  biggest	   shopping	  malls	   (Mall	  of	  Arabia),	   residents	   noticed	   the	   recurrence	   of	   burglary	  attempts	   with	   a	   worrying	   frequency.	   At	   the	   time,	   they	   attributed	   these	   attempts	   to	  construction-­‐worker	  traffic,	  due	  to	  the	  proximity	  of	  the	  huge	  building	  site	  nearby.	  The	  compound’s	  community	  decided	  to	  send	  representatives	  to	  meet	  with	  modir	  al-­‐amn,	  the	  
Sixth	  of	  October	  City’s	  Chief	  of	  Police	  to	  complain	  and	  ask	  for	  an	  upgrade	  of	  the	  police’s	  effort	  to	  secure	  the	  area:	  	  His	  response	  was	  very	  positive	  and	  appreciative	  of	  the	  resident’s	  concerns.	  He	  even	  offered	  to	  build	  a	  small	  police	  post	  right	   in	  front	  of	  the	  compound’s	  gate	  and	   to	   adjust	   the	   course	   of	   police	   patrols	   in	   the	   area	   so	   that	   they	   make	  occasional	  drives	  by	  the	  place.	  We	  thought	  this	  was	  great,	  only	  to	  be	  astonished	  when	  he	  bluntly	  asked	  us	  to	  bear	  the	  financial	  costs.70	  	  If	  the	  compound’s	  residents	  wanted	  to	  enjoy	  the	  upgraded	  level	  of	  local	  services,	  they	  were	  required	  to	  raise	  the	  funds	  to	  cover	  the	  costs	  of	  building	  and	  furnishing	  the	  suggested	  police	  post,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  provision	  of	  regular	  meals	  for	  the	  servicemen	  who	  were	  to	  guard	  it.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Youssef Abdelwahab in discussion with the author, Sixth of October City, Cairo, 17 November 2009. 
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The	   budget	   and	   resources	   allocated	   to	   security	   services	   in	   the	   area	   by	   the	  government	  was	   not	   enough	   to	   cover	   the	   Sixth	  of	  October	  City	   effectively,	   and	   it	  was	  thus	   an	   informal	   but	   government-­‐approved	   approach	   for	   the	   police	   to	   forge	   such	  partnerships	  with	  the	  residents	  of	  the	  compounds.	  ‘It	  was	  a	  surreal	  situation.	  The	  man	  was	   not	   asking	   to	   be	   bribed	   or	   anything.	   This	   was	   official	   state	   policy:	   If	   you	   want	  protection,	   you	   pay’,	   Youssef	   recalled.	   For	   various	   reasons,	   the	   arrangement	  was	   not	  finalised	  and	  no	  police	  post	  was	  built.	  Not	  that	  it	  mattered	  much,	  according	  to	  Youssef,	  since	   later	   the	   residents’	  worst	   security	   fears	   came	   true	   during	   the	   revolt	   of	   January	  2011.	   When	   the	   police	   virtually	   disappeared	   from	   the	   streets	   of	   Cairo	   and	   other	  Egyptian	   cities	   on	   the	   eve	   of	   28	   January,	   residents	   of	  Green	  Heights	   had	   to	   take	   their	  small	   compound’s	   security	   into	   their	   own	   hands.	   Initially,	   they	   took	   shifts	   forming	  patrols	   to	  guard	   the	  compound	   from	  potential	   looters	  or	   from	  attacks	   from	  detainees	  who	   had	   escaped	   the	   prison	   complex	   situated	   adjacent	   to	   the	   Cairo-­‐Alexandria	   road	  some	  80	  km	  away.	  But	  when	  the	  task	  proved	  too	  difficult,	  they	  resorted	  to	  contracting	  armed	  men	  from	  nearby	  Bedouin	  communities	  to	  protect	  their	  properties.	   ‘They	  were	  heavily	  armed	  with	  machine	  guns	  and	  night-­‐vision	  goggles.	  We	  felt	  safe	  again’,	  Youssef	  remembers	  bitterly.	  While	  in	  other	  larger	  compounds,	  residents’	  numbers	  and	  privately	  stocked	  arms	  enabled	  inhabitants	  to	  form	  protection	  patrols	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  state,	  some	  had	  no	  alternative	  but	  to	  purchase	  protection	  directly	  from	  the	  ‘free	  market’.	  Perhaps	   there	   ought	   to	   be	   some	   caution	   against	   the	   use	   of	   such	   examples	   to	  generalise	  specific	  manifestations	  of	   the	  state’s	  de-­‐facto	  commercialisation	  of	   the	  very	  logic	  underpinning	  the	  provision	  of	  basic	  urban	  services	  in	  the	  new	  desert	  extensions.	  The	  point	  here	  is	  to	  provide	  one	  of	  many	  examples	  of	  the	  deliberate	  re-­‐constitution	  of	  the	   state’s	   relationship	   with	   its	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   citizenry	   in	   the	   new	   urban	  extensions	   on	   a	   quasi-­‐commercial	   basis.	  As	   the	   last	   section	   thoroughly	  demonstrates,	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the	  state-­‐sponsored	  structural	  neoliberalisation	  of	  lifestyles	  through	  the	  adjustments	  of	  urban	  planning	  policies	  has	  effectively	  marketised	  an	  important	  area	  for	  the	  practice	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  distinction.	   Such	  marketisation	  has	   evidently	   also	   extended	   to	   the	  very	  logic	  by	  which	  the	  state	  has	  been	  devising	  its	  practical	  engagement	  with	  these	  new	  communities.	  	  
5.2	  When	  Commercial	  Governance	  Fails	  Residential	   gated	   compounds	   in	   Cairo’s	   urban	   extensions	   have	   been	  mushrooming	  despite	   the	  de	   facto	  or	   informal	  marketisation	   in	  aspects	   related	   to	   the	  state’s	   role	   and	   presence	   in	   their	   surrounding	   urban	   space.	   Moreover,	   inside	   the	  confinement	  of	  these	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  enclaves,	  this	  role	  has	  been	  entirely	  replaced	  by	   a	   full-­‐fledged	   commercial	   relationship.	   This	   replacement	   is	   one	   of	   the	   contractual	  foundations	   of	   property	   purchases	   in	   the	   gated	   compounds.	   In	   most	   compounds,	  payment	   plans	   offered	   by	   the	   real	   estate	   developers	   incorporate	   the	   cost	   of	   internal	  governance.	  	  	  As	   part	   of	   these	   financing	   plans,	   purchasers	   pay	   a	   sum	   of	   money,	   usually	  referred	  to	  as	  wadi‘at	  al-­‐siyana	  (the	  maintenance	  deposit),	  of	  up	  to	  15%	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  property	  to	  the	  developer.71	  The	  sum	  total	  of	  residents’	  deposits	  is	  pooled	  under	  the	  financial	   auspices	   of	   the	   real	   estate	   company.	   The	   proceeds	   of	   this	   deposit	   are	  considered	   the	   owners’	   contribution	   to	   the	   provision	   of	   basic	   services	   within	   the	  boundaries	   of	   the	   gated	   compound	   (such	   as	   security,	   garbage	   collection,	   the	  management	   and	   maintenance	   of	   communal	   areas	   and	   gardens,	   and	   the	   regular	  maintenance	  of	  household	  appliances	  and	  the	  compound’s	  internal	  infrastructure).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Since most real estate developers offer customers installment-based payment schemes of up to seven years 
with minimal or no interest, the deposit is usually due along with the last instalment. It is stipulated in most 
examples of such property contracts examined for the purpose of this research that payment of the 'maintenance 
deposit' is a pre-requisite for being awarded access to the property.  
	  273	  
Strikingly,	  this	  is	  a	  private-­‐sector	  replica	  of	  a	  conventional	  taxpayer-­‐municipality	  relationship.	   Established	   within	   a	   commercial,	   rather	   than	   political,	   framework,	   it	  effectively	   relieves	   the	  state	  of	   its	  governance	  duties	  within	   the	   limited	  boundaries	  of	  the	   gated	   compound.	   By	   transferring	   this	   dynamic	   entirely	   to	   the	   market,	   potential	  friction	   arising	   from	   gated-­‐compound	   inhabitants’	   dissatisfaction	   with	   local	   state-­‐provided	  municipal	  services	  is	  practically	  eliminated.	  Instead,	  any	  disputes	  between	  the	  residents	   and	   the	   real	   estate	   developers	  managing	   the	   compounds	   are	   practised	   in	   a	  commercial	   framework.	  Evidently,	   this	   formula	  has	  proved	  widely	   successful.	  Most	  of	  the	  compounds’	  residents	  interviewed	  for	  this	  study	  complained	  of	  little	  in	  this	  regard.	  To	  them,	  the	  contrast	  between	  the	  ever-­‐deteriorating	  standard	  of	  local	  services	  at	  their	  old	   addresses	   in	   traditional	   middle-­‐class	   Cairene	   quarters	   and	   their	   new	   living	  environment	   in	   the	   gated	   compounds	   was	   clear.	   The	   state	   had	   been	   successfully	  replaced	  by	  a	  working	  commercial	  relationship	  between	  residents	  and	  the	  managers	  of	  their	   privatised	   and	   confined	   urban	   space.	   Unquantifiable	   as	   it	   may	   first	   appear,	   the	  bearings	  of	   such	   a	   reconfigured	  urban-­‐space	  dynamic	  on	   the	   socio-­‐political	   agency	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	   class	   can	  be	  measured	  by	   its	   inherent	   ‘stateless’	   character.	   In	  other	  words,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   situation	   in	   traditional	   middle	   class	   Cairene	   quarters,	   the	  state’s	  absence,	  rather	  than	  a	  certain	  mechanism	  of	  its	  presence	  in	  these	  social	  spaces,	  is	  responsible	   for	   the	   production	   of	   a	   discourse	   of	   social	   critique	   and	   discontent.	   This	  point	  is	  best	  examined	  through	  an	  exceptional	  case:	  one	  in	  which	  the	  market	  dynamic	  on	   which	   the	   new	   configuration	   of	   the	   urban	   social	   contract	   is	   based	   has	   not	   been	  successful.	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The	   case	   of	   Sameh	   El-­‐Sayyed72	  embodies	   this	   situation.	   Sameh	   is	   a	   logistics	  manager	  and	  a	  father	  of	  two.	  He	  was	  born	  in	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  town	  of	  Ismailiyya,	  where	  his	   parents	   worked	   for	   the	   Suez	   Canal	   Authority.	   In	   2003,	   he	   moved	   with	   his	   small	  family	  from	  Nasr	  City	  to	  Solaymaneyah	  Golf	  City,	  a	  huge	  gated	  compound	  adjacent	  to	  the	  Cairo-­‐Alexandria	  road.	  His	  relocation	  was	  primarily	  motivated	  by	  his	  desire	  to	  raise	  his	  children	  in	  a	  pollution-­‐free	  environment,	  in	  addition	  to	  his	  growing	  intolerance	  for	  the	  increasing	  inconvenience	  of	  Cairo’s	  crowdedness	  and	  rubbish-­‐filled	  streets.	  At	   first,	   he	   very	   much	   looked	   forward	   to	   the	   prospect	   of	   living	   in	   the	   desert	  compound’s	   second	   development	   phase,	   called	   al-­‐janna	   (Paradise).	   There,	   ‘you	   could	  hear	  your	  own	  voice	  and	  have	  more	  privacy	  and	  enough	  breathing	  space.’	  But	  when	  it	  was	   time	   to	   relocate,	   Sameh	   confronted	   a	   more	   complex	   reality,	   especially	   when	  contrasted	  with	  what	  he	  had	  been	  promised:	  When	  you	   first	   saw	   the	  compound’s	  master	  plan,	   there	  was	  supposed	   to	  be	  a	  mall	   and	   a	   range	   of	   other	   services	   you	   would	   need	   to	   exist	   there,	   like	  transportation,	  cleaning	  and	  so	  on.	  	  	  None	   of	   the	   above	   had	  materialised	   by	   the	   time	   Sameh	  went	   to	   complete	   the	  formal	  procedure	  of	  ownership	  transfer	  in	  May	  2006.	  In	  addition,	  he	  counted	  75	  major	  construction	  flaws	  in	  his	  newly	  acquired	  and	  supposedly	  furnished	  property,	  including	  basics	   (such	   as	   poorly	   installed	   electricity,	   sewage	   and	   water	   infrastructures,	   and	  virtually	   non-­‐existent	   insulation).	   For	   the	   following	   five	   months,	   he	   continued	   to	  demand	  that	  the	  real	  estate	  company	  remedy	  these	  flaws,	  to	  no	  avail.	  Since	  he	  needed	  to	  move	   into	   his	   new	   home	   in	   time	   for	   the	   new	   school	   year,	   he	   decided	   to	   give	   in	   and	  refurbish	   the	   property	   to	   his	   desired	   standard,	   at	   his	   own	   expense.	   Trouble	  with	   the	  compound’s	   management	   however,	   continued	   due	   to	   a	   poor	   level	   of	   basic	   service	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Sameh El Sayyed in discussion with the author, Sheikh Zayed City, Cairo, 14 April 2010. 
	  275	  
provision	  that	  fell	  extremely	  short	  of	  what	  has	  been	  promised	  at	  the	  time	  the	  properties	  were	  still	  being	  marketed.	  	  	  Lobbying	   for	   an	   improvement	   in	   the	   company’s	   performance	   managing	   the	  compounds’	   services	   was	   a	   bitter	   experience,	   despite	   Sameh’s	   attempts	   to	   plan	   his	  moves	  strategically.	  He	   tried	   to	   take	  collective,	   rather	   than	   individual,	  action,	  since	  he	  knew	  of	  a	  considerable	  number	  of	  other	  owners	  with	  similar	  grievances.	  Eight	  of	  them	  met	   together	   to	   strategise	   their	   collective	   efforts	   to	   save	   their	   investments	   in	   the	  properties	  they	  had	  bought.	  After	  repeated	  appeals	  to	  and	  meetings	  with	  the	  company,	  nothing	  had	  changed.	  Both	  the	  construction	  of	  needed	  amenities	  in	  the	  compound	  and	  the	  upgrade	  of	  its	  everyday	  services	  remained	  unfulfilled.	  The	  group	  decided	  that	  legal	  action	  against	  the	  company	  was	  the	  only	  available	  alternative:	  The	   goal	   was	   to	   replace	   the	   Solaymaneyah	  management	   and	   to	   transfer	   the	  money	   of	   all	   maintenance	   deposits	   to	   an	   owner’s	   association	   that	   would	  eventually	   assume	   control	   of	   the	   compound’s	   management.	   But	   we	   were	  dreaming.	  	  Sameh	  and	  his	  fellow	  property	  owners	  filed	  a	  complaint	  against	  the	  company	  at	  the	   public	   prosecutor’s	   office,	   accusing	   it	   of	   breaching	   the	   sales	   contracts,	   which	  stipulated	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  all	  the	  unfulfilled	  elements.	  However,	  the	  complaint	  was	  completely	  ignored	  and	  never	  investigated.	  Before	  they	  could	  effectively	  follow	  it	  up,	  the	  owners’	  group	  faced	  another	  obstacle:	  The	  company’s	  owner	  managed	  to	  sabotage	  their	  efforts	  to	  form	  an	  owners’	  association.	  He	  lobbied	  the	  governor	  of	  Giza,	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	   which	   the	   compound	   was	   situated	   within,	   to	   issue	   an	   administrative	   decision	  preventing	  the	  recognition	  of	  any	  owners’	  associations	  formed	  by	  the	  residents	  of	  gated	  compounds.	  ‘It	  didn’t	  stop	  there’,	  recalls	  Sameh:	  There	   were	   even	   several	   attempts	   at	   intimidation	   and	   bullying,	   especially	  towards	   those	  of	  us	  who	   led	   that	  effort.	  They	  would	  cut	  off	  our	  water	  supply	  and	  electricity	  as	  a	  punishment.	  In	  one	  case	  the	  company’s	  workers	  put	  poison	  that	   killed	   the	   dogs	   of	   one	   of	   the	   residents.	   It	  was	   a	  war	   and	  no	  matter	   how	  many	   times	   we	   complained	   to	   the	   police	   or	   the	   public	   prosecutor,	   nothing	  happened.	   Absolutely	   nothing,	   as	   if	   these	   bodies	   did	   not	   exist,	   or	   as	   if	   the	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company	  always	  got	  its	  way	  with	  them.	  They	  were	  above	  the	  law,	  so	  much	  was	  clear.	   	  At	  the	  time	  he	  was	  interviewed	  for	  this	  study,	  Sameh’s	  group	  was	  exploring	  the	  possibility	  of	  advancing	  their	  case	  to	  public	  opinion	  through	  a	  popular	  television	  show.	  Their	   idea	   was	   to	   hit	   the	   company	   where	   it	   hurt	   the	   most:	   its	   market	   reputation.	  However,	   they	   were	   still	   hesitant	   to	   take	   this	   step,	   simply	   because	   if	   the	   project’s	  reputation	  was	   tarnished,	   their	   ‘investments	   into	  buying	   these	  homes	  would	  go	  down	  the	  drain,	  and	  life	  savings	  would	  be	  lost’.	  As	  has	  previously	  been	  pointed	  out,	  Sameh’s	  case	  is	  not	  too	  common.	  However,	  it	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  rare	  occurrence.73	  It	  bears	  witness	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  state	  has	  decisively	  transferred	  its	  role	  in	  conditioning	  the	  urban	  space	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  to	  a	  loosely	  regulated	  neoliberal	  market.	  Within	  such	  a	  framework,	  upper	  middle	  class	  Egyptians	   in	   search	  of	   the	  material	   realisation	  of	   their	   conception	  of	   a	  modern	  urban	  lifestyle	   are	   left	   with	   only	   one	   choice:	   namely,	   to	   submit	   to	   market-­‐determined	  conditions	  with	  little	  interference	  or	  assistance	  from	  the	  state.	  Put	  differently,	  in	  these	  newly	   developing	   urban	   dynamics,	   the	   traditional	   formula	   of	   state-­‐citizen	   is	  increasingly	  giving	  way	  to	  a	  highly	  commercialised	  version	  of	  the	  social	  contract.	  	  
6.	  Conclusion	  As	   this	   study	   argues,	   the	   Egyptian	   state’s	   deliberate	   handover	   of	   socially	   vital	  areas	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status	  reproduction	  to	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  free	  market	   has	   greatly	   eroded	   this	   class’	   consent	   to	   the	   prevailing	   political	   order.	   In	   the	  housing	   area,	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   chapter,	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   has	   cumulatively	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 As a further indication to the supremacy of the market logic in this regard, much of the anecdotal evidence 
suggests that such severe cases as Sameh’s, who eventually moved from this compound, only occur when the 
real estate developer is a ‘one-project company’. Bigger players in the market who are in a constant process of 
developing and selling new compounds are keen to preserve their market reputation and hence have 
considerably better, although not flawless, management systems in place for urban services in their compounds.  
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perceived	  the	  state’s	  retreat	  as	  a	  clear	  unwillingness	  and	  incapacity	  to	  condition	  urban	  and	  public	   spaces	   in	   accordance	  with	  normatively	   formulated	   conceptions	   of	  modern	  city	  living.	  Since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  these	  conceptions	  have	  become	  ever-­‐more	  attuned	  to	  cultural	  imports	  brought	  in	  by	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class’	  exposure	  to	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  and	  material	  trends	  generated	  by	  globalisation.	  This	  increasing	  discontent	  has	  been	   steadily	   fuelled	   by	   everyday	   encounters	   with	   the	   evolution	   of	   Cairo	   into	   a	  crowded,	   polluted	   and	   poorly	   governed	   urban	   space	   occupied	   by	   conflicting	   social	  identities	  and	  their	  resultant	  competing	  lifestyle	  practices.	  The	  state’s	  strategy	  for	  managing	  the	  political	  risks	  arising	  from	  an	  increasingly	  complex	  urban	  composition	  has,	  once	  again,	  been	  to	  refer	  its	  embedded	  contradictions	  to	   the	   market	   rather	   than	   to	   the	   ‘political’,	   following	   a	   neoliberal	   rationale	   par	  excellence.	  To	  borrow	  a	  term	  from	  the	  business	  lexicon,	  the	  Egyptian	  state	  encouraged	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  real	  estate	  market	  to	  outsource	  yet	  another	  component	  of	   its	   progressively	   unsustainable	   social	   contract	  with	   the	   upper	  middle	   class.	   In	   this	  sense,	   the	   state’s	   neoliberal	   rationale	   gave	   birth	   to	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   the	   gated	  residential	   compounds	   in	   urban	   extensions	   of	   the	   capital,	   designed	   as	   new	   economic	  development	  hubs	  to	  absorb	  the	  city’s	  exploding	  population.	  The	   emerging	   real	   estate	   market	   forcefully	   exploited	   the	   intensifying	  dissatisfaction	   with	   deteriorating	   governance	   of	   traditional	   middle-­‐class	   quarters	   of	  Cairo.	  It	  thus	  pivoted	  its	  marketing	  strategies	  to	  create	  a	  contrasting	  image	  of	  a	  modern	  urban	   space	   within	   the	   class-­‐cohesive	   environment	   of	   gated	   compounds	   built	  extensively	   in	   the	   deserts	   around	   Cairo	   over	   the	   past	   two	   decades.	   Of	   course,	   this	  market	  did	  not	  emerge	  in	  isolation	  from	  the	  corruption	  network	  of	  Mubarak’s	  oligarchy.	  However,	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   wide	   wave	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   relocation	   to	   the	  gated	  compounds	   lay	   in	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  new	  relationship	  between	  citizens	  and	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the	   governance	   of	   their	   confined	   urban	   quarters.	   The	   changing	   foundations	   of	   socio-­‐political	  agency	  have	  thus	  been	  shaped	  by	  the	  dynamics	  of	  a	  new	  social	  model	  inside	  the	  gated	   compounds.	   There,	   citizens	   are	   now	   negotiating	   their	   urban	   wellbeing	   with	  commercial	   market	   entities,	   rather	   than	   with	   state	   institutions	   that	   can	   be	   held	  accountable.	  	  	  	  	  	  Just	  as	  in	  the	  other	  social	  fields	  for	  the	  reproduction	  of	  Egyptian	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   identity	   discussed	   in	   chapters	   three	   and	   four,	   so	   too	   does	   this	   typically	  authoritarian	   neoliberal	   rationale	   of	   exporting	   contradictions	   of	   the	   'social'	   to	   the	  'market'	   avoid	   opening	   the	   political	   field	   to	   the	   negotiation	   of	   these	   contradictions.	  While	  such	  export	  was	  thought	  to	  have	  successfully	  neutralised	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  politically,	   it	   has	   in	   fact	   extended	   socio-­‐political	   discontent	   even	   further.	   On	   the	   one	  hand,	   the	   state’s	   insufficient	   investment	   in	   infrastructure	   (including	   road	   networks,	  amenities	   and	   local	   services)	   in	   the	   vast	   urban	   extensions	   has	   created	   self-­‐confined	  class	   enclaves	   that	   are	   commercially	   managed.	   These	   enclaves	   are	   scattered	   around	  vast	   areas	   of	   unfinished	   housing	   developments	   and	   infrastructure	   projects,	   which	  reflect	  the	  incompetence	  of	  the	  state’s	  urban	  planning	  policies.	  The	  underdevelopment	  of	  the	  new	  urban	  extensions	  has	  also	  kept	  social	  and	  economic	  ties	  to	  old	  middle-­‐class	  Cairo	  alive,	  well	  and	  integral	  to	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  social	  networks	  and	  urban-­‐dwelling	  patterns.	   During	   the	   unavoidable	   daily	   commutes	   between	   those	   quarters	   and	   the	  isolated	  islands	  of	  the	  gated	  compounds,	  aspects	  of	  Cairo’s	  failed	  governance	  are	  even	  more	  intensively	  visible.	  In	   short,	   the	   state’s	   referral	   of	   the	   task	   of	   realising	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  conceptions	  of	  modern	  city	  living	  to	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  market,	  has	  failed	  to	  deflect	   political	   discontent	   surrounding	   deteriorating	   governance	   in	   Cairo	   away	   from	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the	   state.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   such	   discontent	   towards	   the	   state	   has	   been	   further	  intensified	  with	  the	  ‘outsourcing’	  of	  these	  responsibilities.	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Chapter	  Six:	  	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  	  Experiences	  of	  the	  State	  
1.	  Introduction	  The	   previous	   chapters	   discussed	   the	   changing	   dynamics	   of	  middle-­‐class	   social	  reproduction.	  Much	  of	   the	  emphasis	   in	  chapters	   three,	   four	  and	   five	   fell	  on	   the	  state’s	  shrinking	   presence	   and	   role	   in	   social	   areas	   considered	   vital	   to	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status	  reproduction,	  and	  resulting	  new	  reliance	  on	  neoliberal	  market	  mechanisms.	  The	  representative	  narratives	  and	  examples	   in	   these	   three	  chapters	  demonstrated	  aspects	  of	  the	  struggle	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class	  in	  post-­‐1970s	  generations	  to	  preserve	  its	   social	   identity	   and	   status.	   The	   dynamics	   involved	   in	   this	   process	   of	   social-­‐status	  preservation	   and	   reproduction	   indicate	   how	   a	   set	   of	   social	   and	   cultural	   assets	   are	  deployed	   to	   this	   end	   within	   changing	   structural	   conditions.	   Given	   the	   inherent	  characteristics	  of	  neoliberalism	  as	  a	  socio-­‐economic	  project,	  this	  deployment	  has	  been	  taking	   place	  without	  much	   reliance	   on	   the	   state.	   Consequently,	   the	   state	   is	   no	   longer	  perceived	   as	   a	   dependable	   provider	   or	   effective	   facilitator	   of	   the	   acquisition	   of	   social	  capital.	  Nor	  has	  it	  demonstrated	  any	  meaningful	  capacity	  to	  condition	  the	  public	  space	  in	   today’s	  Cairo	   in	  conformity	  with	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  conceptions	  and	  aspirations	  of	  modernity.	  	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  both	  unrealistic	  and	  misinformed	  to	  suggest	  a	  lack	  of	  state	  presence	   and	   role	   or	   the	   altogether	   absence	   thereof	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   social	  environment	  of	  Egypt’s	  upper	  middle	   class.	  Our	  appreciation	  of	   the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  of	  today’s	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class	  is	  shaped	  as	  a	  function	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of	  its	  social	  experience	  is	  therefore	  bound	  to	  touch	  upon	  the	  relationship	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	   class	   with	   the	   state.	   To	   understand	   why	   the	   upper	   middle	   class’	   role	   as	   an	  important	  component	  of	  the	  social	  base	  for	  the	  Egyptian	  state,	  has	  greatly	  eroded	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  context,	  and	  how	  the	   lines	   that	  determine	  this	  class’	   future	  political	  agency	  are	  being	  drawn,	   the	  analysis	  needs	   to	  be	  extended	  beyond	  areas	   in	  which	   the	  upper	  middle	  class	  is	  seeing	  less	  of	  the	  state,	  to	  those	  where	  the	  latter	  is	  still	  encountered	  and	  experienced.	   As	   this	   chapter	   posits,	   the	   production	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   political	  agency	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  era	  is	  a	  function	  not	  only	  of	  the	  agency	  shaped	  in	  the	  context	  of	  producing	  and	  preserving	  status	  and	  distinction,	  but	  also	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  social	  field.	  
1.1	  The	  Social	  Experience	  of	  the	  State	  The	   focus	   in	   this	   chapter	   will	   therefore	   be	   on	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians’	  ‘social	   experience	   of	   the	   state’.	   The	   term	   itself	  warrants	   some	   explanation:	   In	   today’s	  Egyptian	  context,	  it	  demarcates	  a	  multitude	  of	  sometimes	  random	  and	  sporadic,	  but	  at	  other	   times	  more	   formalised	   and	   structured,	   encounters	   between	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  and	  state	  agents,	  institutions,	  branches	  and	  bodies	  in	  the	  social	  field.	  It	  also,	  arguably,	   encompasses	   a	   range	   of	   less	   empirically	   quantifiable	   everyday	   occurrences	  and	   material	   changes	   to	   the	   public	   space	   and	   the	   urban	   environment	   that	   are	  discursively	   attributed	   to	   ‘workings’	   of	   the	   state,	   its	   policies,	   agencies	   or	  representatives.	  The	  complexity	  of	  depicting	  the	  state’s	  construction	  as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  accumulated	   experiences	   and	   encounters	   deserves	   a	   special	   note.	   To	   speak	   of	  ‘encountering	  the	  state’,	  is	  to	  indicate	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  social	  experiences	  that	  vary	  in	  their	   frequency,	   intensity	  and	   formality.	  From	  direct	  and	   indirect	   (for	  example,	   visual	  observation)	  micro-­‐type	   experiences	   of	   the	   state’s	   practical	   exercise	   of	   authority	   and	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power	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  or	  on	  the	  streets;	  to	  the	  somewhat	  more	  formalised,	  yet	  less	  frequent,	   engagement	   with	   the	   bureaucratic	   administrative	   apparatus	   for	   obtaining	  official	   documentation,	   licences	   and	   permits;	   to	   relatively	   highly	   formalised	   and	  structured	  experiences	  of	  the	  state’s	  branches	  and	  institutions	  (such	  as	  holding	  public	  office,	  performing	  obligatory	  military	  service	  or	  resorting	  to	  the	  judicial	  system	  as	  the	  formal	  dispute	  settlement	  mechanism	  embodying	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘the	  law’);	  Egypt’s	  upper	  middle	   class	   experiences	   a	   vast	   spectrum	   of	   interactions	   with	   the	   state	   and	   the	  mechanisms	  that	  underpin	  the	  latter’s	  practice	  of	  its	  role	  and	  various	  forms	  of	  power	  in	  society.	  These	  different	  categories	  of	  accumulative	  experiences	  of	  the	  state	  sharpen	  the	  lines	   of	   social	   distinction	   and	   identity,	   develop	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   individuals’	  awareness	   of	   their	   position	   within	   the	   wider	   social	   structure,	   and	   –	   not	   least	  significantly	  –	  shape	  the	  normative	  convictions	  regarding	  both	  the	  utility	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  ‘political’.	  The	  process	  by	  which	  the	  social	  experience	  of	  the	  state	  contributes	  to	  the	  build-­‐up	  of	   convictions	  and	  normative	  holdings	   that	  eventually	   inform	  political	   choices	  and	  actions	  is	  certainly	  comprised	  of	  more	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  individual	  encounters	  with	  the	  various	  branches,	  agents	  and	  functions	  of	  the	  state	  within	  the	  social	  sphere.	  Individual	  narratives	  of	  these	  encounters	  are	  in	  many	  ways	  widely	  diffused	  through	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   social	   networks.	   The	   lifestyle	   practices	   and	   venues	  within	   the	   neoliberal	   urban	  setting	   that	   play	   an	   important	   role	   as	   a	   production	   arena	   for	   social	   identity	   arguably	  also	   act	   as	   socio-­‐spatial	   sites	   for	   the	   constant	   establishment	   and	   refinement	   of	  discursive	   links	  between	   individual	  narratives	  of	   the	  state	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  more	  generalised,	   collective	  and	  class-­‐typical	   characterisations	  of	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  state	  on	  the	  other.	  Meetings	  with	  friends	  in	  Western-­‐style	  coffee	  shops	  or	  restaurants,	  outings	  in	  shopping	   malls,	   interaction	   with	   colleagues	   in	   the	   workplace,	   family	   gatherings	   and	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other	   socialisation	  patterns	  within	   the	  upper	  middle	   class’	   social	   sphere	   represent	  an	  almost	  daily	  medium	  for	  sharing	  narratives,	  and	  comparing	  and	  discussing	  experiences	  of	  ‘meeting	  the	  state’.	  Such	   constant	   exchanges	   contribute	   to	   the	   construction	   –and	   not	   less	  significantly	   the	   internalisation-­‐	   of	   a	   class-­‐based	   image	   of	   the	   state.	   Throughout	  interviews	   with	   representative	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   in	   the	   course	   of	   this	  research,	   as	  well	   as	   through	  protracted	   exposure	   to	   countless	   conversations	   amongst	  groups	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   men	   and	   women	   during	   fieldwork,	   it	   was	   striking	   to	  witness	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   encounters	   that	   make	   up	   the	   social	  experience	  of	  the	  state	  produce	  an	  image	  that	  is	  then	  discursively	  linked	  to	  the	  purpose	  and	   nature	   of	   politics,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   the	   objectives,	   utility	   and	   means	   of	   political	  contestation	   and	   action.	   Drawing	   on	   patterns	   and	   trends	   identified	   and	   detected	  throughout	   these	   different	   experiences	   of	   the	   state,	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	  constantly	  draw	  and	  develop	  conclusions	  and	  inferences	  as	  to	  hal	  al-­‐balad	  or	  ‘the	  state	  of	  the	  country’.	  	  As	   discussed	   in	   the	   conceptual	   framework	   for	   this	   study,	   Migdal’s	   ‘state	   in	  society’	  paradigm	   is	  a	  particularly	  balanced	  conceptual	   framework	   through	  which	   the	  workings	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  social	   field	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  discursive	  nature	  without	  compromising	  our	  simultaneous	  understanding	  of	   the	  state	  as	  a	  set	  of	  institutional	   arrangements	   and	   structures.1	  This	   chapter’s	   discussion	   of	   the	   social	  experience	   of	   the	   state	  will	   therefore	   be	   based	   on	   a	   conceptual	   understanding	   of	   the	  state	  as	  the	  image	  of	  a	  power	  structure	  that	  is	  constantly	  constructed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  experiences	   of	   social	   groups	   (as	   individuals	   and	   collectives)	   with	   the	   different	  representations	   of	   the	   state	   in	   the	   social	   field.	   This	   is	   quite	   a	   departure	   from	   more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Migdal, State in Society : Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another, 124. 
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traditional	   depictions	   of	   the	   state	   as	   an	   institutional	   structure	  above	   society.	  Migdal’s	  dual	   paradigm,	   in	  which	   the	   state	   constitutes	   both	   an	   institutional	   structure	   and	   the	  discursive	   conception	   that	   is	   constantly	   produced	   by	   the	   complex	   nature	   of	   this	  structure’s	  presence	  and	  effects	  in	  the	  social	  field,	  is	  thus	  most	  suited	  to	  capturing	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  social	  experience	  of	  the	  state.	  According	  to	  Mitchell,	  these	  processes,	  in	  which	   the	   defining	   lines	   between	  what	   is	   state	   and	  what	   is	   society	   are	   constantly	  redrawn,	  represent	  the	  ‘the	  essence	  of	  modern	  politics’.2	  In	   the	   socio-­‐political	   context	   of	   today’s	   Egypt,	   several	   recent	   scholarly	   works	  explore	  how	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  specific	  social	  groups	  is	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  shaped	  by	  the	  particularities,	  conditions,	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  former’s	  presence	  in	  the	  socio-­‐spatial	  environment	  of	  the	  latters.	  These	  practical	  and	  everyday	  encounters	  with	  the	  state	  in	  turn	  inform	  the	  construction	  of	  an	  individual	  and	  collective	  self	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  dominant	  apparatus	  of	  power	  in	  society.3	  As	  chapter	  five	  emphasised,	  the	  sheer	  size	   and	   intensity	   of	   Cairo	   as	   an	   urban	   conglomerate	   of	   different	   human	   masses,	  intersecting	  social	  forces	  and	  multi-­‐layered	  structures	  of	  authority	  and	  power,	  certainly	  make	   the	   city	   and	   its	   communities	   richly	   revealing	   subjects	   of	   inquiry	   in	   this	   regard.	  Much	  of	   the	  existing	  research	   therefore	  observes	   the	  dynamics	  and	  political	  effects	  of	  this	   complex	   relationship	   between	   state	   and	   society,	   and	   how	   both	   constantly	   shape	  and	  define	   one	   another	   in	   the	   social	   sphere.	  Moreover,	   ethnographic	   studies	   of	   other	  regions	  have	  also	  used	  everyday	  encounters	  with	  and	  experiences	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  inferring	  how	  social	  agents	  construct	  the	  latter.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  villagers	  in	  rural	  India,	  for	   example,	   Akhil	   Gupta	   examines	   how	   discourses	   of	   ‘corruption’	   produced	   by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics," 95. 
3 See, for example: Farha Ghannam, Remaking the Modern: Space, Relocation, and the Politics of Identity in a 
Global Cairo (Berkeley, Los Angeles: Univerity of California Press, 2002); Ismail, Political Life in Cairo's New 
Quarters: Encountering the Everyday State; Asef Bayat and Eric Denis, "Who Is Afraid of Ashwaiyyat? Urban 
Change and Politics in Egypt," Environment and Urbanization 12, no. 2 (2000); Salwa Ismail, "Authoritarian 
Government, Neoliberalism and Everyday Civilities in Egypt," Third World Quarterly 32, no. 5 (2011). 
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members	  of	  the	  community	  recounting	  their	  everyday	  dealings	  with	  state	  agents	  at	  the	  local	   level	   while	   ‘shooting	   the	   breeze’	   after	   a	   hard	   day’s	   work	   become	   a	   ‘key	   arena	  through	  which	  the	  state,	  citizens,	  and	  other	  organizations	  and	  aggregations	  come	  to	  be	  imagined’.4	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class,	  ‘tales’	  of	  the	  state	  generated	  through	  direct	  experience	  and	  intensified	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  experiences	  of	  others	  play	  a	  profound	  role	  in	  developing	  a	  generic	  image	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  state.	  In	  turn,	  they	  inform	  the	   formulation	  of	  modes	  of	  evaluation	  and	  critique	  of	   the	  state’s	  role	  and	   function	   in	  society.	   Equally	   importantly,	   the	   normative	   interpretations	   of	   class-­‐common	  experiences	  of	  the	  state	  inform	  agency	  aiming	  to	  negotiate	  the	  state	  to	  secure	  interests	  in	  large	  part	  inspired	  by	  class	  identity.	  	  
1.2	  The	  Image	  of	  the	  State	  and	  the	  Nature	  of	  Politics	  An	   important	   question	   in	   this	   context	   is	   how	   the	   constructed	   image	   and	  normative	  judgement	  of	  the	  state	  (generated	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  social	  experiences	  of	  the	  latter)	   translate	  politically.	  Unfortunately,	   there	   is	  no	  easy	  answer	   to	   this	  question.	   In	  general,	   it	   is	   extremely	   challenging	   to	   establish	  direct	   empirical	   linkages	  between	   the	  social	   experience	   of	   the	   state	   and	   political	   choices	   and	   agency.	   Such	   an	   undertaking	  becomes	   exceptionally	   difficult	   in	   authoritarian	   contexts,	   in	   which	   the	   political	  expression	  resulting	  from	  social	  changes	  is	  not	  permitted	  to	  formalise	  through	  channels	  otherwise	  constituting	  an	   inherent	  part	  of	  democratic	  politics.	   In	   the	  Egyptian	  case	   in	  particular,	  there	  is	  no	  shortage	  of	  studies	  that	  have	  described	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  formal	  political	  field	  in	  the	  Mubarak	  era	  in	  much	  detail	  and	  from	  different	  angles.5	  Although	  the	  regime	   was	   always	   keen	   to	   maintain	   the	   appearance	   of	   formal	   political	   processes,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Akhil Gupta, "Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined 
State," American Ethnologist 22, no. 2 (1995): 376. 
5 See, for example: Kassem, Egyptian Politics, the Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule.; Lisa Blaydes, Elelctions 
and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
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especially	   during	   Mubarak’s	   last	   decade	   in	   power	   (when	   his	   son	   Gamal	   led	   a	  reconfiguration	   of	   the	   state’s	   top	   brass	   political	   elite),	   the	   real	   purpose	   of	   these	  processes	   was	   to	   facilitate	   what	   Kienle	   has	   described	   as	   ‘regime-­‐supporting	   political	  decompression’.6	  When	   they	  were	  necessary,	   cosmetic	  political	   changes	  were	   allowed	  and	   tolerated	  only	   as	   long	  as	   they	  didn’t	  pose	   serious	   challenges	   to	  what	  he	   calls	   the	  ‘structural	  superiority	  or	  hegemony	  of	  the	  regime’7	  over	  formal	  politics.	  Should	  the	  difficulty	  of	  measuring	  forms	  of	  politicisation	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  formal	  political	  processes	  –	  at	  least	  open	  and	  meaningful	  ones	  –	  stop	  us	  from	  trying	  to	  analyse	  political	   agency	   and	   its	   normative	   foundations	   completely?	   To	   do	   so	   would	   in	   fact	  ignore	  the	  role	  of	  wide	  segments	  of	  society	  that	  may	  not	  be	  visible	  in	  the	  formal	  political	  field,	   yet	   play	   an	   important	   role	   in	   shaping	   political	   outcomes.	   In	   this	   regard,	   as	   the	  conceptual	   framework	   of	   this	   study	   touched	   upon,	   Asef	   Bayat's	   notion	   of	   non-­‐
movements	   is	   perhaps	   the	   most	   significant	   attempt	   in	   recent	   years	   to	   develop	   an	  analytical	   paradigm	   that	   looks	   at	   patterns	   of	   politicisation	   and	   forms	   of	   political	  expression	  and	  discontent	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  beyond	  the	  dynamics	  of	  closure	  of	  formal	  politics	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  era.	  Unlike	  in	  ideologically	  driven	  traditional	  social	  movements	  in	   which	   actors	   are	   usually	   involved	   ‘in	   extraordinary	   deeds	   of	   mobilization	   and	  protestation	   that	   go	   beyond	   the	   routine	   of	   daily	   life	   (e.g.,	   attending	   meetings,	  petitioning,	   lobbying,	   demonstrating,	   and	   so	   on)’	   Bayat	   argues	   that	   the	   political	  landscape	   of	   the	   contemporary	   Middle	   East	   is	   increasingly	   being	   shaped	   by	  
nonmovements.	  	  This	  concept	  attempts	  to	  encompass	  the	  collective	  socio-­‐political	  effect	  of	  millions	  of	  ordinary	  people	  engaged	  in	  politically	  and	  symbolically	   loaded	  everyday	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Eberhard Kienle, "Transformation without Democratization? Egypt’s Political Future," Internationale Politik 
und Gesellschaft 4 (2004): 73. 
7 Ibid., 75. 
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practices. 8 Despite	   their	   fragmented	   character,	   these	   individual	   yet	   similarly	  conditioned	  struggles	  within	  the	  social	  apace	  ‘can	  join	  up,	  generating	  a	  more	  powerful	  dynamic	  than	  their	  individual	  sum	  total’.9	  	  Indeed,	   interviews	   conducted	  with	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   in	   the	   earlier	  stages	   of	   this	   research	   (autumn	   of	   2008	   and	   early	   2009)	   showed	   the	   interviewees’	  predominant	   disinterest	   in	   formal	   politics	   at	   the	   time.	   Except	   for	   an	   expression	   of	  general	  concern	  about	  political	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  form	  of	  worriedly	  wondering	  ‘where	  the	   country	   was	   heading’,	   most	   interviewees	   had	   little	   to	   say	   about	   al-­‐siyasa,	   or	  ‘politics’.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   uncertainty	   was	   mostly	   linked	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   presidential	  succession	  in	  light	  of	  Mubarak’s	  old	  age	  and	  the	  political	  ascendance	  of	  his	  son	  Gamal	  as	  a	   potential	   successor.	  When	   the	   interviews	  proceeded	   to	   explore	  where	   and	  how	   the	  upper	  middle	  class	  interacted	  with	  the	  state	  more	  profoundly,	  however,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	   interviewees’	   initially	   declared	   apathy	   towards	   the	   ‘political’	   in	   fact	   concealed	  convictions	   and	   persuasions	   of	   profound	   political	   relevance	   and	   significance.	   In	  most	  cases,	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   state	   lay	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   process	   by	   which	   these	  convictions	   and	   attitudes	  were	  being	   generated	   and	   sharpened.	   Correspondingly,	   this	  chapter	   aims	   to	   demonstrate	   that,	   if	   the	   foundations	   and	   origins	   of	   future	   political	  behaviour	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  middle	  class	  are	  to	  be	  understood,	  a	  strong	  case	  can	  be	  made	  for	  the	  need	  to	  stretch	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  Egyptian	  politics	  and	  the	  agency	  of	  active	  players	  therein,	  extending	  beyond	  the	  model	  that	  limits	  our	  measure	  of	  politicisation	   to	   degrees,	   forms	   and	   patterns	   of	   participation	   in	   traditional	   political	  processes	  and	  structures.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, 19-20. 
9 Ibid., 20. 
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In	  today’s	  Egypt	  (and	  arguably	  beyond,	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  Arab	  World),	  such	  a	  development	  of	  the	  analytical	  scope	  and	  subject	  matter	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  change	  in	  the	  region	   becomes	   even	  more	   vital,	   as	   wider	   social	   sectors	  make	   a	   decisive	  move	   from	  long-­‐held	  positions	  on	  the	  side-­‐lines	  of	  the	  closed	  formal	  political	  sphere	  and	  step	  into	  the	  circle	  of	  direct	  action	  that	  profoundly	  contributes	  to	  the	  formulation	  and	  production	  of	  macro-­‐political	   outcomes.	   In	   their	   very	   unique	  way,	   those	   previously	   dismissed	   as	  politically	  passive	  or	  apathetic	  are	  consciously	  shaping	  new	  rules	  of	  engagement	  with	  ‘the	  political’	   that	  do	  not	  necessarily	   fit	  our	  straitjackets	  of	  measuring	  politicisation	   in	  terms	   of	   conventional	   methods	   of	   participation,	   organisation	   or	   mobilisation.	   For	  example,	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  political	   discourse	   in	  post-­‐Mubarak	  Egypt	   in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  has	  self-­‐descriptively	  produced	  the	  notion	  of	  hizb	  al-­‐kanaba,	  or	  the	  ‘party	  of	  the	  sofa’	  as	  a	  remarkably	  accurate	  and	  witty	  demarcation	  of	  a	  so	  far	  elusive	  and	  ill-­‐defined	  political	  constituency.	  The	  expression,	  which	  has	  widely	  infiltrated	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  political	   language	  since	  the	   fall	  of	  Mubarak,10	  refers	   to	   the	  millions	  of	  ordinary	  people	  who	  are	  rationing	  their	   ‘consumption’	  of	  everyday	  politics	  by	  observing	  and	  following	  
al-­‐siyasa	  from	  the	  comforts	  of	  their	  living	  rooms,	  through	  their	  television	  sets	  or	  online.	  Contrary	   to	   what	   this	   self-­‐defined	   stance	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   political	   may	   suggest	   at	   first	  glance,	   it	   is	   in	   no	  way	   a	   choice	   of	   passiveness.	   The	   revolt	   of	   2011	   itself	   (and	   indeed,	  many	  landmark	  events	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  its	  aftermath),	  stand	  witness	  to	  the	  decisive	  presence	  of	   these	  segments	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  middle	  class	  as	  a	  political	   factor	  and	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The ‘sofa’ in itself can arguably symbolise not only the comfort of one’s own home, but a notion of that home 
comprising Western-styled lifestyle elements, such as modern furnishings – including, of course, a sofa- in 
living rooms usually equipped with state-of-the-art television sets, entertainment systems, gaming devices and 
Internet routers. As opposed to older and more traditional middle-class approaches to furnishing the marital 
habitat, this composition of a living room, where individuals spend much of their time at home, is a typical 
display of a modern lifestyle among younger upper-middle-class families in the last two decades. It is difficult 
to accurately determine the origin of this discursive use of the sofa as the symbol of a political constituency. 
Some accounts credit Egyptian comedian and activist Ezzat Amin with crafting the expression, first on his 
internet blog and later in: Ezzat Amin, Hizb Al-Kanaba, Rihlaty Min Al-Kanaba Ila Al-Midan [the 'Party of the 
Sofa', My Journey from the Sofa to the Square] (Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouk, 2011).  
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readiness	   to	   take	   direct	   action	   and	   mobilise.	   The	   mechanisms	   and	   shapes	   of	   such	  presence,	  and	  the	  frequency	  and	  means	  of	  their	  political	  action,	  may	  not	  correspond	  to	  conventional	   forms	   of	   political	   participation,	   even	   in	   the	   relatively	   open	   political	  environment	  of	   the	  post-­‐Mubarak	  years.	  However,	   that	   should	  not	  be	  an	   invitation	   to	  discard	  this	  constituency	  from	  our	  consideration	  as	  an	  admittedly	  unfamiliar	  and	  new,	  yet	   evidently	   forceful	   and	   important,	   political	   player.11	  Quite	   the	   contrary:	   It	   should	  prompt	  deeper	  and	  more	  creative	  ways	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  character	  of	  ordinary	  people	  as	  a	   political	   force,	   one	   that	   will	   inevitably	   have	   to	   be	   accounted	   for	   in	   any	   future	  arrangement	  of	  political	  power	  in	  Egypt.	  In	  the	  post-­‐2011	  Arab	  context,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class	  in	  particular,	  the	  years	  to	  come	  will	  be	  educative	  as	  to	   the	   pace,	   mechanisms,	   incentives	   and	   catalysts	   of	   political	   agency	   for	   this	   class,	  perhaps	  even	  beyond	  their	  ‘non-­‐’	  character	  that	  Bayat	  has	  advocated	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  understanding	  the	  politics	  of	  non-­‐politicised	  social	  segments	  in	  the	  region	  over	  the	  past	  decade.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 During the final stages of writing this thesis, I was in touch with some of those whom I had interviewed in 
earlier stages of my research, either to follow up on points covered or to confirm unclear aspects in my records 
of these interviews. On an evening in early June 2013, I had a prolonged phone conversation with Ahmed El 
Husseiny, the upper-middle-class dentist whose experience of the judicial system is presented later in this 
chapter. Naturally, our discussion delved into the topic of the day on the Egyptian scene, namely the gathering 
momentum of the tamarrud (rebel) movement, the grass-root petition that eventually mobilised millions to 
march against Mohamed Morsi later that month, prompting the military to step in and depose him. Expecting 
unprecedented turnout in the mass demonstrations tamarrud had called for on 30 June, Ahmed told me 
confidently: ‘I can assure you beyond doubt, and I mean really beyond doubt; the turnout on the 30th will be like 
nothing the country has seen before, al-geish lazim haykhosh (the military will be compelled to intervene). From 
what I am seeing and hearing around me, hizb al-kanaba is about to step in. And you know, if this happens, it is 
of course over. Just as with Mubarak.’ Indeed, on 30 June, unprecedented numbers of people poured onto 
Egyptian streets to protest against Morsi starting a series of developments that culminated three days later with 
the military deposing the president. One of the highlights of that day of mass protests was a widely circulated 
set of photos (see below, Figure 8) of Egyptian men and women in the upper-middle-class quarter of Dokki, 
who had carried large sofas down from their living rooms and placed them on the street in front of their 
apartment buildings situated adjacent to the Shooting Club, an upper-middle-class social hub of Cairo. As a 
form of protest, they sat down on the sofas for most of that afternoon, waving Egyptian flags beneath signs that 
denounced the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, and saluting the floods of passing anti-Morsi protestors. By the 
end of that day, and in more than the striking literal sense projected by these images, ‘the party of the sofa’ had 
dealt its second decisive blow to the political order in less than three years.       
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  Inspired	   by	   the	   many	   displays	   of	   the	   political	   earthquake	   that	   was	   the	   2011	  Arab	  revolts,	  some	  researchers	  have	  already	  made	  important	  ventures	  in	  this	  direction.	  Charles	  Tripp,	  for	  example,	  has	  examined	  the	  role	  of	  street	  art	  in	  expressing	  a	  challenge	  to	  traditional	  cultural	  conditionings	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  state-­‐sponsored	  narratives	  of	  legitimacy	  by	  autocratic	  Arab	  regimes	  that	  very	  much	  underpinned	  the	  ‘Arab	  Spring’.	  Whereas	  the	  internal	  political	  stagnation	  that	  characterised	  much	  of	  the	  past	  decades	  in	  the	  region	  has	  certainly	  given	  a	  false	  impression	  as	  to	  the	  success	  of	  such	  strategies	  in	  managing	   political	   risks	   and	   ensuring	   the	   stability	   of	   these	   regimes,	   the	   crowds	   that	  converged	  onto	  Arab	  streets	  in	  early	  2011	  to	  reclaim	  the	  public	  space,	  argues	  Tripp,	  became	  performers	  of	  unstoppable	  power,	  symbolically	  as	  well	  as	  materially.	  It	  was	  in	  this	  context	  that	  street	  art	  amplified	  that	  power,	  asserting	  the	  defiance	  and	  the	  pride	  of	  citizens	  who	  had	  come	  to	  reclaim	  what	  was	  rightfully	  theirs.12	  	  In	  another	  recent	  exploration	  of	  the	  symbolism	  embedded	  within	  the	  poetics	  of	  slogans	  chanted	   during	   Arab	   Spring	   protests,	   Elliot	   Colla	   interestingly	   notes	   that	   the	   flagship	  chant	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  and	  Egyptian	  uprisings	  beginning	  with	  the	  term	  al-­‐sha‘b	  yurid	  (‘the	  people	  want…’)	  was	   strange	   to	   the	   ears	   of	  many	   Egyptians	   at	   first,	   simply	   because	   it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Charles Tripp, "Art of the Uprisings in the Middle East," Brown Journal of World Affairs 19, no. 2 (2013): 
186. 
Figure	   8,	   Left:	   Anti-­‐Muslim	   Brotherhood	   demonstrations	   near	   the	   Shooting	   Club	   in	   the	  
upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  quarter	  of	  Dokki,	  30	  June	  2013.	  The	  sign	  reads:	  ‘Even	  the	  kanaba	  (sofa)	  
has	  come	  down	  to	  demonstrate	  against	  the	  Brotherhood’.	  Right:	  Dokki	  residents	  who	  spent	  
the	   day	   demonstrating	   on	   their	   sofa,	   waving	   flags	   and	   saluting	   the	   passing-­‐by	   anti-­‐
brotherhood	  demonstrations.	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contained	  no	  metaphor.	  ‘The	  simple	  act	  of	  declaring	  what	  one	  wanted	  in	  blunt	  language	  was	  something	  radically	  new.’13	  Understandably,	  many	  of	  these	  attempts	  to	  comprehend	  the	  characteristics	  of	  these	  newly	  emerging	  political	  forces	  have	  made	  the	  more	  tangible	  and	   direct	   projections	   of	   the	   protest	   movements	   their	   subject	   of	   inquiry.	   Essentially,	  they	   are	   welcome	   and	   needed	   attempts	   to	   acknowledge	   and	   comprehend	   newly	  emerging	   forms	   of	   political	   expression	   by	   socio-­‐political	   forces	   that	   are	   indeed	  unconventionally	  shaping	  the	  public	  arena	  according	  to	  new	  and	  often	  unexpected	  paces	  and	  ways.	  In	  the	  spirit	  of	  furthering	  such	  analysis,	  the	  following	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	   argue	   that,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Egypt’s	   neoliberal	   upper	   middle	   class,	   the	   origins	   and	  foundations	   of	   this	   newly	   developing	   political	   agency	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   inferences	  generated	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  class’	  experience	  of	  the	  state.	  
2.	  Experiencing	  the	  State:	  Neoliberal	  Criteria,	  Political	  Conclusions	  As	  the	  previous	  discussion	  has	  suggested,	  the	  patterns	  and	  forms	  of	  politicisation	  of	  the	   majority	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   during	   the	   past	   two	   decades	   has	   not	  produced	   classically	   recognised	   and	   easily-­‐followed	   paths	   of	   politicisation	   through	  conventional	  channels	   (such	  as	   joining	  opposition	  movements,	  engaging	   in	  campaigns	  and	  civil-­‐society	  advocacy	  groups	  or	  taking	  part	  in	  protests).	  A	  question	  remains	  open:	  What	   elements	   of	   the	   social	   experience	   of	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   inform	   its	   newly	  devised	  way	  of	  engaging	  with	  the	  ‘political’?	  This	  section	  will	  argue	  that	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   experiences	  of	   the	   state	  over	   the	   last	   two	  decades	  have	   stimulated	  a	  protracted	  and	   accumulative	   evaluation	   of	   the	   state’s	   utility,	   efficiency	   and	   capacity	   to	   create,	  organise,	   and	   regulate	   a	   social	   field	   that	   conforms	   to	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   conceptions	  and	  expectations,	  developed	  in	  the	  course	  of	  social	  struggles	  to	  preserve	  and	  reproduce	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Elliott Colla, "The People Want," Middle East Report, no. 263 (2012): 10. 
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social	   distinction	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   context.	   Upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   politicisation	   in	   the	  neoliberal	  era	  is	  primarily	  a	  function	  of	  this	  on-­‐going	  process	  of	  practical	  evaluation.	  In	  other	  words,	   as	   the	   various	  manifestations	   of	   the	   state	   are	   experienced	   in	   the	   social	  context,	  the	  state	  is	  critiqued	  and	  evaluated	  according	  to	  the	  neoliberal-­‐inspired	  criteria	  that	  have	  generally	  engulfed	  the	  formulation	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  social	  agency	  in	  the	  last	   two	  decades.	   It	   is	   this	  experience	   that	  generates	  normative	   ‘inferences’	   regarding	  the	  'political'	  and	  arguably	  drives	  appetites	  for	  political	  change.	  	  	  	  Several	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  interviewed	  for	  this	  study	  repeatedly	  invoked	  this	   ‘ideal-­‐type’	   or	   much-­‐desired	   image	   of	   the	   state	   as	   an	   agent	   of	   enforcing	   values	  inherent	   to	   the	   neoliberal	   ethos	   (such	   as	   quality,	   efficiency	   and	   result-­‐driven	  performance)	   when	   these	   interviews	   touched	   upon	   interviwees'	   perceptions	   of	   the	  nature	  of	  the	  state14.	  For	  example,	  Hisham	  Enan,	  an	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  communication	  engineer,	   articulated	   the	   discrepancy	   between	   this	   neoliberal	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  perception	   of	   how	   the	   state	   should	   function	   and	   the	   disappointing	   reality	   he	   was	  experiencing.	  From	  his	  viewpoint,	  the	  state	  is	  the	  executive	  structure	  which	  governs	  this	  land,	  the	  government	  of	  the	  country.	  Its	   function	  should	  be	   like	  a	  company:	   to	  manage	  the	  country’s	  resources	  and	  turn	  them	  into	  services	  for	  its	  citizens	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  creating	  a	  decent	  life	  for	  them.	   This	   is	   how	   it	   is	   supposed	   to	   be.	   But	   in	   reality,	   what	   you	   see	   is	   a	  government	   system	   in	   disarray,	   plagued	   by	   corruption	   and	   manned	   by	  unqualified	  personnel	  in	  charge.15	  	  	  	   Hisham’s	  description	  of	   the	  state	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  purpose	   it	  ought	   to	   serve	   is	  a	  typical	   articulation,	   influenced	  by	   inherent	   characteristics	  of	   the	   social	  processes	   that	  have	  surrounded	  the	  neoliberal	  middle	  class’	   formation	  and	  ascendance	  in	  Egypt	  over	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Notably, such invocation has been primarily made by interviewees with a professional or corporate private 
sector background: Sherif El Leissy (interview, Cairo, 1 July 2009); Hisham Sweilam (interview, Cairo, 12 
November 2008); Salah Ibrahim (interview, Giza, 13 May 2009); Rami Mettias (interview, Cairo, 19 May 
2009); Ayman Hany (interview, Sixth of October City, 10 February 2008); Laila Bur (interview, Cairo 12 
November 2008); Rasha Zaatar (interview, Cairo, March 2010); Mohamed Adel (interview, Sheikh Zayed City, 
25 April 2009); and Hany Gaafar (interview, Cairo 6 November 2008). 
15 Hisham Enan in discussion with the author, Heliopolis, Cairo, 6 March 2010. 
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the	  past	  two	  decades.	   In	  the	  absence	  of	  clearly	   identifiable	  patterns	  of	   formal	  political	  participation	  amongst	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class	  in	  the	  Mubarak	  era,	  such	  values,	  which	  developed	  during	   the	   social	   process	  of	   the	   creation	  and	  practice	  of	  distinction,	  have	  arguably	  become	  the	  benchmark	  against	  which	  the	  state	  (and	  in	  turn	  the	  political	  order)	  has	  been	  accumulatively	  judged.	  The	  stark	  contrast	  between	  expectations	  of	  the	  state	   and	   the	   actual	   experience	   of	   it	   in	   various	   contexts	   have	   shaped	   a	   desire	   and	  appetite	   for	   inflicting	   political	   change	   that	   has	   greatly	   informed	   the	   decision	   of	  wide	  segments	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  revolt	  against	  the	  regime	  in	  early	  2011.	  It	  also	  potentially	  provides	  a	  suitable	  framework	  for	  understanding	  what	  seems	  to	   be	   an	   inherent	   irregularity	   and	   often	   disinterest	   in	   engaging	   with	   conventional	  politics,	  even	  as	  the	  door	  for	  participation	  in	  party	  politics	  opened	  relatively	  widely	  in	  the	   immediate	  post-­‐Mubarak	  era.	  To	  grasp	  the	  essence	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  political	  choices	  and	  patterns	  of	  agency	  in	  the	  post-­‐Mubarak	  era,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  understand	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  has	  come	  to	  infer	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  vaguely	  defined	  political	  agenda	  of	  change	  from	  its	  cumulative	  experience	  of	  the	  state	  over	  the	  previous	   years.	   In	  many	  ways,	   as	   the	   following	   sections	   will	   shortly	   demonstrate,	   in	  revolting	   against	   Mubarak,	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   was	   expressing	   its	   long-­‐growing	  discontent	  with	  the	  condition	  of	  ‘the	  state’.	  	  Three	  years	  before	  the	  uprising	  of	  2011,	  Amr	  Abdelrahman	  accurately	  captured	  the	  underlying	  rationale	  behind	  what	  he	  described	  as	  a	  developing	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  discontent	  with	  the	  Mubarak	  regime’s	  ruling	  arrangement.	  In	  an	  article	  published	  in	  el-­‐
bosla	   (The	   Compass),	   a	   journal	   that	   between	   2005	   and	   2011	   had	   become	   the	  mouthpiece	   of	   a	   core	   group	   of	   revisionist	   Egyptian	   leftist	   academics	   and	   activists,	  Abdelrahaman	  emphasises	   that	   the	   social	   formation	  and	  ascendance	  of	   the	  neoliberal	  segments	   of	   the	   middle	   class	   owes	   little	   to	   traditional	   structural	   factors,	   such	   as	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privileged	  familial	  origins	  or	  clientalistic	  networks	  woven	  around	  the	  state	  bureaucracy	  in	  popular	  urban	  quarters	  or	  rural	  Egypt.	  In	  due	  course,	  he	  argues,	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  collective	  value	  system	  derived	  from	  the	  neoliberal	  experience	  would	  	  	  create	  a	  tendency	  to	  hold	  sacred	  the	  virtues	  of	  efficiency	  and	  personal	  skill	  that	  can	  be	  acquired	  by	  institutional	  education	  […],	  it	  will	  also	  prompt	  a	  clear	  sense	  of	   superiority	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   traditional	   state	   bureaucracy	  which	   owes	   its	  prominence	  to	  outdated	  clientalistic	  networks.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  openness	  of	  these	  segments	  on	  the	  West	  in	  locations	  within	  the	  corporate	  labour	  market	  will	  […]	  eventually	  lead	  to	  the	  embedment	  of	  the	  values	  of	  rationality,	  efficiency	  and	  discipline	  which	  are	   inherent	   in	   the	  mechanisms	  of	   the	  capitalist	  market.	  These,	   in	   turn,	  will	  become	  a	  guiding	  value	  system	   for	   these	  segments	  on	   the	  personal	  level.	  […]	  The	  interaction	  between	  the	  new	  middle	  class	  and	  the	  state	  apparatus	   from	   this	   position	  will	   be	   the	   beginning	   of	   transforming	   this	   value	  system	  from	  criteria	  governing	  personal	  lives	  to	  criteria	  for	  social	  critique.	  16	  	  The	  described	  neoliberal	   value	   system	  underpinning	   the	  process	   by	  which	   the	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  of	   the	  upper	  middle	  class	   is	  shaped,	  he	  argued,	  would	  prompt	  a	  symbolic	   ‘persecution	   of	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   state	   according	   to	   the	  principle	   of	   rationality’, 17 	  borrowed	   from	   the	   neoliberal	   corporate	   discourse.	   For	  example,	   Hany	   Gaafar,	   the	   advertising	   professional	   and	   entrepreneur	   introduced	   in	  chapter	   five,	   had	   a	   very	   well-­‐defined	   logic	   for	   his	   ‘conscious	   and	   well	   thought-­‐of	  decision’18	  to	   not	   become	   involved	   in	   any	   form	   of	   political	   participation,	   whether	   by	  joining	  the	  NDP	  or	  other	  existing	  parties	  at	  the	  time.	  Hany	  accurately	  described	  formal	  politics	   in	  Egypt	  at	   the	   time	  as	  a	   façade	   for	   the	   reproduction	  of	   an	  autocratic	   form	  of	  rule.	   However,	   this	   in	   itself	   did	   not	   seem	   to	   be	   the	   problem,	   so	  much	   as	   it	   rendered	  engagement	  with	  the	  political	   ‘wasteful’,	   in	  contrast	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  effective	  time-­‐management	  that	  guided	  both	  his	  personal	  and	  professional	  life.	  He	  stated	  that	  political	  engagement,	  either	  through	  the	  NDP	  or	  other	  parties,	  would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Amr Abdelrahman, "Nazra ‘Ala Al-Nidal Al-Dimokraty Fi ‘Am: Wa’d ‘Amalyyet Al-Islah Am Takashof Al-
Tariq Al-Haqiqi Lil-Taghyyir [Looking Back on Democratic Struggle over a Year: The Burial of the Reform 
Process or the Revelation of the Real Path to Change],"  Al-Bosla no. 4 (2007). 
17 Ibid. Abdelrahaman used the Arabic expression al-rashada, which can be translated in a number of ways. 
While I chose ‘rationality’ as a translation, the expression, in the context of the Arabic text referenced, is clearly 
also referring to the principles of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ derived from the neoliberal corporate culture. 
18 Hany Gaafar in discussion with the author, Mohandessin, Cairo, 6 November 2008. 
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first	  of	  all	  mean	  wasting	  my	  time,	  which	  is	  very	  valuable	  to	  me	  since	  I	  can	  put	  it	  to	  better	  use.	  I	  never	  have	  time	  with	  which	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  to	  do,	  even	  if	   it	  was	   for	   leisure	   or	   entertainment.	   That	   in	   itself	   is	   relaxation,	   and	   hence	   a	  psychological	  benefit.	  […]	  There	  may	  not	  be	  any	  harm	  if	  I	  engage	  with	  politics,	  but	  certainly	  there	  is	  nothing	  to	  gain.	  	  	  Judged	  by	  this	  set	  of	  criteria,	  the	  Egyptian	  state	  is	  inevitably	  denounced	  as	  unfit	  for	  its	  purpose,	  backward	  and	  corrupt,	  producing	  a	  discourse	  that	  emphasises	  the	  need	  for	   taghyyir	   fi	  al-­‐dawla	   or	   a	   ‘change	   in	   the	   state’	   to	   dominate	   and	   shape	   the	   political	  expression	   of	   this	   discontent.	   But	   Amr	   Abdelrahman	   was	   writing	   in	   2007,	   at	   a	   time	  when	   the	   seemingly	   unshaken	   authoritarianism	   of	   long-­‐standing	   Middle	   Eastern	  autocracies	   (such	   as	   the	   Mubarak	   regime)	   was	   prompting	   various	   explanations,	   not	  least	  amongst	  scholars,	  as	   to	  how	  neoliberal	   transformations	  seemed	  to	  be	  solidifying	  or	   upgrading	   the	   authoritarian	   capacities	   of	   these	   regimes. 19 	  Indeed,	   despite	   his	  accurate	  identification	  of	  some	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  discontent	  with	  the	  state,	  Abdelrahman’s	  above	  analysis	  came	  in	  the	  context	  of	  his	  attempts	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  neoliberal	  segments	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  had	  thus	  far	  failed	  to	  form	  a	  wider	  political	  stream	   that	   could	   effectively	   challenge	   the	   regime.	   The	   type	   of	   discontent	   he	   was	  describing,	   he	   concluded,	   could	   have	   hardly	   produced	   such	   a	   politically	   defined	   and	  coherent	  movement	  as	  to	  represent	  a	  real	  threat	  to	  Mubarak’s	  authoritarianism.	  Little	  did	   he	   (and	   indeed	   many	   others)	   know	   that	   those	   neoliberal,	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  discontents,	   cultivated	   and	   intensified	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   social	   experience	   of	   the	  state,	  would	  prove	  politically	  pivotal	  three	  years	  later.	  	  However,	   the	  uprisings	  of	   2011	   seem	   to	  have	  prompted	   some	   rather	  marginal	  retrospective	   interest	   in	   searching	   for	   the	   origins	   of	   political	   agency	   in	   the	   very	  characteristics	  of	   the	  neoliberal	  experience.	   In	  his	  examination	  of	   the	  character	  of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See, most notably: Heydemann, Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World; Laura Guazzone and 
Daniela Pioppi, eds., The Arab State and Neo-Liberal Globalization: The Restructuring of State Power in the 
Middle East (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2009); Stephen Juan King, The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East 
and North Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009); and Bellin, "The Robustness of 
Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective." 
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youth-­‐driven	   movement	   that	   led	   the	   revolt	   against	   Mubarak	   from	   Tahrir	   Square	   in	  2011,	  John	  Chalcraft	  has	  noted	  its	  horizontal	  nature,	  which	  renders	  a	  ‘distinctive	  break	  with	   the	   basic	   idea	   of	   having	   a	   blueprint	   for	   social	   action-­‐	   whether	   a	   program,	   a	  revolutionary	  theory	  or	  an	  “answer”,20	  not	  to	  mention	  a	  clearly	  identifiable	  leadership.	  More	  important	  to	  the	  discussion	  at	  hand	  is	  Chalcraft’s	  realisation	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  searching	  for	  the	  motivations	  for	  the	  political	  action	  of	  wider	  constituencies	  of	  ordinary	  participants	  in	  the	  revolt,	  beyond	  the	  colourful	  displays	  of	  creativity	  from	  those	  modern,	  highly	  educated	  and	   technologically	  masterful	   revolutionary	  activists.	   In	   fact,	  he	   finds	  what	   Hardt	   and	   Negri	   call	   ‘a	   general	   sense	   of	   frustrated	   productive	   and	   expressive	  capacities,	   especially	   among	   young	   people’21	  to	   serve	   as	   a	   valid	   explanation	   for	   the	  participation	   of	   these	   middle-­‐class	   segments	   in	   the	   Arab	   Spring	   revolts.	   These	  capacities	   stem	   from	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   classic	   divide	   between	   manual	   and	   mental	  labour,	   which	   is	   characteristic	   of	   late	   capitalism.	   A	   position	   in	   the	   labour	  market,	   in	  which	  the	  intellectual	  capital	  of	  the	  individual	  is	  most	  valuable	  for	  social	  advancement,	  ‘invests	   laboring	  subjects	  with	  power	  as	  well,	  creating	  the	  conditions	  for	  new	  creative	  appropriations	   and	   the	   enunciation	   of	   new	   kinds	   of	   political	   sovereignty’.22	  Thus,	   the	  uprisings	   of	   early	   2011	  were	   ‘the	   expression	   of	   an	   intelligent	   young	   generation	   for	   a	  different	  life	  in	  which	  they	  can	  put	  their	  capacities	  to	  use’.23	  	  	  	  	  The	  previous	  chapters	  have	  analysed	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  education,	  employment	  and	  lifestyles	  as	  social	  fields	  for	  the	  preparation	  and	  practice	  of	  distinction,	  in	  which	  the	  neoliberal	  re-­‐configuration	  of	  the	  state’s	  role	  informs	  the	  birth	  of	  new	  modes	  of	  socio-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 John Chalcraft, "Horizontalism in the Egyptian Revolutionary Process," Middle East Report, no. 262 (2012): 
7. 
21 Michael Hardt and Antonio  Negri, "Arabs Are Democracy's New Pioneers," The Guardian, 24 February 
2011, cited in: Chalcraft, "Horizontalism in the Egyptian Revolutionary Process," 8. 
22 Chalcraft, "Horizontalism in the Egyptian Revolutionary Process," 8. 
23 Hardt and Negri, "Arabs Are Democracy's New Pioneers", cited in Chalcraft, "Horizontalism in the Egyptian 
Revolutionary Process," 8.  
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political	   critique.	   In	   the	   following	   sections,	   different	   in-­‐depth	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  encounters	  with	  the	  state	  will	  be	  presented	  and	  analysed.	  These	  detailed	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   narratives	   aim	   to	   present	   different	   examples	   of	   the	   mechanisms	   by	   which	   the	  upper	  middle	   class’	   social	   experience	   of	   the	   state	   generate	   perceptions	   that	   can	   then	  inform	   political	   choices	   and	   agency.	   An	   inherent	   and	   defining	   factor	   in	   shaping	   this	  process	   of	   inferring	   normative	   holdings	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   state,	   and	   in	   turn	  attitudes	  towards	  politics,	   is	  the	  foundation	  of	  neoliberal	  values	  that	  have	  surrounded	  the	   social	   ascendance	   and	   formation	   of	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   over	   the	   past	   two	  decades.	  As	  mentioned	   earlier,	   the	   social	   experience	   of	   the	   state	   arguably	   encompasses	  considerably	   diverse	   and	   frequent	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   experiences	   and	   observations	   in	   the	  social	   sphere	   and	   public	   space.	   These	   have	   an	   important	   cumulative	   effect	   in	  constructing	  the	  image	  of	  the	  state,	  and	  must	  not	  be	  undervalued	  analytically.	  However,	  in	  light	  of	  their	  micro-­‐type	  nature	  as	  short,	  random	  and	  sporadic	  material	  occurrences,	  the	  following	  analysis	  has	  chosen	  to	  concentrate	  on	  relatively	  structured	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  experiences	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  state.	  This	  choice	  is	  primarily	  prompted	  by	  practical	  analytical	   considerations,	   as	   the	   length,	   structuration	   and	   intensity	   of	   the	   following	  experiences	  render	  them	  better	  suited	  to	  demonstrating	  the	  various	  elements	  discussed	  above.	  However,	  the	  on-­‐going,	  day-­‐to-­‐day,	  and	  less-­‐quantifiable	  experiences	  of	  the	  state,	  as	   defined	   at	   the	   outset	   of	   this	   chapter,	   remain	   significant	   components	   of	   the	   social	  environment	  in	  which	  other,	  more	  structured,	  encounters	  with	  the	  state	  take	  place.	  In	  this	  sense,	  they	  are	  equally	  important	  in	  that	  they	  act	  both	  a	  normative	  prelude	  to	  these	  more	   intensive	   experiences	   of	   the	   state,	   as	  well	   as	   constant	   reminders	   of	   the	   lessons	  subsequently	  learned	  from	  them.	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One	  final	  note	  of	  contrast	  to	  the	  previous	  three	  chapters	  is	  due	  at	  this	  point.	  The	  discussion	   of	   the	   mechanisms	   and	   dynamics	   of	   social	   distinction	   and	   status	  reproduction	  for	  today’s	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class	  would	  not	  be	  complete	  without	  a	  contextualisation	   within	   the	   general	   structural	   changes	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   neoliberal	  transformation.	   Chapters	   three,	   four	   and	   five	   have	   therefore	   devoted	   considerable	  space	   to	  demonstrating	   these	   changes.	  However,	   the	   sections	   to	   follow	  will	  place	   less	  emphasis	   on	   discussing	   the	   structural	   factors	   surrounding	   the	   presented	   experiences	  with	   various	   branches	   of	   the	   state.	   The	   focus	   henceforth	   will	   rather	   be	   on	   how	   the	  details	   of	   these	   interactions	  have	  prompted	   the	   construction	   of	   an	   image	   of	   the	   state	  that	  eventually	  produces	  a	  mode	  for	  its	  evaluation	  and	  judgement.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  these	  narratives,	   it	   should	  also	  become	  clear	  how	   the	   social	   experience	  of	   the	   state	   is	  often	  used	  as	  a	  context	  for	  sharpening	  the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  self-­‐defined	  position	  within	  the	  wider	   milieu	   of	   social	   forces	   encountered	   as	   part	   of	   experiences	   with	   the	   state	  structure.	  
3.	  Upper-­‐Middle-­‐Class	  Military	  Service:	  The	  Army	  as	  a	  Miniature	  of	  
the	  State	  The	  military	   is	   the	   Egyptian	   state's	   core	   institution.	   There	   is	   a	   sizable	   body	   of	  scholarship	  that	  tackles	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  army	  as	  the	  primary	  player	  within	  the	  political	  order	  since	  1952.	  Analyses	  of	  this	  role	  have	  traditionally	  concentrated	  on	  the	  army's	   institutional	   role	   in	   state	   building,24	  in	   conditioning	   the	   political	   order,25	  or	   –more	   recently	   –	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   relative	   standing	   of	   the	   army	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   other	   power	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics: Pattern for New Nations? (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press 1975); Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, 269-76. 
25 The most detailed account of the military's systemic efforts in this regard is: Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military 
Society. The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser, as discussed in chapter two.  
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structures	   and	   institutions	   competing	   for	   political	   prominence	   within	   the	   state	   from	  1952	   onwards. 26 	  Steven	   Cook	   has	   consolidated	   the	   conventionally-­‐held	   scholarly	  wisdom	   of	   the	   dominance	   of	   Middle	   Eastern	  militaries	   over	   their	   states	   through	   the	  development	  of	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  looks	  at	  mechanisms	  whereby	  the	  military	  
rules	  but	  doesn't	  govern.	  Despite	  their	  desire	  to	  conceal	  this	  de	  facto	  hegemony	  behind	  a	  veneer	  of	  democratic	  institutions,	  representative	  and	  legitimising	  structures,	  and	  multi-­‐layered	   facades	   of	   civilian	   leaderships,	   Middle-­‐Eastern	   militaries	   remain	   the	   self-­‐declared	   vanguards	   of	   society	   and	   protectors	   of	   last	   resort	   for	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	  state.27	  In	  Egypt,	  Cook	  proposes	  that	  this	   formula	  has	  been	  driven	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  by	  the	  military's	  self-­‐proclaimed	  image	  as	  the	  protector	  of	  the	  state,	  but	  also,	  equally,	  by	  its	  economic	   interests	  on	   the	  other.	   Indeed,	   the	  military's	  stake	   in	   the	  Egyptian	  economy	  has	  been	  at	  the	  core	  of	  certain	  attempts	  to	  understand	  its	  role	  within	  the	  wider	  socio-­‐political	   order,	   especially	   after	   it	   once	   again	   stepped	   to	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	   political	  scene	  after	   the	   fall	   of	  Mubarak.	  Notably,	   Shana	  Marshal	   and	   Joshua	  Stacher	  present	   a	  thorough	   review	   of	   the	   army's	   current	   economic	   portfolio,	   in	  which	   they	   also	   clearly	  demonstrate	  how	  it	   is	   integrated	  with	  the	  wider	  movement	  of	   transnational	  capital	   in	  the	   region.	   Contrary	   to	   the	   stereotypical	   image	   of	   the	   army	   as	   the	   champion	   of	  protectionism,	  its	  economic	  projects	  are	  ‘collaborative,	  bringing	  in	  Gulf	  conglomerates,	  as	  well	  as	  Western	  and	  Asian	  multinationals,	  as	  partners’.28	  Zeinab	  Abul	  Magd	  not	  only	  followed	   the	  main	   components	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  military's	   economic	  empire	   in	  various	  sectors,29	  but	  also	  the	  proliferation	  of	  retired	  army	  officers	  within	  the	  various	  sectors	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See for example: Imad Harb, "The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?," The 
Middle East Journal 57, no. 2 (2003); but most notably: Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to 
Revolt.  
27 Steven A. Cook, Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and 
Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 14-15. 
28 Shana Marshall and Joshua Stacher, "Egypt's Generals and Transnational Capital," Middle East Report no. 
262 (2012): 13. 
29 Zeinab Abul-Magd, "The Army and the Economy in Egypt,"  Jadaliyya, 23 December 2011. 
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the	  economy	  and	  branches	  of	   the	  state	  apparatus,	  as	   they	  assumed	  civilian	  roles	  after	  being	   routinely	   discharged	   from	   the	   service.30	  Retired	   military	   officers	   are	   not	   only	  placed	  in	  civilian	  positions	  within	  various	  army-­‐owned	  economic	  entities,	  but	  are	  also	  an	   important	   recruitment	   pool	   for	   medium-­‐	   and	   high-­‐ranking	   positions	   within	   the	  state’s	   administrative	   apparatus:	   both	   on	   the	   municipal	   level	   and	   in	   the	   central	  government.	  Studies	  that	  tackle	  the	  army	  from	  an	  ethnographic	  angle,	  focusing	  on	  the	  actual	  experience	   of	   conscripts	   and	   officers	   in	   the	   barracks	   and	   how	   it	   affects	   their	   self-­‐perceived	   position	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   state	   or	   various	   structures	   of	   authority,	   are	   almost	  impossible	  to	  come	  by,	  at	  least	  as	  concerns	  contemporary	  Egypt.31	  Far	  from	  claiming	  to	  remedy	  such	  a	  dearth,	  the	  following	  section	  will	  attempt	  to	  take	  a	  snapshot	  of	  an	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   experience	   of	   obligatory	  military	   service.	  Military	   service,	   a	   formal	   legal	  obligation	  for	  all	  eligible	  young	  Egyptian	  men,	  is	  a	  first-­‐class	  defining	  social	  experience.	  People	  from	  different	  class	  backgrounds	  approach	  and	  experience	  their	  military	  service	  in	  different	  ways.	  In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   upper	   middle	   class,	   fresh	   university	   graduates	  generally	  see	  obligatory	  military	  service	  as	  an	  unwelcome	  delay	  to	  starting	  a	  career	  and	  the	   assumption	   of	   a	   suitable	   position	   in	   the	   labour	  market.	  While	  military	   service	   is	  legally	  obligatory	  at	  the	  age	  of	  18,	  those	  enrolled	  in	  higher	  education	  normally	  postpone	  it	  until	   the	   completion	  of	   their	  university	   (or	  equivalent)	  degrees.	  Much	  social	   capital	  and	   many	   connections	   are	   invested	   in	   attempts	   to	   ensure	   that	   military	   service	   is	  completed	  with	  minimum	   damage.	   For	   example,	   one	   of	   those	   typical	   attempts	   is	   the	  extensive	  use	  of	  connections	  within	  the	  social	  network	  to	  secure	  selection	  for	  military	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Zeinab Abul-Magd, "The Egyptian Republic of Retired Generals,"  Foreign Policy, 8 May 2012. 
31 For a more historical perspective on the suppressive dynamics surrounding the building of the military order 
in Egypt under Mohamed Ali, see: Fahmy, All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of 
Modern Egypt, 8. 
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service	   as	   a	   ‘soldier’	   (private)	   rather	   than	   an	   ‘officer’	   (non-­‐commissioned	   officer	   on	  reserve).	   The	   former	   serve	   for	   a	   total	   of	   nine	  months;	   the	   latter,	   for	   a	   little	   less	   than	  three	  years.	  This	  categorisation	  usually	  takes	  place	  after	  all	  those	  legally	  eligible	  for	  the	  service	   are	   filtered	   through	   a	  medical	   examination	   conducted	   en	  masse	   in	   one	   of	   the	  army’s	   mobilisation	   centres	   (mantiq	   al-­‐tagnid)	   scattered	   around	   the	   country.	  Theoretically	   speaking,	   the	   mo’ahilat	   ‘ulya,	   those	   with	   university	   or	   similar	   higher-­‐education	   qualifications,	   are	   more	   eligible	   than	   others	   to	   be	   recruited	   as	   reserve	  officers.	  During	   the	  period	   that	   separates	   the	  new	  recruits’	  medical	  examinations	  and	  the	  announcement	  of	  their	  placement,	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  social	  and	  familial	  networks	  are	  exploited	  to	  avoid	  being	  placed	  as	  reserve	  officers.	  To	  be	  chosen	  for	  military	  service	  as	  a	  reserve	  officer	  means	  spending	  almost	  double	  the	  time	  in	  the	  army.	  It	  follows	  that,	  upon	   completion	   of	   the	   service	   and	   entry	   into	   the	   employment	   market,	   those	   who	  served	   would	   be	   considerably	   disadvantaged	   compared	   to	   their	   counterparts,	   who	  entered	   the	   job	   market	   immediately	   after	   graduation	   and	   would	   have	   accumulated	  valuable	   working	   experience.	   Embarking	   on	   an	   important	   step	   in	   a	   typical	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   path	   to	   social	   status	   re-­‐production	   (suitable	   employment)	   would	   thus	  become	  more	   challenging.	  Moreover,	   social	   and	   familial	   networks	   are	   also	   utilised	   to	  ensure	  that	  young	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  men	  spend	  their	  military	  service	  as	  comfortable	  as	   possible.	   This	   includes	   securing	   service	   in	   locations	   near	   the	   family	   home	   or	   at	  comfortable	  desk	  jobs,	  instead	  of	  more	  harshly	  conditioned	  service	  functions	  in	  remote	  barracks.	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3.1	  The	  Case	  of	  Tarek	  Hamdy:	  Military	  Service	  as	  a	  Socio-­‐Politically	  Defining	  
Experience	  Tarek	   Hamdy32	  is	   a	   32-­‐year-­‐old	   communications	   engineer	   who	   comes	   from	   a	  typical	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   home.	   His	   father	   is	   a	   mechanical	   engineer,	   his	   mother	   a	  housewife,	  and	  his	  younger	  brother,	  Khaled,	  a	  Dubai-­‐based	  engineer.	  Following	  in	  their	  father’s	   footsteps,	   Tarek	   and	   his	   younger	   brother	   attended	   the	   College	   de	   la	   Sainte	  
Famille,	   Cairo’s	   famous	   French	   Jesuit	   School.	   After	   graduating	   from	   the	   school,	   Tarek	  began	   his	   engineering	   studies	   in	   1998	   at	   the	   then	   newly	   established	   private	  Modern	  
University	   of	   Science	   and	  Arts,	   based	   in	   the	   Sixth	   of	  October	  City.	   The	   first	   stop	   in	   his	  career	   was	   a	   position	   as	   a	   networks	   support	   engineer	   at	   the	   French	   communication	  company	  Orange	  in	  Cairo.	  In	  2008,	  he	  married	  Dina,	  a	  radio	  presenter	  and	  producer	  in	  the	   state-­‐owned,	   French	   speaking	   radio	   station	   al-­‐Birnameg	   al-­‐Urubi	   (‘European	  Program’).	  Dina’s	  father’s	  career	  at	  the	  State	  Information	  Service	  (SIS)	  had	  enabled	  her	  family	   to	   spend	   considerable	   time	   abroad,	   as	   the	   father	  was	   assigned	   to	   posts	   in	   the	  media	  sections	  of	  various	  Egyptian	  embassies	  in	  Europe.	  When	  Tarek	  married	  in	  2008,	  he	  left	  his	  family's	  home	  on	  the	  Nile	  corniche	  in	  ‘Aguza	  to	  live	  in	  an	  apartment	  in	  Nasr	  
City,	   the	  bastion	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class	  east	  of	  Cairo.	  In	  early	  2010,	  Tarek	  changed	   employers	   and	   became	   a	   project	   manager	   at	   the	   Egypt	   branch	   of	   EMC,	   an	  international	  American	  data	  storage	  company	  based	  in	  New	  Cairo	  City,	  a	  position	  that	  he	  holds	  to	  this	  day.	  However,	  before	  starting	  his	  career	  and	  soon	  after	  the	  completion	  of	  his	   higher	   education	   in	   2003,	   Tarek	   was	   called	   for	   obligatory	   military	   service	   and	  remained	  in	  the	  army	  for	  nearly	  one	  year.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 All information and direct quotations contained in this section are based on the author’s interview with Tarek 
Hamdy in his Nasr City apartment in Cairo on 26 November 2009.  
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3.1.1	  Social	  Differences	  in	  the	  Army:	  Confirming	  Social	  Distinction	  Tarek,	  who	  initially	  served	  in	  an	  air	  defence	  battalion	  near	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  Town	  of	  Ismailiyya,	  recalls	  his	  military	  service	  as	  a	  ‘very	  difficult	  experience,	  one	  which	  I	  will	  not	  forget	  as	  long	  as	  I	  live’.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  challenges	  was	  coping	  with	  the	  harsh	  living	  condition	  in	  the	  barracks,	  where	  acceptable-­‐quality	  food,	  clean	  running	  water,	  and	  even	  a	  bed	  or	   a	  bathroom,	  proved	   to	  be	   rare	   luxuries.	  On	   the	  human	  and	   social	   levels,	   the	  experience	  was	  equally	  challenging.	  Tarek	  soon	  determined	  that	  his	   fellow	  conscripts,	  as	  well	  as	  many	  superior	  officers	  and	  saff	  dubat	  (non-­‐commissioned	  officers)	  came	  from	  very	   different	   social	   and	   economic	   backgrounds,	   with	   most	   of	   them	   from	   very	   poor	  circumstances	  in	  rural	  areas.	  Given	  the	  unusualness	  of	  this	  social	  composition	  for	  Tarek,	  he	   needed	   to	   develop	   sensitivity	   and	   delicacy,	   if	   his	   time	   in	   the	   army	   was	   to	   pass	  without	  incident.	  Tarek’s	  description	  of	  the	  social	  contrast	  typically	  experienced	  and	  felt	  by	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  during	  their	  military	  service	  reflects	  a	  wider	  discourse	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  distinction.	  Dichotomies	  of	  an	  ‘educated’,	  ‘aware’,	  and	  ‘intellectual’	  self	  (or	  class)	  versus	  an	  ‘ignorant’,	  ‘vulgar’	  or	  ‘incompetent’	  other	  are	  used	  to	  describe	  a	  relative	  position	   in	   the	   social	   structure.	   During	   military	   service,	   this	   general	   perception	   of	  society’s	   composition	   is	   intensified	   and	   sharpened	   even	   further.	   In	   the	   army,	   Tarek	  asserts,	  	   you	  are	  forced	  to	  deal	  with	  people	  from	  all	  social	  backgrounds	  from	  across	  the	  country.	   Some	  of	   them	  are	   ignorant,	   some	   illiterate	   and	   some	  don’t	   have	   any	  background	  on	  anything	  at	  all.	  A	  very	  popular	   joke	   in	   the	  army	  which	   is	  very	  true	  is	  to	  mock	  someone	  and	  tell	  him	  that	  he	  was	  only	  “introduced	  to	  trousers	  in	   the	   army”.	   Some	   people	   you	  meet	   there	   have	   indeed	   never	  worn	   trousers	  and	  shirts	  except	  when	  they	  served	  in	  the	  army.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  people	  come	  from	   such	   different	   social	   backgrounds	   and	   that	   you	   have	   to	   effectively	   live	  with	   them,	   forces	   you	   to	   adjust	   or	   otherwise	   live	   through	   a	   very	   difficult	  experience.	  	  Although	   Tarek	   was	   able	   to	   adjust	   relatively	   well	   to	   these	   conditions,	   such	  adjustment	   is	   not	   common	   amongst	   people	  who	   belong	   to	   his	   same	   social	   class.	   The	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strict	   requirements	   of	   military	   obedience	   often	   feature	   what	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  conscripts	  usually	  view	  as	  a	  distribution	  of	  power	  and	  authority	  in	  clear	  contrast	  to	  that	  with	  which	   they	  are	   familiar	   in	   civilian	   life.	  As	   if	  having	   to	  develop	  sensitivity	   to	  deal	  with	  fellow	  conscripts	  was	  not	  enough,	  	  	  	  equally	   difficult	   is	   dealing	  with	   people	  who	   practically	   run	   the	   army,	   namely	  the	   saff	   dubat.	   Regrettably,	   around	   90%	   of	   these	   people	   don’t	   possess	  educational	  degrees,	  and	  many	  of	  them	  are	  illiterate.	  So	  you	  can	  imagine	  how	  it	  is	  when	  these	  people	  have	   formal	  control	  over	  doctors	  and	  engineers.	  Here,	  a	  psychological	  factor	  is	  in	  play	  when	  any	  of	  these	  people	  realise	  that	  they	  have	  authority	   over	   a	   doctor	   or	   an	   engineer	   and	   that	   it	   is	   in	   their	   hands	   to	  manipulate	  them.	  I’ve	  seen	  it	  first-­‐hand,	  in	  fact.	  	  	  During	   a	  morning	   line-­‐up,	   a	   conscript	  with	   a	   university	   degree	   in	   engineering,	  whom	  Tarek	  had	  befriended,	  was	   late.	  Using	  vulgar	  expressions,	   the	  Corporal	   leading	  the	   exercise	   ordered	   him	   to	   hurry	   up	   and	   join	   his	   colleagues.	   When,	   feeling	   unduly	  insulted,	  Tarek’s	   fellow	  conscript	  did	  not	  obey	  the	  order,	   the	  Corporal	  ordered	  him	  to	  crawl	   to	   his	   place	   in	   the	   line-­‐up	   as	   a	   punishment.	   Omar,	   Tarek’s	   friend,	   refused	   to	  implement	  what	   he	   saw	   as	   a	   humiliating	   order	   that	   came	   from	   someone	   below	   him,	  educationally	  and	  socially.	  His	  refusal	  led	  to	  a	  further	  escalation	  of	  the	  situation.	  Luckily,	  other	  conscripts	  mediating	  between	  Omar	  and	  the	  Corporal	  later	  resolved	  the	  situation.	  But	   Omar	   had	   to	   swallow	   the	   original	   insult	   and	   apologise	   to	   the	   Corporal	   to	   avoid	  being	  punished	  further.	  Throughout	   his	   service,	   Tarek	   was	   keen	   to	   avoid	   finding	   himself	   in	   similar	  situations,	   in	   which	   he	   either	   had	   to	   obey	   degrading	   orders	   or	   stand	   for	   an	   unfair	  showdown.	   For	   example,	   Tarek	   was	   once	   assigned	   to	   paint	   a	   street	   pavement	   in	  preparation	  for	  a	  high-­‐ranked	  delegation’s	  visit	  to	  his	  battalion.	  On	  another	  occasion,	  he	  was	  given	  an	  order	  to	  clean	  the	  on-­‐camp	  residence	  of	  the	  battalion’s	  General.	  Through	  some	  subtle	  lobbying,	  he	  managed	  to	  avoid	  carrying	  out	  both	  tasks.	  He	  was	  convinced	  that	   most	   of	   these	   orders	   had	   little	   purpose	   other	   than	   to	   provide	   the	   non-­‐
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commissioned	  officers	  with	  moral	   revenge	   for	   their	   social	   inferiority	  on	   conscripts	  of	  higher	   social	   background.	   For	   ‘unfortunately,	   in	   the	   army	   all	   people	   are	   considered	  equal’,	  and	  social	  background	  or	  level	  of	  education	  is	  not	  taken	  into	  consideration	  when	  conscripts	  are	  assigned	  certain	  tasks.	  But	  the	  absence	  of	  appropriate	  recognition	  of	  his	  social	  distinction	  –	  that	  is,	  that	  of	  people	  of	  his	  educational	  and	  social	  background	  –	  	  was	  not	   in	   itself	   the	   source	   of	   Tarek’s	   disenchantment	   with	   the	   division	   of	   labour	   in	   the	  army.	  Rather,	   he	  was	  more	   troubled	  by	   the	   lack	  of	   seriousness	   that	  deemed	   the	   time	  spent	  in	  the	  army	  as	  a	  wasted	  recourse,	  time	  from	  which	  no	  real	  utility	  was	  extracted:	  	  	  I	  am	  here	   to	  do	  my	  military	  service	  and	   learn	  something,	  but	   this	   is	  not	  what	  happens	   in	   the	   army.	   [...]	   There	   are	   light	   years	   of	   difference	   between	   what	  happens	   on	   the	   ground	   and	   the	   purpose	   of	  military	   service,	   as	   it	   is	   officially	  promoted.	  	  Tarek’s	   exposure	   to	   a	   social	   mosaic,	   considerably	   divergent	   from	   his	   original	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Cairo	   environment	   and	   lifestyle,	   was	   a	   complex	   and	   mixed	  experience.	  While	   the	  barracks’	  harsh	   living	  conditions	  gave	  birth	   to	  various	   forms	  of	  solidarity	   among	   comrades	   in	   arms,	   the	   overwhelming	   feeling	   remained	   one	   of	  alienation	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  being	  out	  of	  context.	  For	  example,	  during	   leisure	  time	  in	  the	  battalion’s	  canteen,	   to	  convince	  soldiers	   from	  rural	  backgrounds	   to	  watch	  a	  European	  football	  match	  instead	  of	  the	  local	  Egyptian	  soap	  opera	  was	  to	  fight	  a	  losing	  battle.	  Even	  on	   the	   horizontal	   level	   within	   the	   community	   of	   soldiers,	   socio-­‐cultural	   differences	  were	  almost	  impossible	  to	  bridge.	  Soon	  enough,	  Tarek’s	  battalion	  in	  Ismailiyya	  saw	  the	  creation	   of	   sub-­‐cliques,	   comprising	   those	   who	   felt	   they	   came	   from	   similar	   socio-­‐economic	  or	  socio-­‐cultural	  backgrounds.	  	  
3.1.2	  Petty	  Corruption:	  Clashing	  Values	  in	  the	  Barracks	  The	  difficulties	  of	  Tarek’s	  military	  service	  were	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  negotiation	  of	  unfamiliar	   social	   compositions	   or	   structures	   of	   hierarchy	   and	   authority.	   Often,	   Tarek	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also	   found	   himself	   challenged	   by	   the	   prevalence	   of	  what	   he	   described	   as	   an	   unusual	  value	   system,	   one	   in	  which	  members	   of	   a	   certain	   community	   (in	   this	   case,	   the	   army	  battalion)	  were	   left	   to	  play	  out	   their	  often-­‐contradictory	   interests	   in	   the	   absence	  of	   a	  clearly-­‐present	  and	  respected	  regulatory	  framework.	  Amidst	  the	  harsh	  living	  conditions	  that	   included	   permanent	   water	   shortages,	   insufficient	   food	   supplies	   and	   inhumane	  lodging	  facilities,	  Tarek	  was	  faced	  with	  an	  informal	  rule	  that	  new	  conscripts	  are	  taught	  in	  the	  military:	  al-­‐gaish	  biy’ullak	  itsarraf	  (The	  army	  tells	  you	  to	  find	  a	  way)!	  For	  Tarek,	  this	   infamous	  army	  proverb	  stood	  as	  a	  clear	  articulation	  of	  negligence	  and	  the	   lack	  of	  effective	  governance	  in	  the	  military,	  despite	  its	  stereotype	  as	  an	  organisation	  bound	  by	  a	   strictly	   followed	   set	   of	   internal	   regulatory	   frameworks.	   In	   the	   earlier	   stages	   of	   his	  military	  service,	   some	  conscripts’	  belongings	  (such	  as	  blankets	  or	  similar	   items)	  went	  missing.	  Their	  superiors	  simply	  told	  Tarek	  and	  his	   fellow	  soldiers	   that	   if	   they	  become	  victims	  of	  theft,	  they	  should	  steal	  from	  others	  to	  compensate	  for	  their	  loss.	  Categorically	  ruling	   out	   such	   conduct,	   the	   question	   that	   troubled	   Tarek	   at	   the	   time	   was	   whether	  people	  who	  adhered	  to	  such	  a	  corrupt	  moral	  code	  behaved	  similarly	  outside	  the	  army.	  It	  worried	  him	   that	   the	  answer	   to	   this	  question	  may	  very	  well	   be	  positive.	  However,	   as	  troubling	   as	  his	   encounter	  of	   this	   flagrant	  display	  of	  moral	   corruption	  was,	   it	   did	  not	  escape	   Tarek’s	   attention	   that	   such	   codes	   are	   articulated	   and	   reproduced	   through	   the	  army’s	  wider	  institutional	  structure	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  privileges	  therein:	  	  	  Going	  up	  the	  hierarchy,	  superior	  ranks	  in	  the	  army	  are	  treated	  far	  better	  than	  regular	   conscripts.	   They	   have	   running	   water,	   they	   sleep	   on	   beds,	   and	   have	  lockers	   in	   their	   barracks.	   The	   relationship	   between	   them	   and	   the	   soldiers	   is	  suppressive.	  The	   foundation	  of	   the	  relationship	   is	   that	   they	  suppress	   those	   in	  the	   lower	  ranks,	   in	  order	  to	  make	  them	  feel	   that	  they	  are	   in	  control.	  They	  are	  convinced	   that	   if	   they	   treat	  you	   in	  a	   friendly	  manner,	   they	  would	   lose	  control	  over	  you.	  	  Tarek’s	   social	   background	   oftentimes	   worked	   to	   spare	   him	   the	   perils	   of	   such	  suppressive	  arrangements.	  Once	  a	  superior	  officer	  realised	  that	  he	  was	  an	  engineering	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graduate,	  a	  degree	  of	  respect	  would	  usually	  develop	  and	  protect	  him	  from	  the	  prospect	  of	   being	   assigned	  degrading	   tasks.	  However,	   another	   equally	   troubling	  pattern	  would	  emerge.	  At	  one	  point	  during	  the	  later	  stages	  of	  his	  service,	  Tarek	  was	  transferred	  to	  a	  so-­‐called	   sports	   battalion,	   a	   relatively	   relaxed	   army	   enclave	   occasionally	   tasked	  with	  performing	   in	  military	  parades.	  There,	  he	  had	  a	   superior	  officer	  with	  a	   reputation	   for	  living	   on	   soft	   bribes	   in	   return	   for	   administrative	   favours	   (such	   as	   approving	   leaves).	  Once	   this	   officer	   had	   established	   that	   Tarek	   came	   from	   a	   relatively	   affluent	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   social	   background,	   he	   made	   several	   implicit	   requests	   for	   gifts,	   such	   as	  electronic	   devices.	   Tarek	   refused	   to	   give	   in	   to	   the	   officer’s	   demands.	   Some	  of	   Tarek’s	  colleagues,	  who	  at	   first	  went	  along	  with	   this	  officer’s	  demands,	  spent	   the	  rest	  of	   their	  service	  burdened	  by	  continued	  demands	  on	  his	  part.	  Sometimes,	  the	  officer	  would	  give	  these	   ‘gifts’	   to	  his	   superior	  officer,	   the	  head	  of	   the	  battalion,	   in	   return	   for	   favours	   for	  himself.	  As	  Tarket	  stated,	  ‘I’ve	  seen	  this	  pattern	  of	  behaviour,	  with	  many	  of	  the	  officers	  in	  the	  army,	  you	  encounter	  it	  all	   the	  time.	  It’s	  how	  it	  goes.’	  Bribery	  as	  a	  way	  to	  obtain	  preferential	   treatment	   from	   superior	   officers	   represented	   a	   clear	   clash	   with	   Tarek’s	  morals.	   I	   just	   cannot	   understand	   how	   someone	   would	   accept	   such	   money	   upon	   his	  household,	   his	   family	   or	   his	   children.	   I	   am	   saying	   this	   because	   it	   reached	   a	  degree	  where	   I	  have	  seen	  an	  officer	  once	  who	  asked	  a	  conscript	   to	  buy	  him	  a	  black	  female	  blouse	  of	  a	  rather	  large	  size,	  which	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  present	  he	  wanted	   to	   give	   to	   his	   wife.	   I	   cannot	   understand	   how	   someone	   would	   accept	  something	  like	  this	  upon	  themself.	  	  
3.1.3	  Lessons	  from	  Military	  Service:	  Social	  Position	  and	  the	  Nature	  of	  the	  State	  Tarek’s	   intense	  experience	  of	  his	  military	  service	  taught	  him	  several	   important	  lessons,	   and	   had	   two	   main	   effects	   on	   him.	   First,	   it	   made	   him	   very	   conscious	   of	   his	  privileged	  position	  within	  the	  country’s	  overall	  social	  structure.	  ‘I	  once	  took	  part	  in	  a	  2nd	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Army	  parade	  attended	  by	  Field	  Marshal	  Tantawy,33	  along	  with	  some	  fourteen	  thousand	  other	  soldiers,’	  he	  remembers.	  ‘This	  was	  a	  decent	  sample	  that	  tells	  you	  what	  the	  people	  in	  this	  country	  are	  like,	  where	  they	  come	  from,	  what	  their	  traditions	  and	  values	  are	  like.’	  Observing	   how	   this	   human	   mass	   displayed	   characters	   from	   many	   different	   social	  backgrounds	   during	   the	   assembly	   stage	   of	   the	   parade,	   he	   learned	   to	   appreciate	   the	  relatively	   privileged	   class	   position	   he	   enjoyed.	   For	   Tarek,	   as	   for	   many	   other	   young,	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptian	  men	   eligible	   for	   military	   service,	   army	   life	   represents	   a	  social	  experience	  outside	  their	  traditional,	  Cairo-­‐based,	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  space.	  It	  is	  a	  rare	   encounter	   with	   a	   strange,	   different	   and	   diverse	   ‘Egypt’.	   It	   thus	   considerably	  contributes	   to	  sharpening	   lines	  of	  contrast	  with	  other	  social	  groups	  through	   intensive	  interaction	   with	   representatives	   of	   a	   multitude	   of	   class	   backgrounds	   within	   an	  unfamiliar	   structure	   of	   hierarchy,	   authority,	   and	   unusually	   harsh	   material	  arrangements.	  Equally	  importantly,	  this	  experience	  also	  results	  into	  the	  development	  of	  a	   sense	   of	   distinction	   that	   is	   clearly	   expressed	   through	   a	   discursive	   dichotomy	   of	   an	  educated,	  enlightened	  and	  modern	   ‘self’	  against	  a	  backward,	  uneducated	  and	   ignorant	  ‘rest’.	  	  	  	  	  	   Another	   important	  outcome	  of	  a	   typical	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  army	  experience	   is	  the	   development	   of	   a	   certain	   image	   of	   the	   state.	   The	   army’s	   rigid	   authoritarian	  structures	   owe	   little	   to	  measures	   of	   social	   distinction	   prevalent	   outside	   the	   barracks.	  Therefore,	   negotiating	   these	   structures	   becomes	   a	   platform	   in	   the	   accumulation	   of	  convictions	   regarding	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   state	   and	   its	   modus	   operandi.	   Corruption,	  suppressive	   hierarchies	   with	   little	   flexibility	   or	   openness	   to	   change,	   incapable	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 At the time of the interview, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawy was the Minister of Defense and 
General Commander of the Egyptian Armed Forces. After Mubarak’s resignation on 11 February 2011, 
Tantawy became the de facto head of the Egyptian state as he presided over the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (SCAF), which was handed control of the country, a situation later legitimised through the constitutional 
declarations issued by the Council on 13 February 2011.  
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unworthy	   leadership,	   as	   well	   as	   endless	   inconveniencies	   embedded	   in	   the	  administrative	   procedures	   of	   this	   bureaucratic	   branch	   are	   discursively	   linked	   to	   the	  general	   image	   of	   the	   state	   as	   an	   institutional	   arrangement.	   As	   Tarek	   articulately	  explains,	   the	  army	  is	  an	  organization	  which	  [...]	  reflects	  a	  the	  picture	  of	  the	  state	  [...]	  It	  is	  one	   of	   the	   most	   important	   institutions	   of	   the	   state,	   the	   one	   charged	   with	  defending	  the	  country	  against	  foreign	  aggression.	  So	  when	  I	  tell	  you	  that	  people	  in	  the	  army	  refer	  to	  it	  as	  a	  process	  of	   ‘tahrig	  monazzam’	  (organised	  farce),	  [...]	  this	  means	  that	  the	  whole	  system	  outside	  the	  army	  is	  also	  like	  that.	  I	  mean	  the	  whole	  state.	  	  Even	  after	  the	  completion	  of	  his	  military	  service,	  whenever	  Tarek	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  state	  apparatus,	  he	  could	  sense	  the	  presence	  of	   the	  same	   institutional	  deficiencies	  that	   he	   experienced	   in	   the	   army.	   ‘In	   all	   governmental	   agencies,	   the	   same	   lack	   of	  organization,	   inefficiency,	   incapable	   employees	   and	   people	   in	   charge,	   everything	   gets	  done	   through	  money.	   This	   is	   what	   used	   to	   happen	   there	   (in	   the	   army)	   as	   well.’	   The	  experience	  of	  military	  service	  left	  Tarek	  with	  a	  deep	  apprehension	  and	  mistrust	  of	  the	  state.	  Moreover,	   his	   intense	   experience	  with	   the	   state	  during	  military	   service	  merged	  with	  many	  other,	  more	  limited,	  encounters	  with	  state	  branches	  and	  agents	  in	  different	  contexts,	  to	  form	  a	  firm	  belief	  in	  the	  need	  to	  upgrade	  and	  modernise	  the	  state.	  
4.	  	  The	  Upper	  Middle	  Class	  and	  the	  ‘Law’	  Generally	  speaking,	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  lies	  the	  process	  through	   which	   ‘subjects’	   of	   the	   state	   eventually	   come	   to	   consider	   themselves	   as	  ‘citizens’,	   ‘on	  whose	   sovereignty	   as	   a	   collective	   the	   power	   and	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   state	  was	   claimed	   to	   rest’. 34 	  However,	   this	   social	   process,	   which	   underpinned	   the	  development	  of	  the	  state	   in	  Europe	  and	  North	  America,	   is	  by	  no	  means	  universal.	  The	  global	  diffusion	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  institutional	  arrangement	  and	  a	  form	  of	  rule,	  argues	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34  Roland Axtmann, "The State of the State: The Model of the Modern State and Its Contemporary 
Transformation," International Political Science Review 25, no. 3 (2004): 261. 
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Roland	   Axtmann,	   is	   more	   the	   result	   of	   ‘coercive	   imposition	   by	   hegemonic	   western	  powers	  as	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  colonialism	  and	  imperialism’.35	  The	  Arab	  World	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point.36	  Indeed,	   one	   of	   the	   significant	   themes	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   the	   evolution	  of	   the	  Arab	  State,	  especially	  in	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  era,	  remains	  the	  question	  of	  the	  state’s	  ability	  to	  establish	  its	  supremacy	  and	  legitimacy	  above	  other,	  more	  traditional	  forms	  of	  social	  organisation	  and	  structures	  of	  authority.	  Self-­‐defined	  identities	  along	  sectarian,	  tribal	  or	  religious	  lines	  in	  many	  communities	  around	  the	  Arab	  World	  have	  often	  clashed	  with	  the	  post-­‐colonial	   state’s	   attempts	   to	   create,	   and	   indeed	   impose,	   artificially	   unifying	  nationalist	   narratives	   that	   craft	   an	   image	   of	   a	   society	   of	   ‘citizens’	  within	   those	   newly	  established	  states.	  These	  clashes	  have	  arguably	  shaped	  many	  aspects	  and	  dynamics	  of	  state-­‐society	  relationships	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  Arab	  World	  over	  the	  past	  decades.	  However,	   it	   would	   be	   safe	   to	   argue	   that	   such	   a	   clash	   has	   been	   a	   debacle,	   more	  engulfing	   the	   evolution	   of	   relatively	   newer	   Arab	   states,	   than	   playing	   role	   in	   shaping	  state-­‐society	  relations	  in	  Egypt,	  particularly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  urban	  middle	  class.	  Over	  the	   last	   two	   centuries,	   and	   especially	   in	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   and	   early	   twentieth	  centuries,	  the	  formation	  and	  evolution	  of	  the	  middle	  class,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  two,	  have	   provided	   the	   socio-­‐political	   context	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   relatively	   distinct	  Egyptian	  national	  identity.	  The	  purpose	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  this	  section	  is	  not	  to	  follow	  the	  development	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   national	   narratives	   of	   ‘Egyptianness’,	   as	  fundamental	   as	   they	   are	   to	   shaping	   today’s	   upper	   middle	   class’	   self-­‐constructed	  identity. 37 	  Rather,	   this	   section	   takes	   as	   its	   subject	   the	   question	   of	   how	   such	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ibid., 262. 
36 For a thorough discussion on the foundations and historical evolution of the modern Arab state system see: 
Iliya Harik, "The Origins of the Arab State System," in The Arab State, ed. Giacomo Luciani (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1990). 
37 During the fieldwork for this research, I witnessed numerous occasions on which a relatively well-defined 
upper-middle-class self-conscious sense of ‘Egyptianness’ was expressed and displayed. This identity is 
informed by many factors, including what can be described as a shared heritage of Egyptian middle-class pop 
culture from the 1980s and 1990s. 
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development	  has	  taken	  a	  new	  turn	  in	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  promoting	  the	  inclination	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   increasingly	   to	   develop	   a	   generic	   self-­‐perception	   as	   a	  modern	  and	  politically	  entitled	  citizenry.	  This	   self-­‐constitution	  as	  a	   citizenry	   is	  highly	  informed	   by	   the	   neoliberal	   dynamics	   of	   social	   re-­‐production,	   as	  well	   as	   by	   the	   social	  experience	  of	  the	  state.	  	  	  	  
4.1	  ‘Good	  Citizens’:	  The	  Need	  for	  the	  ‘Law’	  	  	  Interviews	   conducted	   with	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   men	   and	   women	   in	   the	   earlier	  stages	   of	   this	   research	   showed	   a	   clear	   tendency	   to	   articulate	   a	   specific	   conception	   of	  modern	   citizenship,	   configured	   primarily	   around	   the	   desire	   to	   condition	   the	   public	  sphere	   according	   to	   a	   set	   of	   clear,	   fair	   and	   well-­‐enforced	   laws	   and	   regulations.	   The	  Egyptian	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   considers	   such	   laws	   and	   regulations	   an	   integral	   part	   of	  living	  in	  a	  much-­‐desired	  ‘modern’	  and	  ‘civilised’	  urban	  setting,	  in	  which	  the	  public	  space	  conforms	   to	   criteria	   of	   neoliberal	   modernity	   generated	   as	   part	   of	   the	   upper	   middle	  class’	  multifaceted	  exposure	  to	  globalisation.	  As	  chapter	  five	  argued,	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Cairene	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  urban	  space	  is	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  emergence	  of	  this	  conception,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  habitual	  complaints	  of	  ghiyab	  al-­‐kanun	  (absence	  of	  the	  law).	  In	  this	  context,	  comparisons	  between	  an	  increasingly	  chaotic	  and	  ‘lawless’	   Cairo	   and	   the	   effectively	   governed	   and	   regulated	   public	   space	   of	   Western	  metropolises	   and	   popular	   Gulf	   destinations	   are	   constantly	   invoked.	   While	   state	  performance	   in	   upholding	   reasonable	   standards	   of	   governance	   in	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  areas	   is	   considered	   deteriorating,38 	  the	   ability	   of	   other	   social	   strata	   (increasingly	  sharing	   the	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   urban	   space)	   to	   penetrate	   and	   negotiate	   the	   state’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Characteristic examples of such failures included traffic and parking control, garbage collection services, and 
the absence of effective regulation of commercial activities in the urban space (such as noise levels from and 
opening hours of shops, cafes and restaurants).   
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bureaucratic	  structure	  on	  the	  local	  level,	  and	  hence	  to	  display	  and	  exercise	  authority	  in	  the	   public	   space,	   is	   increasingly	   resented.	   Their	   perceived	   ‘infringement’	   on	   public	  space	   is	   generally	   attributed	   to	   the	   deployment	   of	   unethical,	   illegal	   and	   sometimes	  violent	  practices	  to	  outflank	  and	  manipulate	  the	  corrupt	  state	  bureaucracy.	  As	  a	  result	  of	   its	   practical	   inability	   to	   match	   such	   everyday	   practices	   and	   influence	   the	   power	  relations	   shaping	   the	  urban	  space,	   the	  upper	  middle	   class	  discursively	   falls	  back	  on	  a	  self-­‐proclaimed	  status	  as	  ‘citizens’	  aspiring	  to	  live	  in	  a	  rationally	  regulated	  social	  space.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  state	  is	  assigned	  a	  central	  responsibility	  as	  a	  supposed	  agent	  of	  order	  and	   regulation	   in	   the	   public	   space,	   and	   its	   perceived	   failure	   to	   uphold	   such	   a	   role	  cumulatively	  informs	  the	  upper	  middle	  class’	  growing	  political	  agony.	  Hany	  Gaafar,	  who	  complained	  about	  the	  ‘complete	  erosion	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  law	  in	  Egypt	  today’,	  39	  placed	  the	  blame	  unequivocally	  on	   the	  state’s	   inability	   to	  control	   the	  public	   space.	  From	  this	  angle	  he	  defined	  the	  state	  as	  the	   guarantor	   and	   administrator	   of	   a	   system	   by	   which	   rights	   and	   duties	   are	  supposed	  to	  be	   fairly	  and	  equally	  distributed	   in	  society,	  so	  that	  everyone	  gets	  their	   rights.	   I	   need	   an	   army	   to	   protect	   me,	   a	   police	   to	   secure	   me,	   but	   most	  importantly	  a	  set	  of	  clear	  laws	  which	  outline	  what	  my	  rights	  are,	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  way	  of	  settling	  my	  disputes	  with	  others	  through	  civilised	  legal	  means.40	  	  This	   expressed	   need	   for	   the	   state,	   as	   a	   force	   conditioning	   the	   social	   field	  according	   to	   a	   neoliberally	   inspired	   conception	   thereof,	   is	   characteristic	   of	   the	   upper	  middle	  class.	  This	  point	  is	  best	  made	  when	  such	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  state	  and	  its	  role	  in	  the	   public	   sphere	   are	   contrasted	   with	   the	   mechanisms	   through	   which	   other	   social	  classes	  and	  formations	  in	  today’s	  Egyptian	  society	  keep	  the	  state’s	  intrusion	  into	  what	  Salwa	  Ismail	  calls	  the	  ‘internal	  governance’41	  of	  their	  communities	  to	  a	  minimum.	  In	  her	  inquiry	   into	  mechanisms	  of	   local	   conflict	   resolution	  amongst	   residents	  of	   the	  popular	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Hany Gaafar in discussion with the author, Mohandessin, Cairo, 6 November 2008. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ismail, Political Life in Cairo's New Quarters: Encountering the Everyday State, 33. 
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quarter	  of	  Bulaq	  al-­‐Dakrur	  in	  Cairo,	  for	  example,	  Ismail	  points	  out	  that	  disputes	  arising	  from	   quarrels	   between	   residents	   or	   their	   families	   are	   usually	   solved	   through	   the	  intervention	  and	  mediation	  by	  local	  figures	  of	  authority	  often	  labelled	  kibar	  al-­‐mantiqa	  (elders	   of	   the	   area).42	  In	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   stakes	   of	   inter-­‐communal	   conflicts	   are	  higher,	  such	  as	  with	  commercial	  or	  monetary	  disputes	  between	  merchants,	  or	  in	  cases	  in	   which	   the	   disputants	   possess	   a	   relatively	   high	   degree	   of	   authority	   and	   influence	  within	   the	   community,	   a	   more	   formalised	   and	   sophisticated	   mechanism	   of	   conflict	  resolution	   is	   deployed	   –	   once	   again,	  with	  no	   involvement	   from	  or	   resort	   to	   the	   state.	  Informal	   arbitration	   councils	   composed	   of	   figures	   chosen	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   ‘the	   respect	  they	  are	  accorded	  as	  well	  as	  their	  status	  and	  standing	  in	  the	  community’,	  are	  convened	  to	  resolve	  such	  conflicts.	  Their	  judgement	  is	  as	  good	  as	  binding	  to	  the	  disputants,	  as	  the	  legitimacy	  bestowed	  on	  them	  by	  the	  community	  deters	  noncompliance.43	  Similar	   mechanisms	   for	   customary	   dispute	   settlements	   traditionally	   exist	   in	  provincial	  Egypt.	  For	  example,	  Nielsen	  examines	  how	  informal	  yet	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  well	  established	   institutions	   of	   customary	   arbitration	   in	   upper	   Egypt	   continue	   to	   play	   an	  extensive	  role	  in	  facilitating	  the	  negotiation	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  conflicts	  away	  from	  the	  state’s	   formal	   judiciary	   system.	   He	   argues	   that	   these	   arbitration	   councils,	   which	   are	  divided	  into	  various	  levels,	  ought	  to	  be	  analysed	  as	  a	  meeting	  point	  of	  	  state	  and	  society,	  modernity	  and	   tradition,	   religion	   in	   its	  different	   forms,	  and	  ideologies	   and	   practices	   related	   to	   very	   specific	   local	   social	   organization,	  acknowledging	  that	  they	  are	  of	  great	  practical	  significance,	  carriers	  of	  multiple	  layers	   of	   meaning,	   and	   institutions	   in	   which	   numerous	   parties	   invest	   their	  political	  and	  symbolic	  capital.44	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   In	   this	  regard,	  Nielsen	  warns	  of	   the	  depiction	  of	  such	   institutions	  of	  customary	  dispute	   settlement	   as	   replacing	   the	   state	   altogether.	   He	   reminds	   us	   that	   millions	   of	  people	   across	   Egypt	   and	   in	   areas	  where	   these	  mechanisms	   play	   their	   social	   role	   still	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Ibid., 35. 
43 Ibid., 36. 
44 H.C.K. Nielsen, "State and Customary Law in Upper Egypt," Islamic Law and Society 13, no. 1 (2006): 124. 
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resort	  to	  state	  courts	  should	  it	  be	  deemed	  to	  serve	  their	   interests.	   	  However,	  as	  far	  as	  this	   study	   is	   concerned,	   the	   important	   point	   is	   the	   need	   to	   take	   note	   of	   how	   such	  mechanisms	   play	   an	   essential	   role	   alongside	   the	   formal	   judicial	   system	   as	   social	  channels	   for	   dispute	   settlements.	   In	   a	   dialectically	   complex	   way,	   these	   mechanisms	  have	  the	  double	  function	  of	  curtailing	  the	  state’s	  ability	  to	  penetrate	  these	  communities	  and	  social	  formations,	  and	  simultaneously	  remedying	  the	  state’s	  inability	  to	  do	  so.	  Such	  conditioning	  of	  the	  state	  results	  in	  the	  emphasis	  of	  a	  certain	  notion	  of	  relative	  autonomy	  and	  independence	  from	  the	  state	  and	  its	  irrelevance	  in	  regulating	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  inter-­‐community	   relations.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   absence	   of	   such	  mechanisms	   in	   the	   social	  sphere	  of	   the	  upper	  middle	  class	  enhances	  the	   importance	  awarded	  to	  the	  state	  as	  an	  agent	  of	  regulation	  of	  the	  public	  space,	  and	  also	  –	  more	  importantly	  –	  of	  the	   ‘civilised’	  settlement	   of	   disputes,	  with	   exclusive	   resort	   to	   the	   formality	   of	   ‘the	   law’	   as	   a	  way	   of	  achieving	  this	  objective.	  
4.2	  Where	  Is	  the	  Law?	  The	  State’s	  Despotic	  Myth	  vs.	  Its	  Infrastructural	  
Capacity	  The	   upper	   middle	   class’	   emphasis	   on	   the	   desire	   to	   condition	   the	   social	   field,	  according	  to	  a	  neoliberally	  inspired	  conception	  of	  modernity	  and	  progressive	  urban	  life,	  assigns	   a	   central	   role	   to	   the	   state,	   especially	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   other	   mechanisms	   of	  power	  brokerage	   in	   the	   social	   field	   at	   the	   disposal	   of	   the	   upper	  middle	   class.	   Typical	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   frustration	   with	   the	   ever-­‐more-­‐evident	   display	   of	   the	   state’s	  inability	  to	  uphold	  such	  a	  role	  in	  today’s	  Egypt	  calls	  attention	  to	  the	  practical	  interplay	  between	   what	   Michael	   Mann	   calls	   the	   despotic	   and	   infrastructural	   sources	   of	   state	  power.	   Mann’s	   analysis	   of	   these	   two	   types	   of	   power	   displays	   comprised	   part	   of	   his	  examination	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  state’s	  autonomy	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  society.	  Notwithstanding	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this	   point,	   which	   the	   conceptual	   framework	   touched	   upon	   earlier,	   the	   former	   can	   be	  understood	  as	  the	  prerogative	  power	  of	  the	  elites	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  state’s	  institutions	  to	  announce	  and	  declare	  a	  certain	  order	   in	  the	  social	   field	  through	   laws,	  regulations	  and	  administrative	   orders.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   infrastructural	   power	   of	   the	   state	   is	  defined	   as	   the	   latter’s	   capacity	   ‘to	   actually	   penetrate	   civil	   society,	   and	   to	   implement	  logistically	  political	  decisions	  throughout	  the	  realm’.45	  In	  today’s	  Egypt,	  while	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  continues	   to	  believe	   in	   the	   importance	  of	   the	  state’s	  despotic	  role	  and	  of	  this	  role	  as	  a	  criterion	  by	  which	  to	  judge	  the	  state,	  the	  socio-­‐political	  agency	  of	  this	  class	  is	  largely	  shaped	  by	  the	  exposure	  to	  the	  complex	  mechanisms	  that	  govern	  the	  exercise	  and	  manipulation	  of	  state	  power	  on	  the	  infrastructural	  level.	  An	   example	   from	   the	   family	   history	   of	   Radwa	   Emad46	  will	   explain	   this	   point	  further.	  Radwa,	  35,	  is	  a	  finance	  and	  stock	  brokerage	  professional	  at	  EFG	  Hermes,	  one	  of	  the	   leading	   regional	   financial	   groups	   and	   investment	   banks.	  Her	   father	   had	   inherited	  the	  shared	  ownership	  of	  a	  sizable	  piece	  of	  agricultural	   land	  near	   the	   town	  of	  Kaha,	   in	  the	   Nile	   Delta	   Qalyubiyya	   governorate.	   The	   shared	   ownership	   of	   the	   property	   (‘al	  
masha‘47)	  with	   a	   number	   of	   his	   siblings	   and	   cousins	  was	   supposed	   to	   prevent	   any	   of	  them	  from	  selling	  his	  or	  her	  share	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  others.	  A	  few	  years	  ago,	  one	   of	   Radwa’s	   father’s	   cousins	   unilaterally	   sold	   his	   share	   of	   the	   land	   to	   the	   local	  member	  of	   the	  People’s	  Assembly	  (Parliament’s	   lower	  house).	  Soon	  after	   the	  sale,	   the	  MP	   succeeded	   in	   lobbying	   local	   authorities	   to	   include	   the	   part	   of	   the	   land	   he	   had	  purchased	   with	   adjacent	   areas	   demarcated	   by	   the	   governorate	   for	   urban	   expansion.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," European 
Journal of Sociology 25, no.2 (1984): 189. 
46 Radwa Emad in discussion with the author, Mohandessin, 11 March 2009. 
47 A common form of inheritance in rural Egypt. Land ownership is passed onto the next generations as shared 
property, which none of the heirs can sell to another party without the consent of all other co-owners. The 
primary goal is to preserve landownership within the family by preventing succeeding generations, especially 
those who move to a more urban-based life, from decomposing the family’s land wealth by selling their shares 
outside the family.  
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Such	  an	  inclusion	  meant	  an	  immediate	  and	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  the	  value	  of	  the	  land,	  as	  it	   would	   no	   longer	   be	   considered	   exclusively	   agricultural,	   and	   housing	   construction	  would	  be	  permitted	  on	  it.	  Not	  long	  afterwards,	  construction	  activity	  on	  the	  piece	  of	  land	  in	   question	   was	   underway.	   Radwa’s	   father	   filed	   a	   number	   of	   complaints	   at	   the	   local	  police	  station	  and	  tried	  to	  use	  his	  friendly	  connection	  to	  the	  station’s	  chief	  to	  record	  the	  MP’s	   illegal	   attempt	   to	   build	   on	   the	   land	  he	  had	   illegally	   purchased	   in	   the	   first	   place.	  However,	  the	  police	  did	  nothing	  to	  examine	  the	  scene	  or	  report	  the	  illegal	  construction	  on	   the	   property,	   passivity	   that	  made	   filing	   a	   lawsuit	   against	   the	  MP	   almost	   pointless	  because	   of	   the	   lack	   of	   any	   official	   documentation	   of	   such	   violations.	   Construction	  continued,	  and	  Radwa’s	   father	  was	  not	  able	   to	  prevent	   the	   illegal	   infringement	  on	  the	  family’s	  property.	  He	  reached	  the	  conclusion	  that	  any	  attempt	  to	  recover	  the	  property	  would	  have	  to	  wait	  until	  the	  MP	  was	  unseated	  in	  the	  future:	  Either	   there	   were	   mutual	   interests	   between	   [the	   police]	   and	   the	   Parliament	  Member,	  or	  they	  were	  afraid	  he	  might	  harm	  them.	  If	  this	  were	  not	  a	  Member	  of	  Parliament	   they	  would	  have	  gone	  down	  and	   thrown	  him	  out	  of	   the	   land.	  But	  the	   fact	   is:	   he	   was	   the	   representative	   of	   their	   constituency	   in	   the	   People’s	  Assembly	  and	  they	  didn’t	  want	  to	  create	  animosity	  with	  him.	  	  The	  everyday	  experience	  of	   the	  state	  by	   the	  upper	  middle	  class	   is	   shaped	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  both	  a	  belief	  in	  the	  despotic	  power	  of	  the	  state	  -­‐hence	  the	  belief	  in	  the	  notion	   of	   the	   ‘law’	   in	   the	   first	   place-­‐,	   and	   a	   repeated	   confrontation	   with	   a	   growing	  inability	   to	   depend	  on	   the	   state	   displaying	   similar	   power	   on	   the	   infrastructural	   level.	  Radwa’s	   explanation	   of	   local	   authorities’	   passivity	   echoes	   a	   firm	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  conviction	  that	  other	  social	  forces,	  less	  inclined	  to	  abide	  by	  moral	  codes	  of	  ‘civility’	  and	  ‘respect’,	  are	  much	  better	  positioned	  to	  manipulate	  the	  institutional	  arrangements	  and	  power	  structures	  of	  the	  state	  in	  their	  favour,	  in	  the	  everyday	  conduct	  of	  social	  activity.	  Such	   convictions	   are	   confirmed	   by	   repeated	   confrontations	   with	   clientalistic	   and	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interest	   networks	   that	   effectively	   manipulate	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state	   on	   these	  infrastructural	  levels.	  	  I	   remember	  my	   father	   telling	  me	  back	   then	   that	   this	   infringement	  could	  have	  been	  stopped	   if	  he	  hired	  a	   lawyer	   familiar	  with	  corrupt	  methods,	  who	  would	  have	  paid	  some	  thugs	  to	  go	  and	  fire	  a	  couple	  of	  bullets	  and	  force	  those	  people	  out.	  That	  would	  have	  been	  the	  end	  of	  the	  story.	  But	  my	  father	  does	  not	  know	  how	  to	  do	  such	  a	   thing.	   [...]	  He	  does	  not	  know	  how	  to	   face	  someone	   like	   that	  who	   resorts	   to	   such	   illegitimate	   ways,	   since	   he	   [the	   father]	   was	   raised	   on	  respect	  and	  was	  taught	  that	  this	  is	  not	  something	  you	  do.[...]	  Even	  if	  you	  have	  legitimacy	  on	  your	  side.	  	  	  	   Radwa’s	  father’s	  refusal	  to	  resort	  to	  securing	  his	  lawful	  property	  rights	  through	  informal	  means	  (such	  as	  the	  hiring	  of	  thugs)	  is	  indicative	  of	  a	  dominant	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  ethos,	  which	  regards	  such	  means	  as	  an	  uncivilised	  tool	  of	  securing	  interests	  in	  the	  social	   sphere	   and	   hence	   unworthy	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   social	   status.	   However,	  equally,	   there	   is	   also	   an	   element	   of	   realism	   underpinning	   the	   adherence	   to	   such	   an	  ethos.	  Radwa’s	  father	  calculated	  that,	  should	  he	  take	  the	  legal	  path,	  he	  would	  probably	  never	   be	   able	   to	   match	   his	   adversary’s	   influence	   on	   local	   officials,	   his	   ability	   to	  manipulate	   the	  bureaucratic	  process	   related	   to	   legal	  dispute	   settlement,	   and	  even	  his	  capability	  to	  produce	  fake	  documents	  if	  needed	  to	  support	  his	  case.	  He	  simply	  realised	  that	  he	  was	  entering	  a	  losing	  battle.	  He	  decided	  to	  postpone	  taking	  legal	  action	  against	  the	  Member	  of	  Parliament’s	   assault	  on	  his	   land	  until	   this	   individual	  was	  out	  of	  office,	  judging	  that,	  in	  such	  a	  case,	  his	  chances	  in	  the	  legal	  battle	  may	  be	  more	  balanced.	  	  	   Radwa’s	  father’s	  appraisal	  of	  his	  relative	  power	  in	  this	  situation	  led	  him	  to	  take	  a	  decision	   of	   inaction.	   This	   discussion’s	   goal	   is	   to	   demonstrate	   how	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  exposure	  to	  the	  dynamics	  of	  state	  presence	  in	  the	  social	  field	  prompts	  the	  formation	  of	  normative	   convictions	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   latter,	   which	   in	   turn	   informs	   political	  behaviour.	  This	  should	  not,	  however,	  suggest	   that	  such	  a	  passive	  reaction	   is	   the	  norm	  amongst	   the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	   class.	  The	  absence	  of	   the	   state	  or	   the	   inability	   to	  depend	  on	  the	  latter’s	  infrastructural	  power	  to	  impose	  a	  certain	  conception	  of	  physical	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and	   normative/legal	   order	   in	   the	   social	   field	   prompts	   different	   courses	   of	   actions	  amongst	  different	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  in	  various	  contexts	  and	  situations.	  The	   case	   of	  M.	  K.48	  ought	   to	   demonstrate	   this	   point	   further.	  M.	  K.	   is	   an	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   entrepreneur	   who	   owns	   a	   small	   import/export	   company.	   As	   part	   of	  conducting	   business,	   M.	   has	   had	   to	   remedy	   the	   absence	   of	   the	   ability	   to	   depend	   on	  formal	  state	  power	  in	  different	  ways	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions.	  In	  one	  incidence,	  one	  of	  his	   clients,	   to	  whom	  he	   had	   supplied	   a	   shipment	   of	   imported	  merchandise,	   had	   been	  delaying	  due	  payments.	  M.	  possessed	  overdue	  IOUs	  signed	  by	  the	  client,	  and	  could	  have	  taken	   legal	   action.	   He	   didn’t.	   After	   repeatedly	   requesting	   that	   the	   client	   make	   the	  overdue	  payments,	  and	  constantly	  being	  met	  by	  the	  client’s	  evasion	  tactics,	  he	  decided	  that	  there	  was	  a	  need	  for	  a	  show	  of	  strength.	  He	  put	  all	  the	  IOUs	  in	  an	  envelope	  and	  sent	  them	   to	   the	   client’s	   office	   by	   a	   special	   courier.	   That	   same	   day,	   he	   arranged	   for	   a	  microbus	   full	  of	  hired	   thugs	   to	  park	  visibly	  beneath	   the	  client’s	  apartment	  building	   in	  
Dokki.	  For	  the	  whole	  day,	  while	  the	  man	  was	  at	  work,	  one	  of	  these	  thugs	  would	  knock	  on	   the	   door	   to	   his	   apartment	   every	   hour,	   shouting	   intimidating	   verbal	   threats	   at	   the	  client’s	  wife	  inside.	  A	  few	  days	  later,	  the	  client	  arrived	  at	  M.’s	  office	  and	  apologetically	  paid	  the	  money	  he	  owed	  almost	  in	  full.	  Intimidation	  had	  paid	  off.	  By	  sending	  his	  client	  the	   IOUs	   proving	   his	   legal	   entitlement	   to	   the	   overdue	   payments,	   M.	   had	   sent	   him	   a	  strong	  message	  that	  he	  was	  not	  going	  to	  wait	  for	  what	  would	  normally	  be	  a	  lengthy	  and	  ineffective	  legal	  process	  to	  retrieve	  his	  money.	  You	  are	  telling	  him	  basically:	  look,	  here	  are	  the	  papers,	  I	  can	  obtain	  my	  money	  without	   having	   to	   go	   to	   court.	   You	   bring	   the	   issue	   to	   his	   home,	   wife	   and	  children.	  He	  will	  have	  no	  option	  but	  to	  do	  anything	  to	  pay.	  This	  is	  not	  like	  me	  at	  all	  and	  such	  tactics	  are	  of	  course	  extreme	  and	  are	  only	  used	  as	  a	  last	  resort;	  and	  in	   some	   cases	   you	   can’t	   just	   use	   them	  because	   they	  will	   not	   be	   useful	   as	   the	  other	  person	  could	  be	  bold	  or	  reckless	  enough	  to	  retaliate	  in	  kind.	  But	  on	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 For legal considerations and protective reasons related to the details of this case, the identity of this particular 
informant has been deliberately concealed, despite that I have on record his approval to use the interview 
conducted with him in Cairo in the winter of 2010 for the purposes of this thesis. ‘M.K.’, the initials used here 
to refer to him, are therefore not those of his real name.  
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other	   hand	   I	   have	   a	   reputation	   to	   protect	   in	   the	   market	   and	   if	   it	   becomes	  known	  that	  anyone	  can	  feel	  free	  to	  never	  pay	  me	  for	  merchandise,	  I	  will	  go	  out	  of	  business	  tomorrow.	  	  M.’s	   operations	   include	   a	   set	   of	   other	   informal	   tactics,	   which	   are	   selectively	  deployed	   to	   ensure	   relatively	   smooth	   business	   conduct.	   These	   include	   several	  mechanisms	  for	  negotiating	  dispute	  settlements	  with	  other	  entrepreneurs,	  through	  the	  intervention	   of	   ‘sponsors’.	   These	   are	   usually	   heavyweight	   figures	   in	   the	   business	  community,	   to	   whom	   a	   medium-­‐sized	   business	   owner	   like	   M.	   has	   identifiable	   and	  traceable	   social	   or	   family	   connections,	   and	   who,	   if	   asked,	   would	   confirm	   such	  ‘sponsorship’.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  reliance	  on	  formal	  legal	  processes,	  disputes	  arising	  over	  aspects	   of	   business	   operations	   are	   often	   resolved	   by	   resorting	   to	   the	   intervention	   of	  these	   informal	   authority	   figures.	  According	   to	  M.,	   the	  outcome	  of	   these	   settlements	   is	  not	  always	  favourable,	  since	  they	  depend	  on	  the	  relative	  power	  of	  the	  sponsors	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  each	   other,	   or	   their	   own	   complex	   calculations	   of	   business	   dynamics	   that	   informally	  control	  their	  own	  higher	  layer	  of	  the	  business	  community.	  	  One	   last	  point	   is	  pivotal	   to	   emphasise	   in	   this	   section:	  The	   two	  above	  examples	  are	   not	   suggestive	   of	   the	   absence	   of	   relevant	   legislation	   or	   formal	   regulatory	  frameworks.	  In	  today’s	  Egypt,	  there	  is	  hardly	  a	  shortage	  of	  an	  extensive	  arsenal	  of	  laws	  and	   regulations	   as	   evidence	   of	   the	   state’s	   extensive	   and	   continuous	   practice	   of	   its	  despotic	  prerogative	   to	  place	   frameworks	   for	   the	   regulation	  of	  various	   fields	  of	   social	  activity	   (including,	   in	   these	   cases,	   property	   relations	   and	   business	   operations).	  However,	  this	  section	  aims	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  upper	  middle	  class’	  constant	  exposure	  to	  the	   dynamics	   of	   state	   exercise	   of	   infrastructural	   power	   and	   presence,	   including	   the	  susceptibility	   of	   state	   structures	   and	   exercise	   of	   authority	   for	   manipulation	   by	   other	  social	   categories.	  Within	   these	   dynamics,	   the	   Egyptian	   upper	  middle	   class	   finds	   itself	  relatively	  disadvantaged	  both	  practically	  and	  morally,	  mainly	   in	   its	   inability	   to	  rely	  on	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the	   state’s	   infrastructural	   power	   to	   regulate	   the	   social	   field	   rationally,	   effectively	   and	  efficiently.	  	  
4.3	  The	  Case	  of	  Ahmed	  El	  Husseiny:	  Going	  to	  Court	  Ahmed	  El	  Husseiny’s	   case	  will	   present	   a	   detailed	   account	   of	   an	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   experience	  with	   the	   judicial	   system.	   It	   provides	   another	   example	  of	   the	   state	   as	  experienced	   by	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   in	   today’s	   social	   environment;	   in	   this	  case,	  particularly	  examining	  its	  capacity	  as	  an	  agent	  of	  dispute	  settlement	  and	  arbiter	  in	  interclass	   relations	   in	   everyday	   life	   within	   the	   Cairene	   social	   space.	   Many	   of	   the	  individual	   aspects	   reflected	   in	   Ahmed’s	   experience,	   such	   as	   narratives	   of	   encounters	  with	   the	   police	   or	   the	   niyaba49,	   are	   quite	   common	   amongst	   the	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class.	  These	   narratives	   are	   essential	   inputs	   in	   the	   process	   of	   subjective	   construction	   of	   the	  state.	   The	   latter	   is	   constructed	   as	   an	   inefficient	   institutional	   process,	   much	   more	  penetrable	  by	  other	  social	  strata,	  and	  incompetent	  in	  upholding	  notions	  of	  ‘civility’	  and	  the	  ‘law’.	  	  Ahmed	  El	  Husseiny50	  is	  a	  32-­‐year-­‐old	  dentist	  who	  lives	  in	  the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  quarter	  of	  Mohandessin	  in	  Giza.	  He	  has	  a	  three-­‐year-­‐old	  son.	  His	  wife	  Yasmine,	  a	  French-­‐schooled	   economics	   graduate,	   works	   as	   an	   executive	   assistant	   in	   the	   French	  multinational	   oil	   and	   gas	   drilling	   company	   Schlumberger.	   Ahmed	   himself	   is	   a	   2002	  graduate	  of	  the	  Faculty	  of	  Dentistry	  at	  Cairo	  University;	  his	  university	  studies	  followed	  his	   graduation	   from	   the	  Manor	   House	   School,	   a	   popular	   English	   high	   school	   among	  Cairo’s	  upper	  middle	  class.	  Ahmed	  runs	  a	  private	  dental	  clinic,	  representing	  his	  primary	  source	  of	  income,	  which	  occupies	  a	  small	  property	  in	  the	  Sheikh	  Zayed	  City,	  some	  25	  km	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 The public prosecution authority and first stage of judicial review in cases brought forth by the police. 
50 All quotes cited and information presented in this section are based on an interview with Ahmed El Husseiny 
conducted at his home in Mohandessin, Giza on 19 November 2009. 
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to	  the	  West	  of	  Giza.	  As	  chapter	  five	  discussed,	  Sheikh	  Zayed	  City	  is	  home	  to	  many	  gated	  housing	  compounds,	  settled	  mostly	  by	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians,	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades.	   Ahmed	   chose	   to	   establish	   his	   private	   clinic	   in	   an	   affluent	   area	   in	   order	   to	  secure	   a	   clientele	   with	   privileged	   social	   and	   income	   levels.51	  For	   several	   years	   now,	  commuting	  by	  car	  through	  the	  26th	  of	  July	  corridor,	  the	  highway	  that	  links	  the	  heart	  of	  
Mohandessin	   to	   Cairo’s	  Western	   urban	   extensions	   and	   the	   Cairo-­‐Alexandria	   highway,	  has	  comprised	  part	  of	  his	  daily	  routine.	  Ahmed’s	   general	   perception	   of	   the	   ‘law’	   in	   Egypt	   is	   admittedly	   subjective	   and	  perhaps	  exaggerated.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  a	  quite	  telling	  one.	  A	  range	  of	  experiences	  have	  led	  him	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  the	  law,	  it’s	  everyone	  by	  their	  hands.	  Everyone	  tries	  to	  manipulate	   laws	   or	   do	  whatever	   they	   please	   but	  make	   it	   appear	   legal.	   Those	  who	   can,	   outflank	   the	   law	   or	   violate	   it.	   In	   the	   end,	   laws	   are	   only	   truly	  implemented	  on	  al-­‐ghalaba,	  the	  powerless	  who	  can	  do	  neither	  of	  these	  things.	  	  In	  some	  incidents,	  Ahmed’s	  experience	  even	  shows	  that	  laws	  and	  regulations	  are	  more	   of	   an	   illusionary	   bond	   on	   social	   activity	   than	   they	   are	   real,	   binding	   regulatory	  frameworks	  thereof.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  his	  efforts	  to	  complete	  the	  necessary	  paperwork	  for	  starting	  his	  private	  dental	  clinic,	  Ahmed	  was	   faced	  with	  an	  obstacle	  he	  thought	  threatened	  the	  entire	  project:	  The	  property	  he	  rented	  for	  his	  clinic	  was	  situated	  in	   a	   building	   with	   no	   permission	   from	   the	   Sheikh	   Zayed	   governorate	   to	   host	  ‘administrative	  or	   commercial’	   activity.	  He	  went	   to	   the	  governorate’s	  headquarters	   to	  inquire	  about	  obtaining	  the	  needed	  permissions,	  only	  to	  spend	  half	  a	  day	  being	  referred	  from	   one	   official	   to	   the	   other	   and	   from	   one	   department	   to	   the	   next.	   None	   of	   the	  employees	  at	  the	  governorate	  seemed	  to	  be	  able	  to	  offer	  any	  useful	  advice	  as	  to	  the	  legal	  or	   regulatory	   frameworks	   for	  obtaining	   the	  permissions	  he	  needed	   to	  open	   the	  clinic.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 In 2011, Ahmed bought a flat in the commercial service (mall) area of Beverly Hills, by far the largest of 
Sheikh Zayed City’s gated compounds, built and managed by the real estate giant SODIC. Ahmed plans to open 
a second dental clinic in the 120 square-metre property, which he could only afford through his father’s support. 
By expanding into the gated compound, Ahmed hopes to attract a more affluent clientele for his clinic.    
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Just	  before	   leaving	   in	  despair,	   one	  of	   the	  officials	   gave	  him	   ‘brotherly	   advice’,	   namely	  not	   to	   give	   the	   matter	   much	   attention	   and	   simply	   proceed	   with	   his	   project.	   When	  Ahmed	   voiced	   his	   concern	   that	   if	   he	   did	   so,	   he	   could	   be	   held	   accountable	   by	   local	  authorities,	   the	   official	   was	   surprised	   by	   his	   ‘idealism’	   and	   assured	   him	   that	   it	   was	  almost	  unheard	  to	  enforce	  such	  regulations.	  Although	   undeniably	   content	   that	   there	   was	   less	   paperwork	   than	   he	   had	  anticipated	   for	  opening	  his	  private	  clinic,	  Ahmed	  was	  deeply	  disturbed	  by	   this	   laissez	  passer	  approach	  by	  the	  local	  authorities.	  In	  his	  view,	  it	  was	  another	  manifestation	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  –	  and	  the	  incompetence	  of	  the	  state	  charged	  with	  enforcing	  it.	  Laws	   and	   regulations	   seemed	   to	   be	   in	   place	   to	   be	   ignored	   –	   or,	   at	   best,	   selectively	  enforced	  by	  the	  state.	  Not	   least	  of	  his	  worries	  at	   that	  stage	  was	  that	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  legalisation	  of	  his	  economic	  activity,	  a	  door	  would	  be	  wide	  open	  for	  local	  officials	  to	  blackmail	  him	  in	  the	  future:	  I	  was	  of	  course	  happy	  that	  I	  was	  spared	  the	  effort	  of	  all	  the	  red	  tape.	  But	  I	  was	  suspicious;	  I	  could	  not	  believe	  that	  they	  would	  just	  let	  me	  go	  like	  this.	  I	  worried	  that	  at	  some	  point	  somebody	  from	  the	  governorate	  or	  the	  hay	  (neighbourhood	  municipal	   authority)	  would	   show	  up	  one	  day	   in	   the	   clinic	   and	  would	   ask	  me	  where	  my	  papers	  and	  permissions	  were.	  Of	  course	  he	  would	  want	  to	  get	  paid	  to	   turn	   a	   blind	   eye,	   because	   I	  would	  be	   rightly	   committing	   an	   administrative	  violation.	  But	  luckily	  nothing	  [has]	  happened	  so	  far.	  	  
4.4	  Impossible	  Justice:	  Experiencing	  the	  Court	  Ahmed’s	   combination	   of	   experiences	   with	   barely	   enforced	   regulatory	  frameworks	  were	  crowned	  by	  an	  incident	  that	  confirmed	  his	  conception	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	   failure	   in	  regards	   to	  upholding	   ‘the	   law’.	   It	  was	   the	  morning	  of	  Shamm	  al-­‐Nasim52	  at	  6:30	  a.m.	  Ahmed	  was	  driving	  back	  to	  his	  home	  near	  the	  exit	  of	  the	  26th	  of	  July	  corridor	  onto	  Lebanon	  Square	  in	  Mohandessin,	  after	  having	  stayed	  up	  late	  at	  a	  social	  gathering	  at	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The day is an annual national holiday marking the ancient Egyptian festival of the spring and end of the 
Coptic Easter week.  
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one	  of	  his	  friends’	  house	  in	  Beverly	  Hills	  in	  the	  Sheikh	  Zayed	  City.	  Suddenly,	  a	  car	  ahead	  of	  him	  hit	  a	  man	  who	  was	  crossing	  the	  street,	  and	  drove	  away.	  Ahmed	  stopped	  his	  car	  to	  check	   on	   the	  man’s	   condition,	   as	   several	   people	   gathered	   at	   the	   site	   of	   the	   incident.	  Partially	  driven	  by	  humanitarian	  reasons	  and	  partially	  pressured	  by	  the	  crowd’s	  appeal	  to	  his	   ‘good	  heart’,	  Ahmed	  volunteered	  to	  drive	  the	  man	  to	  the	  nearest	  hospital,	  a	  few	  streets	  away	  from	  the	  accident’s	  site.	  At	  the	  hospital,	  he	  paid	  a	  150	  L.E.	  admission	  fee	  to	  the	  emergency	  section,	  and	  at	  the	  injured	  man’s	  request,	  called	  the	  man’s	  brother	  from	  his	  mobile	   phone	   to	   come	  meet	   him.	   In	   the	  meantime,	   the	   hospital	   had	   reported	   the	  incident	  to	  the	  local	  police	  station,	  which	  in	  turn	  sent	  an	  amin	  shurta53	  to	  file	  a	  report.	  After	  the	  man’s	  minor	  injuries	  were	  treated	  in	  the	  hospital,	  they	  all	  went	  to	  the	  police	  station	  to	  finish	  the	  paperwork.	  	  Ahmed	   drove	   to	   the	   police	   station	   in	   his	   car,	   while	   the	   other	   two	   men	  accompanied	   the	   police	   officer	   in	   his	   van.	   While	   he	   arrived	   there	   in	   less	   than	   ten	  minutes,	  the	  other	  three	  arrived	  at	  the	  nearby	  station	  two	  hours	  later,	  much	  to	  Ahmed’s	  surprise.	  But	   the	  biggest	   surprise	  of	   all	   came	  when	   the	   injured	  man	   formally	  accused	  Ahmed	  in	  the	  police	  report	  of	  hitting	  him	  with	  his	  car.	  Ahmed	  immediately	  realised	  that	  it	  was	  an	  attempt	  at	  blackmail,	  devised	  by	  the	  two	  brothers	   in	  corroboration	  with	  the	  policeman.	  They	  were	  probably	  after	  a	  sum	  of	  money	   in	  return	   for	  dropping	  the	   false	  charges	  against	  him.	  Despite	  his	  rage	  at	  what	  he	  thought	  was	  ‘low’	  behaviour	  by	  the	  two	  brothers,	  he	  thought	  that	  the	  policeman’s	  behaviour	  was	  worst	  of	  all:	  ‘I	  was	  in	  shock,	  he	  must	  have	  encouraged	  them	  during	  those	  two	  hours	  on	  doing	  that	  in	  return	  for	  a	  share.	  This	   man	   who	   is	   supposed	   to	   enforce	   the	   law	   directly	   encouraged	   those	   people	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Amin al-Shurta is a rank below the formal hierarchy of officers in the police force. The latter category are 
graduates of the state’s police academy or kulliyyat al-shurta, who then ascend to higher ranks of the semi-
military structure of the Egyptian police. The former group on the other hand, has, since their introduction to the 
police structure in the 1970s under Sadat, played an increasing role in creating networks of control between the 
state and urban communities. They have also been widely identified with both corrupt and coercive practices of 
the police establishment in the Mubarak era.   
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blackmail	  me.’	  Ahmed	  tried	  to	  prevent	  the	  situation	  from	  further	  developing	  by	  offering	  to	  take	  the	  lightly	  injured	  man	  to	  a	  private	  hospital	  and	  eventually	  compensate	  him	  with	  a	   small	   sum	  of	  money.	   The	   two	  brothers	   refused,	   knowing	   they	  would	   be	   in	   a	   better	  bargaining	  situation	  if	  the	  case	  went	  to	  court.	  Ahmed	  had	  to	  stay	  at	  the	  police	  station	  until	   the	  evening,	  when	  the	  whole	  case	  would	   be	   brought	   forward	   to	   the	   niyaba,	   which	   would	   decide	   whether	   there	   were	  sufficient	  grounds	  for	  presenting	  the	  case	  to	  court.	  When	  the	  investigation	  judge	  wakil	  
al-­‐niyaba	   finally	  reviewed	  the	  case,	   including	  a	  brief	  questioning	  of	  all	   those	   involved,	  Ahmed	  was	  almost	  certain	  he	  would	  dismiss	  the	  case.	  After	  all,	   the	  man	  was	  suffering	  from	  minor	  injuries	  that	  required	  no	  further	  medical	  attention	  and	  there	  were	  no	  direct	  witnesses	  to	  the	  incident	  in	  the	  first	  place.	   ‘The	  man	  was	  claiming	  I	  had	  hit	  him,	  I	  was	  claiming	   the	   opposite,	   there	   were	   no	   witnesses	   and	   there	   was	   no	   accident	   site	   to	  examine,	   so	   there	  were	   hardly	   any	   components	   of	   a	   case.’	   But	   Ahmed	  was	   in	   for	   yet	  another	   frustrating	   surprise	  when	   the	   investigation	   judge	  decided	   to	   take	   the	   case	   to	  trial.	  ‘The	  only	  explanation	  for	  this	  is	  that	  the	  investigation	  judge	  normally	  takes	  such	  an	  action,	  in	  order	  not	  to	  be	  accused	  of	  bribery.’	  Later	  that	  evening,	  after	  Ahmed	  had	  been	  dismissed	  by	  the	   investigating	   judge,	  his	  father	  received	  a	  phone	  call	  from	  a	  relative	  of	  the	  man	  who	  had	  claimed	  to	  be	  hit	  by	  Ahmed’s	   car,	   implying	   the	   possibility	   of	   dropping	   the	   case	   against	   him	   in	   return	   of	   a	  sum	  of	  money.	  Although	  Ahmed’s	  father	  was	  instinctively	  of	  the	  view	  that	  it	  was	  a	  short,	  trouble-­‐saving	   way	   of	   ending	   this	   whole	   episode,	   Ahmed	   refused.	   His	   sense	   that	   an	  immense	  injustice	  was	  being	  inflicted	  on	  him	  and	  that	  he	  was	  being	  blackmailed	  drove	  him	   to	   confront	   his	   opponent	   and	   to	   try	   to	   clear	   his	   record	   through	   the	   due	   legal	  process.	   He	   decided	   to	   stand	   and	   defend	   himself	   in	   court	   against	   a	   totally	   fabricated	  accusation.	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Ahmed’s	   decision	  was	   beginning	   of	   an	   encounter	  with	   the	   judicial	   system	   that	  taught	   him	   lessons	   for	   life,	   not	   least	   concerning	   his	   relationship	   with	   the	   state	   as	   a	  mechanism	   for	   regulating	   the	   social	   sphere	   through	   the	   legal	   system	   and	   solving	  disputes	  therein.	  Despite	  Ahmed’s	  morally	  dictated	  stance,	  his	  father	  still	  continued	  to	  try	  and	  reach	  an	  ‘understanding’	  with	  his	  accuser,	  behind	  his	  back.	  Mr.	  El	  Husseiny	  Sr.	  coordinated	  with	  one	  of	  Ahmed’s	   cousins	   to	   contact	   the	  man	  and	  offer	  him	  money	   in	  return	   for	   dropping	   the	   case.	   Notably,	   this	   approach	  was	  made	   through	   this	   cousin’s	  private	  driver,	  a	  man	  thought	  to	  ‘be	  better	  suited	  to	  understand	  the	  mentality	  of	  these	  people,	  since	  he	  came	  from	  a	  popular	  area	  himself’.	  But	  despite	  the	  driver’s	  best	  efforts,	  the	  man	  refused.	  The	  trial	  was	  unavoidable.	  When	   the	   trial	   commenced,	   the	   lawyer	   Ahmed	   had	   hired	   advised	   him	   that	   he	  was	  not	  formally	  required	  to	  attend	  the	  first	  hearing	  session.	  However,	  the	  first	  hearing	  of	  the	  case	  was	  also	  the	  last.	  The	  judge	  penalised	  him	  with	  a	  month	  in	  jail	  for	  hitting	  the	  man	  with	  his	  car.	  The	  foundation	  of	  the	  judge’s	  ruling	  was	  a	  medical	  report	  the	  accuser	  had	   submitted	   to	   the	   court,	   which	   was	   produced	   many	   days	   after	   the	   incident	   by	   a	  private	   hospital.	   According	   to	   the	   lawyer,	   this	   was	   unexpected:	   The	   law	   clearly	  stipulates	  that	  in	  such	  cases,	  the	  court	  is	  only	  to	  admit	  as	  evidence	  medical	  reports	  from	  public	  hospitals	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  incident.	  When	  they	  appealed	  the	  ruling,	  Ahmed	  had	  to	   attend	   the	  hearing	  of	  his	   appeal	   in	  person.	  The	   court	   session	   took	  place	   in	   a	   court	  complex	  situated	  in	  Sudan	  street,	  a	   long	  road	  effectively	  representing	  an	  urban	  border	  between	   the	   overwhelmingly	   middle/upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   neighbourhood	   of	  
Mohandessin,	  and	  the	  more	  popular	  areas	  of	  Imbaba,	  Ard	  al-­‐Liwa,	  Bulak	  al-­‐Dakrur	  and	  
Nahia.	  	  Ahmed’s	  experience	  that	  day	  shattered	  any	  pre-­‐conceived	  notions	  he	  may	  have	  previously	  possessed	  about	  the	  judicial	  system	  as	  an	  institution	  charged	  with	  securing	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justice	   through	  due	  process.	   ‘This	   is	  an	   image	  only	   true	   in	   the	  movies,	  but	   reality	   is	  a	  completely	   different	   matter’,	   he	   stated.	   After	   finding	   his	   way	   with	   much	   difficulty	  through	   the	   court	   complex	   to	   meet	   his	   lawyer,	   the	   latter	   guided	   him	   through	   the	  building’s	   maze	   of	   courtrooms	   and	   offices.	   Finally,	   he	   settled	   down	   in	   the	   right	  courtroom	  and	  waited	   for	  his	   case	   to	  be	   reviewed	  by	   the	  appeals	   judge.	   Inside,	   there	  were	   several	   policemen	   (Umana’	   Shurta),	   who	   were,	   at	   least	   in	   theory,	   tasked	   with	  maintaining	  order	   in	   the	   courtroom.	  Ahmed’s	   case	  was	  number	  80	  out	   of	   120	  on	   the	  day’s	   roll	   call.	   As	   the	   judge	   started	   reviewing	   the	   cases,	   Ahmed	   could	   hardly	   believe	  what	  he	  was	  witnessing:	  During	   the	   session,	   the	   room’s	   door	   kept	   constantly	   opening	   and	   closing,	  people	  coming	  in	  or	  going	  out	  and	  there	  was	  much	  disturbance	  and	  noise.	  They	  started	  calling	  out	   for	   the	  cases.	   I	  would	  have	   thought	   that	   case	   reviews	   take	  some	  reasonable	  amount	  of	  time.	  But	  my	  turn	  came	  in	   just	  one	  hour.	  […]	  The	  review	  of	  each	  individual	  case	  takes	  almost	  less	  than	  one	  minute	  by	  the	  judge	  if	  we	  exclude	  those	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  parties	  were	  absent.	  A	  case	  which	  would	  have	   a	   ‘prolonged’	   review,	   would	   take	   a	  maximum	   of	   one	   and	   a	   half	   or	   two	  minutes.	  While	  mine	  could	  be	  said	  to	  have	  been	  a	  trivial	  case,	  there	  were	  other	  serious	  ones	  like	  thefts	  or	  prostitution.	  And	  these	  are	  cases	  he	  sees	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  	  The	   judge’s	   speedy	   and	   hastily	   conducted	   review	   of	   the	   legal	   cases	   brought	  forward	  to	  him	  instantly	  discredited	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘due	  process’	  in	  Ahmed’s	  view.	  ‘There	  was	  hardly	   a	   process	   at	   all,	   to	   be	  honest’,	   he	   remembered.	  When	  his	   case	  was	  up	   for	  review,	  and	  as	  he	  was	  stepping	  forward	  towards	  the	  judge’s	  bench,	  the	  policeman	  who	  was	   announcing	   the	   cases	   degradingly	   pulled	   Ahmed	   by	   his	   shirt	   to	   position	   him	  correctly	  facing	  the	  judge.	  There	  were	  also	  two	  additional	  judges	  on	  the	  bench,	  neither	  of	  whom	  took	  part	  in	  any	  noticeable	  way	  in	  the	  entire	  procedure.	  After	  the	  lawyer	  made	  his	   arguments	   for	   Ahmed’s	   innocence	   of	   the	   hit	   and	   run	   accusation,	   the	   case	   was	  reserved	   for	   ruling	   later	   that	  afternoon.	  That	  meant	   that	  Ahmed	  had	   to	   remain	   in	   the	  courtroom	   and	   wait	   for	   the	   ruling	   to	   be	   announced	   by	   one	   of	   the	   policemen	  approximately	  four	  hours	  later.	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During	  those	  hours,	  the	  policemen	  in	  the	  courtroom	  demanded	  several	  bribes	  so	  they	  would	  let	  me	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  room.	  I	  also	  saw	  women	  whose	  affiliates	  were	   in	   the	  detention	  cage	  bribing	   the	  policemen	  and	  passing	  small	   things	   to	  them	   inside	   the	   cage.	   It	   couldn’t	   have	  been	   food;	   it	  must	   have	  been	  drugs	   or	  sharp	  items	  or	  things	  like	  that.	  	  Four	   hours	   later,	   when	   the	   policeman	   charged	   with	   announcing	   the	   rulings	   to	   those	  waiting	  in	  the	  courtroom	  arrived,	  Ahmed	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  one	  last	  attempt	  to	  extract	  money	  out	  of	  him.	  The	  policeman	  refused	  to	  hand	  out	  the	  written	  verdicts	  unless	  they	  tipped	  him	  generously.	  When	  Ahmed	  finally	  had	  the	  document	  in	  his	  hand,	  he	  learned	  that	   the	   judge	   had	   ruled	   to	   override	   the	   earlier	   sentence,	   yet	   still	   found	   him	   guilty	  enough	  to	  order	  him	  to	  pay	  a	  200	  L.E.	  fine.	  ‘The	  verdict	  made	  little	  sense,	  but	  of	  course	  how	  could	  it.	  There	  was	  absolutely	  no	  objective	  way	  to	  anticipate	  what	  the	  judge	  would	  have	  ruled.	  The	  whole	  process	  is	  bizarre.’	  Ahmed	  El	  Husseiny’s	  case	  is	  certainly	  not	  a	  generalisable	  description	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  judicial	  system,	  nor	  should	  it	  be	  considered	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  totality	  of	  its	  workings.	  Indeed,	   many	   cases	   on	   various	   levels	   take	   longer	   and	   are	   thoroughly	   reviewed.	  However,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  case	  offers	  an	  example	  of	  various	  processes	  by	  which	  subjectivities	   arise	   from	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   experiences	   of	   the	   state	   in	   its	   assumed	  function	   as	   an	   agent	   of	   conflict	   resolution	   in	   the	   public	   sphere.	   Once	   again,	   such	  accumulated	  experiences	  construct	  an	  image	  of	  the	  state	  that	  confirms	  widely	  circulated	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  preconceptions	  of	  the	  corruption	  and	  inefficiency	  of	  the	  state.	  	  
5.	  Working	  for	  the	  State:	  The	  State	  as	  a	  Producer	  of	  ‘Value’	  In	   chapter	   two	   of	   this	   study,	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   mutually	   formative	  relationship	   between	   the	   state	   and	   the	   upper	   echelons	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   middle	   class	  touched	  upon	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  this	  relationship:	  The	  role	  of	  this	  social	  group	  as	  a	  base	   for	   the	   state-­‐building	   project	   itself	   and	   for	   cementing	   the	   social	   alliances	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underpinning	   successive	   political	   orders.	   As	   such,	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   has	  accumulatively	   developed	   a	   deeply	   entrenched,	   self-­‐perceived	   image	   as	   Egyptian	  society’s	  modern	  avant-­‐garde.	  In	  practice,	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  has	  traditionally	  been	  keen	  to	  sustain	  and	  reproduce	  this	   image,	  creating	  a	  rich	  pool	   for	  successive	  regimes’	  attempts	  to	  recruit	  highly	  qualified	  cadres	  for	  the	  assumption	  of	  leading	  positions	  in	  the	  state	  bureaucracy.	  Since	  1952,	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  technocrats	  in	  various	  fields	  became	  high-­‐ranked	   managers,	   cabinet	   ministers,	   governors,	   and	   leaders	   of	   state-­‐owned	  economic	   entities.	   Even	   as	   the	   appeal	   of	   public	   service	   has	   retreated	   in	   favour	   of	   an	  emerging	  preference	  for	  corporate	  and	  private-­‐sector	  employment	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  era,	  this	   self-­‐perceived	   image	  of	   the	  upper	  middle	   class	   is	   renewed	  as	   the	   cutting	   edge	   in	  society’s	   race	   to	   join	   modernity	   and	   globalised	   socio-­‐economic	   and	   socio-­‐cultural	  progress	  trends.	  As	  briefly	  explained	  in	  chapter	  four,	  some	  branches	  of	  the	  state	  are	  still	  common	  destinations	   for	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   entrants	   into	   the	   employment	   market	   in	   the	  neoliberal	   era.	   Some	   of	   these	   derive	   their	   standing	   as	   accepted	   routes	   for	   the	  reproduction	   of	   social	   status	   and	   the	   preservation	   of	   distinction	   from	   their	   position	  within	   the	   relative	   institutional	   arrangement	  of	  power	  and	   influence	  within	   the	   state.	  Examples	  of	  this	  category	  include	  judicial	  positions	  in	  al-­‐niyaba	  or	  working	  in	  branches	  of	  the	  security	  establishment,	  such	  as	  some	  departments	  of	  the	  ministry	  of	  the	  interior	  or	   the	  mukhabarat	   (the	   intelligence	   service).	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   other	  positions	  have	  arguably	   preserved	   their	   social	   character	   as	   suitable	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   occupations	  mainly	   as	   a	   result	   of	   their	   attachment	   to	   the	   production	   of	   intellectual	   and	   cultural	  value.	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The	   case	  of	  Ahmed	  Reda,54	  a	   30-­‐year-­‐old	  dentist	   and	   lecturer	   at	   the	  Faculty	   of	  Dentistry	   in	   the	   Cairo	   University,	   will	   demonstrate	   how	  working	   for	   the	   state	   is	   yet	  another	  experience	  by	  which	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	   judges	  the	  nature	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	   latter.	   The	   criteria	   by	   which	   the	   ailing,	   overstretched	   and	   manipulated	   state	   is	  appraised	   are	   informed	   by	   broadly	   defined,	   yet	   clearly	   expressed,	   conceptions	   of	  efficiency	  and	  good	  governance.	  These,	  as	  this	  chapter	  has	  stressed,	  are	  integral	  inputs	  to	   the	   socio-­‐cultural	   constitution	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   identity	   in	   the	   age	   of	  globalisation.	  Reda’s	   family,	  of	  mixed	  Turko-­‐Egyptian	  origins,	  was	  one	  of	   the	  big	   landowning	  families	   in	   the	   Gharbiyya	   governorate	   in	   the	   Nile	   Delta.	   In	   the	   mid-­‐1960s,	   his	  grandmother	   moved	   to	   Cairo	   with	   her	   children	   to	   be	   close	   to	   her	   parents	   after	   his	  grandfather’s	   death.	   His	   father	  was	   only	   12	   years	   old	   at	   the	   time.	   Encouraged	   by	   his	  uncle,	  a	  renowned	  physician	  who	  later	  became	  president	  of	  Cairo	  University,	  his	  father	  joined	  the	  university’s	  Faculty	  of	  Dentistry	  in	  the	  early	  1970s.	  He	  excelled,	  and	  assumed	  an	  academic	  position	  that	  saw	  him	  ascend	  to	  the	  position	  of	  the	  faculty’s	  deputy	  dean	  several	   years	   ago,	   a	   position	   he	   then	   left	   to	   run	   the	   school	   of	   dentistry	   of	   the	  Future	  
University,	  a	  private	  higher	  education	  institution	  based	  in	  the	  Sixth	  of	  October	  City.	  	  After	  graduating	   from	  the	  Manor	  House	  School,	  Reda	  was	  driven	  by	  his	   fascination	  with	   the	  manual	   skills	   his	   father’s	   profession	   entailed	   to	   join	   this	   course	   of	   study,	   to	   excel	  academically	   and,	   eventually,	   to	   become	   part	   of	   the	   school’s	   staff.	   In	   addition	   to	   his	  university	  work,	  Reda	  was	   in	   the	  process	  of	  gradually	   taking	  over	  his	   father’s	  private	  dental	   clinic,	   the	   family’s	   primary	   source	   of	   income,	   as	   his	   father	   was	   considerably	  decreasing	  his	  workload	  in	  preparation	  for	  final	  retirement	  (except	  from	  teaching).	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Information and quotes included as part of this section are based on an interview with Ahmed Reda, Dokki, 
Cairo, 8 March 2010. 
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So	   far,	   working	   for	   a	   state-­‐run	   educational	   institution	   has	   been	   an	   altogether	  troubling	   experience	   for	   Reda.	   Although	   the	   private	   clinic	   is	   his	   primary	   source	   of	  income,	  he	   initially	  saw	  his	  university	  role	  as	  well	  suited	   to	   fulfilling	  his	  research	  and	  dentistry-­‐skill	  development	  interests:	  In	  Al-­‐Kasr	  Al-­‐‘ainy	  hospitals55	  you	  have	  an	  enormous	  flow	  of	  patients.	  I	  saw	  my	  university	  position	  not	  as	  a	  job	  but	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  practice	  as	  much	  as	  I	  want	  and	  to	  learn	  about	  specialities	  [that]	  I	  was	  interested	  in.	  	  Theoretically,	   this	   was	   the	   perfect	   setting	   for	   Reda,	   who	   saw	   himself	   as	   a	  talented	   researcher	   and	   a	   practitioner	   of	   great	   potential,	   with	   an	   appetite	   for	   the	  exploration	  of	  new	  applications	  and	  the	   implementation	  of	  cutting-­‐edge	   techniques	   in	  his	  field.	  His	  practical	  experience	  as	  a	  faculty	  member,	  however,	  has	  so	  far	  brought	  him	  nowhere	   near	   the	   realisation	   of	   this	   ambition.	   Disappointment	   caused	   by	   the	   stark	  contrast	   between	   objective	   possibilities	   for	   the	   production	   of	   valuable	   research	   and	  actual	  output	  has	  been	  greater	  than	  he	  had	  anticipated.	  I	  knew	  of	  course	  that	  there	  was	  corruption	  and	  that	  not	  everything	  was	  perfect,	  but	   I	   never	   imagined	   that	   there	   would	   be	   such	   indifference	   and	   waste,	  especially	  with	  the	  vast	  research	  potential	  which	   is	  naturally	  created	  because	  we	  get	  hundreds	  of	  patients	  daily.	  If	  there	  [were]	  a	  will	  we	  could	  be	  producing	  the	  best	  clinical	  research	  papers	  in	  the	  world.	  But	  it	  is	  all	  wasted.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Reda	   clearly	   attributes	   this	   discrepancy	   between	   the	   potential	   production	   of	  value,	   in	   this	   case	   scientific	   research,	   and	   actual	   results	   to	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	  university	   as	   a	   state-­‐run	   institution.	   In	   his	   view,	   employment	   within	   an	   institutional	  structure	  plagued	  by	  the	  persisting	  deficiencies	  of	  state	  employment	  was	  to	  blame.	  The	  deficiency	  that	  has	  been	  troubling	  Reda	  most	  is	  the	  absence	  of	  clearly	  identifiable	  merit-­‐based	  criteria	   for	  career	  advancement	  and	  the	  assumption	  of	   leading	  positions	  within	  the	   faculty.	   As	   older	   generations	   of	   powerful	   staff	   control	   influential	   positions	  within	  the	  school	  and	  circulate	  them	  according	  to	  carefully	  calculated	  and	  crafted	  networks	  of	  patronage,	  little	  (if	  any)	  weight	  is	  placed	  on	  academic	  excellence.	  The	  incentive	  to	  excel	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Cairo University’s educational-hospital complex, in which treatment is generally free of charge. 
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academically	   gives	   way	   to	   a	   forcefully	   imposed	   pre-­‐occupation	   with	   career	  advancement	  through	  the	  integration	  into	  these	  networks.	  Old	   generation	   university	   staff,	   who	   consider	   their	   academic	   positions	   as	  important	  marketing	  points	  for	  their	  private	  clinics,	  do	  their	  utmost	  to	  prevent	  the	   ascendance	   of	   any	   younger	   staff	   members	   to	   these	   positions,	   so	   as	   to	  prevent	  the	  emergence	  of	  competition.	  	  According	  to	  Reda,	  such	  mechanisms	  of	  closure,	  which	  result	  in	  the	  waste	  of	  the	  university’s	   valuable	   research	  potential,	   are	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   the	  mechanical	   rules	   of	  seniority-­‐based	  promotion	  that	  generally	  characterises	  Egyptian	  state	  employment.	   In	  the	  earlier	  stage	  of	  university	  careers,	  supervisory	  committees	  charged	  with	  examining	  Master's	  and	  PhD	  research	  are	  manned	  and	  tightly	  controlled	  by	   these	  power	  centres	  within	  the	  university	  establishment.	  Later,	  once	  a	  staff	  member	  has	  received	  his	  or	  her	  PhD,	  promotion	  progresses	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  formal	  fulfilment	  of	  certain	  academic	  criteria	  (to	  which	  hardly	  anyone	  is	  truly	  held).	  The	  admission	  of	  papers	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  promotion	   by	   research	   appraisal	   committees	   is	   hardly	   the	   result	   of	   the	   value	   of	  research	   they	   reflect.	   In	   most	   cases,	   as	   Ahmed	   reiterated,	   these	   papers	   feature	  fabricated	  results	  of	  clinical	   research	   that	  never	   took	  place.	  What	   is	  actually	  valued	   is	  the	   degree	   to	   which	   the	   progressing	   staff	   member	   is	   incorporated	   into	   networks	   of	  intercollegiate	  patronage,	  which	  are	  often	  woven	  together	  by	  exchanged	  interests	  and	  favours	  extending	  beyond	  university	  boundaries	  to	  the	  private	  dental	  clinics	  market.	  The	   dynamics	   of	   manipulation	   are	   not	   only	   limited	   to	   controlling	   the	  advancement	  trajectories	  of	  postgraduate	  academic	  staff.	  Even	  processes	  of	  evaluation	  and	   examination	   for	   dentistry	   students	   act	   as	   tightly	   controlled,	   entry-­‐level	   filtering	  tools,	   rather	   than	   an	   objective	   evaluation	   system	   for	   academic	   achievement.	   Since	  appointment	   to	   university	   positions	   is	   determined	   on	   the	   final	   ranking	   of	  undergraduate	   students,	   exam	   papers	   are	   routinely	   leaked	   by	   instructors	   to	   sons,	  daughters	  or	  relatives	  of	  other	  influential	  university	  staff	  members	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	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score	   higher	   than	   other	   students,	   securing	   future	   positions	  within	   the	   faculty.	   Result	  fixing	  and	  preferential	  treatment	  for	  certain	  students	  in	  oral	  examinations	  are	  more	  of	  an	  established	  norm	  than	  they	  are	  an	  occasionally	  occurring	  corrupt	  malpractice.	  	  	  	  For	  Ahmed	  Reda,	  much	  of	  his	  disappointment	  derives	   from	  his	   realisation	  and	  first-­‐hand	   experience	   of	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   mechanisms	   of	   manipulation	   are	  entrenched	  within	  what	  he	  described	  as	  a	  rigid,	  unresponsive	  and	  out-­‐dated	  system	  of	  progression	   governing	   the	   university	   structure.	   Equally,	   he	   attributed	   many	   of	   the	  malfunctions	   in	   this	   important	   institution	   of	   knowledge	   production	   to	   economic	  reasons	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  appropriate	  financial	  allocations	  by	  the	  state	  to	  the	  education	  and	  scientific	  research	  sectors.	   ‘The	  mother	  of	  all	  problems	  is	  economic’,	  he	  stressed.	  The	  meagre	  pay	  for	  university	  staff	  drives	  them	  to	  devote	  most	  of	  their	  time	  and	  energy	  to	  securing	  the	  success	  of	  their	  private	  clinics	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  quality	  of	   their	   teaching	   and	   research	   roles.	   The	   potential	   lost	   as	   a	   result	   of	   administering	  universities	   as	   state-­‐run	   bureaucracies	   has	   greatly	   harmed	   their	   supposed	   role	   as	  institutions	   charged	   with	   advancing	   the	   causes	   of	   scientific	   research	   and	   knowledge	  production	  in	  society.	  Interestingly,	  Reda’s	  proposed	  remedy	  of	  the	  system’s	  problems	  is	  inspired	  by	  a	  broadly	   constituted	   picture	   of	   how	   similar	   sectors	   are	   regulated	   barra	   (abroad).	  Without	   focusing	  on	   specific	   countries	  or	   examples,	   the	   term	  barra	   is	  deployed	  as	   an	  important	   discursive	   reference	   to	   broadly	   defined	   processes	   and	   frameworks	   for	  regulating	  the	  social	  field,	  adhered	  to	  in	  an	  often	  idealistically	  constructed	  advanced	  or	  developed	   world,	   believed	   to	   exist	   beyond	   the	   immediate	   frustrations	   of	   Egyptian	  reality.	   In	   this	   instance,	   Reda	   referred	   to	   education	   systems	   in	   Western	   countries,	  where	   universities	   are	   rationally	   administered	   according	   to	   practices	   of	   good	  governance,	   and	  where	   the	   ‘value	  of	   science	  was	   respected’.	  Notably,	  one	  of	   the	  main	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manifestations	   he	   listed	   of	   such	   respect	   was	   fair	   compensation	   for	   academics	   who	  devote	   their	   careers	   to	   scientific	   research.	   Fair	   payment	   schemes	   for	   academics,	   in	  Reda’s	  view	  should	  at	  least	  match	  peers	  in	  his	  direct	  social	  circle	  who	  chose	  careers	  in	  the	  private	  corporate	  sector	  or	  in	  multinational	  companies.	  Once	   again,	   Ahmed	   Reda’s	   conclusion,	   drawn	   from	   his	   experience	   as	   a	   faculty	  member	  of	  a	  state-­‐run	  university	  leaves	  little	  to	  be	  added	  as	  to	  the	  discursive	  inference	  it	  prompts	  regarding	  the	  overall	  state	  of	  the	  country:	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day	  we	  are	  a	  governmental	  agency,	  a	  state	  agency.	  What	  you	  see	   in	   the	   university	   is	   the	   same	   everywhere,	   money	   shortage,	   wasta,	  corruption	  and	  waste.	  We	  are	  a	  small	  picture	  of	  the	  whole	  state.	  	  	  
6.	  Conclusion	  This	   chapter	   has	   placed	   much	   of	   its	   focus	   on	   the	   particularities	   of	   the	   social	  experience	   of	   the	   state.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   meaningful	   and	   inclusive	   processes	   and	  institutions	   of	   formal	   political	   participation	   in	   Egypt’s	   authoritarian	   context,	   political	  agency	  is	  arguably	  informed	  by	  the	  collectively	  accumulated	  subjective	  construction	  of	  the	  state.	  These	  subjectivities	  are	  generated	  and	  produced	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  multitude	  of	  diverse	   interactions	   with	   the	   state	   in	   the	   social	   field.	   Some	   of	   these	   experiences	   are	  structured	  and	  prolonged	  (such	  as	  yearlong	  obligatory	  military	  service,	  or	  employment	  in	  some	  branches	  of	  the	  state).	  Others	  are	  more	  frequently	  occurring	  and	  less	  intensive	  encounters	   of	   the	   various	   manifestations	   of	   state	   presence	   and	   power	   in	   the	   public	  space.	  In	   order	   to	   comprehend	   the	   processes	   by	   which	   the	   normative	   foundations	   of	  political	   agency	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   upper	   middle	   class	   are	   shaped,	   there	   is	   a	   strong	  imperative	   to	   delve	   into	   linking	   ‘tales	   of	   the	   state’	   to	   the	  highly	   subjective	  process	   of	  inferring	   political	   attitudes	   and	   judgements,	   as	   well	   as	   stimulants	   and	   incentives	   for	  political	  action.	  In	  the	  post-­‐2011	  Egyptian	  and	  Arab	  contexts,	  this	  becomes	  essential	  to	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understanding	   the	   future	   patterns	   of	   politicisation	   and	   forms	   of	   political	   action	   and	  mobilisation.	   The	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   narratives	   presented	   in	   this	   chapter	   were	  acquired	   before	   the	   upheavals	   of	   the	   ‘Arab	   Spring’.	   The	   2011	   uprisings	   in	   the	   Arab	  World	   indeed	   came	   as	   a	   strong	   validation	   of	   the	   need	   for	   sufficient	   attention	   to	   the	  political	   agency	   inferred	   from	   constant	   and	   recurrent	   experiences	   of	   the	   state	   in	   the	  social	  field.	  In	  the	  Egyptian	  case,	  for	  example,	  Salwa	  Ismail	  has	  argued	  that:	  The	   collectivity	   that	   mobilised	   in	   the	   revolution	   is	   made	   up	   of	   individuals	  whose	   shared	   experiences	   of	   interaction	  with	   government	   shaped	   their	   self-­‐forming	  and	  self-­‐positioning.	  An	  important	  dynamic	  here	  is	  the	  interplay	  of	  the	  individual	   self	   and	   the	   collective.	   This	   dynamic	   could	   be	   understood	   as	   a	  process	   through	   which	   intersubjective	   understandings	   of	   individual	  experiences	   become	   constitutive	   of	   a	   social	   imaginary	   and	   translate	   into	  shared	  sentiments	  and	  agreed	  ideas	  and	  aspirations.56	  	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class,	  as	  the	  cases	  presented	  in	  the	  chapter	  have	  demonstrated,	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  state	  is	  an	  essential	  component	  of	  this	  process	  of	   constituting	   self	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   dominant	   apparatus	   of	   power	  monopolising	   political	  authority	   in	  society.	  As	  previous	  chapters	  have	  emphasised,	   the	  traditional	  role	  of	   the	  state	   in	   social	   areas	   where	   status	   is	   reproduced	   and	   distinction	   practiced	   has	   been	  eroding	  since	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  liberalisation	  model	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s.	  Cumulatively,	  this	  state	  retrenchment	  has	  eroded	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  that	  generated	  the	  political	   consent	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	   class	   to	   successive	  political	   orders	  and	  regimes.	  Nevertheless,	   this	  did	  not	  mean	   the	  altogether	  disappearance	  of	   the	  state’s	   role	   in	  the	  social	  environment	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  class.	  Despite	  the	  obvious	  reconfiguration	  of	  its	  role	  and	  function,	  the	  state	  is	  still	  very	  much	  a	  daily	  occurrence	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians.	   However,	   the	   newly	   configured	  mode	   of	   interaction	  with	   the	  state	   is	   based	   on	   a	   set	   of	   criteria	   that	   are	   informed	   by	   a	   clearly	   neoliberal	   ethos,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Salwa Ismail, "Civilities, Subjectivities and Collective Action: Preliminary Reflections in Light of the 
Egyptian Revolution," Third World Quarterly 32, no. 5 (2011): 990. 
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formulated	   within	   various	   processes	   related	   to	   status	   reproduction.	   Current	  generations	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   are	   developing	   ever-­‐more-­‐critical	  appraisals	  of	  the	  state’s	  performance,	  institutional	  arrangements	  and	  exercise	  of	  power.	  These	  appraisals	  are	  primarily	  based	  on	  criteria	  acquired	  through	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  socio-­‐cultural	  trajectories	  in	  which	  the	  neoliberal	  rationale	  reigns	  supreme.	  The	  future	  patterns	  of	  politicisation	  and	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  class’	  role	  as	  a	  political	  constituency	  will	  be	  very	  much	  determined	  by	  the	  inclination,	  readiness	  and	  capacity	  of	  any	  emerging	  political	  order	  or	   composition	  of	  political	  power	   in	  Egypt	   to	   fulfil	   these	  conceptions	  of	  modern	  citizenry.	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   Conclusion	  and	  Findings	  
1.	  Unexpected	  Upheaval	  On	  the	  evening	  of	  4	  February	  2011,	  Egypt	  stood	  on	  a	  knife’s	  edge.	  A	  week	  earlier,	  millions	   of	   people	   had	   poured	   into	   the	   streets	   of	   Cairo	   and	   other	   major	   cities	   to	  denounce	   the	  Mubarak	   regime.	   As	   the	   army	  was	   deployed	   to	   the	   streets	   to	  maintain	  order	   and	   a	   curfew	  was	   imposed,	   thousands	  of	   revolutionary	   youths	   set	   up	   a	  protest	  camp	  in	  the	  capital’s	  landmark	  Tahrir	  Square.	  Many	  tens	  of	  thousands	  would	  join	  them	  in	  daily	  rallies	  demanding	  the	  immediate	  departure	  of	  Mubarak.	  That	  evening,	  as	  many	  Egyptians	   stayed	   glued	   to	   their	   televisions	   during	   curfew	   hours,	   the	   nationalist	   poet	  Abdulrahman	   Al-­‐Abnudi	   phoned	   in	   to	   one	   of	   the	   popular	   programs	   covering	   the	   on-­‐going	   protests	   and	   the	   latest	   political	   developments.	   He	   read	   out	   a	   poem	   titled	   ‘al-­‐
midan’	   (The	   Square),	   inspired	   by	   the	   on-­‐going	   revolution.1	  	   The	   first	   phrases	   of	   the	  poem	  were	  loaded	  with	  symbolism	  pertaining	  to	  the	  scope	  and	  causes	  of	  the	  upheaval	  shaking	  the	  Arab	  World’s	  biggest	  country:	  
Ayadi	  misriyya	  samra,	  liha	  fil	  tamyyiz	  (Brown	  Egyptian	  arms,	  which	  know	  how	  to	  differentiate,)	  
mamduda	  wist	  al-­‐za’ir,	  bitkassar	  al-­‐barawiz.	  (stretched	  amidst	  the	  roar	  to	  break	  the	  frames.)	  
Sutu‘	  li	  sawt	  al-­‐gumu‘,	  shuf	  misr	  taht	  al-­‐shams.	  (The	  rise	  of	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  masses:	  look	  at	  Egypt	  under	  the	  sun.)	  
An	  al-­‐awan	  tirhaly	  ya	  dawlit	  al	  ‘awagiz!	  (It	  is	  time	  for	  you	  to	  leave,	  oh	  state	  of	  the	  elderly!)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Abdulrahman Al-Abnudi’s original phone call on the Al-Hayah private television channel can be found here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DTa8WIQWSRM, accessed 1 December 2013. 
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Al-­‐Abnudi’s	   articulation	   of	   the	   scene	   in	   Cairo’s	   Tahrir	   Square	   is	   but	   a	   poet’s	  unique	  depiction	  of	  a	  rift	  between	  wide	  segments	  of	  Egyptian	  society	  and	  the	  state.	  In	  the	   2011	   revolution,	   this	   rift	   widened	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   prompted	   unprecedented	  constituencies	  to	  make	  a	  forceful	  debut	  onto	  the	  political	  stage	  and	  take	  direct	  political	  action	   against	   the	   Mubarak	   regime.	   The	   Egyptian	   upper	   middle	   class,	   and	   its	   young	  generation	   in	   particular,	   was	   most	   visible	   in	   planning	   and	   organising	   the	   uprising,	  effectively	  leading	  the	  movement	  that	  was	  later	  joined	  by	  wider	  social	  sectors	  and	  other	  opposition	   forces.	   During	   the	   two	  weeks	   of	   protests	   in	  Tahrir	   Square,	   culminating	   in	  Mubarak’s	   stepping	   down	   on	   11	   February,	   the	   globalised,	   modern	   youth	   of	   Egypt’s	  affluent	  and	  upper	  middle	  classes	  became	   the	  defining	  visual	  element	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  revolution.	  	  This	  wide	   participation	   and	   pivotal	   role	   played	   by	   the	   Egyptian	   upper	  middle	  class	   in	   forcing	   Mubarak	   from	   office	   contradicted	   a	   dominant	   view	   in	   scholarly	  literature	  about	  the	  future	  political	  prospects	  of	  Arab	  regimes.	  Regarding	  Egypt,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  Arab	  states,	  some	  scholars	  contributing	  to	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  prospects	  for	  democratisation	   in	   this	   part	   of	   the	  world	   in	   the	   early	   1990s,	   initially	   argued	   that	   the	  adoption	   of	   IMF-­‐	   and	  World-­‐Bank-­‐prescribed	   neoliberal	   economic	   reform	   agendas	   of	  the	  early	  1990s	  would	  create	  and	  empower	  wide	  segments	  of	   the	  middle	  class.	  These	  segments,	   in	  turn,	  would	  represent	  a	  growing	  constituency	  for	  bottom-­‐top	  democratic	  transformation.	   Some	   two	   decades	   later,	   however,	   authoritarianism	   in	   Egypt	   (as	   in	  Syria,	  Tunisia	  and	  other	  Arab	  countries)	  seemed	  to	  be	  more	  entrenched	  and	  stable	  than	  ever.	   Moreover,	   the	   first	   decade	   of	   the	   new	   millennium	   had	   also	   witnessed	   the	  advancement	  of	  several	  presidential	  succession	  plans	  by	  ruling	  elites,	  primarily	  aimed	  at	  renewing	  the	  lifespan	  of	  these	  regimes	  and	  preserving	  their	  essentially	  authoritarian	  doctrines.	   A	   new	   academic	   agenda	   emerged	   out	   of	   the	   urge	   for	   explaining	   the	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persistence	  of	  Arab	  authoritarianism.	  The	  overlapping	  interests	  between	  benefiting	  and	  aspiring	  segments	  of	  middle	  classes	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  intertwined	  networks	  of	  crony	  capitalists	  and	  ruling	  establishments	  in	  the	  Arab	  World’s	  neoliberal	  economies,	  it	  was	  argued,	  were	   forging	  a	  new	  social	   alliance,	   effectively	   renewing	   the	   legitimacy	  of	  authoritarian	  arrangements.	  Once	  again,	   the	  main	   contestations	  of	   a	   considerable	  body	  of	   scholarship	  were	  frustrated	  by	  developments	   on	   the	  Arab	   street.	  Why	  did	  wide	   segments	   of	   the	   upper	  middle	   class	   participate	   in	   the	   revolution?	  Why	   did	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   youth	  widely	  participate	  in	  a	  wave	  of	  opposition	  that	  eventually	  brought	  down	  a	  regime	  following	  a	  socio-­‐political	   agenda	   of	   which	   their	   wider	   social	   class	   was	   one	   of	   the	   prime	  beneficiaries?	  This	  study	  aims	  to	  contribute	  to	  a	  substantiated	  answer	  to	  this	  question.	  The	   evidence	   gathered	   during	   this	   research	   shortly	   before	   the	   breakout	   of	   the	   2011	  revolution	   provided	   important	   clues	   to	   the	   identification	   of	   several	   changing	  characteristics	   of	   the	   processes	   by	   which	   the	   normative	   foundations	   of	   the	   political	  agency	  of	  Egypt’s	  upper	  middle	  class	  were	  being	  shaped	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  country’s	  nearly	  two-­‐decades-­‐old	  neoliberal	  transformation.	  	  Initially,	  this	  study	  set	  out	  to	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  state’s	  reconfiguration	  of	  its	   traditional	  role	   in	  harbouring	  trajectories	   for	  the	  preservation	  and	  reproduction	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   social	   status	   and	   distinction.	   Evidence	   gathered	   during	   fieldwork	  between	  the	  autumns	  of	  2008	  and	  2010	  strongly	  indicated	  that	  there	  was	  a	  good	  basis	  for	   revising	   the	   main	   propositions	   of	   the	   scholarly	   belief	   in	   the	   persistence	   of	  authoritarianism	  in	  Egypt.	  Narratives	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptian	  men	  and	  women	  regarding	  their	  struggles	  to	  preserve	  social	  status	  and	  reproduce	  distinction	  suggested	  there	   was	   a	   need	   to	   revisit	   the	   assumption	   that	   neoliberalism	   was	   enhancing	   the	  suppressive	  capacities	  of	  the	  state	  and	  its	  ruling	  regime.	  Furthermore,	  the	  subjectivities	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accumulated	  from	  recounted	  experiences	  of	  the	  many	  manifestations	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  social	  space	  indicated	  brewing	  levels	  of	  political	  discontent	  buried	  beneath	  thick	  layers	  of	  apathy	  towards	  the	  farcical	  political	  processes	  of	  Mubarak’s	  Egypt.	  As	  Gregory	  Gause	  retrospectively	   acknowledged,	   the	   important	   analytical	   task	   of	   explaining	   the	  persistence	   of	   Arab	   authoritarianism	   has	   led	   to	   the	   underestimation	   of	   ‘the	   forces	   of	  change	  that	  were	  bubbling	  from	  below,	  and	  at	  times	  above,	  the	  surface	  of	  Arab	  politics’.2	  Throughout	  this	  study,	  the	  main	  argument	  has	  been	  that	  the	  changing	  dynamics	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  social	  status	  preservation	  and	  reproduction,	  since	  the	   inception	  of	  liberalisation	  policies	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  but	  especially	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  has	  substantially	  contributed	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  new	  modes	  for	  the	  socio-­‐political	  critique	  of	  the	   state	   and	   its	   political	   order.	   As	   part	   of	   a	   neoliberal	   project	   aimed	   primarily	   at	  upgrading	   its	   authoritarian	   capacities,	   the	   state	   deliberately	   handed	   over	   vital	   social	  processes	  surrounding	  the	  reproduction	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  privilege	  and	  distinction	  to	   the	  mechanisms	  of	   the	   neoliberal	   free	  market.	   The	   accumulative	   result	   has	   been	   a	  gradual	  erosion	  of	  the	  legitimacy-­‐generating	  social	  contract	  that	  has	  secured	  traditional	  middle	   class	   consent	   to	   essentially	   non-­‐democratic	   forms	   of	   rule	   since	   1952.	  Furthermore,	  this	  newly	  reconfigured	  and	  retreating	  state	  role	  decisively	  disentangled	  the	   traditional	   structural	   intertwinement	   of	   the	   upper	  middle	   class	   and	   the	   Egyptian	  state.	  The	  normative	  foundations	  of	  the	  political	  agency	  of	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  has	   thus	  been	   shaped	  by	   social	   experiences	   surrounding	   their	  negotiation	  of	  status	  preservation	  and	  reproduction	  in	  the	  market,	  rather	  than	  with	  the	  state.	  The	  neoliberal	  ethos	  underpinning	  such	  a	  process	  has	  been	  a	  primary	  input	  into	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  modes	  of	  socio-­‐political	  critique	  by	  which	  the	  state,	  its	  performance,	  and	  the	  political	  order	  at	  large	  are	  appraised.	  Class-­‐typical	  encounters	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Gause	  III,	  "Why	  Middle	  East	  Studies	  Missed	  the	  Arab	  Spring:	  The	  Myth	  of	  Authoritarian	  Stability,"	  90. 
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social	  space	  provide	  both	  an	  informal	  and	  a	  structured	  context	  for	  the	  sharpening	  and	  intensification	  of	  such	  critiques	  –	  and,	  hence,	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  broadly	  defined	  desire	  for	  political	  change.	  	  
2.	  The	  New	  Dynamics	  Informing	  Political	  Agency	  	  To	  substantiate	  the	  above	  argument,	  the	  thesis	  was	  divided	  into	  six	  chapters.	  
2.1	  Concepts	  and	  Methodology	  Chapter	   one	   provided	   the	   study’s	   conceptual	   and	   methodological	   framework.	  Conceptually,	   the	   study	   deploys	   the	   two	   concepts	   of	   class	   and	   the	   state	   based	   on	   a	  critical	  appraisal	  of	  the	  relevant	  theoretical	  trends	  surrounding	  them	  in	  the	  discipline.	  The	  Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class,	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  this	  study,	  is	  analysed	  according	  to	  Pierre	  Bourdieu’s	  conception	  of	  class	  as	  a	  group	  of	  social	  agents	  possessing	  components	  of	   social	   capital	   that	   place	   them	   in	   proximate	   positions	  within	   a	  multi-­‐dimensionally	  constructed	  social	  field.3	  Joel	  Migdal’s	  ‘state	  in	  society’	  model	  is	  used	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  understanding	  the	  double	  character	  of	  the	  state	  and	  examining	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  both	  historically	  and	  during	  the	  neoliberal	  era.	  The	  model	  advocates	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  state	  as	  both	  an	  institutional	  arrangement	  and	  as	  the	  construed	  image	   produced	   by	   the	   discourses	   resulting	   from	   real-­‐life	   individual	   and	   collective	  experiences	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  social	  field.4	  Methodologically,	  the	  research	  was	  carried	  out	  based	  on	  a	  balanced	  approach	  between	  structural	  analysis	  and	  qualitative	  in-­‐depth	  examination	  of	  individual	  class-­‐typical	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  narratives.	  This	  combination	  was	  analytically	  rewarding,	  in	  that	  it	  points	  to	  the	  particulars	  of	  the	  real-­‐life	  processes	  by	   which	   normative	   foundations	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   political	   agency	   have	   been	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Bourdieu, "The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups," 724. 
4 Migdal, State in Society : Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another, 15-16. 
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shaped	   through	   the	   constant	   interplay	   between	   variable	   structural	   factors	   and	   the	  social	  agency	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians.	  
2.2	  Reproducing,	  Preserving	  and	  Displaying	  Distinction	  Chapters	   three	   through	   five	   were	   dedicated	   to	   the	   examination	   of	   the	   social	  processes	  surrounding	  the	  central	  theme	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  social	  struggle:	  namely,	  the	   preservation	   and	   reproduction	   of	   status,	   distinction	   and	   privilege.	   The	   chapters	  tackle	   three	  different,	   significant	  social	   fields	   in	  which	   these	   formative	  processes	   take	  place:	  education,	  employment	  and	   lifestyle	  practices.	   In	  all	   three	  areas,	   the	  respective	  chapters	  combine	  a	  structural	  analysis	  of	  the	  changing	  role	  of	  the	  state	  with	  narratives	  of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   dynamics	   by	   which	   status	  preservation	  and	  reproduction	  are	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  market.	  Education	  and	  employment	  have	  been	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  between	  the	  middle	  class	  and	  the	  state	  since	  1952.	  With	  the	  expansion	  and	  relative	  quality	  of	  public	  education	  and	  the	  commitment	  of	  guaranteed	  state	  careers	  for	  university	  graduates	  in	  the	  context	  of	  state-­‐led	  development	  under	  Nasser,	  the	  state	  practically	  became	  a	  vessel	  for	  upward	  social	  mobility	  and	  the	  acquisition	  of	  distinction	  for	  the	  middle	  class.	  	  	  
2.2.1	  Education	  In	   education,	   the	   past	   two	   decades	   have	   seen	   a	   continuous	   decline	   in	   the	  standing	   of	   state	   education	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   infitah	   policies	   of	   the	  mid-­‐1970s.	   The	  increasing	  retrenchment	  and	  loose-­‐handed	  policies	  of	  the	  state	  have	  gradually	  led	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  market	  practices	  in	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  education	  system.	  For	  example,	  in	  recent	  years,	   private	   tutoring	   has	   grown	   into	   a	   de	   facto	   informal	   industry	   dominating	   this	  important	  field	  of	  middle-­‐class	  social	  mobility.	  Over	  the	  past	  decade,	  a	  private	  education	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market	  has	  been	  emerging	  and	  expanding,	  providing	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  families	  with	  a	  wider	   choice	   of	   educational	   venues.	   International	   and	   semi-­‐international	   schools	  market	  themselves	  to	  potential	  customers	  as	  providing	  trajectories	   for	  the	  acquisition	  of	   socio-­‐cultural	   credentials	   of	  modernity,	   distinction	   and	   privilege.	   They	   represent	   a	  fundamental	   shift	   from	   the	   traditional	   role	   of	   the	   school	   as	   a	   social	   space	   for	   the	   re-­‐production	  of	  specific	  conceptions	  of	  national	  identity,	  to	  a	  more	  market-­‐based	  service	  that	   provides	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   tools	   for	   securing	   distinction.	   The	   lack	   of	  accountability	   and	   the	   loosely	   regulated	   frameworks	   for	   the	   operation	   of	   these	  upmarket-­‐segment	   schools	   in	   today’s	   Egypt	   forces	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   into	  unfair	  and	  unleveraged	  contractual	   relationships	  with	   the	  schools’	  administrations.	   In	  the	   vital	   undertaking	   of	   securing	   a	   solid	   foundation	   for	   the	   future	   struggle	   for	   status	  preservation,	   Egypt’s	   upper	   middle	   class	   finds	   itself	   in	   constant	   negotiation	   with	   a	  clearly	   unfavourable	   neoliberal	   private	   market	   mechanism	   amidst	   a	   perceived	  conspicuous	  neglect	  by	  the	  state.	  
2.2.2	  Employment	  	   State	  employment	  has	  traditionally	  been	  one	  of	   the	  most	  visible	  characteristics	  of	   Egypt’s	   middle	   class.	   The	   expansion	   of	   the	   state	   apparatus	   as	   part	   of	   the	   statist	  development	  model	   under	   Nasser	   created	   an	   overall	   discourse	   of	   the	   glorification	   of	  state-­‐employed	   technocrats	   as	   society’s	   avant-­‐garde.	   Furthermore,	   ascendance	   in	   the	  state	   structure	   was	   established	   throughout	   the	   1960s	   as	   an	   important	   trajectory	   for	  upward	  social	  mobility	  into	  the	  higher	  echelons	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  and	  possibly	  into	  the	  elite	  circles	  of	  successive	  regimes.	  The	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  were	   therefore	   the	  period	   in	  which	  Egypt’s	   state	  bourgeoisie	  became	   the	   solid	  backbone	  of	   the	  Egyptian	   state	   and	  the	  source	  of	  support	  for	  the	  essentially	  authoritarian	  political	  order.	  After	  the	  October	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war	  of	  1973,	   Sadat’s	  political	   calculations	   led	   to	  a	   loosening	  of	   the	   state’s	   grip	  on	   the	  economy	  and	  opening	  the	  door	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  long-­‐suppressed	  private	  sector.	  His	   reign	   saw	   the	   twilight	   of	   the	   state	   bourgeoisie’s	   prominence,	   as	   scores	   of	  bureaucrats	  sought	  their	  fortunes	  outside	  the	  state	  sector	  –	  whether	  by	  immigrating	  in	  search	  of	  petro-­‐dollar	  fortunes	  in	  the	  Gulf	  or	  by	  forging	  intertwining	  interests	  with	  the	  emerging,	  parasitic	  private	  sector.	  As	  Egypt	  was	  ushered	  into	  the	  neoliberal	  era	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  a	  new	  breed	  of	  companies	   emerged	   as	   the	   privatisation	   of	   the	   public	   sector	  went	   underway	   and	   the	  Egyptian	   economy	   became	   increasingly	   integrated	   into	   the	   global	   capitalist	   system.	  Multinational	   companies	   entering	   the	   Egyptian	  market,	   as	  well	   as	   local	   corporations’	  restructured	  management	  systems	  and	  their	  mergers	  with	  flowing	  foreign	  investment,	  provided	   suitable	   destinations	   for	   the	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   generation	   for	   whom	   state	  employment	   no	   longer	   served	   the	   purpose	   of	   securing	   distinction	   and	   prestige,	   or	  providing	  suitable	   incomes	  for	  maintaining	  desired	  lifestyle	  patterns.	  Discursively,	   the	  traditional	   glorification	   of	   state	   employment	   gradually	   gave	   way	   to	   the	   rise	   of	   a	  desirable	  image	  of	  the	  modern	  professional	  private	  sector	  executive	  as	  the	  new	  ideal	  for	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptian	   entrants	   into	   the	   labour	  market	   towards	   the	   turn	   of	   the	  century.	   Such	   a	   trend	   was	   actively	   state-­‐sponsored	   –	   not	   only	   through	   structural	  changes	   inflicted	   by	   neoliberal	   economic	   policies,	   but	   also,	   and	   equally,	   by	   the	   active	  encouragement	  of	  prominent	  figures	  in	  the	  Mubarak	  regime.	  In	   recent	   years,	   a	   neoliberal	   economic	   ‘employment	   domain’	   has	   become	   the	  primary	  social	  trajectory	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  economic	  status	  and	  social	  prestige	  in	  the	   labour	   market.	   Careers	   in	   this	   domain	   require	   cosmopolitan	   credentials	   and	  educational	   qualifications	   hardly	   available	   to	   social	   strata	   still	   dependent	   on	   state	  education.	  The	  processes	  controlling	  access	  to	  and	  ascendance	  and	  advancement	  within	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this	   domain,	   which	   is	   defined	   primarily	   by	   its	   socio-­‐cultural	   composition,	   effectively	  ensure	   this	  domain’s	   character	   as	   a	   social	   arena	   for	   the	   acquisition,	   preservation	  and	  reproduction	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   distinction.	   Upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   access	   to,	   and	  careers	  within	  this	  distinctive	  employment	  domain,	  are	  profoundly	  formative	  processes	  that	   inform	   the	   normative	   foundations	   of	   political	   agency	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   era.	  Meanwhile,	   the	   ethics	   and	   modus	   operandi	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   employment	   domain	  inform	   socio-­‐political	   critiques	   of	   the	   state.	   Appraisals	   of	   the	   state	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	  work	  principles	  and	  values	  such	  as	  efficiency,	  ‘goal-­‐driven	  performance’,	  etc.,	  typical	  of	  the	  western	  capitalist	  corporate	  culture,	  contribute	  to	  inferences	  of	  the	  incapacity	  and	  unworthiness	  of	  the	  state	  and,	  in	  turn,	  its	  political	  order.	  
2.2.3	  Lifestyles	  and	  the	  Display	  of	  Distinction	  Many	  socio-­‐cultural	  changes	  in	  the	  self-­‐conception	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Egyptians	  as	   a	  modern	   citizenry	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   informing	   an	   appetite	   for	   political	  change.	   The	   arena	   of	   lifestyle	   practices	   provides	   an	   important	   context	   for	   the	  fundamental	   change	   of	   the	   normative	   foundation	   of	   political	   agency	   of	   the	   Egyptian	  upper	  middle	  class	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades.	  In	  the	  neoliberal	  era,	  the	  traditional	  self-­‐perceived	   status	   of	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   as	   the	   cutting	   edge	   of	   Egyptian	   society’s	  ventures	  in	  modernity	  and	  progress	  has	  been	  engulfed	  in	  a	  growing	  integration	  with	  the	  trends,	   manifestations	   and	   material	   displays	   of	   the	   culture	   of	   globalisation.	   Lifestyle	  practices	   that	   portray	   and	   translate	   a	   self-­‐perceived	   image	   of	   the	  modern	   individual	  have	   emerged	   in	   recent	   years	   as	   continuous	   contexts	   for	   the	   reproduction	   of	   social	  identity.	  The	  exercise	  and	  display	  of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  distinction	  has	  thus	  been	  tied	  more	   and	  more	   to	   the	   constant	   physical	  movement	   between	   class-­‐cohesive	   spaces	   in	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the	   Cairene	   urban	   setting,	   where	   consumption	   patterns,	   material	   displays	   and	  socialisation	  trends	  identifiable	  with	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  status	  can	  be	  carried	  out.	  	  	  In	   recent	   years,	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   aspirations	   for	   the	   material	   reflection	   of	  normatively	   accumulated	   perceptions	   of	   modern	   city	   living	   have	   evolved	   in	   stark	  contrast	   to	   the	   deteriorating	   conditions	   of	   Cairo	   as	   an	   urban	   space.	   The	   growing	  governance	   incapacities	   of	   the	   state	   in	   traditional	  middle-­‐class	   quarters	   have	   caused	  these	   areas	   to	   deteriorate	   into	   chaotic,	   dirty	   and	   polluted	   urban	   spaces	   contested	   by	  various	  other	  social	   strata.	  The	  upper	  middle	  class	  has	  cumulatively	  perceived	  such	  a	  retreat	  of	   the	   state	  as	   the	   latter’s	   clear	  unwillingness	   to	   condition	   the	  public	   space	   in	  conformity	   with	   normatively	   formulated	   conceptions	   of	   modern	   urbane	  cosmopolitanism.	   Since	   the	   early	   1990s,	   these	   conceptions	   have	   become	   ever	   more	  attuned	   to	   cultural	   imports,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   an	   intensifying	   exposure	   of	   Egypt’s	   upper	  middle	  class	  to	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  and	  material	  trends	  generated	  by	  globalisation.	  In	  this	  context,	  chapter	  five	  examines	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  private	  real	  estate	  market	  comprised	   primarily	   of	   gated	   residential	   compounds	   and	   privately	   developed	  properties	   in	   Cairo’s	   desert	   urban	   extensions.	   Over	   the	   past	   years,	   the	   relocation	   to	  properties	  in	  the	  gated	  compounds	  has	  evolved	  as	  a	  class-­‐typical	  strategy	  for	  escaping	  the	  material	  urban	  deterioration	  of	  old,	  middle-­‐class	  Cairo.	  A	  fundamental	  shift	  in	  state	  urban-­‐planning	  schemes	  provided	  the	  main	  structural	  environment	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	   a	   neoliberal	   real	   estate	   industry	   as	   part	   of	   the	   Mubarak	   regime’s	   interwoven	  networks	  of	  crony	  capitalism	  and	  corruption.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  the	  myth-­‐building	  power	  of	  the	  emerging	  real	  estate	  industry’s	  marketing	  machines	  has	  played	  an	  enormous	  role	  in	   embedding	   the	   emerging	   luxury	   gated-­‐compounds	  market	   within	   a	   discourse	   of	   a	  ‘promised	  land’,	  where	  the	  material	  reflection	  of	  desired	  lifestyles	  is	  depicted	  as	  being	  a	  mere	   property	   purchase	   away.	   As	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   faced	   the	   mixed	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realities	  of	  life	  in	  the	  desert	  extensions	  of	  Cairo,	  discontent	  towards	  the	  state	  found	  new	  causes	  for	  growth.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  state	  had	  practically	  outsourced	  the	  function	  of	  conditioning	  the	  urban	  space	  to	  a	  market-­‐based,	  customer-­‐client	  relationship	  between	  property	   owners	   and	   the	   private	   management	   of	   their	   class-­‐cohesive	   urban	   spaces	  scattered	  around	  Cairo.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  relocation	  to	  the	  urban	  extension	  did	  little	  to	  spare	   the	   upper	   middle	   class	   the	   many	   inconveniences	   of	   the	   old	   neighbourhoods.	  Strong	   social	   and	   economic	   ties	   bind	   residents	   of	   the	   urban	   extensions	   to	   traditional	  middle-­‐class	  neighbourhoods	  and	   the	   city	  at	   large.	  Long	  commutes	   to	  and	   from	  Cairo	  have	  become	  daily	  contexts	  for	  the	  intensification	  of	  discontent	  with	  the	  state’s	  failure	  to	   provide	   adequate	   infrastructure	   and	   services	   to	   integrate	   the	   promised	   urban	  escapes	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   upper	   middle	   class	   with	   its	   –	   thus	   far	   -­‐	   still	   irreplaceable	  Cairene	  socio-­‐economic	  base.	  	  
2.3	  The	  Upper	  Middle	  Class,	  the	  State	  and	  Future	  Politics	  	  Throughout	   the	   chapters	   examining	   the	   social	   processes	   surrounding	   the	  preservation	  and	  reproduction	  of	  distinction,	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  the	  state’s	  role	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  context	  served	  as	  an	  important	  thread	  of	  inquiry.	  This	  thread	  was	  more	  dominant	  at	  both	  ends	  of	  the	  thesis.	  Chapter	   two	   focuses	  on	  the	  structural	  bond	  between	  the	  Egyptian	  middle	  class	  and	   the	   state	   from	   a	   historical	   perspective.	   Tracing	   this	   mutually	   constitutive	  relationship	  from	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century	  onwards,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  highlighting	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  as	  the	  traditional	  social	  backbone	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  state.	  The	  very	   formation,	  as	  well	   as	   the	  evolution,	  of	   the	  social	   composition	  of	   the	  middle	  class	  has	  been	  closely	  tied	  to	  structural	  changes	  inflicted	  by	  successive	  regimes	  through	  the	  state,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  building	  a	  social	  base	  for	  modernisation	  and	  political	  consent.	  Over	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two	  centuries,	   the	  patterns	  of	  evolution	  of	  agricultural	   land	  wealth	   in	   the	  countryside	  and	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   state	   apparatus	   have	   provided	   the	   two	   main	   structural	  evolution	   tracks	   for	   the	  Egyptian	  middle	   class.	   Since	  1952,	   the	   structural	   relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  middle	  class	  has	  been	  articulated	  into	  a	  set	  of	  socio-­‐political	  arrangements,	  which	  in	  their	  totality	  amounted	  to	  a	  social	  contract,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  state	  would	  harbour	  middle	  class	  social	  mobility	  and	  status	  reproduction	  in	  return	  for	  political	  docility.	  The	  chapter’s	  structural	  review	  of	  the	  subsequent	  cycles	  of	  middle	  class	  formation	  passes	  through	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  liberalisation	  shift	  under	  Sadat’s	  
infitah	  policy.	  It	  concludes	  by	  examining	  the	  context	  for	  the	  state’s	  adoption	  of	  a	  more	  rigorous	  neoliberal	  agenda	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  under	  Mubarak,	  and	  the	  splitting	  effect	  on	  the	  cohesion	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  into	  upper	  and	  lower	  echelons	  thereof.	  The	  chapter	  is	  an	   important	   contextualisation	   for	   the	   following	   three	   chapters,	   which	   examine	   the	  processes	   of	   social	   status	   reproduction	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   era	   in	   the	   aforementioned	  areas.	  	  Chapter	  six	  concludes	  the	  thesis,	  examining	  the	  mechanisms	  surrounding	  what	  is	  referred	   to	  as	   the	   ‘social	  experience	  of	   the	  state’.	  The	   link	  between	   the	  erosion	  of	   the	  state’s	   legitimacy	   as	   a	   result	   of	   its	   retreat	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   market	   in	   the	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   social	   environment	   can	   only	   be	   established	   if	   the	   subjectivities	  accumulated	  in	  the	  social	  experiences	  of	  the	  state	  are	  factored	  into	  the	  analysis.	  Modes	  of	  socio-­‐political	  critique	  developed	  and	  sharpened	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  social	  environment	  have	  informed	  an	  accumulative	  appraisal	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  political	  composition.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  political	  processes	  that	  could	  have	  reflected	  such	  growing	  discontent	  under	  Mubarak,	   the	   changing	   political	   attitudes	   of	   upper-­‐middle-­‐class	   Egyptians	   remained	  largely	   undetected	   underneath	   thick	   layers	   of	   apathy	   towards	   formal	   politics	   or	  conventional	  forms	  of	  opposition	  and	  mobilisation.	  The	  diverse	  and	  in-­‐depth	  narratives	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of	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  encounters	  with	  the	  state	  presented	  in	  the	  chapter	  prove	  that	  the	  these	  experiences	  provided	  a	  social	  medium	  in	  which	  the	  neoliberal	  ethos	  has	  informed	  an	  ever-­‐growing	  critical	  evaluation	  of	   the	  state.	  The	  social	  experience	  of	   the	  state	   is	  a	  process	   that	   combines	   structured	   and	   frequent	   everyday	   encounters	   with	   the	   many	  manifestations	  and	  displays	  of	  state	  presence	  in	  the	  social	  space.	  It	  is	  thus	  a	  key	  area	  of	  inquiry	   that	   could	   facilitate	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   political	   agency	   of	   largely	  apolitical	   constituencies,	   ones	   that	   nonetheless	   will	   arguably	   play	   a	   decisive	   role	   in	  determining	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  future	  arrangement	  of	  political	  power	  in	  Egypt.	  The	   micro-­‐processes	   by	   which	   everyday	   encounters	   with	   the	   state	   have	  informed	  the	  inference	  of	  political	  attitudes	  should	  be	  a	  compelling	  invitation	  for	  future	  research	  into	  the	  patterns	  of	  political	  engagement	  and	  agency	  in	  the	  upper	  middle	  class,	  beyond	   the	   traditional	   straitjacket	   measurements	   of	   participation	   in	   conventional	  political	  bodies	  or	   forms	  of	  mobilisation.	  Equally	   importantly,	   the	  neoliberal	  modes	  of	  socio-­‐political	  critiques	  of	  both	  state	  and	  politics	  entrenched	  in	  Egypt	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  could	  arguably	  urge	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  academic	  sensitivity	  towards	  ordinary	  people’s	   relative	   indifference	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   political	   rule.	   Instead	   of	   examining	   the	  degrees	   to	   which	   certain	   political	   arrangements	   of	   rule	   conform	   to	   parameters	   of	  democracy	  or	  authoritarianism,	   further	   research	   is	  needed	   into	   the	   real	   stimulants	  of	  political	  mobilisation	   in	   the	  Arab	  World	  and	   in	  Egypt.	  This	   thesis	  has	   tried	   to	   identify	  the	   effect	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   transformation	   on	   changes	   in	   the	   mode	   with	   which	   an	  important	  social	  segment	  of	  Egyptian	  society	  has	  developed	  new	  normative	  foundations	  for	  political	  agency	  and	  accumulated	  political	  discontent	   towards	   the	  state,	   leading	   to	  the	  uprising	  of	  2011.	   In	   the	   future,	  an	  appreciation	  of	   the	  pace,	  patterns	  and	   forms	  of	  politics	   of	   Egypt’s	   upper	   middle	   class	   will	   arguably	   have	   to	   rest	   on	   the	   two	   threads	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explored	   in	   this	   study:	   namely,	   the	   neoliberal	   social	   experience	   and	   the	   relationship	  with	  the	  state.	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